This chapter has focused on the idea that judging the value of efforts intended in the public interest is contextual – approaches appropriate for decisions about re-ducing traffic congestion may not suffice, and may be dysfunctional, for decisions about improving social welfare policies.
Aligning Valuing Methods with Complexity of Contexts
The juxtaposition of a fairly rational-technical domain of a fairly simple aspect of transportation policy, installing a left-turn signal for reducing traffic congestion (there are, of course, much more complex issues in transportation policy, as in whether to tear down a community to clear space for a new highway), and the domain of welfare policy, with its more controversial emotional, cultural, political tensions may seem extreme. However, it highlights the implications of the added complexity of the welfare domain. As a first-level analysis of aligning valuing methods with contexts, the need for balancing multiple approaches to valuation seems stronger for welfare policy than for the more straightforward situation of deciding whether to install a left-turn signal:
1. Prescriptive and Descriptive Sources of Values. While both transporta-tion and welfare policies can be valued using prescriptive values, the ex-ample provided by McClintock and Lowe calls attention to the need for a more descriptive approach, for assessing the perspectives of welfare recip-ients, and for complementing the elite perspectives of experts with the lo-cal voices of many.
2. Sources of Evidence. While both sets of policies can be valuated by ob-serving conditions (degree of traffic congestion or degree of poverty), it may be more important to supplement observation with self-report for welfare recipients – how do they view their life conditions? Similarly, the recent interest in contrasting individual versus collective valuing may be more relevant for the more ambiguous domain of welfare policy where people’s value are often based on limited experience and so could be al-tered more by hearing of the experiences of others.
3. Aggregation. While the algorithmic aggregation of benefit-cost analysis is commonly used for both transportation and welfare policy, the lack of consensus around valuing is more pronounced in welfare policy, making simple aggregation more problematic.
Aligning Valuing Paradigms with Contexts
The three suggestions above for aligning methods with contexts are useful and could be extended for other distinctions in methods of valuing. However, in addi-tion to making lists of distincaddi-tions to be considered in our efforts to understand what constitutes “better” or an “improvement” in the public sector, it would be helpful if we could frame the issues in terms of a small set of alternative perspec-tives of the task of valuation. One way to distinguish perspecperspec-tives of valuing is to make use of the paradigms that have been identified in other areas of social sci-ences.
Distinguishing Major Paradigms. House and Howe (1999) provide this service by delineating four paradigms for valuing. Their preferred “deliberative democra-cy” model draws from several paradigms, but three of the valuing paradigms that they describe are familiar to all social scientists (quotations from pp 104–105):
1) “Post-Positivist (Value minimalist) (e.g., Shadish, Cook, & Leviton):
Facts can be determined nonfoundationally but value claims must be tied to values of stakeholders in value summaries, ‘X is good if you value Y.’
Evaluator role: construct value summaries, accept stakeholder values.
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View of democracy: emotivist or preferential.” [i.e., values as preferences to be reported]
2) “Radical constructivist (e.g., Guba & Lincoln): ‘Reality’ must be negotiat-ed among stakeholders. Evaluator role: Mnegotiat-ediate constructions of reality among participants. View of democracy: hyper-egalitarian (i.e., all views count the same in reaching consensus).”
3) “Postmodernist (e.g., Stronach & MacLure): Society must be liberated by disruptive acts. Evaluator role: deconstruct conventional notions and dis-rupt power relationships. View of democracy: hyper-pluralist (consensus not desirable, prolifereate diversity indefinitely).”
Two-Dimensional Framework for Valuing. To make use of these identified paradigms for strategic valuation, it would help if we could position them in rela-tionship to each other so as to highlight implications for practice (Julnes 2012b).
For this, it is useful to consider Deetz’s (1996) reframing of the Burrell and Mor-gan metatheory. Each of Deetz’s paradigms addresses a different problem and so accepts a different approach to “knowing” as appropriate for addressing the rele-vant problem. Presented in Figure 1, his metatheory makes use of two dimensions that we found useful in differentiating the contexts of reducing traffic congestion and of improving welfare policies. First, one distinction is between approaches based on the judgments of elite experts (e.g., traffic engineers) versus those that focus on giving local voice to a broader range of stakeholders. Second, we can distinguish contexts in which there is a fair consensus on the appropriate policy goals (e.g., reduction of traffic congestion) with those in which there is little hope of real consensus, where, for example, the opposing interests of stakeholders con-fronting welfare reform yield the opposite of consensus or, Deetz’s word, “dis-sensus.”
Source of Values
Local Voice Elite Judgment
Aggregation
Figure 1. Paradigms Aligning Valuing Methods with Primary Problems (Adapted from Deetz, 1996; published previously in Julnes 2012b) Claiming the validity of each of the four paradigms does not require that each is equally important in particular settings or should be used equally often in funded evaluation. Rather, the metatheory reminds us that multiple social problems have historically been recognized and addressed as specified. For example, in situa-tions in which there truly is a broad consensus that efficiency should be the pri-mary consideration in judging whether a program or policy serves the public in-terest, then, as shown in Figure 1, economic analyses carried out by trained perts are ideal. If, however, consensus seems desirable and appropriate but ex-perts have no uniquely privileged perspectives of what is “good” for the commu-nity, as in deciding what kind of public park should be developed on public land, then the constructivist paradigm may be more appropriate, particularly with a variety of group forums to help support collective valuing.
On the other hand, when stakeholder values are fundamentally opposed, then ap-peals to “consensus” may be less appropriate and, indeed, may be more a form of attempted social control. One way to deal with such fundamental dissensus is through the political process. In the U.S., the Republicans and Democrats are op-posed on many issues and decisions are often made less from consensus than
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from raw political power – it is understood within this political view that the party with the most power will attempt to dominate and the weaker party will try to resist. And yet, there are times when the “masses” object to what they see as an organized elite imposing their values. The postmodern paradigm legitimizes such concerns, positing that elite groups will always try to suppress the masses and advocating for empowerment through the valued expression of diverse views (Fetterman 2001). The implication is that there are contexts in which the other paradigms for valuation are not uniquely appropriate, that elite values and the call for consensus can be dysfunction.
Needless to say, efforts to empower the masses, whether in the Tea Party in the U.S., the Occupy Wall Street movement that spread across the world, or the Arab Spring awakening, are rarely popular with public administrators and policymak-ers, and so the postmodern critique is rarely welcomed or employed. And this may be just as well; perhaps the majority of contexts call for consensus-based valuing and for allowing elite perspectives greater voice. Perhaps. However, it may also be that only with a framework of paradigms, or metatheory, that helps us recognize how paradigms can be aligned with contexts will we be able to see examples of misalignment. If so, such a framework can be a useful tool that liber-ates us, in at least marginal ways, from the limitations of single perspectives, helping us to be more strategic in employing valuation methods appropriate to their contexts when judging the value of public initiatives. And this, in turn, can prepare us better to truly serve the public interest.
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