Broadly construed, liberal multicultural theories can be divided into autonomy-based, toleration-based and equality-based approaches to cultural diversity. The autonomy-based approaches emphasize individual autonomy as one of the key values of liberalism, and also argue for the need of the liberal state to protect and/or promote individual autonomy through state policies and public institutions.
Autonomy-based arguments have been used in support of both collectively as well as individually exercised differentiated rights, but they have also been used to indicate certain limitations to these rights: the right of a cultural or religious group to conduct its internal affairs, for example, cannot be used to suppress individual autonomy, but is conditional upon a framework within which individuals are both free as well as capable of leading autonomous lives, including being free and capable of rejecting the rules and norms imposed on them by their own cultural or religious groups.
The toleration-based approaches tend to reject the centrality of individual autonomy within liberalism and the role of the liberal state in protecting and/or promoting individual autonomy. The toleration-based approaches highlight the freedom of individuals to associate (and to disassociate) in whatever ways they wish, including ways that suppress individual autonomy, and argue for a requirement of the different cultural or religious groups to tolerate – that is, to not interfere with – the affairs of another. The toleration-based arguments can be used both in support of as well as against a variety of differentiated rights, although most prominently, the toleration-based approaches have been associated with the rigid rejection of both the liberal state’s role in promoting individual autonomy as well as its role in accommodating minority cultural groups with the help of differentiated rights.
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The equality-based approaches, unsurprisingly, start from the presupposition that the liberal state should treat all of its members with equal concern and respect. The equal treatment of different people may, however, sometimes mean differentiated treatment, and the equality based arguments have been used to argue for a need to grant cultural groups and their members differentiated rights on the basis of considerations of equality. The equality-based arguments may, however, also be used in opposition to differentiated rights, for example in cases where a differentiated right is seen to disadvantage certain members of groups (for example, when a group’s right to govern its internal affairs is used to discriminate against some of its own members), or in cases where the differentiated right would undermine the rationale for a universal rule (for example, in cases where an exemption is sought from rules that, for good reasons, are upheld for everyone).
Clearly, the autonomy-based, toleration-based and equality-based arguments can be used to different effects and, as will become clear later on, the distinctions between these three approaches are far from clear cut. On the contrary, most theorists of multiculturalism utilize autonomy, toleration and equality arguments conjointly, and one’s emphasis on one type of argument rather than another may well depend on the specific issue at hand.
The autonomy-, toleration- and equality-based approaches do, however, provide slightly different grounds upon which to begin assessing the difficult issues of liberal multiculturalism, including the rationale for the liberal state to take cultural considerations into account (A), the compatibility of differentiated rights with liberalism (B), and the state policies of cultural accommodation (C).
In this part, I look at the so-called grand theories of multiculturalism (broadly labelled under the autonomy, toleration and equality –approaches)84 and assess the ways in which these
84 The so-called grand theories include those of Will Kymlicka (Ch. 1 &
2), Chandran Kukathas (Ch. 2) and Brian Barry (Ch. 3). I call these theories “grand theories”, as each of the authors aim at building fairly comprehensive accounts of how to justify (or not justify) culturally
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grand theories are capable (or incapable) of answering the questions of rationale (A), compatibility (B) and state policies (C). In the course of doing so, I build a strong case, based on the basic liberal commitments to individual freedom, autonomy and equality, for the liberal state to be concerned about people’s cultural disadvantages and to aim at rectifying these disadvantages, possibly – albeit not necessarily – with the help of different kinds of minority rights.
The kinds of cultural disadvantages, faced by minority groups and their members are of various kinds, and one of the purposes of this part is to shed some light on the kinds of cultural disadvantages that can be conceived of as proper concerns of the liberal state. This part also assesses the scope of the arguments put forth both in defence, as well as in opposition to, differentiated rights, showing how the arguments for rationale (A) have often been conflated with the arguments for state policies (C). For the benefit of the second part of this work (Part II: Liberal multiculturalism and minority rights in practice) this part identifies some of the internal inconsistencies in the works of the so-called grand theorists, that are partially due to their overt emphasis on a particular liberal value (be it autonomy, freedom of association or equality), partially due to the conflating of the three questions of rationale (A), compatibility (B) and state policies (C). Whereas I argue (sometimes contrary to the theorists themselves) that the grand theories of liberal multiculturalism do provide strong cases for the liberal state to be concerned about and to try to rectify people’s cultural disadvantages, I also show that they remain relatively silent about those specific policies that the liberal state should adopt, leaving considerable scope in the legitimate variation of the ways in which
differentiated rights within liberalism and how the liberal state should respond to cultural diversity. Each of these positions have also prompted extensive discussions in their own right (some of which will also be commented upon in due course). To an extent, this part can also be read as a historical overview of the debates on liberal multiculturalism, starting from the classical debates on “minority rights” (as a bulk), proceeding to the more recent, specified and critical approaches to accommodating people’s cultural differences in liberal societies.
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the liberal state can respond to cultural diversity in practice.
Contrary to providing conclusive guidance to the liberal state in issues on cultural diversity, I argue that the grand theories of multiculturalism should rather be viewed as providing frameworks within which different cases – no doubt to be assessed in context – can be discussed.
As the discussions on liberal multiculturalism cannot ignore the tremendous influence of Will Kymlicka’s ground breaking work, I, too, begin by assessing some of the benefits and weaknesses of Kymlicka’s account. In the first chapter, Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism, I focus especially on Kymlicka’s luck-egalitarian defence of minority rights before (in Ch. 2) turning to his autonomy based commitments and to the so-called diversity-liberal critique of autonomy liberalism. In chapter 3, Liberal egalitarianism and equality of opportunity, I return to the egalitarian standpoint (now specified in the context of individually exercised membership rights) to complement my argument for the different kinds of rationales that the grand theories of liberal multiculturalism provide for the liberal state to be concerned about and to try to rectify cultural disadvantages, without, however, providing conclusive guidance on the kinds of policies that the liberal state should adopt.
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