Conclusion on Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism

In this chapter, I have concentrated on Will Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism as presented mainly in Liberalism, Community and Culture, and Multicultural Citizenship.¹⁶⁴ Although Kymlicka’s work incorporates several elements (all of which could be discussed in their own right), I have tried to concentrate on his basic liberal egalitarian framework, and on his proposals (minority rights) for rectifying those inequalities that this framework comes to identify. I have argued that Kymlicka’s modified, resourcist account of equality manages to explain both the disadvantages caused by one’s lack of one’s own cultural context, as well as the disadvantages faced by those who, due to adhering to some particular cultural norms or practices, find it difficult to participate in the workings of the larger society. I did, however, point out that the rationales for the state to be concerned about and try to rectify these disadvantages were, in each case, different. A much stronger case, based on the prerequisite for choice, importance and involuntariness arguments, was made for rectifying the disadvantages caused by one’s lack of one’s own cultural context, whereas the

163 More thorough analyses of how to address these questions of cultural membership and the protection of any individual’s membership within the liberal framework needs to wait until Part II of this work.

164 The choice to concentrate on these two earlier works of Kymlicka comes from the acknowledgement of these two works as outlining Kymlicka’s theoretical commitments most explicitly. Whereas in his later work, Kymlicka deepens and, no doubt, somewhat fine tunes his analysis on different cases of cultural inequality by tying his analysis more tightly to the concrete circumstances around the globe (esp. Kymlicka 2001;

2007a), I do not think that his later work makes substantive modifications or additions into his basic theoretical framework. Rather, whereas Kymlicka’s later work certainly gains from being even more connected and sensitive to the multiplicity of cases of cultural inequality, it loses in being less connected with and rigorous about the theoretical problems incorporated in issues of cultural accommodation.

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accommodation of people’s cultural differences within the context of the majority could, in many cases, only be based on the importance argument (and, as that, on the modified importance argument that Kymlicka never explicitly subscribes to himself).

Whereas Kymlicka’s egalitarian framework does, therefore, manage to explain why the cultural inequalities faced by minority members should be proper concerns of the liberal state, his arguments for minority rights as appropriate responses to these inequalities are far from satisfying. Kymlicka argues that minority rights (both rights of self-government and accommodation rights) are not to advance any particular cultural contents, but to simply enable minority members to live in their own cultural contexts and/or express their cultural identities in ways they themselves see fit. It is, however, clear that neither of these categories of rights manage to stay entirely clear from promoting certain cultural contents by legitimizing certain cultural practices as proper elements of that culture. Although the minority rights do not, as such, create anything as strong as an obligation for the minority members to maintain any particular cultural contents, they do, nevertheless, promote certain conceptions as well as contents of culture, and may, in effect, also reinforce the preservation of certain cultural practices, and diminish the opportunities of the minority members to alter or reject these practices.

The problem of minority rights as promoting certain conceptions as well as contents of culture could, however, perhaps be accepted if the minority rights in question did, nevertheless, perform the task they were tasked to perform: that is, to protect people’s cultural memberships. However, as argued in section 2.3., Kymlicka’s treatment of minority rights as protecting cultural structures (memberships in the abstract) rather than any individual memberships (in particular), only gets us half way to fulfilling this task. The framework, given by Kymlicka, never answers the questions of who should come under any particular right (rights of self-government) or who should be eligible for the rights of cultural accommodation, and – by not doing so – also casts some doubt on the idea of minority rights as protecting people’s memberships.

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Answering these questions, however, is of utmost importance in order for minority rights to track their targets, and in Part II, I answer these questions in more detail.

To make things clear, none of the above mentioned considerations (the different kinds of rationales for the state concern, the failure of minority rights to stay clear of promoting particular contents of culture, or the inadequacy of the membership-model) are intended as providing support for an outright rejection of different kinds of minority rights within the liberal framework.

Such rejection (if, indeed, possible) would need to assess the question of minority rights from a slightly different perspective, partially taken in the next two chapters of this work. What I hope to have shown, however, is that the problems outlined in this chapter, even if not providing any conclusive case against minority rights, are very real and should not be ignored lightly. At the very least, they should direct us towards a far more cautious approach to minority rights, both at the level of their justification as well as at the level of application. Whereas the general liberal egalitarian framework of Kymlicka, as I have shown, gives good reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about and to try to rectify cultural disadvantages, this framework may not be extended as far as dictating the kinds of policies that the liberal state should adhere to.

Rather, the actual policies of cultural accommodation need to be assessed in context, taking into account both the theoretical difficulties outlined above, as well as other possible considerations that there may be for granting, or not granting, such rights in practice.

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Chapter 2