Chandran Kukathas’s account of a free society

Chandran Kukathas rejects Kymlicka’s emphasis on individual autonomy, and the state’s role in catering for autonomy, on the basis that this would prevent those groups that reject the value of autonomy from living in accordance with their conscience.

According to Kukathas, a free, liberal society is a society that allows people to live in accordance with their conscience, even if this means that some people’s autonomy, and their freedom to choose their own conceptions of the good, would be suppressed.

For Kukathas, the free society is guided by the fundamental principle of freedom of association that allows people to associate with, as well as to disassociate from, those they wish or do not wish to associate with. This freedom of association (and disassociation) is to guarantee that people can live their lives in accordance with their conscience, without being forced to accept those values (including the value of individual autonomy) they would not voluntarily be willing to accept.²⁰⁶

In order to highlight the differences in Kymlicka’s and Kukathas’s accounts, and in order to identify the scope of Kukathas’s criticism of Kymlicka, it may be helpful to begin by outlining some of the things these two thinkers have in common.

Like Kymlicka’s, Kukathas’s theory is a liberal, individualist account of a good society. It is individualist in the sense that its starting point lies in the interests and well-being of individuals.

According to Kukathas, groups or collectives have no independent value of their own, but they matter only in so far as they contribute to the well-being of individuals. This is not to say that a group’s character or its interests could always be reduced to the character or

although, as I try to argue, this theoretical framework is far from convincing.

206 Kukathas 1992a; 1997a; 2003: esp. ch. 3. Importantly, the liberty of conscience is not to be held as the fundamental value of a free society, as those wishing to reject the value of the liberty of conscience should also be free to do so, and free to associate with those they can associate with in accordance with their conscience.

136

the interests of its members, but only that the group and its interests are valuable only by virtue of their effects on individual well-being.

Nor is it therefore to say that the individual members of groups could not be (partially) constituted by their group membership – to the contrary, the view acknowledges the importance of group membership (and the possible adherence to shared norms and values) as inherent elements in the constitution of one’s identity.²⁰⁷ Kukathas’s individualist commitments, and the value that Kukathas attaches to one’s culture, thus resonate with Kymlicka’s, who also emphasizes that culture, and one’s cultural membership, should be conceived as valuable only in so far as it caters for individuals’

well-being.²⁰⁸

Like Kymlicka, Kukathas also acknowledges the diversity of moral, cultural and religious outlooks in contemporary societies.

The nation states (that are often the default units of political organization)²⁰⁹ are far from being homogenous, and the views and values of different people within the nation can vary tremendously.

Being committed to the idea that the state should stay neutral with respect to people’s conceptions of the good,²¹⁰ both Kukathas and Kymlicka argue that the liberal state should not be in the business

207 Kukathas1992a, 112; 2003, 85-93.

208 As will be noted later on, Kukathas and Kymlicka do, however, draw very different conclusions from how the instrumental value of culture should effect the kinds of policies, legitimate in a liberal state.

209 Whereas both Kymlicka and Kukathas view nation states as the common units of social organization, they disagree on the role that the nation state should play in contemporary circumstances of cultural diversity. Whereas Kymlicka can well be described as a cultural nationalist (viewing societal cultures also largely as features of nations), Kukathas questions the primacy of nation states as locus of political authority, viewing states simply as transitory political settlements that should not be concerned with cultural issues. Kukathas 2003, 15.

210 That is, the state should not base its policies in an assesment of people’s different conceptions of the good, although both Kukathas and Kymlicka also acknowledge that, by default, the state is bound to privilege certain ways of living by creating certain rules for the peaceful cohabitation of different groups.

137

of imposing any particular moral, cultural or religious outlooks on people, but allow, as far as possible, people to live the kinds of lives and to pursue the kinds of projects they themselves see worthwhile.²¹¹

Despite these preliminary commitments (to the instrumental value of culture, existence of cultural diversity and state neutrality), Kymlicka and Kukathas come to argue for very different responses to cultural diversity. What they disagree upon is, fundamentally, what it means for people to be able to live the kinds of lives they themselves see fit, and what the role of the state should be in allowing for them to do so. Whereas Kymlicka holds that, in order to live the kind of life one finds meaningful requires one to also be able to assess, and to possibly change, one’s ways of living (and one’s views of a good life), for Kukathas, it is not necessary for a person to have this ability in order to live a perfectly meaningful life. In fact, Kukathas argues that, in some cases, this ability may even be detrimental to the individual in question, making her life go worse for her, as not all individuals have an interest in being able to revise or to change their ways of living (or thinking).²¹² What is important, according to Kukathas, is not that people are free to judge, reaffirm or reject their current ways of living or thinking, but that they acquiesce (for whatever reason) to the kinds of lives they are leading, and to the kinds of values, norms or practices that they are subscribing to.²¹³

Consequently, Kukathas argues that, rather than building a framework within which people’s freedom to choose their own conceptions of the good would be protected, the liberal society should be organized in accordance with the principle of mutual toleration that allows people to live as their conscience dictates. The two building blocks of a liberal society, freedom of association and

211 Kymlicka 1989; 1995; Kukathas 2003, esp. ch. 5.

212 Kukathas 2003, 58-59. Kukathas’s view thus reflects the idea that it is impossible for a person’s life to go better for her against her own judgment. For discussion, see e.g. Dworkin, R. 1989; Dworkin, G., 2005.

213 Kukathas 2003, 101.

138

mutual toleration cater, not for individual autonomy, but for freedom of conscience – even in cases where one’s conscience rejects the value of individual autonomy and one’s freedom to choose between alternative courses of life. Further, Kukathas argues that the role of the state, in a liberal society organized in accordance with the principles of freedom of association and mutual toleration, should be very minimal, operating only as an umpire that secures the peaceful coexistence of different cultural (religious, or other) groups. The liberal state, in Kukathas’s model, holds no right to infringe upon the groups’ internal affairs, but it also holds no obligation to cater for the groups’ interests (or existence) with any system of minority rights.²¹⁴