Culture as a context of choice

In order to place the base line of equality to the point in which people are already able to live their lives within their own cultural framework, Kymlicka needs to show why having one’s own cultural framework would be something that people cannot be expected to abandon or pay the price for. Part of the support for this claim comes from Kymlicka’s treatment of cultural membership as one of the primary goods, part from his assumptions about the involuntary nature of cultural membership. These lines of support can best be examined in the light of Kymlicka’s conception of culture as a context of choice, and the elements incorporated in this conception. I identify three distinct, although interrelated, arguments within the context of choice –view that, together, form the support needed for placing the base line of equality to the point of being able to live one’s life in one’s own cultural framework.

Later on (in part 1.2.) I use these arguments to show that, although supportive of Kymlicka’s new base line, these arguments also pose certain restrictions on the ways in which the rationales for the liberal state to rectify different kinds of disadvantages can be conceived of.

The prerequisite for choice –argument

In order to show why people should not be required to abandon, or pay the price for their own cultural framework, Kymlicka looks at the role of cultural membership in the constitution of a good life.

According to Kymlicka, cultural membership can be conceived as one of the primary goods – something that all rational persons can be expected to want,⁹² and that the state should (based on

92 Kymlicka 1989, 166; 1995, 86; for Rawls’s original account of primary goods, upon which Kymlicka builds, see Rawls 1971, 62; 92.

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requirements of justice) attempt to guarantee. Drawing from a specifically liberal framework, Kymlicka emphasizes the role of individual freedom and the importance of the individual’s capabilities to view, assess and make choices about one’s life.

Contrary to the traditional liberal theories, however, Kymlicka argues that one’s freedom of choice is both enabled as well as restricted by one’s cultural framework. Culture, as a context of choice, is a prerequisite for individual freedom and autonomy as “it is only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their value.”⁹³

This view of culture as prerequisite for individual choice is essentially related to Kymlicka’s understanding of culture as a specifically societal culture.⁹⁴ By societal culture Kymlicka refers to a framework that “provides its members with meaningful ways of life across a full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.”⁹⁵ Societal culture is encompassing both in the sense of it being regulative of people’s lives in a wide area of activity, as well as in the sense of it being institutionally embedded, for example in the school, court and financial systems of society.⁹⁶ Despite its encompassive nature, however, Kymlicka argues that societal cultures do not determine the ways in which people should live their lives but, rather, provide the context within which people can make their lives meaningful.

The societal cultures thus have two important functions. Firstly, they provide options that people can, should they so wish, take

93 Kymlicka 1989, 165.

94 Esp. Kymlicka 1995, ch. 5. For different conceptions of culture used in debates on multiculturalism, including societal, normative, constructivist / semiotic, see: Festenstein 2005, 13-26.

95 Kymlicka 1995, 76.

96 Similar accounts of culture as encompassing in the sense of it being regulatory of a wide variety of human behaviour have been given for example by Margalit & Raz 1994 (emcompassive cultures) and Shachar 2001 (nomoi communities).

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advantage of. And secondly, they also provide the framework – the cultural narratives⁹⁷ – through which people can mediate and make value judgments about these options. Notably, for Kymlicka, it is only through one’s membership in a societal culture that one gains access to the options provided by culture, as well as learns to make intelligible choices among them. Thus, for Kymlicka, one’s cultural membership comes to be seen as a prerequisite for individual freedom of choice and, consequently, as one of the primary goods that the liberal state should attempt to guarantee.

Kymlicka’s argument for cultural membership as one of the primary goods does not, however, justify as yet the move for positing the base line of equality at the point in which people are already able to use their resources within their own cultural context.

All Kymlicka has been able to demonstrate so far, is that some cultural context is needed, in order for the individuals to become aware of their options and to make intelligible choices among these options. But the requirement of some cultural context for individual freedom of choice is still far from the requirement of having some particular cultural context – the requirement of having one’s own cultural context being, in fact, something of a misnomer, as culture is hardly something that people cannot not have.⁹⁸ Recognizing this, Kymlicka has to bring in a further argument for why it would be precisely one’s own (born into) cultural context that, as one of the primary goods, should be guarded by the liberal state.

The importance –argument

In order to argue for the status of one’s own (born into) cultural context as one of the primary goods guaranteed by the liberal state, Kymlicka turns to look at the identity-forming functions of cultural

97 Kymlicka 1995, 83.

98 As Kwame Anthony Appiah has aptly noted: “the problem with grand claims for the necessity of culture is that we can’t readily imagine an alternative. It’s like form: you can’t not have it.” Appiah 2005, 124. See also: Tomasi 1995, 588-589.

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membership.⁹⁹ Drawing from empirical evidence, Kymlicka argues that one’s born into culture plays an extremely important role in the development of that person’s identity. The view of oneself is, at least partially, constituted by one’s cultural membership, and one’s self-respect can be inherently tied up with this membership. Being such a constitutive element of one’s identity and self-respect, people (at least generally) also wish to maintain and protect this membership, and the cultural context to which they belong.¹⁰⁰ Further, it is not only that people would (generally) have a strong wish to maintain their cultural membership, but that the consequences of losing this membership and the cultural context that one belongs to, can be catastrophic. By linking one’s cultural membership with one’s identity and self-respect, Kymlicka argues that it is not reasonable to expect people to abandon their membership and the cultural context to which they belong to, but to preserve this context, due to the importance that that this context (that is, one’s own born into cultural context) has for the identity and self-respect of its members.¹⁰¹

What should be noted, however, is that the claims about the identity forming functions of one’s own cultural membership and the magnitude of the harm that the loss of this membership may produce are independent of the argument for the need of having one’s own cultural context due to it catering for one’s abilities to view, assess and make choices about one’s life (the prerequisite for choice –argument). Whereas one can, undoubtedly, make choices

99 Esp. Kymlicka 1989, 175-176; 192-193; 1995, 89-90; for alternative views on the role of culture and/or cultural membership for the constitution of people’s identities, see e.g. Margalit & Halbertal 1994;

Young 1990; Taylor 1989; 1994; Raz 1998; I will return to the identity-forming functions of cultural membership in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. 100 Kymlicka 1989, 175-176; see also: 1995, ch. 5, esp. 89-90.

101 Thus, for Kymlicka, “respecting people’s own cultural membership and facilitating their transition to another culture are not equally legitimate options.” Kymlicka 1989, 176.

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within an alien cultural context,¹⁰² it may not be reasonable to expect one to abandon one’s own (born into) cultural context, due to the importance of one’s cultural membership to one’s identity and self-respect. The reasons for one not to be expected to abandon one’s own (born into) cultural context thus come from the importance –argument, whereas the prerequisite for choice – argument simply establishes the role of cultural contexts for individual freedom and autonomy. ¹⁰³ As will be seen, there is

102 At times, Kymlicka does seem to lean towards the view according to which the range of options from which individuals can choose their courses of life could only be provided by the particular cultural context to which the individual happens to be born to (see e.g. Kymlicka 1989, ch 8

& 9 for Kymlicka’s discussions on the dangers of rapid changes within cultures, and of the losing of one’s own cultural context). This view, however, is rejected both by Kymlicka (1995, 84-85) as well as by the majority of other theorists on multiculturalism. In contemporary circumstances of cultural diversity, it is hardly sustainable to argue that people could not live in other cultural contexts, and make meaningful choices within these contexts. The options provided by the majority culture are surely options that are open also to the members of the minority (although, as I discuss in chapter 3, this can, in certain occasions, be debated), and the choices either to take advantage or not to take advantage of these options surely indicate the capability of the minority members to make value judgments about these options. As many have argued, it is a gross misunderstanding to think of cultures as completely isolated, holistic entities that would have nothing in common, and between which people could not negotiate. (For a cosmopolitan market-place view of cultures, see Waldron 1992; against so-called billiard-ball conception of cultures, see Tully 1995, ch. 1.) Although living in a different cultural context may, at times, be difficult for those who are not accustomed to the norms and practices of that context, it is surely too strong a claim to insist that the meaningful options among which individuals are able to make meaningful choices could be provided only by one’s own (born into) culture.

103 Rainer Forst makes a similar observation emphasizing that it is culture as a context of identity (rather than choice) that provides an argument for one’s need to live in one’s own cultural context rather than in the context of the majority. Forst 1997; for Kymlicka’s attempted response based on

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certain tension between these two arguments, the prerequisite for choice –argument somewhat constraining the kinds of cultural contexts Kymlicka views as worthy of protection, whereas the importance –argument makes no such restrictions.¹⁰⁴

The involuntariness –argument

The importance argument, connected to the other supporting strand of Kymlicka’s model – that of the assumption of the involuntariness of one’s cultural membership (the involuntariness argument) – supposedly brings forth the support needed for positing the base line of equality at the point in which people are already able to utilize their resources in their own cultural context. As cultural membership is something that (at least in most cases) is not chosen by the members themselves, and as this membership is (at least in many cases) something of a tremendous importance for the members themselves, it is not reasonable to expect people to abandon this context, nor is it fair that the resources given to the members of minority cultures would have to be used (solely or extensively) for the preservation of that context. Being more of an unchosen circumstance rather than a choice (to be responsible for), members of minority cultures should not be disadvantaged by their efforts to live within their own cultural context – something which it is not reasonable to expect them to abandon, and which they did not choose to belong to.¹⁰⁵

the interdependency of the considerations based on choice and identity, see: Kymlicka 2001, 55.

104 I will return to this tension in more detail in Ch. 2.

105 Despite obvious dissimilarities, Kymlicka’s treatment of cultural membership can be conceived as on a par with some of the factors discussed by Dworkin, such as physical or mental disabilities, the disadvantages of which people should not be required to pay for. This parallel, it should be emphasized, needs not presume that one’s cultural membership (like one’s physical or mental disability) would be a disadvantage in itself, but simply that, in a society, organized in accordance with the cultural norms of the majority (or, in accordance with the needs of the able bodied or minded), one’s membership in a minority

78 1.2. The scope of Kymlicka’s arguments

Although Kymlicka’s prerequisite for choice, importance and involuntariness arguments, taken together, would thus seem to provide the support needed for positing the base line of equality at the point in which people are, already, able to live their lives in their own cultural contexts, it is also important to keep these arguments separate, in order to establish what kinds of inequalities Kymlicka’s model is able to incorporate and what kinds of reasons there may be for the liberal state to try to alleviate these inequalities. Before turning into assessing the kinds of minority rights that Kymlicka’s model may justify, I wish to elaborate on the scope of these arguments, as the cultural disadvantages faced by minority members are of various kinds. Importantly, one needs to distinguish between the kinds of disadvantages that Kymlicka’s model is able to identify from the reasons that the liberal state may have for trying to rectify these disadvantages. Further (as discussed in the latter part of this chapter), these two aspects of Kymlicka’s account need to be separated from the kinds of minority rights that may be used to alleviate these disadvantages.

Two types of disadvantage

Following, roughly, Kymlicka’s own distinction between the inequalities faced by ‘national minorities’ and ‘ethnic groups’,¹⁰⁶ there are two major types of disadvantages that can be identified

cultural group may result in disadvantages that one should not end up paying the price for.

106 Kymlicka 1995, 10-11. Kymlicka’s typology of minority groups is, to be fair, much more complex, incorporating national minorities, indigenous peoples, immigrants and religious groups (see e.g. Kymlicka 1995; 2001) as well as some “hard cases and grey areas” (Kymlicka 1995, 24-25) that do not fit neatly into the fourfold distinction above. For critical remarks on Kymlicka’s typology, see e.g. Young, 1997; Mason 2000, ch. 3;

Carens1997; 2000, ch. 3. For the sake of clarity, I discuss only the two major types of disadvantages that correspond, roughly, to Kymlicka’s distinction between national minorities and ethnic groups.

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within Kymlicka’s modified, resourcist account of equality. On the one hand, those minority members striving to lead their lives in their own cultural contexts are disadvantaged by not having an automatic access to their own cultural context and by having to spend large amounts of their resources on maintaining this context.

As the western liberal societies are already organized in accordance with certain cultural norms (reflected, for example, in public holidays, school curriculums, and official languages), the members of the majority get their cultural context for free whereas the members of the minority do not. On the other hand, the disadvantages resulting from the need to spend extra resources, due to one’s membership in a minority culture are not only encountered by those who are striving to keep their own cultural contexts (such as those aboriginal people who wish to maintain their traditional ways of living, or those religious minorities who wish to separate themselves from the modern life), but also by those who, due to adhering to some particular cultural practices, have difficulties in taking part in the public life of society (organized in accordance with the cultural norms of the majority). Even if the members of a minority would not aim at maintaining their cultural context as a whole, it may well be that the adaptation of some of their cultural customs (such as dress codes, religious holidays, languages) to the cultural context of the majority will require a substantial amount of time and effort that is not required of the majority (whose dress codes, religious holidays, and languages coincide with the general norms and practices of the society). A minority member who is, say, not capable of speaking the official language, will (unless assisted) need to use a substantial amount of her resources in order to, say, be able to communicate in governmental offices, thus leaving her less resources for her other endeavors.

Reasons for the liberal state to be concerned about these disadvantages

At the level of explanation, Kymlicka’s modified, resourcist account of equality would thus seem to be able to account for both the disadvantages encountered by those striving to live their lives

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within their own cultural context, as well as of those who, due to adhering to some particular cultural practices, have difficulties in participating in the workings of the society. These two types of disadvantages are, however, very different with respect to the reasons that the liberal state has for being concerned about them and for trying to alleviate those disadvantages.

As already indicated, Kymlicka puts forward three distinct arguments for why the liberal state should be concerned about and try to alleviate the disadvantages caused by one’s cultural membership (the prerequisite for choice, importance and involuntariness –arguments).¹⁰⁷ However, the prerequisite for choice –argument gives no independent support for the state to be concerned about the disadvantages caused by the lack of one’s own cultural context, but merely establishes the role of cultural context for individual freedom and autonomy.The prerequisite for choice – argument is important for showing that the claims based on culture are not necessarily incompatible with the liberal values of individual freedom and autonomy, although the rationale for the state being concerned about the disadvantages caused by the lack of one’s own cultural context must come from other sources – those of the importance and involuntariness arguments. As one’s own cultural context can be conceived of as being of a potentially tremendous importance for the bearer of that culture, and as people have not normally chosen to belong to one culture or another, it may not be reasonable to expect one to abandon such a context, nor to pay the price of being able to maintain it. The importance and involuntariness –arguments, taken together, thus provide a rationale for the state to be concerned about and try to rectify those disadvantages that result from not being able to live within one’s

107 Kymlicka also discusses two further arguments, those of the argument from historical agreements and the argument from the value of cultural diversity, but acknowledges that these two arguments should only be seen as complementing the concerns based on equality. See: Kymlicka 1995, ch. 6.

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own cultural context (provided that this context is, indeed, compatible with individual freedom and autonomy).¹⁰⁸

With respect to the second kind of disadvantages (that is, the disadvantages relating to particular cultural customs or practices), it may not, however, be possible to use the same kind of rationale conjoining the importance and involuntariness –arguments. As established by the prerequisite for choice –argument, Kymlicka views cultural contexts as frameworks within which people make choices and the cultural practices (that may, no doubt, result in

With respect to the second kind of disadvantages (that is, the disadvantages relating to particular cultural customs or practices), it may not, however, be possible to use the same kind of rationale conjoining the importance and involuntariness –arguments. As established by the prerequisite for choice –argument, Kymlicka views cultural contexts as frameworks within which people make choices and the cultural practices (that may, no doubt, result in

In document Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism (sivua 88-105)