Freedom of association, exit and autonomy

Two important clarifications need to be made about Kukathas’s account of a free society governed by the principles of freedom of association and mutual toleration. Firstly, it should be noted that the scope of the principle of mutual toleration is, in Kukathas’s framework, restricted by the principle of freedom of association. As the individuals of a free society should be free to associate with whomever they can associate with in accordance with their conscience, in order to guarantee this freedom to all individuals, the associations (and members of associations) must refrain from interfering with the internal matters of other associations. The principle of mutual toleration does not, however, operate as the guiding principle between all interactions of all individuals of the free society. Rather, mutual toleration can only be seen as holding at the level of interactions between associations (and between members of different associations). Although an association (say, a religious sect) can be tolerant towards the differing views of its own members, it is not obliged to be so. It is, however, obliged to tolerate the differing views and ways of lives of others (members of other associations), and not interfere with them. The freedom of

214 I will discuss Kukathas’s views on the role of the state as well as his account of minority rights in the upcoming section 3.

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association, in Kukathas’s model, is to guarantee that people can associate with those they wish associate with in accordance with their conscience, and if one cannot associate with those of different (perhaps reprehensible) world views, one should not be obliged to do so. ²¹⁵

Secondly, although the freedom of association, conjoined with the requirement of mutual toleration, prevents outsiders (including the liberal state) from interfering with the internal affairs of cultural (or religious, or other) groups, the freedom of association is also intended to give certain (minimal) protection to the individual members of such groups. In Kukathas’s model, the groups (and their members) are perfectly free not to tolerate internal dissent and also to continue to engage in their (sometimes illiberal) practices,²¹⁶ but they are not free to force anyone to become, or to remain as, a member. The freedom of association, conjoined with the requirement of mutual toleration, gives groups substantive authority over their members, but this authority does not override any individual’s right to associate (or disassociate). On the contrary, this individuated freedom of association (and disassociation) entails

215 Kukathas 2003, ch. 3 & 4. It should also be noted that mutual toleration, in Kukathas’s view, is a very minimal form of toleration.

Kukathas 2003, 23-24. Tolerating different values and world views of different associations (or members of these associations) does not entail any forms of respect (towards the associations or towards the differing views), nor does it require that the associations (or their members) would need to value the existence of this plurality. The different associations (and members of different associations) simply need to tolerate each other in the sense of “not objecting to coexist” (ibid., 210), and thus not also interfere with the internal matters of other associations. Kukathas 2003, esp. ch. 4. For alternative, more substantive accounts on toleration, see e.g.

Galeotti 2002; see also: articles in Williams and Waldron 2008.

216 Kukathas does claim that there are some limits to the kinds of illiberal practices that should be tolerated (most notably those of “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” Kukathas 1992a, 128; see also Kukathas 1997b;

2001), although it is not entirely clear where and how to draw the line between tolerable and intolerable illiberal practices. See also: Mason 2000:

74-77; Barry 2001, 141-146.

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that, even if subject to the group’s authority, the individual members of groups have one fundamental right against their group – that is, the right of exit.²¹⁷ Individuals should be free to leave their associations, and they should also be free to form new associations with those who they wish to associate with.

In broad outline, Kukathas’s model of a free society thus builds upon four interlinking elements: that of (1) mutual toleration between (but not necessarily within) groups, (2) freedom of association (and disassociation) aimed to cater for (3) individual freedom of conscience, and (4) the right of exit derived from freedom of association (and disassociation) catering for the individual freedom of conscience. Given Kukathas’s emphasis on freedom of conscience and his rejection of individual autonomy as something that the liberal state should attempt to provide conditions for, it is worth looking at whether Kukathas’s model in fact manages to protect individual freedom of conscience without also incorporating some minimal conditions for individual autonomy into this model.

Formal right of exit

I believe that the problems of Kukathas’s model – that tries to secure freedom of conscience without also securing individual autonomy – lie in the first and fourth of the above mentioned elements (those of the requirement of mutual toleration and the right of exit) and the rather robust preconditions that these requirements provide for all members of the liberal society. To recall, in Kukathas’s model the individuated freedom of association also entails individuated right of exit – that is, the right of the individual to leave her group. According to Kukathas, this right of exit is fundamental and one that holds even if the group in question does not recognize it as such. The group cannot thus force the individual to stay in the group, but she should be free to leave should she no longer find the group worthy of her allegiance.²¹⁸

217 Kukathas 1992a, 116; 2003: 96.

218 Kukathas 1992a, 116-117; 2003, 96-97.

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Kukathas’s account of the right of exit is a very formal one.

According to Kukathas, the existence of the right of exit does not depend on one’s capabilities of taking advantage of such right, or even on one’s ability to comprehend (or be aware of) this option or the alternative courses of life that one could exit to. Rather, the right of exit prevails as long as the individual is, at least in principle, free to leave her group, should she ever become aware this option, or the alternative courses of life that she could lead.²¹⁹ For Kukathas, the only substantive requirements for the right of exit to be effective are, firstly, that the individual is not forced by others to remain in her group (for example, by being locked up or enslaved)²²⁰ and, secondly, that the wider society is also open for those who use this right to leave their communities.²²¹ None of this, however, requires that the individual members of groups should also be autonomous – that is, capable of assessing (and possibly changing) their own conceptions of the good – or that the state (or the group itself) should protect or promote the individual members’

autonomy.

Kukathas’s account of a formal right of exit has, of course, prompted extensive critique in its own right, especially from those who view the right of exit as meaningless if people have no realistic opportunities to use it. The critics argue that, in order for the right

219 As an example, Kukathas talks of Fatima, who lives in a small fishing village in Malaysia with no desire to live elsewhere or otherwise, and who might even be fully ignorant of the possibility of leaving or living differently, see Kukathas 2003, 113-114. For Kukathas’s restatement of the plain exit –principle, see Kukathas 2012.

220 Kukathas thus claims that the right of exit must clearly have “some substantive bite” (Kukathas 1992a, 128-134.), although it is clear that some of the legitimate (in Kukathas’s view) practices of groups that wish to prevent their members from leaving (such as the threat of “shunning” or

“banishing”) may have precisely the same effects as the illegitimate practices of for example enslavement. See: Kukathas 1992b, 677.

221Kukathas 1992a, 133-134. Kukathas conceives this wider society as a liberal society, or “much more like a market society” (Kukathas 1992a, 134), although he does not think this necessarily needs to be so. Kukathas 1992b, 677.

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of exit to be meaningful, the preconditions of the lack of physical coercion and the existence of a society to be exited to, would need to be supplemented by the person’s capacity to make use of exit. At the very minimum, this would entail that the group members should be aware of alternative ways of life, although many also argue that, in order for the right of exit to be realistic, the members should also possess certain capabilities of critical reflection, as well as not be overwhelmed by the high costs of exit.²²²

For Kukathas, none of these conditions (1. knowledge of alternative ways of life, 2. capability to reflect upon these ways of life, or 3. reasonable costs of exit) should be taken as necessary conditions for a person to be free to leave, nor therefore as something that the liberal state should attempt to guarantee. For Kukathas, a person who is not aware of any alternative courses of life, has no capabilities of assessing these (or even her own) courses of life, and who may be discouraged (even disabled) by the high costs of exit would still be free to leave, as long as she was not (physically) forced to stay in her group, and the wider society was such that the person could exit to. Further, Kukathas argues that it is perfectly possible for this kind of person to live a meaningful life, and that the imposition of knowledge about alternative ways of living or the teaching of basic skills of critical thinking may even be detrimental to her well-being. The person, fully unaware of and unable to assess any alternatives, may still be considered as living her life in accordance with her conscience – something that she should, according to Kukathas, not be prevented from doing.

Whereas it is, no doubt, debatable whether the acknowledgement of the worthiness of an unexamined life and the possibility of this kind of life being a life led under the dictates of conscience would lead to the view according to which it would

222 I will return to some of the preconditions of exit, and the exit debate in more general in Ch. 5. For alternative perspectives on the realistic right of exit, see e.g. Shachar 2000; 2001; Spinner-Halev 2000; 2005; Okin, 2002;

Holtzleithner, 2012; For the costs of exit debate, see: Barry 2001;

Borchers 2012.

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never be justifiable to expose these people to some knowledge of alternative courses of life, or to teach them some basic skills of critical thinking, my interest, for the time being, lies not in this worry. Nor does it lie in the well rehearsed debate on whether a person can really be conceived as free to leave her community if she possesses no capabilities for exercising such freedom. Rather, what I attempt to show is that the two elements – the right of exit and the (soon to be discussed) requirement of mutual toleration – create much stronger requirements for all members of the society to fulfill and, by doing so, also undermine Kukathas’s formal account of the rights of exit by incorporating certain (minimal) conditions of autonomy into his theoretical framework.

Mutual toleration

In Kukathas’s model, in order to guarantee freedom of association (catering for the freedom of conscience) to all individuals, the free society would need to operate in accordance with the principle of mutual toleration. That is, the different associations would need to

“not object to coexist”²²³ with other associations, and they would also need to refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of other associations. Although Kukathas emphasizes that these requirements operate primarily at the level of different associations rather than at the level of (all) individuals, it is difficult to see how the requirement of mutual toleration would work if it did not also operate as a guiding principle for interactions between different individuals of different associations. Although the individuals within any particular group are not required to tolerate the dissenting views of their fellow members (but, depending on their position in the group, they can either leave or excommunicate the dissenters), they are, nevertheless, required to tolerate and refrain from interfering with the affairs of others, who do not belong to the same cultural/religious/other group.

Provided that the individual members of groups (as well as groups as collectives) are required not to interfere with the affairs of

223 Kukathas 2003, 210.

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other groups or members of such groups, the question arises, what would be the conditions within which this toleration and non-inteference would be secured. As Kukathas notes himself, it is very unlikely that different groups (or individual members of these groups) would, or even could, stay in complete isolation from one another²²⁴ – and even if they did, certain conditions would need to be met, in order to ensure that, should the different groups or their members come in contact with one another, the principle of mutual toleration and non-interference would be followed.²²⁵

Contrary to Kukathas, who gives no clear answer to how the principles of mutual toleration and non-interference would be secured, Willian Galston attempts to address this point in his discussions on the preconditions that the liberal society, allowing for the fullest possible scope for diversity, should fulfill.²²⁶ Like Kukathas, Galston questions the view according to which the liberal state should be in the business of protecting (let alone promoting) individual autonomy, and also holds that only a strong system of toleration will ensure that different views and ways of life (including those ways of life that do not value individual autonomy) are able to flourish.²²⁷ Contrary to Kukathas, however, Galston

224 Kukathas 2003, 132-133.

225 This, I believe, is fully consistent with Kukathas’s remarks on the role of the state to preserve order in which different people and different associations can coexist peacefully (Kukathas 2003, 147; 213). I will come back to the role of the liberal state in Kukathas’s account in more detail in section 3 (esp 3.3.).

226 Galston 1995; 2002; 2005.

227 It should be noted that, for Galston and Kukathas, the primary reasons for promoting toleration are somewhat different. Whereas Kukathas sees mutual toleration as necessary for the protection of individual freedom of conscience, for Galston, toleration is also necessary for the preservation of deep diversity . (An aim that Kukathas explicitly rejects, Kukathas 2003, 29) This difference need not, however, affect the point that I am making here. What is important, for my purposes, is that both Galston and Kukathas view toleration as one of the guiding principles of a liberal society, and that they both also interpret toleration in fairly minimalist terms: as refraining from interference and not objecting to coexist

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worries that toleration, in the sense of non-interference, could not be secured without at least minimal awareness of the existence and nature of ways of life other than those of one’s family and community.²²⁸ If individuals of cultural groups are kept in complete isolation and ignorance of other ways of life than their own, it may well be that, should they ever come across these alternative ways of life, their reaction would not be that of toleration, but that of hostility and (forceful) intervention. Consequently, Galston argues that the liberal state, committed to safeguarding deep diversity, should also incorporate a vigorous system of civic education that teaches toleration to all, including the teaching of some information about the existence and nature of different ways of life.²²⁹

Whereas one does not need to go as far as Galston does in arguing for a vigorous system of civic education on behalf of the liberal state,²³⁰ I do believe that Galston’s concerns about how to ensure mutual toleration between different groups and members of these groups should be taken seriously. If, as Kukathas seems to hold in his discussions on the right of exit, it is perfectly all right for the minority groups to keep (some of) their members in complete ignorance about other ways of life, then there is nothing that would ensure that these members would be tolerant and not try to interfere with the affairs of others, should they ever come across these other ways of living. It is not, of course, that the civic education such as the teaching of toleration, would necessarily need to be provided by the state, but it does seem that the minority groups would need to comply with certain general guidelines, including the requirement that they provide their members some (minimal) knowledge about

(Kukathas), and as refusing to use coercive power to impose one’s views on others (Galston, 1995, 528).

228 Galston 1995, 529; 2002, 127.

229 Galston 1995, 528-529; for further elaboration on Galston’s views on education, see e.g. Galston 2002, ch. 8.

230 That is, one does not need to agree with Galston on the exact contents of such education (Galston’s views on civic education do, in fact, incorporate much more than the teaching of toleration), nor on the provider (liberal state) of such education.

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different ways of life, as well as teach them to tolerate and not interfere with these ways of living.

As Galston maintains, none of this needs to entail that the minority members should also be taught to question and to be critical about their own ways of living.²³¹All that is required is that the minority members are given some knowledge about alternative ways of life and that they are also taught to respond to these alternatives appropriately.²³² But, if this is the case, then it would seem that the principle of mutual toleration, and especially the ensuring of this toleration, would require that at least some (albeit very minimal) conditions for individual autonomy should also be protected. Firstly, it must be ensured that the minority members have some knowledge about alternative ways of living and, secondly, it must also be ensured that these alternatives are portrayed, not as something to be gotten rid of, but as viable options, at least for some (other) people. The minority members do not need to be taught to be critical of their own ways of living, but they do need to be shown that the other ways of living may also be worthwhile, thus also providing some tools for the minority members to mirror their own ways of life to the alternatives presented.²³³

231 Galston 1995, 529.

232 That is, by refraining from forcefully interfering with these ways of life.

233 It could be argued (as Galston does) that these conditions (the requirement of the minority members to have at least some (minimal) knowledge of alternative ways of life as well as the portraying of these ways of life as worthwhile for at least some (other) people) do not, as yet, constitute conditions for the protection, let alone promotion, of individual autonomy. The minority groups are still perfectly free to deny their members certain ways of life, and they can even prevent their members from acquiring information about alternative ways of life (Recall that, for securing mutual toleration, only some minimal information about alternative ways of life are needed, and the groups are perfectly free to block any further information from their members.) Nevertheless, these conditions are, as will be argued in more detail with respect to the conditions relating to the right of exit, far more substantive than, for

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Taking Galston’s insight about the necessity of certain minimal information about alternative ways of life for the securing of mutual

Taking Galston’s insight about the necessity of certain minimal information about alternative ways of life for the securing of mutual

In document Limits of Liberal Multiculturalism (sivua 154-164)