THE FUTURE OF A SHARED MISSION AND SHARED VALUES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

It is frequently accepted that a common normative base – even a col-lective identity - underpins the transatlantic community. Despite dif-ferences in national political structures and cultures, this has facilitated the undertaking of a joint strategic and political project to build a liberal international order based on core liberal ideas, including democracy, freer trade and human rights – values unfortunately too often respected in the

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breach.6 A substantial weakening of this shared value foundation could have significant potential implications for the joint project to buttress the existing world order, because for better or for worse, the transatlantic se-curity community still makes up the dense core of the liberal international order. The political institutions and values are the glue that holds this core community together. Currently all three, the liberal international order, the political institutions and the shared value base, are under pressure, attributable to both external and internal developments (Chapter 5).

Evidence of the shared transatlantic value base is to be found in both the Transatlantic Trends and the World Values surveys, according to which significant majorities in the United States, Great Britain, France and Ger-many have a favourable view of each other and agree that the United States and Europe share common values (Dalton 2013). As recently as the start of 2017, both sides of the Atlantic continued to see each other as valuable allies in international affairs, with 73 per cent of Americans seeing Europeans as such and 67 per cent in Europe seeing the US as such (Ewering 2017). However, there are considerable fluctuations. For example, in addition to historically grounded anti-American sentiments on the old continent, European views of the US tend to track changes of presidential administrations (and their policies) in America (Pew Research Center 2017f; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007).

In fact, President Trump has made it abundantly clear that he does not agree with the European elites on the normative foundations of the transatlantic security community and the liberal international order (Ikenberry 2017; Stephens 2017). For example, his Secretary of State has explicitly downgraded the promotion of human rights and diplomacy in America’s set of foreign policy priorities (Piccone 2017; US Department of State 2017b). The new National Security Strategy only mentions “hu-man rights” once, in the context of punishing those (regimes) that abuse them (White House 2017z). Additional examples of differences between European foreign-policy elites and President Trump include frequent expressions of admiration by the latter of autocratic leaders, and casual suggestions that the torture of terrorist suspects should be reinstated (see Chapters 3 and 5).

By calling into question America’s espousal of core liberal values upon which the collective identity of the transatlantic community has tradi-tionally been built, President Trump has raised concerns in Europe (Ew-ering 2017; Pew Research Center 2017f). However, the “fraying” of the

6 The EU and the US have traditionally shared the belief that their conceptions of democracy and human rights are worthy of active promotion to the outside world (Nicolaïdis 2005). Differences have usually arisen over how to go about this process of promotion, rather than over the actual desirability of such forays (for instance during the George W. Bush era).

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shared normative base is also an internal phenomenon, both in the United States and within the European Union. This explains, to some extent, why President Trump’s approach – and the sentiments that fuel it – have met with applause from some in Europe, including national political leaders of EU member states.

Although there is strong mutual support for the transatlantic rela-tionship, it is worth pointing out that there are genuine and substantial differences within Europe and the United States. In Europe, for instance, there are significant differences in terms of values relating to political sys-tems (democracy vs. other syssys-tems) and individualism, and commonality is common within groups/states that share a particular religious affinity (protestant or catholic) or a recent historical background (part of West-ern Europe during the Cold War) (see Pew Research Center 2016d). This has an impact on the functioning of the European Union, and thereby on the transatlantic relationship. Comparable divisions also exist within the United States. Moreover, the US has domestic drivers that do not always move in synchrony with the internal and domestic dynamics of its Euro-pean allies and partners – when it comes to support for global institutions and US engagement, for example (Chapter 1).

The key question is whether the shared transatlantic mission of but-tressing the current international order can survive the diverging values and fluctuating commitments to shared political institutions that are visible on both sides of the Atlantic.

Now at the end of the first year of the Trump presidency, concerns regarding the interest of the US in continuing to underwrite the current international order have been alleviated to a degree. After a tumultuous beginning, the administration has taken policy positions that are increas-ingly in line with the longer-term trends in the American global role, and in keeping with its commitments. Several key advisors who pushed for policies specifically aimed at breaking with tradition, most notably Stephen Bannon, have left the administration. Moreover, experienced generals and businesspersons occupy many key positions in the White House and cabi-net. Trump’s early critique of Brussels has also largely disappeared from his rhetorical toolbox, which may have something to do with a general sense of a resurgent EU and NATO.

What has not disappeared is the almost total abdication of US leadership on issues relating to climate change. Although individual states and US actors (including corporations) continue to work to reduce the impact of climate change, official United States is likely to remain on the sidelines in terms of global efforts, occasionally even taking the role of a spoiler. A genuine difference between the United States and Europe is the level of

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politicization and science denialism that infuses the policy discourse on climate issues. Even if future administrations wanted to take a more pro-active role, this underlying trend would be likely to surface with regularity (Mehling and Vihma 2017; see also Chapter 10).

However, the rhetorical dismissal of the need to uphold norms and val-ues is not entirely consistent with the actions of the Trump administration.

For example, it cited the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons to justify its bombing of the Syrian airfield in April, which some liberal-lean-ing foreign-policy commentators actually regarded as a positive develop-ment. In a departure from Trump’s rhetorical cosying-up to authoritarian strongmen, the US withheld portions of its military aid to Egypt in August 2017. The decision was reportedly attributable not only to Egyptian links to North Korea, but also to Cairo’s continuing crackdown on civil-society organisations (Tamkin 2017; Harris and Walsh 2017). In any case, it is un-likely that democracy and human-rights promotion will be at the top of Trump’s policy agenda.

Similarly, it is likely that President Trump’s focus on the defence of Western civilisation will shift from liberal values towards the defence of more traditional common threads that transcend the Atlantic, the shared Judeo-Christian heritage in particular (Chapter 1). This qualitative shift in how Washington views the value base of the Transatlantic community, and the normative parameters of American leadership in the world, looks to persist throughout President Trump’s tenure.