THE CHINA CHALLENGE

The single most important predicament for the US remains China’s chal-lenge to US hegemony. An increasingly assertive China under President Xi Jinping clearly harbours the ambition to regain a central role in Asia and to acquire a larger role in global affairs. This has led to speculations about the unavoidability of conflict in the long run, and a debate on whether both powers will be able to avoid “Thucydides’s trap”, which postulates that when one rising power threatens to displace another great power, war is almost always the result (Allison 2017). China’s challenge to American hegemony and international principles is clear. China has challenged the freedom of navigation and strengthened territorial claims in Southeast Asia. Its military spending continues to rise. It has been aggressively in-vesting in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities as well as in cyber, electronic warfare, a blue-water navy, missiles, and intelligence-surveil-lance-reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, all intended to undermine the US military capability to protect its interests in the region (see Green et al.

2016, 2-3). The US remains the dominant naval power in the Asia-Pacific, but is being increasingly challenged byChina, which no longer accepts that the US is the sole naval power in the region. According to China’s Defense White Paper of 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is gradually seeking to shift the defence focus from offshore waters to include “open seas protection” (Green et al. 2016, 18) and long-distance operations in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific (Economist 2015).

In addition, China has ambitions to create alternative systems of gov-ernance, including through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the BRICS Bank, and the pro-posed Shanghai Cooperation Bank. The 16+1 grouping of Central and Eastern European countries plus China could be seen as an example of China’s strategy not to displace existing structures (as “Thucydides’s trap” would predict), but to create parallel ones. Economic development, continued growth and sustainable prosperity are key determinants of whether China can further boost its clout in the Asia-Pacific in particular.

In the aftermath of the US withdrawal from the TPP, China is profiling itself as the champion of free trade. Beijing is pushing forward with its own regional trade construction, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

China also displays a newfound self-confidence. At the recent Con-gress of the Communist Party, President Xi Jinping referred to China as a “mighty force” in the world and a role model for political and econom-ic development, adding that his country’s politeconom-ical system “is a great

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creation” that offers “a new choice for other countries” (Doan 2017).

Furthermore, since the rise to power of Xi in 2012, China has come to see US power in the region as a lesser constraint on China’s exercise of influence, and relations with the US in general have seemed less of a pre-occupation than in earlier years (Green et al. 2016, 14). Trump has only strengthened that tendency: his numerous missteps and mishaps, both at home and abroad, have boosted the Chinese leadership’s confidence.

When Trump cast doubt on US adherence to the One-China policy, Xi made the non-negotiable demand that Trump reassert the policy before any conversation between both leaders could take place. The fact that Trump duly reversed his view only reinforced a strengthening conviction in China of American weakness and of the US as a “paper tiger” (Econ-omist 2017c).

One key element that will determine whether conflict in the region can be avoided and a balance of power achieved, is the extent to which the US can maintain and strengthen the hub-and-spokes system of alli-ances. It is said, for example, that within the next 30 years China’s navy might match the American navy, but this discounts the fact that the US could cooperate closely with the powerful Japanese Maritime SDF and the growing Indian navy (Economist 2015). The extent to which the US can complement the alliance system with the strengthened strategic partner-ships with other countries in the “Indo-Pacific” is a core determinant in the China-US rivalry.

A second key element is Japan’s stance. Japan has historically refused to submit itself to a China-dominated order, seeing itself as an equal. As Michael Green argues, in view of Japan’s own expansionist policies during the Pacific War, and the lingering grievances concerning its actions during the first half of the 20th century, the country will not be able to become a dominant regional power through a Pax Nipponica. At the same time, Japan will reject domination by China (Pax Sinica). Peace and stability in the region therefore hinge upon the strength of the security alliance with the US and the continued Pax Americana (Green 2001).

8.6 CONCLUSION

The debate on the US as a power in relative decline in the Asia-Pacific, coupled with Trump’s references to US disengagement from the region, have served to underscore the notion of a continuing power shift in the region propelled by a strongly (re)emerging China. One core aim of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia was to “bend Asia’s evolving

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distribution of power away from hegemony and more toward balance”

(Campbell 2016, 157). The US aimed to engage China and cooperate with Beijing, but at the same time sought to hedge against China’s rise. The prime instrument for achieving this was engagement with India, Australia and individual Southeast Asian countries through economic diplomacy, and the strengthening of military ties to establish a security network in the Asia-Pacific. Relations with alliance partners Japan (e.g. through collective security) and South Korea (e.g. the THAAD missile defence sys-tem) were strengthened. In addition, the US was a driving force behind the creation of strategic partnerships with countries such as India and Australia. The creation of these partnerships has gained popularity in the region as a highly flexible foreign-policy instrument to promote cooper-ation on a limited number of specific issues. Countries such as Japan, for example, aspire to build strategic alliances of like-minded, democratic Indo-Pacific countries that share similar anxieties about China’s growing naval might. Many countries in the region, including Southeast Asian states, Australia and Japan, therefore welcome a stronger presence and a regional role for the US, as this allows them to conduct a “dual hedge”

and play both great powers against each other. China, for its part, has been highly active in exerting influence in the region through different degrees of charm offensive and tactical intimidation to test US standing as the region’s security guarantor (Gill et al. 2016, 16).

Compared to the Obama era, at first sight the Trump administration has changed tack by emphasising an “America first” policy and shifting towards isolationism and self-interest. Nevertheless, US grand strategy is likely to remain by and large the same. The extent to which the Trump administration can uphold these efforts in the years to come is the key to balancing China’s rise. Trump’s recent tour of Asia confirms that a prime goal for now is to build personal relationships and cement partnerships, but this is likely to be done at the expense of expressing support for human rights and normative principles, as the President’s visit to the Philippines made clear. The promotion of liberal norms has been a key element in US foreign policy, given “the clear strategic advantages of maintaining a favorable ideational balance of power in which like-minded states rein-force American influence, access, and security” (Green 2017, 9). Trump is seemingly overturning this policy. However, it should be kept in mind that strong tension between self-determination and universal values has been an equally consistent element of US policy in Asia. Trump’s focus on commercial access and national defence underscores the inconsistency that has also been present during preceding administrations.

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Propelled by China’s ascendency, US re-engagement with East Asia has drawn other players, old as well as new, more closely into the East Asian power game. The EU remains a more important trading partner for East Asia than the US. The total volume of EU trade and the relative importance of the East Asian region have increased significantly. As a political actor however, the EU continues to have a limited role. A major milestone towards assuming a more influential role in political affairs was its attendance at the East Asia Summit as a guest for the first time in November 2017. This was preceded by the Union’s accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in 2012 – a pre-requisite for being considered a candidate for a seat at the East Asia Summit table.

Another possible element contributing to a potentially larger security role in the region is the EU’s agreement (signed by 25 member states) to establish Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which aims to increase joint military investment and defence capabilities. Furthermore, as the US appears to be less interested in promoting liberal norms, the EU could revitalise region-to-region cooperation with ASEAN based on a shared commitment to a rule-based order, and emphasise human rights and normative principles in the process. America’s evolving engagement in Asia thus provides opportunities for the EU, not only to intensify com-mercial links and promote free trade, but also to engage more closely with Asian countries by offering – in the words of European Commission vice-president Jyrki Katainen – “stability, rule of law, [and] a rules-based system of multilateralism” (quoted in Beesley et al. 2017). Ultimately, it will be in the interest of the US to work with Europe in upholding support for a rules-based order in Asia.

PART V