FRUSTRATED EXPECTATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA

A key contributing factor to this rapid decline in Russian-American rela-tions after Trump’s inauguration was the unrealistically high initial level of expectations on both the US and the Russian sides of the willingness to pursue improved relations on the one hand, and the infeasibility of such forays given the constraints of the current situation on the other. This, in fact, made mutual disillusionment all the more likely. It is worth ex-ploring the substance of these unrealistic expectations. On the American side, (parts of) the Trump administration seem to have held the belief that Russian-American relations would improve simply because the incum-bent was the antithesis of Obama. Just as President Obama blamed the deterioration in Moscow-Washington ties during the Bush administration on his predecessor, Trump attributed the failure of the highly publicised

“Russia reset” almost solely to his predecessor, President Obama. President Trump has even boasted on several occasions that Putin “likes me”, thus

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enabling him to make a deal with the Russian leader more easily than Obama (whom they both despise).

The details of what such a deal would entail have never been made clear, however. President Trump seemed to expect that because he and Putin were “on the same wavelength” they could work together on what the new US incumbent saw as their common problems, including Syria (both opposed ISIS), Iran and even China. Trump also had a geopolitical logic supporting his Russia proposals: he thought that Obama had driven Russia closer to China – and China was a prominent target of his campaign rheto-ric, especially on the issue of trade. In return, Trump made it clear that he would not try to promote democratisation in Russia, or hector Putin about human rights and the rule of law the way Obama had done. Going against the foreign-policy mainstream, even (or especially) that of his own party, the current US President considered such criticism of Russia ineffective, and thus unnecessary. Further, he seemed to hope that there was room for a grand bargain with Russia covering arms control, counter-terrorism, Crimea, economic sanctions and relations with China. He also seemed to expect that improved Russian-American relations would entice Russia to cooperate with the US against Iran. In return, Trump appeared willing to lift US sanctions, which had been imposed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. This would have been part of a larger Russian-American “deal”

in which “the two leaders indomitably face down all comers like some maverick geopolitical wrestling team” (Economist 2017a).

The Kremlin’s expectations were quite different, however. To begin with, Russia did not view Iran or China as problems: they were part-ners, and therefore cooperation with the US against them was not on the Russian agenda. In addition, Moscow seemed to anticipate not only that Trump would end all efforts to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Russia, but also that he would lift sanctions and accept as valid the Moscow-sponsored 2014 referendum in Crimea, which called for the peninsula’s adhesion to Russia. America was also expected to acknowledge the Russian sphere of influence in its near abroad. This would have meant that neither Ukraine nor other former Soviet republics (except the Baltics) would join NATO or the EU.

Even if such Russian expectations were unrealistic, it appears that the Kremlin actually had them. According to media reports, the Russian government sent a proposal to the US in March 2017 for the immediate restoration of US-Russian cooperation in the diplomatic, military and intelligence fields, which had been severed in response to Russian inter-vention in Ukraine and Syria. The proposal appeared to have been made on the basis that the Trump administration would be willing to ignore

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reports that Moscow had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election (especially since, after all, Trump had won), and that Trump would ignore Russian behaviour in Ukraine and lift the Obama-imposed sanctions against Moscow. Furthermore, the Kremlin seems to have developed the expectation that all this would be possible from Western press re-ports about how Trump wanted to work with Putin, and from Trump’s own statements to that effect (Hudson 2017). If Russia really did interfere in the 2016 US presidential election to help Trump against Clinton, the Russian leadership may have felt not just disappointed, but tricked when Trump did not adopt the pro-Russian policies that the Kremlin expected from him.

These differing expectations on the US and Russian sides were based on a mutually held assumption that the other side would be willing and able to modify its policies for the sake of improving relations. However, neither side had either the willpower or the ability to undertake such policy reorientation. Thus, although President Trump was willing to end the Obama-era calls for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Russia, he could not drop the Ukraine-related sanctions that Congress (including the Republican leadership) insisted on continuing and even strengthening if Russia did not modify its Ukraine policies. The checks and balances inherent in the US political system set limits for the US president, even in foreign policy (see Chapter 2).

For the Kremlin, however, Ukraine is not just a foreign-policy issue:

it is also a domestic matter in that Russian nationalists genuinely con-sider much of it (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine especially) as rightfully belonging to Russia. This shows how foreign-policy considerations have a

“cultural component” grounded in the domestic sphere that sets limits on manoeuvrability, not only in the United States but also in Russia. Making any concessions on Ukraine would risk undermining support for Putin not just among the Russian public, but also in his core security service and nationalist constituencies.

In addition, although it might seem sensible to the Trump adminis-tration that Moscow should distance itself from Iran and China as part of Russian-American rapprochement, Russia remains dependent on both.

Tehran’s support is essential for propping up the Assad regime, and Rus-sia’s status seeking in the Middle East is intimately linked to maintaining an influential role in Syria. China, on the other hand, has a role to play in buttressing the Russian economy through substantial investments and loans, and Beijing continues to share similar views about the coming of a multipolar world order. In addition to putting these benefits at risk, moving away from Iran and China at Washington’s behest would make

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Russia appear as “less than a great power”. Such questions of status are of great significance to the Kremlin. Nor will Russia support Trump’s efforts to end the Iranian nuclear accord, and will likely see the divisions over the JCPOA as an opportunity for exploiting the differences between Trump and most of America’s allies on this issue.

Similarly, Russia may see it as perfectly reasonable for the US to fore-swear the expansion of NATO into any other former Soviet republic outside the Baltic states, or even anywhere else in Europe (such as Finland and Sweden). However, there are domestic and international constraints that limit President Trump’s ability to make such promises: precluding a pos-sible NATO expansion would be a concession that most Republicans and Democrats in Congress, let alone most of America’s NATO allies, would not be willing to make. The alliance will not relinquish the principle that accession to NATO is decided by the current and prospective member governments alone, and does not require agreement from any third party such as Russia (even though, as a practical matter, Ukraine and Georgia are highly unlikely to be admitted into NATO). The Kremlin’s expectations about sanctions relief are also likely to be thwarted. Russia may be able to hold on to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, but what it has been unable to do is to get America and its European allies to acquiesce to this and return to business as usual. The issue is simply too fundamental to the interests of the Western actors involved.

Yet, despite the many differences between the US and Russia that have persisted since Trump’s inauguration, Moscow and Washington continue to share some common interests. Both oppose ISIS and other jihadist groups in Syria and elsewhere in the greater Middle East. On this, Russian-American cooperation could be achieved. Further, the Trump administration does not appear to be insisting that Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad step down, as the Obama administration did, and this also constitutes a potential basis for cooperation with Moscow. Although they disagree on Iran, Moscow and Washington both have good relations with Tehran’s regional adversaries (Israel and the Arab Gulf monarchies).

Indeed, both want to see the status quo in the Middle East largely pre-served, and conflicts there to be contained even if they cannot be ended.

Unlike most governments in the region, Washington and Moscow are sympathetic to the Kurds in both Iraq and Syria. Far from opposing the Kremlin’s support for right-wing nationalist forces in Europe, Trump has also expressed sympathy for them. At the same time, both are simulta-neously pursuing good relations with moderate democratic governments in Europe.

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