ALTERNATIVE TRADITIONS OF US STRATEGIC THOUGHT

Debates on America’s place in and engagement with the world are habit-ually framed in terms of competing grand-strategic alternatives. Simply put, “[a] state’s ‘grand strategy’ is its leaders’ theory and story about how to provide for its security, welfare and identity” (Nye 2011, 212). It also informs states and their leaders on “how they mobilise which elements of their power in pursuit of which causes in global politics” (Kitchen 2010, 121).

All leaders engage in the formulation of grand strategies when con-ducting foreign policy. They do this by deciding which ends to pursue and which means to harness for such exploits. They “have a sense, whether implicitly or explicitly, of their country’s national interests, the threats that exist to those interests, and the resources that can be brought to bear against those threats” (Dueck 2005, 198). This implies that grand strategies are not necessarily enshrined in foreign-policy documents or reiterated in key speeches: they may also be embedded in policy practices (Brands 2012, 6-7).

One way of categorising the ebb and flow of the grand-strategic de-bate on US engagement with the world is through the three prominent traditions of post-Cold War American thinking on foreign policy: liberal internationalism, neoconservatism and realism. Neoisolationism can be considered a fourth approach, which until recently had been relegated to the fringes of US foreign-policy debates (Quinn 2016). These schools of thought represent “ideal type” positions, which presidents tend to utilise in combination to arrive at different grand-strategic options.

The first of these schools, liberal internationalism, has been ascendant in US foreign-policy circles throughout the post-Cold War era. Adherents of the approach view the promotion of liberal trade practices and core American (and more broadly Western) values, especially democracy and human rights, as central to America’s national interests. US involvement in multilateral institutions is seen as crucial to entrench these values in international society (Ikenberry 2009, 14-20). When it comes to exerting force, liberal internationalists do not shy away from using military power to defend these values. However, such measures should be undertaken for legitimate reasons with the support of the broader international com-munity. The so-called humanitarian interventions undertaken during the

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Clinton presidency are thus often attributed to the ascendancy of liberal internationalism in Washington (Dueck 2005).

Liberal internationalists also place strong emphasis on the economic dimension of foreign policy and the tools of soft power that tend to be associated with public diplomacy (Nye 2011; Ikenberry 2015). Many lib-eral internationalists thus subscribe to a strategy of “deep engagement”, maintaining America’s responsibilities to international institutions and its military commitments around the world (Ikenberry 2014). According to proponents of the strategy, nurturing the liberal international or-der is necessary for co-opting the rising powers – China as well as India some years ahead – as “responsible stakeholders” in resolving common global challenges. In addition, the US needs the institutions of the lib-eral order to perform essential functions, including the maintenance of financial stability, the negotiation of best practices for global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and securing interstate peace (Nye 2017;

see also Chapter 5).

Proponents of the second school of thought, the neoconservatives, agree with the liberal internationalists on the importance of promoting America’s liberal-democratic values – especially the so-called “negative freedoms”1 – abroad. In fact, neoconservatism is often associated with moralistic “missionary zeal”. Therefore, unlike liberal internationalists,

“neocons” are willing to follow their agenda unilaterally if necessary, without encumbering multilateral alliances and, in extremis, circum-venting international legal constraints on the use of military force. In practice, however, this has meant the use of flexible US-led “coalitions of the willing”. Neoconservatives also emphasise the importance of main-taining America’s unchallengeable military power position in the inter-national system as a clear foreign-policy priority (Krauthammer 2002).

This connotes a willingness to expend vast resources on bolstering mil-itary power. Soft power tools, although potentially useful instruments, are treated as auxiliary means of achieving foreign-policy goals (Singh 2014, 30-31). The muscular and unilateralist foreign policy of the George W. Bush presidency, especially during his first term in the aftermath of 9/11, is often termed the golden age of the neoconservative foreign-policy vision (see Reus-Smit 2004).

Realism, the third school, represents a broad and diverse tradition of foreign-policy thought. Despite the heterogeneity, most realists would acknowledge that the international system is inhabited by states bent on survival and locked in persistent competition for power. This preoc-cupation with international “anarchy” and power in its material form

1 Negative freedom here refers to the freedom of persons or groups to conduct themselves as they see fit without interference from others. For the seminal discussion, see Berlin (1969).

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leads realists to argue that states will (and should) act in a self-interested manner within the international system, seeking relative gains and plac-ing little emphasis on values (Mearsheimer 2001, 17-18; Wohlforth 2008, 133-135). At best, the proliferation of democracy or human rights is a welcome side effect of pursuing national interests. At worst, the pursuit of such eloquent goals could divert attention away from the true task of a nation’s leadership: ensuring national survival. Moreover, given the in-evitable uncertainty among states about each other’s intentions, the best way to ensure survival is to accumulate power (Mearsheimer 2001, 31-33).

Prominent realist thinkers have recently challenged the strategy of

“deep engagement” ascribed to liberal internationalists. Instead, they call for a strategy of “offshore balancing” to scale back America’s over-seas engagements and focus only on making sure key regions (Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf) do not fall under the rule of a hostile regional hegemon. This would cater to a narrower definition of American national interests. Such an approach, they claim, would avoid the dangers of overstretch that a policy bent on the promotion of liberal-democratic values might create, but still retain America’s place at the top of the global power hierarchy (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016).2

Neoisolationists take the argument to disengage further. As a term, isolationism echoes negative connotations from the 1930s, but the whole school should not be equated with nationalistically minded figures on the right of the political spectrum, despite similar talking points. Nevertheless, like their isolationist forebears of the interwar period, neoisolationists call for the abandonment of America’s role as global leader and the putting of its own house in order. From this standpoint, America’s pursuit and maintenance of superpower status and entangling global engagement – massive military spending in particular – has, in fact, made it less secure and economically less well off. Such sentiments were long relegated to the fringes of US foreign-policy debates, but have resurfaced in Trump’s

“America First” agenda. Proponents of the approach claim that America’s deep engagement with the world is a folly maintained by foreign-policy experts and the elite, which holds little appeal among the broader public (Preble 2017).

2 Realism is a broad school of thought. Some realists even agree with liberal internationalists in regarding

“deep engagement” with the world as the safest bet for safeguarding US interests (Brooks et al. 2012).

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3.4 DECIPHERING THE “TRUMPIAN” APPROACH