THE EMERGING DEFENCE STRATEGY: THE THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY RESPONSES

In the hierarchy of national security documents mandated by Congress, the National Security Strategy (NSS) report is the core document outlining the tenets of the US grand strategy. Prepared by the National Security Council and approved by the President, the NSS, according to its Congres-sional mandate, should provide guidance for the entire US Government on matters including US worldwide interests, objectives, and commitments deemed vital to national security; proposed political, diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence and other elements of national power to promote those interests and objectives; and the overall resources and capabilities required to execute the various parts of the overall strategy.1

In many respects, the new National Security Strategy (White House 2017z) reflects the ongoing tension between two somewhat amorphous camps. On the one hand, there are the President and a circle of hardline, ideologically-driven advisors within the administration or with close, informal links to the White House. On the other hand, there are conserva-tive but pragmatic officials whose government and/or military experience has framed their thinking more along the lines of the defence and foreign policy “establishment” often derided by the President and his loyalists.

For the former camp, the NSS represents an unapologetic shift to an explicit “America First” approach across the spectrum of domestic and international security issues. Hence, the document promises, inter alia, stronger border controls (including a “border wall”), “enhanced vetting”

of prospective immigrants and refugees, expanded cyber and ballistic missile defences, greater protection for American defence industries,

“strengthening (US) sovereignty” in multilateral organisations, and re-taining US “military overmatch” to deter and defeat adversaries – or, in the President’s words quoted by the NSS, to “always win”.

1 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated the submission of the NSS. The principal drafters are staff members of the National Security Council (NSC), working under the direction of the President’s National Security Advisor, a position now held by Army Lieutenant General H.R.

McMaster.

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For the latter camp, the NSS offers more traditional and/or centrist reference points. It promises, for example, to “preserve peace through strength” (resurrecting President Ronald Reagan’s theme during the Cold War); counter Chinese and Russian efforts to “shape a world antithetical to US values and interests,” while keeping open the possibility of cooperation in areas of mutual interest; integrate all elements of America’s national power – political, economic and military; and “deepen collaboration with our European allies and partners to confront forces threatening to undermine our common values, security interests, and shared vision”.

Not surprisingly, the President’s critics were quick to point out many inconsistencies between the NSS description of US objectives and prior-ities and the actual policies and actions undertaken by his administra-tion (Cohen 2017). For example, shortly following release of the NSS, the Republican-controlled Congress passed tax legislation (enthusiastically embraced by the President) that, according to independent estimates, would be likely to add more than $1 trillion to the US national debt over the coming decade (Patel and Parlapiano 2017; Joint Committee on Tax-ation 2017). According to the NSS, however, the current $20 trillion debt

“presents a grave threat to America’s long-term prosperity and, by exten-sion, its national security” (White House 2017z). Even Republican-leaning commentators pointed to disconnects between the NSS praise for the

“indispensable” role of American diplomacy while the administration has proposed a 30 percent cut in funding for the Department of State (Schake 2017; Inboden 2018). Similarly, the NSS acknowledges the growing cyber threats to American political, economic and security interests, and – in a separate chapter – Russian “interference in the domestic political affairs of countries around the world,” but carefully omits any explicit linkage between the two.

According to its congressional mandate, the forthcoming NDS should describe the projected threat environment and the defence department’s strategy for countering those threats; priority missions and planning sce-narios to execute them; the size, posture and non-nuclear capabilities of the military forces; and the necessary investment framework to execute the strategy over a five-year period. The Pentagon will submit the strategy to the appropriate congressional committees in a classified form, with an unclassified summary released to the public. The classified nature of the report might facilitate Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ stated intention to challenge the status quo and to make hard choices among readiness, investment, force structure and operational commitments.

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In recent months, Mattis and Marine General Joseph Dunford, Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have previewed their thinking on the threat environment in regions vital to US security.2

In Europe, they see a “resurgent and more aggressive” Russia, which is investing in capabilities designed to limit the US ability to project power into Europe, and thereby meet its commitments to NATO. These Russian capabilities range from anti-access/area denial (A2AD) tools – including long-range strike platforms, extended air defences, and electronic war-fare – to the modernisation and deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia’s reported deployment, in December 2016, of a new nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, together with various military activ-ities in the northern European region and in Syria have heightened Pen-tagon concerns about Moscow’s intentions and appetite for risk-taking.

In Asia, North Korea has moved to the top of the Pentagon’s list of near-term threats for several reasons: its tests of prototype interconti-nental-range ballistic missiles in July 2017; the detonation two months later of its largest nuclear device to date; and reports (attributed to US intelligence) that it might be closer than previously assessed to mounting a nuclear warhead on ballistic missiles capable of reaching Hawaii, Alaska and the US territory of Guam. The Pentagon leadership is also concerned about an assertive China, which is challenging international norms on the freedom of navigation (especially in the South China Sea) and intimidating nations on its periphery. China’s extensive programmes to modernise and expand its strategic arsenal and conventional (including A2AD) capabilities are seen as an integral part of Beijing’s strategy to limit US power projec-tion and its ability to meet alliance commitments in the Pacific. Indeed, as Dunford told a Senate panel in September: “China probably poses the greatest threat to our nation by about 2025” (quoted in Hincks 2017).

Across the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest Asia (especially, Afghanistan and Pakistan), Mattis and Dunford highlight “extremists” or

“violent extremist organizations” such as ISIS and al Qaeda as a serious, long-term threat to US partners in those regions, European allies, and potentially the American homeland. At the same time, they avoid using descriptors such as “radical Islamic extremists” favoured by the White House. They cite Iran’s support for proxies in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as its improving ballistic-missile, cyber and cruise-missile capa-bilities as a growing threat to regional security and American interests.

Although they reportedly opposed Trump’s initial plans to withdraw from

2 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

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the 2015 multilateral agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme, they later acquiesced in his decision to seek its renegotiation (see Chapter 2).

Mattis and Dunford also point to global trends that pose an increasing risk to US forces. According to their analysis, although the US military maintained either uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain – air, land, maritime, space and cyber – for decades, it now finds itself challenged in all of them. In addition, many of the rapid techno-logical changes that the US military will depend upon in the future – in-cluding advanced computing, big data analytics, artificial intelligence and robotics – emanate from the commercial sector. This means that, in many instances, state and non-state adversaries might have increased access to technologies that they can employ to degrade US advantages.

Even if Mattis and Dunford adopt a somewhat more strident and urgent tone than projected by the Obama administration, their description of the evolving threat environment does not differ radically in substance. Hence, in terms of its overarching objectives, the forthcoming NDS is likely to resemble the Pentagon’s last major strategic report, the 2014 Quadren-nial Defense Review (US Department of Defense 2014). That document emphasises the need to deter and defeat any attack on the US homeland;

to continue with a strong US commitment to shaping world events so as to deter and prevent conflict, while assuring allies and partners of that commitment; and to maintain armed forces with the capability to de-ter acts of aggression and defeat adversaries in one or more operational theatres. If this analysis proves correct, one might anticipate a degree of continuity in the NDS’s approach to policy.

For example, despite the President’s scolding of NATO allies on defence spending and his six-month wait before explicitly reaffirming his com-mitment to the collective defence provision (Article 5) of the NATO Treaty, Mattis and Dunford have consistently made the case for maintaining strong transatlantic defence bonds and a “rock solid” US commitment to NATO and Article 5. The new NSS specifically confirms this view. The NDS, therefore, could be expected to endorse efforts – initiated by the Obama administration following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine – to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence capabilities: these include the enhanced US forward presence in Poland, the Baltic states and Romania, and the further pre-positioning of equipment to support the rapid deploy-ment of additional forces, if necessary, from the United States. Although Mattis and Dunford do not use the “third offset” terminology of the last administration, they do support further US and NATO efforts to counter Russia’s A2AD capabilities.3 As Mattis stated: “While willing to engage

3 For an excellent discussion of the “third offset strategy,” see Hicks et al. (2017).

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diplomatically, we are going to have to confront Russia when it comes to areas where they attack us, whether it be with cyber, or they try to change borders using armed force” (quoted in CBS News 2017).

Similarly, without reference to “rebalance” – the Obama admin-istration’s descriptor for paying greater attention to the Asia-Pacific region – Mattis appears to differ very little from his immediate prede-cessors in his overall approach. Thus, while welcoming China’s economic development, he warns against its militarisation of islands in the South China Sea, and any unilateral changes to the status quo. He has also pledged to strengthen longstanding US bilateral alliances (with Austral-ia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines), and to forge newer defence-cooperation partnerships (with India and Vietnam, for exam-ple). As a result, the new NDS is likely to follow through on the Obama administration’s plan to assign 60 per cent of US Navy ships, 55 per cent of Army forces, two-thirds of Marine forces and (in the near future) 60 per cent of US overseas tactical aviation assets to the Asia-Pacific region.

Regarding North Korea, Mattis and Dunford warn that US patience has its limits, and a military conflict would have disastrous consequences for the Kim Jong-un regime. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that US allies (especially South Korea and Japan) and US forces in the region are vul-nerable to North Korean conventional, chemical and, potentially, nuclear weapons. Hence, they have avoided Trump’s most provocative rhetoric, emphasising that the best approach is through diplomatic and economic pressure, while strengthening missile-defence cooperation with South Korea and Japan.

If a military conflict with North Korea were to appear imminent, ad-ditional US forces and support assets would be deployed to the region.

This, in turn, would force difficult decisions by the Pentagon on whether, and if so how to draw such reinforcements from US-based units and/or regional combatant commands, such as the European Command and the Central Command. The unclassified version of the NDS would not include detailed analyses of potential conflict scenarios and associated risks. However, it might point to the volatile situation on the Korean peninsula as a reason why a future US defence strategy, force structure and global posture should be tailored to the possible need to fight and win two major regional wars simultaneously.4

In some respects, the Pentagon’s preferred strategy for dealing with ISIS resembles the Obama administration’s approach (often ridiculed by

4 Critics of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review argued that its force-sizing construct meant that US forces could not simultaneously fight and defeat aggressors in two major regional conflicts. The QDR language reads:

“If deterrence fails at any given time, US forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of – or imposing unacceptable costs on – a second aggressor in another region” (US Department of Defense 2014).

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then candidate Trump) to “degrade and destroy” the terrorist organi-sation and its affiliates through a US-led anti-ISIS coalition comprising some European allies and partners, with participation and support from largely Sunni Arab states in the region. The NDS almost certainly will not suggest the reintroduction of thousands of US combat forces into the Mid-dle East. However, Mattis has promised an “accelerated and reinforced”

effort and a shift from “attrition” to “annihilation” tactics. Based on its budget submissions for the fiscal year 2018, the Pentagon envisages a slight increase in funding to train and equip Iraqi government, Kurdish Peshmerga, and Syrian opposition forces. Several thousand US military advisors will probably remain forward deployed with (or near to) the combat forces they support in Iraq, with additional US military person-nel – approximately 2,000 according to recent Pentagon statements – in Syria. Notwithstanding the aforementioned cruise-missile strike last April, US military efforts in Syria are likely to remain heavily weighted

to combatting ISIS rather than the Syrian regime.

In this context, the Pentagon apparently remains sceptical regarding the possibility of extensive military cooperation with Russia in Syria. After all, Moscow and Washington are backing different sides in the conflict, and the US military and its coalition partners are very critical of Russian military tactics that produce high civilian casualties. Still, the NDS will probably support efforts, where possible, to avoid a direct US-Russian confrontation through military-to-military lines of communication.

Elsewhere in the region, the NDS is likely to stress the importance of enhanced defence cooperation (including through military sales) with Israel and those Arab states that are presumed to be reliable partners in fighting terrorism and containing Iran.

Regarding South Asia, the NDS will not unveil any significant change from the President’s August 2017 statement, which promised a “condi-tions-based” approach to the size and timing of the US troop presence in Afghanistan; increased pressure on Pakistan to stop the “harbouring of militants and terrorists”; and the further development of a US “strategic partnership” with India (White House 2017u). Some 4,000 US soldiers reportedly will join the 11,000 currently deployed in Afghanistan. Most will provide increased training and mentoring to Afghan forces, putting some Americans in closer proximity to direct combat with the Taliban.

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