A bridge between science and theology? : William A. Dembski´s theory of intelligent design

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DISSERTATIONS | JUUSO LOIKKANEN | A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY? | No 140

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THE UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN FINLAND Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology

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Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology

PUBLICATIONS OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN FINLAND

JUUSO LOIKKANEN

A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY?

William A. Dembski’s Theory of Intelligent Design According to the theory of intelligent design,

some features of the universe are too complex to have emerged by chance and must have been designed by a supernatural being. In this study, the thinking of one of the leading

advocates of intelligent design, William A. Dembski, is examined from scientific, philosophical, and theological perspectives.

JUUSO LOIKKANEN

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A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY?

WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI’S THEORY OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN

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Juuso Loikkanen

A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY?

WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI’S THEORY OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology

No 140

University of Eastern Finland Joensuu

2019

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Grano Oy Jyväskylä, 2019 Editor: Matti Kotiranta

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Loikkanen, Juuso

A Bridge Between Science and Theology? William A. Dembski’s Theory of Intelligent Design

University of Eastern Finland, 2019, 79 pages Publications of the University of Eastern Finland

Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology; 140 ISBN: 978-952-61-3085-9 (print)

ISBN: 978-952-61-3086-6 (PDF) ISSNL: 1798-5625

ISSN: 1798-5625 ISSN: 1798-5633 (PDF)

ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis was to examine William A. Dembski’s theory of intelligent design. Advocates of intelligent design oppose naturalism and hold that some features of the universe cannot have emerged by chance but were instead designed by a supernatural being. In particular, they are critical of the theory of evolution as an explanation of the development biological organisms. Dembski’s contribution to building the theory of intelligent design has been essential. He has constructed a systematic method with which it is allegedly possible to differentiate between objects that are designed and those that are not. The method is based on the concept of “specified complexity”.

Dembski suggests that if an object is, first, complex (one of many possibilities that could have actualised) and, second, specified (conforming to an independently given pattern), it can be inferred as being “designed”.

Dembski finds the consequences of intelligent design to be revolutionary. He argues that, using his method, objects manifesting specified complexity can be—and have been—found in the natural world. Since specified complexity cannot be gener- ated by natural causes, this would imply the existence of a supernatural agent who has created these objects. Although the identity of the designer cannot be revealed through the theory of intelligent design itself, Dembski believes that the designer is the God of Christianity, depicting intelligent design as “a bridge between science and theology”. Further, Dembski argues that methodological naturalism should be dis- carded as a principle of scientific inquiry, since it categorically excludes supernatural explanations. Likewise, according to Dembski, metaphysical naturalism should be abandoned as a philosophical viewpoint.

In this study, different aspects of Dembski’s thinking pertaining to intelligent design were brought together. First, the logic of design inference in Dembski’s theory was investigated and the credibility of the theory was assessed. It was shown that the criterion of specified complexity does not provide a plausible method of distin- guishing designed objects from non-designed ones, leading to the conclusion that intelligent design cannot be deemed as a proper scientific theory. Then, the possibility of applying Dembski’s theory to biology was considered. It was concluded that even if specified complexity were assumed to be a reliable indicator of design, it would be difficult to apply Dembski’s method to biological organisms because they are formed in a more complex manner than Dembski suggests. The implications of intelligent design for methodological and metaphysical naturalism, respectively, were also examined. It was revealed that Dembski’s theory—if true—would prove

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metaphysical naturalism to be false (more than just natural entities would exist) but would not result in completely abandoning methodological naturalism (restricting enquiry primarily to natural entities would be a reliable working method). Finally, the connection between intelligent design and Christianity was analysed. It was shown that the supernatural designer implied by Dembski’s theory would lack some of the characteristics commonly associated with the Christian God, making it problematic to associate the designer with God.

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Loikkanen, Juuso

A Bridge Between Science and Theology? William A. Dembski’s Theory of Intelligent Design

Itä-Suomen yliopisto, 2019, 79 sivua

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland

Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology; 140 ISBN: 978-952-61-3085-9 (nid.)

ISBN: 978-952-61-3086-6 (PDF) ISSNL: 1798-5625

ISSN: 1798-5625 ISSN: 1798-5633 (PDF)

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tämä tutkimus käsittelee William A. Dembskin älykkään suunnittelun teoriaa. Älyk- kään suunnittelun kannattajat vastustavat naturalismia ja väittävät, että tietyt maail- mankaikkeuden piirteet eivät ole voineet muotoutua sattumalta vaan niiden on olta- va yliluonnollisen olennon suunnittelemia. He kritisoivat erityisesti evoluutioteorian kykyä selittää kaikkien biologisten organismien kehitys. Dembski on eräs keskeisim- mistä älykkään suunnittelun teorian kehittäjistä. Hän on muotoillut systemaattisen menetelmän, jonka avulla hän katsoo olevan mahdollista erottaa suunnitellut objektit suunnittelemattomista. Menetelmä perustuu “täsmennetyn monimutkaisuuden” kri- teeriin: objektin voidaan päätellä olevan suunniteltu, jos se on monimutkainen (yksi monesta vaihtoehdosta, jotka olisivat voineet aktuaalisoitua) ja täsmennetty (objek- tista riippumatonta hahmoa vastaava).

Dembski pitää älykkään suunnittelun seurauksia mullistavina. Hänen mukaansa täsmennettyä monimutkaisuutta ilmentäviä objekteja voidaan havaita – ja on havait- tu – myös luonnossa. Koska luonnolliset syyt eivät pysty tuottamaan täsmennettyä monimutkaisuutta, on pääteltävä, että on olemassa yliluonnollinen olento, joka on luonut nämä objektit. Vaikka älykkään suunnittelun teoria ei paljasta suunnittelijan identiteettiä, Dembski uskoo suunnittelijan olevan kristinuskon Jumala, kuvaten äly- kästä suunnittelua “luonnontieteen ja teologian väliseksi sillaksi”. Dembski esittää, että metodologisesta naturalismista on luovuttava tieteen tekemisen perustana, sillä se sulkee kategorisesti pois yliluonnolliset selitykset. Samoin metafyysinen naturalismi on hylättävä filosofisena lähtökohtana.

Tässä tutkimuksessa Dembskin ajattelua lähestyttiin useasta eri näkökulmasta. En- sin analysoitiin suunnittelun havaitsemisen logiikkaa Dembskin teoriassa ja arvioitiin teorian toimivuutta. Kävi ilmi, että täsmennetyn monimutkaisuuden avulla ei voida luotettavasti erottaa toisistaan suunniteltuja ja ei-suunniteltuja objekteja. Älykästä suunnittelua ei näin ollen voida pitää uskottavana tieteellisenä teoriana. Seuraavaksi tutkittiin mahdollisuutta soveltaa Dembskin teoriaa biologiaan. Todettiin, että vaikka täsmennetty monimutkaisuus olisikin käyttökelpoinen suunnittelun havaitsemisen keino, menetelmää olisi hankalaa soveltaa biologisiin organismeihin, jotka muodos- tuvat Dembskin teoriassa kuvattua monimutkaisemmin.

Tämän jälkeen tarkasteltiin älykkään suunnittelun seurauksia metodologiselle ja metafyysiselle naturalismille. Jos Dembskin teoria olisi totta, metafyysinen naturalismi kumoutuisi (muitakin kuin luonnollisia olioita olisi olemassa), mutta metodolo- gista naturalismia ei tarvitsisi hylätä (luonnontieteellisen tutkimuksen rajoittaminen

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luonnollisiin ilmiöihin olisi perusteltua). Lopuksi tutkittiin älykkään suunnittelun ja kristinuskon välistä suhdetta. Paljastui, että Dembskin teorian mukaiselta yliluonnol- liselta suunnittelijalta puuttuu joitain ominaisuuksia, jotka perinteisesti yhdistetään kristinuskon Jumalaan. Suunnittelijan samastaminen Jumalaan on näin ollen ongel- mallista.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

According to theologian Alister McGrath, “the study of science and theology is one of the most fascinating areas of human inquiry,” bringing together “two of the most significant forces in contemporary society.”¹ I agree fully. As long as I remember, I have always found the subject extremely intriguing. A few years ago, I came across an interesting book. The back cover said that “everyone with interest in and responsibility for how science and theology interrelate should study it carefully.” I cer- tainly felt the interest, and perhaps even some responsibility, so I read the book.

The book was William A. Dembski’s Intelligent Design. The Bridge between Science and Theology. After reading it, I felt puzzled. On the one hand, I was impressed by the way Dembski daringly challenged many preconceptions considered self-evident in aca- demia, while also justifying many of his claims persuasively. On the other hand, he appeared over-confident and many of his claims perhaps not so well-founded after all. Overall, the book made me delve deeper into Dembski’s thinking. Eventually, I chose Dembski as the subject of my doctoral thesis.

I thank everyone who has supported me during the past few years and have enabled me to bring this research project into completion. In its early stages, the study was funded by the Finnish Cultural Foundation’s South Savo Regional Fund, the Church Research Institute of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, and the Olvi Foundation. I am especially grateful to the Philosophical Faculty and the School of Theology of the University of Eastern Finland for offering me a position as a Jun- ior Researcher, which allowed me to finish the project on schedule. I express special gratitude to the staff of the School of Theology for welcoming me as a fully-fledged member of the inspiring and supportive community. My thanks are also extended to my employer, the Student and Learning Services of the University of Eastern Finland, for its flexibility during my study leave.

I am greatly indebted to my supervisors Antti Raunio and Petteri Nieminen for their guidance during the writing of this thesis. Their constructive comments on different versions of the manuscript enabled me to greatly improve my text. Moreover, I appreciate the freedom given to pursue the work in my own way and to engage in other writing activities besides the thesis. I also thank the pre-examiners of the thesis, Willem B. Drees and Rope Kojonen, whose insightful remarks helped me add many important clarifications. The series editor Matti Kotiranta deserves thanks for his help in preparing the thesis for publication.

I express my deepest gratitude to my parents Olli and Ritva, whose encouragement to explore my topics of interest has been invaluable throughout my life. Finally, Katri, whose support extends from perceptive reading and commenting of my texts, and offering an intellectual stimulus to help me process my ideas, to partnering me in all endeavours of life—thank you.

Joensuu, April 2019 Juuso Loikkanen

1 McGrath 2010, vii.

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LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

This thesis is based on following original articles, referred to in the text by their Ro- man numerals:

ARTICLE I

Loikkanen, J. (2015): William A. Dembski’s Argument for Detecting Design through Specified Complexity. Philosophy and Theology 27(2), 289–306.

ARTICLE II

Loikkanen, J. (2015): Is God an Information Inputter? Complex Specified Information as Evidence of Divine Action. Journal of Academic Perspectives 8(4).

ARTICLE III

Loikkanen, J. (2016): Christianity and Intelligent Design. A Multidimensional Ap- proach. European Journal of Science and Theology 12(4), 61–69.

ARTICLE IV

Loikkanen, J. (2018): William A. Dembski’s Project of Intelligent Design. Studia Theo- logica – Nordic Journal of Theology 72(1), 68–83.

The articles are reprinted with the kind permission of Philosophy Documentation Center (I), Journal of Academic Perspectives (II), European Journal of Science and Theology/Dr. Iulian Rusu (III), and Taylor and Francis (IV).

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The Explanatory Filter. (Dembski 1998a, 37.) ... 45

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE INTUITION OF DESIGN

The intuition that some features of the universe are so well-ordered that they must have been designed for a purpose has been one of the strongest reasons to think that the world is governed by a supernatural being, such as God. The history of this so- called design argument (or teleological argument) is millennia-long, reaching back to Anquity.² The argument gained popularity especially in the heyday of British natural theology in the 17^th–19^th centuries. In his renowned treatise Natural Theology, William Paley illustrated the design intuition as follows, offering first an everyday example of design versus non-design:³

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the con- trary, it had lain there forever. (…) But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer I had before given. (…) [t]he inference, we think, is inevitable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.⁴ Paley then drew an analogy between the design of the watch and the apparent design observed in the natural world:

[E]very indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater or more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.⁵

Paley took it as self-evident that the existence of such a complex artefact as the watch would imply the existence of a designer who designed it. Since many natural objects were, in Paley’s view, clearly more complex and more skilfully constructed than the watch, it could indisputably be inferred that a supernatural designer who designed the natural objects exists: “the marks of design are too strong to be got over. Design [in nature] must have had a designer.”⁶ Furthermore, Paley believed that “[the] designer must have been a person. That person is God.”⁷

2 Sedley 2007.

3 As a promoter of the design argument, Paley was preceded by many of his fellow-countrymen, for example, John Ray (1717) and William Derham (1754).

4 Paley 2006, 7–8.

5 Paley 2006, 16.

6 Paley 2006, 229.

7 Paley 2006, 229.

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Before the competing evolutionary explanation introduced by Charles Darwin⁸ and Alfred Russel Wallace⁹, Paley’s view was a popular one. Both philosophers and scientists were convinced that the most reasonable explanation for the perceived adaptedness of organisms was that they had been purposefully designed by God.¹⁰ Although biology has since shown that the complexity of life forms can be explained by the gradual development of organisms, the intuitive attractiveness of design has not disappeared.¹¹ Even as prominent an atheist as Richard Dawkins admits that many features of the natural world look as if they have been designed. According to him,

“[b]iology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”¹²

The appearance of design, however, does not necessarily coincide with actual design. In other words, mere intuition that some particular object—as complex as it may appear to be—is designed does not mean that it really is. Further evidence that reaches beyond intuition is needed.¹³ During the last twenty years, a new movement promoting the idea that it is actually possible to gain reliable empirical evidence about signs of design in nature has emerged: Intelligent Design. That is the focus of this study.

1.2 DEFINING INTELLIGENT DESIGN

There are various definitions of intelligent design. The Oxford English Dictionary de- fines it as “deliberate design in the natural or physical world, attributed to an intelligent entity (usually identified as God)” or, “frequently with capital initials,” “a theory which posits this.” The same dictionary also reminds us that “the term is now used chiefly with reference to a modified form of creation science which promotes teleological explanations while minimizing the use of religious terminology.”¹⁴ This

8 Darwin 1859.

9 Wallace 2009.

10 Sober 1993, 29. For a thorough presentation of the historical development and contemporary perspectives on the relationship between the design argument and the theory of evolution, see McGrath 2011.

11 It has been argued that humans might have developed a tendency towards intuitively favouring teleological explanations as the cause of ambiguous phenomena because it would have given us a survival advantage in avoiding predators (Barrett 2000). Justin Barret (2004, 31) explains that our “ADD [agent detection device]

suffers from hyperactivity, making it prone to find agents around us, including supernatural ones, given fairly modest evidence of their presence”. However, the existence of a hyperactive agent detection device does not in itself either prove or disprove the existence of supernatural agents (Leech & Visala 2011a; Leech

& Visala 2011b). See also De Cruz & De Smedt 2010; Visala 2011.

12 Dawkins 2015, 4. Dawkins compares biological objects, which appear to be designed, to man-made arte- facts, which “are complicated and obviously designed for a purpose.”

13 For some, evidence is equal to scientific evidence. According to others, personal experience also counts as evidence. Alvin Plantinga (1981) and Del Ratzsch (2000, 100–109), for instance, hold that it is possible to adopt warranted beliefs without scientific evidence.

14 Oxford English Dictionary 2018b. The term “theory of intelligent design” can be taken as meaning that intelligent design aims to offer a rational explanation for some particular phenomena in the world (in Dembski’s formulation, those exhibiting specified complexity), much in the same sense that the theory of evolution offers a rational explanation for the development of biological organisms.

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definition corresponds well with how the majority of the contemporary scientific community sees intelligent design.¹⁵

William A. Dembski’s definition, in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, corresponds more closely with the views of the intelligent design community, defining intelligent design as “the field of study that investigates signs of intelligence”¹⁶ and “identifies those features of objects that reliably signal the action of an intelligent cause.”¹⁷ Elsewhere, Dembski sees intelligent design more widely, as “a scientific research program that investigates the effects of intelligent causes; an intellectual movement that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy; and a way of understanding divine action.”¹⁸

Often, a definition offered by the Discovery Institute, which sets intelligent design more clearly at odds with naturalism, is used (by both defenders and critics of intelligent design):

Intelligent design (ID) is a scientific theory that employs the methods commonly used by other historical sciences to conclude that certain features of the universe and of liv- ing things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection.¹⁹

In this study, the term “Intelligent Design” (spelt with capital letters) is used to refer to the movement initiated by Philip Johnson in the United States in the 1990s and nowadays associated with the Seattle-based Discovery Institute and its Center for Science and Culture.²⁰ The movement opposes methodological naturalism²¹, promotes

15 Now that the terms ”science” and ”scientific” have been mentioned, it is in order to clarify what is meant by “science.” It is safe to say that no universal definition of “science” exists. In this study, science is under- stood widely as “a systematic and logical approach to discovering how things in the universe work,” and also “the body of knowledge accumulated through the discoveries about all the things in the universe”

(Bradford 2017). This definition includes the formal sciences, such as mathematics and logic (which, e.g., makes it reasonable to use the term “scientific dimension” in Article II), and widens the often used definition of science as “(knowledge from) the careful study of the structure and behaviour of the physical world, especially by watching, measuring, and doing experiments, and the development of theories to describe the results of these activities” (Cambridge Dictionary 2018). The role of the scientific community in accu- mulating and preserving the body of knowledge known as “science” is essential. Scientific consensus in a particular issue is formed through communication and careful consideration of facts by experts in a relevant field of science. Consensus opinions are not necessarily true and are not immune to change, and may need to be revised when new facts are discovered. Furthermore, although consensus implies very broad agreement, it does not necessarily mean complete unanimity. (Kojonen 2015; Shwed & Bearman 2010.)

16 Emphasis in the original.

17 Dembski 2006a, 716.

18 Dembski 1999, 13.

19 Discovery Institute Staff 2009.

20 The history and characteristics of the Intelligent Design movement will be discussed further in Chapter 4.1.

21 Methodological naturalism can be defined as the view that “every legitimate method of acquiring knowledge consists of or is grounded in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences” (Moser

& Yandell 2000, 9). According to another definition, methodological naturalism is “a worldview-laden methodological approach, often taken for granted in science, according to which everything that happens must be explained by natural causes” (Puolimatka 2008, 631–632). The latter definition, which highlights the worldview-ladenness of methodological naturalism, seems to be in line with Johnson’s and his followers’

understanding of methodological naturalism. For a critique of methodological naturalism, see Craig &

Moreland 2000. See also Larvor 2015. The relationship between methodological naturalism and intelligent design is discussed in more detail in Articles II and IV.

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supernatural design and aims at influencing public opinion (mainly) in the United States. The term “intelligent design” (spelt with lower case letters), in turn, is used to refer to the actual theory of detecting design promoted by members of the Intelligent Design movement.²² It is also possible to interpret “intelligent design” more widely to describe all such thinking that there might exist signs of purposeful design in the physical world.²³

1.3 DESIGN ARGUMENTS: FROM ANALOGY TO IMPROBABILITY

According to William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design “is linked both conceptually and historically” to British natural theology—exemplified by Paley above—which he describes as “the attempt (…) to understand divine action scientifically.”²⁴ Although Dembski admits that natural theology has its problems, he holds that it still “contains an empirical core”—the idea of detectability of design in nature—that is worthy of consideration and could be developed further.²⁵ The strategy of Dembski and his fellow proponents of intelligent design for approaching this core, however, is sub- stantially different from that employed by natural theologians in the preceding centuries. Whereas Paley and his contemporaries mostly relied on analogical arguments, Dembski’s idea is to draw on logic and probability. His design argument is elimina- tive: design is inferred if other explanations can be ruled out with a high probability.²⁶ Admittedly, the traditional argument from analogy suffers from vulnerabilities, as was famously pointed out by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.

Hume argued that the argument is unreliable, because the similarities between two different kinds of things, for example human-made objects and natural objects, are always incomplete. Different things may share many properties but not all of them.

Consequently, it is impossible to know whether they share the property of “being designed.”²⁷ Moreover, the analogical argument cannot show that the designer would be some particular being, for instance, the God of Christianity (as has often been assumed in the Western discussion). Furthermore, the argument does not offer grounds for assuming that there are no multiple designers:

And what shadow of an argument (…) can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth: why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world?²⁸

22 In some cases, the contrast between “intelligent design” and “Intelligent Design” can be subtle. However, throughout the study I have tried to remain loyal to the distinction drawn here and always to use the more appropriate term.

23 Beckwith 2007, 93; Leslie & Kuhn 2013, 174.

24 Dembski 1999, 16.

25 Dembski 1999, 16, 73.

26 See Articles I and II and Ch. 5.1 and 5.2 for details of Dembski’s argument. As a part of his argumentation, Dembski also utilises analogical reasoning when discussing “specifications.”

27 Hume 1779, Pt. II.

28 Hume 1779, Pt. V.

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The argument from analogy also calls the assumption about the perfectness and in- finity of the designer into question, making it even more difficult to associate the designer with the Christian God:

This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superi- or standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force, which it received from him.²⁹ The probabilistic design argument proposed by Dembski and others might be able to escape much of Hume’s criticism. First, the argument does not rely solely on intuition, that is, inferring an object as designed simply if it instinctively appears to show signs of design. Instead, after the initial thought of design has arisen, formal calculations are applied to find out whether it actually is more probable that the emergence of the object is due to design than to other causes. Second, Dembski’s design argument is more agnostic than the classical analogical argument. Whereas Paley rather straightforwardly identified the designer as the God of Christianity, advocates of the theory of intelligent design admit that such a conclusion cannot be made merely on the grounds of the theory. In other words, Hume’s criticism regarding the identity of the designer is answered by dodging the question.³⁰

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

This study consists of six chapters, together with the four articles published in international peer-reviewed journals. In the current chapter, first introductory glimpses to the research theme are provided (1.1, 1.3) and the concept of intelligent design is defined (1.2). In Chapter 2, the aims of the study (2.1) and the structure of the research articles (2.2) are explained. The method of the study is also described (2.3) and the sources of the study are listed (2.4). Chapter 3 provides a review of previous literature on the research theme.

In Chapter 4, the birth and development of the Intelligent Design movement is described (4.1). In addition, an overview to the more general conversation on science and religion is offered (4.2) and the alleged role of intelligent design as “a bridge between science and theology” is discussed (4.3). In Chapter 5, the results of the study are presented: the credibility of the theory of intelligent design is assessed (5.1) and the implications of the theory for biology (5.2), philosophy (5.3), and theology (5.4) are presented. In the final chapter, the conclusions of the study are summarised.

29 Hume 1779, Pt. V. Similarly, Immanuel Kant (1998, 578–583) argued that the design argument can at most prove the existence of some kind of architect, not the God of Christianity (or other “all-sufficient original being”).

30 Of course, analogy and probabilistic elimination are not the only two ways to frame the design argument.

The purpose of this section is merely to introduce some main lines of discussion. In general, there has been a shift from somewhat intuitive arguments to more formal ones based on probabilities and logic. In this study, further discussion is omitted. For further analysis of the design argument, see Jantzen 2014; Ratzsch

& Koperski 2015, and for a critique of the argument, Sober 2013.

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2 AIMS, METHODS, AND SOURCES OF THE STUDY

2.1 AIMS OF THE STUDY

The object of the study is to offer a comprehensible evaluation of William A. Dembski’s theory of intelligent design, as well as to assess its reliability and implications. More precise research questions are:

1) According to Dembski’s theory, how can it be inferred that an object is designed?

2) Is Dembski’s theory a reliable method of detecting design?

3) If there are objects that have been designed—in the sense of Dembski’s theory—

what kind of conclusions should be drawn from this? Especially, if a biological object can be inferred to be designed, what are the consequences, first, for science and, second, for philosophy and theology?

4) What is the relationship between science, philosophy, and theology in Dembski’s theory?

Political and societal aspects of the theory of intelligent design mostly fall outside the scope of this study—questions such as whether intelligent design should be taught in schools or not, and the relationship between evangelical conservatism and intelligent design. These issues have already been covered widely by other authors.³¹ Moreover, these questions are more or less confined to the North American context and would require a more comprehensive analysis of the underlying political and intellectual landscape than the current study permits.³² Therefore, I find it reasonable to concentrate on the actual design arguments set forth by proponents of intelligent design.³³

To be precise, my aim is not to provide an analysis of the argumentation of the entire Intelligent Design movement. The focus is on Dembski. Of course, whenever necessary, the perspective includes other thinkers. Focusing solely on Dembski is a justified choice, for two reasons. First, Intelligent Design is not a homogenous movement but rather an attempt to unite a somewhat diverse group of people who share the belief that some features of the universe imply the existence of a supernatural

31 See, e.g., Campbell & Meyer 2003; Renka 2005; Forrest 2001; Forrest & Gross 2005. See also note 139.

32 Requests for including the teaching of intelligent design in the school curriculum have also been presented—to a much more modest extent, however—in other countries (BBC News 2006; Deutsche Welle 2005; Wroe 2005).

33 Another topic that is not discussed in this study is the problem of evil. Some commentators have argued that the apparent bad design in nature constitutes a powerful argument against the existence of an almighty, benevolent God—with whom the “Intelligent Designer” is often identified. However, first, because the problem of evil does not pertain specifically to intelligent design (or its Christian proponents) but challenges all Christian theology and, second, because I do not view the “bad design” argument as very strong in the first place (I find it difficult to define what would be “bad” design and what would not), the subject is omitted from this study. Moreover, the problem of evil is irrelevant to the actual formal argument proposed by Dembski, which does not depend on the goodness or badness of the designer. I have analysed Dembski’s understanding of the problem of evil in an article not included in this thesis (Loikkanen 2015).

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designer.³⁴ Therefore, treating Intelligent Design as a monolith might lead to gener- alizations, which could blur the difference between different members of the movement and could even be unfair to some. Second, although Dembski’s status as one of the leading promoters of the idea of intelligent design is undisputable, no academic study dealing exclusively with his thinking has been published previously. With this doctoral thesis, my aim is to fill that gap in the research.

2.2 THE RESEARCH ARTICLES

Answers to the above research questions are presented in four articles published in international academic journals between 2015 and 2018 (and supplemented in Chap- ter 5). The articles progress from examining the fundamentals of Dembski’s theory to analysing its connections with science, philosophy, and theology, and finally to an overall assessment of Dembski’s project. In Article I (William A. Dembski’s Argument for Detecting Design through Specified Complexity), the basic structure of Dembski’s argu- ment for detecting design is presented. The logic of the argument is described in detail (research question 1) and scrutinised carefully, revealing various problems relating to the theory (research question 2).

A slightly different perspective is taken in Article II (Is God an Information Input- ter? Complex Specified Information as Evidence of Divine Action). There, an overview of Dembski’s theory of design detection is offered from the point of view of information theory (research question 1). It is shown that this approach also entails serious difficulties (research question 2). Furthermore, the possibility of applying Dembski’s theory to biology is examined and its implications for the methodology of science are addressed (research question 3).

A more multifaceted—and this way, hopefully, a more complete—picture of Dembski’s theory of intelligent design is constructed in Article III (Christianity and In- telligent Design. A Multidimensional Approach³⁵). The scientific dimension of Dembski’s theory is put into a wider context when its philosophical and theological implications are explicated (research question 3). In consequence, it becomes clear why scientific credibility is crucial to all aspects of Dembski’s theory. The connection between intelligent design and Christianity is also considered (research question 4).

In Article IV (William A. Dembski’s Project of Intelligent Design), a big picture of Dembski’s theory of intelligent design is constructed and the overall success of his project is assessed. It is also analysed whether the implications of Dembski’s theory for the practices of science—methodological naturalism, in particular—are as significant as he claims (research question 3). Some theological viewpoints regarding the connection between intelligent design and Christianity are also considered (research question 4).³⁶

34 Paul Nelson (2002) describes Intelligent Design as a “big tent”, under which “any number of particular theories may also be possible, including traditional creationism, progressive (or ‘Old-Earth’) creationism, and theistic evolution”–although this view is not shared by all followers of Intelligent Design, many of whom see theistic evolutionism and intelligent design as being at odds (see Ch. 4.1.4). Dembski (2006b, 20) writes that he has “seen intelligent design embraced by Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, agnostics and even atheists.”

35 The bolding in Article II reflects the choices of the publisher and not those of the author.

36 Regarding Article IV, during the editing process, three of my original Internet sources were removed and replaced with references to ”Southern Baptist Theological Seminary website”, ”CitizenLink website” and

“interview (…) published on Sean McDowell Blog”. The original sources are, respectively, Robinson 2004;

Williams 2007; McDowell 2016.

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2.3 METHOD OF THE STUDY

The method of the study is systematic analysis. In systematic theology, “systematic analysis” usually refers to a collection of analytic methods by which the researcher aims at:

1) clarifying the inner world of the texts examined by analysing the concepts, presuppositions, assertions, and argumentation employed by the author, and 2) presenting the results of this analysis in a logically organised manner.³⁷

Sometimes, making sense of an author’s texts can turn out to be challenging since the original texts are not in an easily analysable form. The task of systematic analysis is to accept this challenge and to reveal the structuring principles of the author’s thinking based on possibly multi-interpretational and ambiguous material. Possible inconsistencies and logical fallacies emerging from the texts must also be brought to light.³⁸ Another difficulty is that the initial research questions cannot necessarily be answered on the basis of the research material. Often, research questions need to be reformulated during the research process.³⁹

More specifically, in this study, what is meant by systematic analysis is to construct a comprehensive picture of Dembski’s thinking by carefully scrutinising his writings and analysing the concepts and the line of argumentation used by him. In addition to what Dembski is saying, the things he remains silent about are taken into account. The presuppositions and structuring principles not explicitly expressed by Dembski are determined in order to reveal the logicality—or illogicality—of his thinking. Moreover, Dembski’s theory of intelligent design is mirrored against the backdrop of contemporary discussion on science and religion.

2.4 SOURCES OF THE STUDY

The main sources of the study are Dembski’s writings, most importantly the monographs The Design Inference. Eliminating Chance through Small Possibilities⁴⁰ and No Free Lunch. Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased without Intelligence⁴¹. These pieces of work are constitutive to Dembski’s theory: in the former, he formulates the concept of specified complexity and in the latter, he explains why specified complexity necessarily implies the existence of an intelligent designer. Other frequently used sources include Dembski’s books The Design Revolution. Answering the Toughest Questions about Intelligent Design⁴², Intelligent Design. The Bridge Between Science and Theology⁴³, and

37 Jolkkonen 2007.

38 Heinonen 2001.

39 Nurmi 2014.

40 Dembski 1998a.

41 Dembski 2002a.

42 Dembski 2004a.

43 Dembski 1999.

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Being as Communion. Metaphysics of Information⁴⁴, which offer broader perspectives on the theory of intelligent design and in which Dembski explains his ideas in a more non-technical language. In addition, I will be using several other books and articles written by Dembski, in which he sharpens and refines the details of his design argument and expresses his philosophical and theological views more widely.⁴⁵

44 Dembski 2014.

45 Not all Dembski’s publications are listed as sources in this study. In many of his writings, Dembski cir- culates the same ideas (even verbatim), and therefore listing all the publications only in order to present an exhaustive bibliography would not add anything to the analysis.

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3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH

3.1 BOOKS ON INTELLIGENT DESIGN

During the past two decades, dozens of books have been published on the theory of intelligent design.⁴⁶ However, it is still not easy to find an objective, well-balanced study on the subject. Most writers have either labelled intelligent design as creationism or accepted its claims without any critique. Three examples of somewhat neu- tral and comprehensive representations of different aspects of intelligent design are Debating Design. From Darwin to DNA⁴⁷, edited by William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse, God and Design. The Teleological Argument and Modern Science⁴⁸, edited by Neil A. Manson, and Intelligent Design. William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse in Dialogue⁴⁹, edited by Robert B. Stewart. The former two deal (mostly) with issues in biology and cosmology, respectively, whereas the latter is more general in scope. However, all these books consist of individual articles written by proponents and opponents of intelligent design with no thorough overarching analysis. The most comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of Intelligent Design is a recent doctoral thesis by Rope Kojonen, Intelligent Design. A Theological and Philosophical Analysis, in which he attempts (and largely succeeds) to provide “a more balanced and nuanced view of both the strengths and weaknesses of ID’s argumentation than much of the previous discussion.”⁵⁰ A profound analysis of the philosophical foundations of design arguments (that of Intelligent Design but also more general ones) is Del Ratzsch’s Nature, Design, and Science.⁵¹

Some of the books more straightforwardly criticising intelligent design include The Tower of Babel. The Evidence Against the New Creationism⁵² by Robert T. Pennock, Un- intelligent Design⁵³ by Mark Perakh, God, the Devil, and Darwin. A Critique of Intelligent Design Theory⁵⁴ by Niall Shanks, and Why Intelligent Design Fails. A Scientific Critique of New Creationism⁵⁵ edited by Matt Young and Taner Edis. In Creatonism’s Trojan Horse.

The Wedge of Intelligent Design Creationism⁵⁶, Barbara Forrest and Paul R. Gross focus on

46 The history of the more general design argument is, of course, much longer than this. Here, I concentrate on Intelligent Design. For an introduction to the design argument—and its connections to the idea of intelligent design—see, e.g., Himma 2018.

47 Dembski & Ruse 2004.

48 Manson 2003.

49 Stewart 2007. The subtitle is actually rather misleading: most of the articles in the book are written by other scholars (i.a., John Polkinghorne and Wolfhart Pannenberg).

50 Kojonen 2014, 3. See also Kojonen 2016.

51 Ratzsch 2001.

52 Pennock 1999.

53 Perakh 2003a.

54 Shanks 2004.

55 Young & Edis 2004.

56 Forrest & Gross 2005.

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revealing the religious, political and societal presuppositions and aims of Intelligent Design. Perhaps the most extensive collection of articles sceptical of intelligent design (although many pro-intelligent design papers are also included) is Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics. Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives⁵⁷ edited by Robert T. Pennock.⁵⁸

Several introductory works have been produced by members of the Intelligent Design community, for example, Mere Creation. Science, Faith and Intelligent Design⁵⁹ edited by Dembski, Intelligent Design 101. Leading Experts Explain the Key Issues⁶⁰ edited by H. Wayne House, and Darwinism, Design and Public Education⁶¹ edited by John Angus Campbell and Stephen C. Meyer.⁶² In addition, the key figures of Intelligent Design have published a variety of more detailed monographs which are considered to constitute the cornerstones of intelligent design as a scientific theory. Philip E.

Johnson’s Darwin on Trial⁶³ was the ground-breaker, setting the intellectual framework for the entire project of intelligent design. Dembski’s The Design Inference. Eliminating Chance through Small Possibilities⁶⁴ and No Free Lunch. Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased without Intelligence⁶⁵ aimed at establishing the mathematical foundations of intelligent design, while Michael Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box. The Biochemical Chal- lenge to Evolution⁶⁶ and The Edge of Evolution. The Search for the Limits of Darwinism⁶⁷ focused on applying intelligent design to biology. Alongside Behe, Stephen C. Meyer has defended the biological design argument in Signature in the Cell. DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design⁶⁸ and Darwin’s Doubt. The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design⁶⁹.⁷⁰

3.2 INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN PEER-REVIEWED JOURNALS

Since the late 1990s, intelligent design has found its way into academic journals. How- ever, the discussion has been rather modest (when compared to many other contemporary topics in the science-and-religion field, such as the problem of consciousness

57 Pennock 2001. Although space is also given to pro-intelligent design voices such as Dembski, the majority of writers belong to the opposite camp.

58 See also Ayala 2006; Brockman 2006; Baird & Rosenbaum 2007; Petto & Goldfrey 2007.

59 Dembski 1998b.

60 House 2008.

61 Campbell & Meyer 2003. Despite its name, the book also addresses other topics relating to intelligent design, not only school education.

62 See also Behe, Dembski & Meyer 2000.

63 Johnson 1991.

64 Dembski 1998a.

65 Dembski 2002a.

66 Behe 1996.

67 Behe 2007. Wells (2002) has also criticised the evolutionary theory as the only acceptable paradigm in biology.

68 Meyer 2009.

69 Meyer 2013.

70 See also Moreland 1994; Wells 2006; Fuller 2007; Fuller 2008; Monton 2009.

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or the relationship between modern physics and divine action) and often limited to assessing the (hidden) metaphysical and religious motives behind the allegedly scientific theory. The following two examples (from Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science⁷¹) are illustrative. Howard van Till argues that intelligent design does not stand a chance as a scientific theory, at least not before its advocates lay all their philosophical and theological cards on the table, thus making it possible for everyone to assess their scientific claims against a wider ideological backdrop. Van Till insists that “people who believe that life could arise only as the outcome of irruptive, form-imposing acts by an intelligent agent (presumably God, in this case) will (…) just have to say so.”⁷² Gregory R. Peterson agrees, reaching the conclusion that intelligent design is an “ideological agenda masquerading as science” and primarily driven by religious considerations. Denying the ideological aspect, according to Peterson, “will result in only more painful public encounters at the expense of the religious traditions its proponents seek to defend.”⁷³

Other authors have concentrated on the internal inconsistencies in the argumentation of intelligent design advocates (again, two examples from Zygon are offered). Uko Zylstra Zylstra points out that, on the one hand, they accuse naturalism of reducing reality to the material world but, on the other hand, fall victim of ontological reduc- tionism of their own, which leads to a flawed understanding of reality. Zylstra admits that philosophical critique against naturalism could—in principle—be justified, but proposes that this needs to be done in a more coherent manner, taking all levels of reality into account on their own terms.⁷⁴ This is characteristic of much of the debate surrounding intelligent design: although it is seen as an interesting phenomenon (not by all commentators, of course), it is usually treated with considerable reservation.

Rope Kojonen remarks that the line of argumentation against theistic evolutionism⁷⁵ employed in the Intelligent Design movement is not consistent. When theistic evolutionism is opposed because it does not provide sufficient scientific evidence for design and therefore is not essentially different from atheistic evolutionism, symptoms of scientism⁷⁶ are evident. However, opposing (naturalistic) scientism is often seen as one of the main goals of Intelligent Design.⁷⁷

It has also been remarked that the proponents of intelligent design sometimes resort to argumentative fallacies when promoting their views. According to Petteri Nieminen, Esko Ryökäs and Anne-Mari Mustonen, intelligent design authors cite individual statements of scientists out of context and use these statements as a support for highlighting (alleged) problems in the theory of evolution. Furthermore, scientific

71 For a list of selected articles on intelligent design published in Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, see Drees 2013.

72 Van Till 1999. Van Till focuses here mostly on analysing the argumentation of Dembski (1998a) and Overman (1997).

73 Peterson 2002.

74 Zylstra 2004.

75 See Ch. 4.1.4.

76 Scientism can be defined as “an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural science applied to all areas of investigation” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2018). Put a bit differently, scientism is

“the belief that science is the only or at least our overwhelmingly best way of gaining knowledge about anything” (Kojonen 2014, 44).

77 Kojonen 2013.

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evidence is sometimes cherry-picked and counter-evidence against the theory of intelligent design is ignored in order to draw attention only to those pieces of evidence which support the theory.⁷⁸

Jeffrey Koperski attempts to approach the issue more neutrally than many other authors and has called for a balanced, non-polemic discussion on both the merits and shortcomings of intelligent design. He admits that there are good reasons to be critical of intelligent design (such as its poor ability to come up with a proper scientific research programme), but also notes that much of the criticism directed against it (such as focusing on the religious commitments of the promoters of intelligent design) is not relevant and only complicates rational assessment of the actual design argument.⁷⁹ Similarly, Gregory Dawes argues that although some forms of the argument (elimina- tive argument) put forward by Intelligent Design are bound to fail, others (inductive argument, inference to the best explanation) are “worthy of respect” and cannot be dismissed out of hand but should be considered carefully.⁸⁰

The Intelligent Design community has also launched a journal of their own called BIO-Complexity, which “aims to be the leading forum for testing the scientific merit of the claim that intelligent design (ID) is a credible explanation for life.”⁸¹ According to Jay W. Richards, such a journal is needed because the opposition to ID in the scientific community is so intense, particularly in the biological sciences.⁸² The journal is supported by the Biologic Institute, whose staff is “developing and presenting the scientific case for intelligent design in biology.”⁸³ The Biologic Institute is, in turn, funded primarily by the Discovery Institute.⁸⁴ So far, the success of the journal has been modest. Since its establishment in 2010, BIO-Complexity has published 27 research or review articles, more than half of which have been authored or co-authored by members of the Editorial Team of the journal.⁸⁵

3.3 PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON DEMBSKI’S THEORY

A few peer-reviewed articles dealing specifically with Dembski’s thinking are available. Topics covered are rather similar to those mentioned above (Dembski’s work is also commented in many of the mentioned books). In some cases, Dembski is seen simply as one of the many advocates of intelligent design who promote a common antinaturalistic agenda (which, arguably, is also true). Some writers, however, have concentrated more on the details of Dembski’s argumentation. Below, in addition to offering an overview of previous research on Dembski, some gaps in the research are identified.

78 Nieminen, Ryökäs & Mustonen 2014; Nieminen, Ryökäs & Mustonen 2015. Nieminen (2015, 49–50) points out, however, that argumentative fallacies are also found in pro-evolutionary texts.

79 Koperski 2008.

80 Dawes 2007.

81 BIO-Complexity 2018b.

82 Richards 2010.

83 Biologic Institute 2018b.

84 Biologic Institute 2018a.

85 BIO-Complexity 2018a; BIO-Complexity 2018c.

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Michael J. Murray has focused on Demsbki’s “explanatory filter”⁸⁶—his method of detecting design—and its inability to detect design imitating chance.⁸⁷ According to Murray, even if we accepted the assumption that a supernatural designer existed and might act in the world, it would be impossible to know whether some particular phenomenon was brought about by the designer. This is because a designer powerful enough could conceal its actions and make it seem like the regular laws of nature were operating to produce the observed phenomenon. Furthermore, Murray holds that purely naturalistic methodology is always the only reasonable option in science. In my view, Murray’s ideas are largely correct but they might require refining, particularly with regard to the idea that it may not be possible in all cases to discern between God acting through natural causes and observable interventions.

Some gaps in Dembski’s reasoning regarding how to detect design are also examined by Branden Fitelson, Christopher Stephens and Elliott Sober. In particular, they point out that Dembski’s explanatory filter is “enormously ambitious” in aiming to reliably reject all possible explanations based on other causes than design, even including explanations that have not yet been presented. Moreover, Dembski has been criticised for assigning probabilities to phenomena in a biased manner.⁸⁸ This critique is well founded, but—the paper being a book review (of Dembski’s The Design Infer- ence⁸⁹)—could perhaps be developed even further. Similar considerations have also been raised by other authors, for example, Robin Collins, who claims that although it is theoretically possible to construct a reliable procedure for detecting design, Dembski has not yet provided one.⁹⁰ Overall, the need to bring together and analyse the somewhat fragmented pieces of critique regarding Dembski’s explanatory filter still remains.

Dembski’s theory has also been approached from the point of view of information theory. Wesley Elsberry and Jeffrey Shallit maintain that Dembski uses the concept of information differently from how information theorists usually do, leading to biased results.⁹¹ Sean Devine agrees, noting that there are already better and more established procedures to measure randomness than Dembski’s method based on complex specified information.⁹² One important aspect of Dembski’s thinking relating to information, however—the philosophical and theological dimensions of information and the way God (allegedly) uses information to act in the world—has not previously been discussed in the literature.

Chris Doran has analysed Dembski’s critique of naturalism, asserting that the way he equates methodological naturalism with metaphysical naturalism “denigrates the considerable work that those involved with the contemporary science and religion

86 See Dembski 1998a, 88.

87 Murray 2012. See also Murray 2006.

88 Fitelson, Stephens & Sober 1999.

89 Dembski 1998a.

90 Collins 2001. Collins himself believes that convincing evidence of design is already available, although not through intelligent design. He is a firm supporter of the fine-tuning argument, according to which some physical constants are so finely balanced that even minor changes in their values would make it impossible for life as we know it to arise (Rees 1999, 1–3). See Collins 2003; Collins 2013.

91 Elsberry & Shallit 2011. See also Shallit & Elsberry 2004.

92 Devine 2014.

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dialogue have done on this issue.”⁹³ Regardless of the definitions given to methodological and metaphysical naturalism, it is clear that they are not—contrary to what Dembski has claimed— “functionally equivalent”.⁹⁴ This also means that the relationship between Dembski’s theory and methodological naturalism is not similar to the relationship between the theory and metaphysical naturalism. Doran, however, does not discuss the differences, neither is the issue addressed in depth elsewhere in the literature. In my view, the consequences of Dembski’s theory for both methodological and metaphysical naturalism should be explicated thoroughly.

Doran is also one of the authors who has focused attention on the theological implications of intelligent design.⁹⁵According to Doran, from the viewpoint of Christianity, Dembski’s theory yields significant difficulties in terms of associating the supernatural designer with the God of Christianity.⁹⁶ The point raised is an important one—after all, Dembski believes that “the Designer of intelligent design is, ultimately, the Christian God”⁹⁷—but it is not clear that the relationship between intelligent design and Chris- tianity is necessarily as problematic as Doran suggests. Further analysis is needed.

Other theological commentators have also seen tensions between intelligent design and Christianity, and difficulties in the attempts to connect the two. For example, Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath find that Intelligent Design “argues for an ‘Intelligent Designer’ based on gaps in the scientific explanation” and that “those who adopt this approach make Christianity deeply—and needlessly—vulnerable to scientific progress.”⁹⁸ On the one hand, this is a justifiable concern: the promoters of intelligent design do in fact tend to focus on phenomena that remain currently unexplained by natural causes as evidence for God, thus taking the risk that natural explanations will someday be found. On the other hand, Dembski, for example, argues that there are phenomena that can never be explained by natural causes. If this could be proven, it would have significant metaphysical and theological consequences.⁹⁹

Although the review offered here may not be complete, it is—hopefully—sufficient- ly comprehensive to provide an overview of the critique that Dembski’s theory has attracted, as well as to indicate the range of scientific, philosophical, and theological issues associated with intelligent design.¹⁰⁰ Generally speaking, Dembski’s argumentation has been hailed as revolutionary within the Intelligent Design movement but has failed to convince many scholars outside the movement.¹⁰¹ However, a more complete and thorough analysis of the different aspects of Dembski’s thinking is still missing; no all-encompassing study of Dembski exists. In this thesis, I hope to provide one.

93 Doran 2010.

94 Dembski 1998, 28.

95 See also Nieminen, Mustonen & Ryökäs 2014 (although their focus is not on Dembski).

96 Doran 2010.

97 Williams 2007.

98 McGrath & Collicutt McGrath, 11–12. Similarly, Hart 2013, 38.

99 See Ch. 5.3 and 5.4.

100 Critique against Dembski’s theory is discussed in more detail in the research articles.

101 See, e.g., Behe 1999; Meyer 2000; Luskin 2010; Ewert 2013 for supporting and praising comments. One interpretation could be that those agreeing with Dembski are by definition already within Intelligent Design.

Some commentators, although not supporting Intelligent Design, give Dembski genuine credit for his efforts.

For example, Ted Peters (2004, 3) describes Dembski’s argumentation as “careful,” “erudite,” and “thorough.”

A bridge between science and theology? : William A. Dembski´s theory of intelligent design

uef.fi

Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology

JUUSO LOIKKANEN

A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY?

JUUSO LOIKKANEN

A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY?

Juuso Loikkanen

A BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY?

ABSTRACT

TIIVISTELMÄ

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE INTUITION OF DESIGN

1.2 DEFINING INTELLIGENT DESIGN

1.3 DESIGN ARGUMENTS: FROM ANALOGY TO IMPROBABILITY

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

2 AIMS, METHODS, AND SOURCES OF THE STUDY

2.1 AIMS OF THE STUDY

2.2 THE RESEARCH ARTICLES

2.3 METHOD OF THE STUDY

2.4 SOURCES OF THE STUDY

3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH

3.1 BOOKS ON INTELLIGENT DESIGN

3.2 INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN PEER-REVIEWED JOURNALS

3.3 PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON DEMBSKI’S THEORY