3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
3.3 Previous Literature on Dembski’s Theory
A few peer-reviewed articles dealing specifically with Dembski’s thinking are avail-able. Topics covered are rather similar to those mentioned above (Dembski’s work is also commented in many of the mentioned books). In some cases, Dembski is seen simply as one of the many advocates of intelligent design who promote a common antinaturalistic agenda (which, arguably, is also true). Some writers, however, have concentrated more on the details of Dembski’s argumentation. Below, in addition to offering an overview of previous research on Dembski, some gaps in the research are identified.
78 Nieminen, Ryökäs & Mustonen 2014; Nieminen, Ryökäs & Mustonen 2015. Nieminen (2015, 49–50) points out, however, that argumentative fallacies are also found in pro-evolutionary texts.
79 Koperski 2008.
80 Dawes 2007.
81 BIO-Complexity 2018b.
82 Richards 2010.
83 Biologic Institute 2018b.
84 Biologic Institute 2018a.
85 BIO-Complexity 2018a; BIO-Complexity 2018c.
Michael J. Murray has focused on Demsbki’s “explanatory filter”86—his method of detecting design—and its inability to detect design imitating chance.87 According to Murray, even if we accepted the assumption that a supernatural designer existed and might act in the world, it would be impossible to know whether some particular phenomenon was brought about by the designer. This is because a designer powerful enough could conceal its actions and make it seem like the regular laws of nature were operating to produce the observed phenomenon. Furthermore, Murray holds that purely naturalistic methodology is always the only reasonable option in science. In my view, Murray’s ideas are largely correct but they might require refining, particularly with regard to the idea that it may not be possible in all cases to discern between God acting through natural causes and observable interventions.
Some gaps in Dembski’s reasoning regarding how to detect design are also exam-ined by Branden Fitelson, Christopher Stephens and Elliott Sober. In particular, they point out that Dembski’s explanatory filter is “enormously ambitious” in aiming to reliably reject all possible explanations based on other causes than design, even in-cluding explanations that have not yet been presented. Moreover, Dembski has been criticised for assigning probabilities to phenomena in a biased manner.88 This critique is well founded, but—the paper being a book review (of Dembski’s The Design Infer-ence89)—could perhaps be developed even further. Similar considerations have also been raised by other authors, for example, Robin Collins, who claims that although it is theoretically possible to construct a reliable procedure for detecting design, Dembski has not yet provided one.90 Overall, the need to bring together and analyse the somewhat fragmented pieces of critique regarding Dembski’s explanatory filter still remains.
Dembski’s theory has also been approached from the point of view of information theory. Wesley Elsberry and Jeffrey Shallit maintain that Dembski uses the concept of information differently from how information theorists usually do, leading to biased results.91 Sean Devine agrees, noting that there are already better and more established procedures to measure randomness than Dembski’s method based on complex spec-ified information.92 One important aspect of Dembski’s thinking relating to informa-tion, however—the philosophical and theological dimensions of information and the way God (allegedly) uses information to act in the world—has not previously been discussed in the literature.
Chris Doran has analysed Dembski’s critique of naturalism, asserting that the way he equates methodological naturalism with metaphysical naturalism “denigrates the considerable work that those involved with the contemporary science and religion
86 See Dembski 1998a, 88.
87 Murray 2012. See also Murray 2006.
88 Fitelson, Stephens & Sober 1999.
89 Dembski 1998a.
90 Collins 2001. Collins himself believes that convincing evidence of design is already available, although not through intelligent design. He is a firm supporter of the fine-tuning argument, according to which some physical constants are so finely balanced that even minor changes in their values would make it impossible for life as we know it to arise (Rees 1999, 1–3). See Collins 2003; Collins 2013.
91 Elsberry & Shallit 2011. See also Shallit & Elsberry 2004.
92 Devine 2014.
dialogue have done on this issue.”93 Regardless of the definitions given to method-ological and metaphysical naturalism, it is clear that they are not—contrary to what Dembski has claimed— “functionally equivalent”.94 This also means that the relation-ship between Dembski’s theory and methodological naturalism is not similar to the relationship between the theory and metaphysical naturalism. Doran, however, does not discuss the differences, neither is the issue addressed in depth elsewhere in the literature. In my view, the consequences of Dembski’s theory for both methodological and metaphysical naturalism should be explicated thoroughly.
Doran is also one of the authors who has focused attention on the theological impli-cations of intelligent design.95According to Doran, from the viewpoint of Christianity, Dembski’s theory yields significant difficulties in terms of associating the supernatural designer with the God of Christianity.96 The point raised is an important one—after all, Dembski believes that “the Designer of intelligent design is, ultimately, the Christian God”97—but it is not clear that the relationship between intelligent design and Chris-tianity is necessarily as problematic as Doran suggests. Further analysis is needed.
Other theological commentators have also seen tensions between intelligent design and Christianity, and difficulties in the attempts to connect the two. For example, Alister McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath find that Intelligent Design “argues for an ‘Intelligent Designer’ based on gaps in the scientific explanation” and that “those who adopt this approach make Christianity deeply—and needlessly—vulnerable to scientific progress.”98 On the one hand, this is a justifiable concern: the promoters of intelligent design do in fact tend to focus on phenomena that remain currently unexplained by natural causes as evidence for God, thus taking the risk that natural explanations will someday be found. On the other hand, Dembski, for example, argues that there are phenomena that can never be explained by natural causes. If this could be proven, it would have significant metaphysical and theological consequences.99
Although the review offered here may not be complete, it is—hopefully—sufficient-ly comprehensive to provide an overview of the critique that Dembski’s theory has attracted, as well as to indicate the range of scientific, philosophical, and theological issues associated with intelligent design.100 Generally speaking, Dembski’s argumenta-tion has been hailed as revoluargumenta-tionary within the Intelligent Design movement but has failed to convince many scholars outside the movement.101 However, a more complete and thorough analysis of the different aspects of Dembski’s thinking is still missing; no all-encompassing study of Dembski exists. In this thesis, I hope to provide one.
93 Doran 2010.
94 Dembski 1998, 28.
95 See also Nieminen, Mustonen & Ryökäs 2014 (although their focus is not on Dembski).
96 Doran 2010.
97 Williams 2007.
98 McGrath & Collicutt McGrath, 11–12. Similarly, Hart 2013, 38.
99 See Ch. 5.3 and 5.4.
100 Critique against Dembski’s theory is discussed in more detail in the research articles.
101 See, e.g., Behe 1999; Meyer 2000; Luskin 2010; Ewert 2013 for supporting and praising comments. One interpretation could be that those agreeing with Dembski are by definition already within Intelligent Design.
Some commentators, although not supporting Intelligent Design, give Dembski genuine credit for his efforts.
For example, Ted Peters (2004, 3) describes Dembski’s argumentation as “careful,” “erudite,” and “thorough.”