Intelligent Design and Philosophy (III, IV)

5.3.1 Intelligent Design and Metaphysical Naturalism

The philosophical implications of Dembski’s theory are discussed in Articles III and IV. One of his main targets of criticism (and also that of the entire Intelligent Design movement) is metaphysical naturalism, the philosophical idea that natural causes and spatial-temporal objects are everything that exists.²⁸⁷ Dembski claims that

methodological naturalism is the functional equivalent of full-blown metaphysical nat-uralism. Metaphysical naturalism asserts that nature is self-sufficient. Methodological naturalism asks us for the sake of science to pretend that nature is self-sufficient. But once science is taken as the only universally valid form of knowledge within a culture, it follows that methodological and metaphysical naturalism become functionally equiv-alent.²⁸⁸

Here, the addition “once science is taken as the only universally valid form of knowl-edge” is crucial. In my view, such an assumption, also known as scientism, is unneces-sary—and logically false.²⁸⁹ Although some commentators hold that “the relationship between methodological and philosophical naturalism (…) is the only reasonable metaphysical conclusion”,²⁹⁰ it is by no means necessary to adopt such a position.

Dembski should know better, considering all the philosophical and theological argu-ments he employs when arguing for supernatural intelligence, for example. To stress the difference of methodological and metaphysical naturalism, a quote from Paul de Vries, the coiner of the term “methodological naturalism” is appropriate:

Methodological naturalism is quite different from metaphysical naturalism. Metaphys-ical naturalism is a philosophMetaphys-ical perspective that denies the existence of a transcendent God. Methodological naturalism does not deny the existence of God because this scien-tific methodology does not even raise the question of God’s existence. Unfortunately, these two kinds of naturalism have often been confused. As a result, it has seemed to the philosophically careless as if the natural sciences under the guidance of methodo-logical naturalism have provided evidence for metaphysical naturalism. This confusion is regrettable and certainly inexcusable.²⁹¹

Contrary to the case of methodological naturalism, discovering signs of design in nature would have significant consequences for metaphysical naturalism. Clearly (to revisit the formulation used above),

287 Larvor 2015, 48–49.

288 Dembski 1999, 119–120.

289 See note 75.

290 Forrest 2000, 7.

291 De Vries 1986, 389.

a) if Dembski’s theory of intelligent design would provide a reliable method to detect design, and

b) if the method could be applied to natural phenomena, and c) if some of these phenomena exhibited specified complexity,

then metaphysical naturalism should be abandoned because a supernatural design-er—and thus supernatural causes—would necessarily exist. ²⁹²

Undoubtedly, this would be revolutionary: the existence of a supernatural being (of some kind) would be proven with a very high probability probability, which would have to be seriously taken into account in all human life. In particular, this would mean that naturalistic theories would lose much—if not all—of their credibility in philosophy. At the same time, obviously, if the existence of a supernatural being was confirmed, it would open up plenty of chances to develop theistic (or other reli-gious-based) theories of philosophy in a much more solid manner than is currently possible.²⁹³ In my view, this is the aim of the advocates of intelligent design—to make explanations appealing to the supernatural acceptable and to question the plausibility of naturalistic philosophy.

If successful, the approach employed by Dembski and his colleagues would be very convenient. To wit, if someday signs of design were found in nature, it would indis-putably lead to the conclusion that a supernatural designer exists and metaphysical naturalism would be false. However, as yet, no convincing examples of supernatural design have been presented—either by Dembski or by anyone else.

5.3.2 Who is the Intelligent Designer?

Even if it could be confirmed that a supernatural designer has designed some natural phenomena, the identity and the motives of the designer behind these phenomena would still remain a mystery, since the theory of intelligent design does not offer tools for answering these questions (surely, Dembski himself believes that the designer is the God of Christianity²⁹⁴).²⁹⁵ Consequently, as Dembski also points out, the theory of intelligent design is compatible with a variety of different worldviews and “intelligent designers”. Dembski himself comments on the matter follows:

292 It is a theoretical possibility compatible with Dembski’s theory that the supernatural designer who has introduced the complex specified information into the universe would not exist anymore at some certain moment in time. At that moment, metaphysical naturalism would hold true, provided that no other su-pernatural entities would exist, either. Nevertheless, metaphysical naturalism in its strictest sense, i.e., the claim that natural entities are all that can exist, would still be proven false.

293 I do not mean to imply that the current philosophical discussion on, for example, the existence of God would not be justified. Surely, some authors argue rather convincingly that there actually is evidence for the existence of God (see, e.g., Swinburne 2004). Yet, strictly speaking, the existence of supernatural entities is currently unconfirmed and the discussion remains somewhat speculative.

294 Williams 2007; Dembski 1999, 210.

295 To clarify, it is possible that the identity of the designer could be speculated about on another basis, for example by using philosophical arguments.

[T]he designer is compatible with the Creator-God of the world’s major monotheistic religions like Judaism, Christianity and Islam. But the designer is compatible with the watchmaker-God of the deists, the demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus and the divine reason (i.e., logos spermatikos) of the Ancient stoics. One can even take an agnostic view about the designer, treating specified complexity as a brute unexplainable fact.²⁹⁶

Indeed, when discussing the identity of the supernatural designer, it should be kept in mind that the term “supernatural” should be understood to refer to any intelligent agent powerful enough to interfere with natural processes and thoroughly manipulate the development of biological organisms (in a manner beyond human abilities). It is precisely in this regard that the designer would be “above nature”, that is, supernat-ural.²⁹⁷ Dembski himself thinks that “such an intelligence would in all likelihood be unembodied” but is also quick to admit that “strictly speaking this is not required of intelligent design—the designer could in principle be an embodied intelligence, as with the panspermia theories”.²⁹⁸

There are two ways in which the supernatural designer could have entered the complex specified information into the universe:

1) either the designer entered the information in the system at its beginning,

“pre-programming” the universe to develop according to the designer’s will,²⁹⁹ 2) or the designer entered the information into the system at a later moment (which

requires that the system has then been open for interaction).³⁰⁰

In other words, the complex specified information in the universe was either present already at the moment of the beginning of the universe, or it was added later during the development of the universe by some supernatural being with the ability to affect physical states. In sum, Dembski’s theory reveals neither the identity of the designer nor the precise moment when the designer acted in the universe. Nevertheless, if true, the theory would show that there exists—or existed—some kind of a supernatural

296 Dembski 1999, 252. Similarly, Dembski 1999, 25.

297 It must be noted that Dembski (2004a, 188–189) himself does not like to use the term “supernatural” be-cause of the “presuppositional baggage it carries” in terms of assuming the primacy of natural phenomena over those that are “outside nature”. For him, “[t]he proper contrast is between undirected natural causes on the one hand and intelligent causes on the other.” [Emphasis in the original.] Dembski (2004a, 189) stresses that “[w]hether an intelligent cause is located within or outside nature is a separate question from whether an intelligent design has acted within nature.” This is true. However, since there is no universal definition of “supernatural”, I believe it is also justifiable to define “supernatural” in the manner I have done here.

298 Dembski 2002a, 333. The Raëlian movement, for example, has embraced intelligent design, rebranding their founder’s “holy” book under the title Intelligent Design. Message from the Designers (Vorilhon 2006).

299 Clearly, in this scenario, the designer must be unembodied and some sort of an omnipotent creator deity.

300 In physics, the universe is often treated as an isolated system, i.e., as a system which cannot have any interaction (most commonly, energy exchange) with its surroundings. However, since we do not know for certain whether anything exists outside our universe, we do not know whether the universe actually is iso-lated (Van Wylen & Sonntag 1985, 233). So it is possible that the universe is—to some extent—open, allowing interaction with its surroundings and thus the option 2 presented here is logically possible. A special case of option 2 would be a situation in which the designer repeatedly interferes with the development of the universe. This scenario, however, is not considered by Dembski. He rather seems to think that God does not directly affect everything that happens; regarding the development of biological organisms, for instance, he writes: “The design theorist is not committed to every biological structure being designed. Mutation and selection do operate in natural history to adapt organisms to their environments.” (Dembski 2011, 10.)

designer—or designers³⁰¹—who at some point(s) during the history of the universe has/have interfered with its development.³⁰²