Bridging Science and Religion

4.3.1 Mutual Support Between Science and Religion

Of the models of relating science and religion presented above, Dembski seems to have adopted the integration model—although he decides to call this the “mutual support model.” According to Dembski, the credibility of scientific claims can be enhanced through theological arguments, as long as everyone is willing to take these arguments seriously. Similarly, theological ideas can be supported by scientific theories.²⁰² For example, in cosmology, the Christian doctrine of creation can be seen to support the Big Bang theory, but not the Steady State theory.²⁰³ Dembski emphasises that he does not, of course, think that science and religion could be merged; there are certain areas where they have nothing to do with each other.²⁰⁴ Modifying Gould’s terms, one could say that Dembski sees science and religion as “partly overlapping magisteria.”

Dembski calls this kind of cooperation between science and religion “epistemic support.” Epistemic support is not rationally compelling: it does not mean that sci-entific theories could be proven right by using religious or theological arguments, or that the truth value of religious propositions could be determined by the results of science.²⁰⁵ Dembski subscribes to the belief that obtaining absolutely certain knowl-edge is possible only in mathematics; other disciplines must settle for more or less well-founded arguments and theories with varying degrees of uncertainty. Basically, Dembski is arguing that some scientific theories might make some religious beliefs appear more probable, and vice versa.²⁰⁶

Dembski founds his idea of the epistemic support between scientific theories and religious claims on the principle of abductive reasoning (abduction), which is also known as inference to the best explanation.²⁰⁷ In abductive reasoning, the conclusions do not follow from the premises with logical necessity.²⁰⁸ Instead, abduction is a more creative process on the grounds of which it is inferred which of the possible mod-els of explanation is the most probable. The more comprehensive and coherent the explanation is, the higher is the probability of its being true.²⁰⁹ In short, as famously formulated by Charles S. Peirce, the logic behind abductive reasoning is as follows:

“The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.”²¹⁰

202 Dembski 1999, 189–192.

203 Dembski & Meyer 1998, 426–428.

204 Dembski 1999, 191.

205 Dembski’s line of thinking is similar to, e.g., that of Alister McGrath (2010, 2), who embraces the way science and religion “can offer a stereoscopic view of reality denied to those who limit themselves to one discipline’s perspective on things” while reminding that “both science and religion lose their way when they play at being what they are not”.

206 Dembski 1999, 192–199; Dembski & Meyer 1998, 417–422. Here, again, Dembski agrees with McGrath (2013), who states that “proof in the strict sense of the term is limited to mathematics and to logic.”

207 Although abduction and inference to the best explanation can often be used interchangeably, the two are not completely identical (Campos 2009).

208 Here, abductive reasoning comes closer to inductive reasoning than to deductive reasoning.

209 Douven 2017.

210 Peirce 1955, 151.

Dembski presents his own version of the abductive argument, setting the following three conditions for an explanation B to constitute the best possible explanation for phenomenon A:

1) B must be consonant with A, in other words, B must be in harmony both with A and with the network of beliefs of which A is a part.

2) B must contribute to A, that is, B must answer questions pertaining to A which could not be answered without B.

3) B must be the best explanation for A among all current competitive explanations for A.²¹¹

Abductive arguments are not logically compelling; results obtained through abduc-tion are condiabduc-tional and falsifiable and thus only “currently true”. It is always possible that a new, better explanation will be discovered later.

In order to illustrate the power of epistemic support based on abduction, Dembski offers the example of the cosmological theory of the Big Bang and the Christian doc-trine of creation. According to Dembski, the docdoc-trine of creation is, first, consonant with the Big Bang since if the universe began through an act of a Creator (God), an event in which something was created out of nothing would be exactly what one would expect. Second, Christianity teaches that God is the reason the universe came into existence, so the doctrine of creation contributes to the theory of Big Bang by providing a causal explanation of it—an explanation which would not exist if theistic explanations were not considered. Third, the doctrine of creation is the best explana-tion of the Big Bang because its naturalistic competitors are unable to account for the above details and can only treat the Big Bang as a coincidence.²¹²

4.3.2 Intelligent Design as a Bridge Between Science and Religion

Much in the same manner as in the case of the Big Bang, Dembski maintains that the complexity observed in biology is best explained by a supernatural intelligent cause.

He founds this argument on the claim that there are some biological features which are too complex and too information-rich to have been developed through the evo-lutionary processes known to contemporary biology. Dembski argues that current naturalistic theories simply “lack the resources for making sense of an information age whose primary entity is information and whose only coherent account of infor-mation is design.”²¹³

Intelligent design, instead, gives an answer to why these features exist by sug-gesting that they have been designed—and actualised—by a powerful supernatural agent who can generate complex biological information. Dembski describes this as

“the fundamental claim” of intelligent design: “there are natural systems that cannot be

211 Dembski 1999, 202–203.

212 Dembski & Meyer 1998, 426–428.

213 Dembski 1999, 15. In general, Dembski’s (2004c, xxi) views towards the theory of evolution are rather sceptical: “Regardless of one’s point of view, it’s quite easy to see that Darwinism is not in the same league as the hard sciences. For instance, Darwinists will often compare their theory favorably to Einsteinian physics, claiming that Darwinism is just as well established as general relativity. Yet how many physicists, while arguing for the truth of Einsteinian physics, will claim that general relativity is as well established as Darwin’s theory? Zero.”

adequately explained in terms of undirected natural forces and that exhibit features which in any other circumstance we would attribute to intelligence.”²¹⁴ Therefore, intelligent design is “currently the best explanation” for biological complexity.²¹⁵ Dembski’s theory of detecting design in biology is discussed in more detail in Articles II–IV.

Although Dembski emphasises that the theory of intelligent design is only “cur-rently the best explanation” for some features of the universe, he still regards it as an unprecedented step forward in the dialogue between science and religion. According to Dembski, no other theory is capable of enabling such a strong epistemic support between the two disciplines. Intelligent design constitutes a unique “bridge” between science and religion by linking some otherwise unexplained phenomena with their cause, an act of a supernatural designer. Dembski is convinced that intelligent design is “just what the doctor ordered to both science and theology.”²¹⁶

Dembski finds it regrettable that the idea of design has been altogether abolished from scientific inquiry since the rise of modern science. According to him, both atheist and theist scientists have adopted the view that science works best when only natural causes are accepted as explanations of events occurring in the physical world. Science and religion are no longer companions in the search for truth—like they were in the age of pre-modern natural philosophy—but have become strangers to each other.²¹⁷ Dembski believes that the connection between general revelation (knowledge about God gained through natural reason and everyday experience) and special revelation (spiritual evidence of God received through supernatural acts) should be reinstated.

The Book of Nature and the Book of Scripture can be mutually illuminating if they are read together and not separated from each other. Science helps us understand the former, theology the latter.²¹⁸

Dembski stresses, however, that when bringing together science and theology (or religion), the integrity of each discipline must be maintained:

Theology may lead us to question certain claims of science, but any refutation of those claims must ultimately depend on scientific evidence (as ascertained by carefully read-ing the Book of Nature). Likewise, science may lead us to question certain claims of theology, but any refutation of those claims must ultimately depend on exegetical evi-dence (as ascertained by carefully reading the Book of Scripture).²¹⁹

Dembski finds it impossible that the Book of Nature and the Book of Scripture could con-tradict each other, so there is no risk in uniting them and even allowing God’s actions to be accessible to scientific inquiry. After all, God is the author of both books and he never contradicts himself. Ultimately, science and religion should point to the same truth.²²⁰

214 Dembski 2004, 27. Emphasis in the original.

215 Dembski 2001a. Dembski notes, correctly, that “inference to the best explanation […] always presupposes at least two competing explanations and attempts to determine which comes out on top.” For Dembski, the only serious current competitor to design is (unguided) evolution.

216 Dembski 1999, 13. Similarly, other proponents of intelligent design, for example, Phillip Johnson and Michael Behe have argued that discovering signs of design in nature could strengthen belief in God (Ko-jonen 2016, 91).

217 Dembski 1999, 122–124.

218 Dembski 2009, 71–72.

219 Dembski 2009, 71.

220 Dembski 2009, 72.

4.3.3. Towards a Science of Intelligent Design?

Not many share Dembski’s position. According to the majority of the academic com-munity, supernatural entities and causes must be kept completely out of scientific discussion. As Stephen Jay Gould summarises it, “whatever we think of God, his existence is not manifest in the products of nature.”²²¹ Methodological naturalism—

which by definition denies any appeal to the supernatural—is regarded as the only acceptable basis for doing science.²²² Because intelligent design opens the door to supernatural explanations, it is often shunned.²²³

Many critics see the design argument promoted by Intelligent Design as a form of the God-of-the-gaps fallacy, which is based on the idea that if a natural phenomenon cannot be explained by appealing to any currently accepted (naturalistic) scientific theory, God must be invoked as an explanation.²²⁴ Such a line of argumentation is not considered solid because it is assumed that science will very probably at some later point discover a naturalistic explanation for the phenomena in question and make God unnecessary. Therefore, if one believes that God acts in the world, it is safer to assume that he acts in ways that are unobservable to humans. As Dembski points out, this is a common strategy among Christians:

Most Christians accept that God by wisdom created the world and that therefore God is a designer and the world is designed. But many Christians also accept that God’s design is only accessible through the eyes of faith.²²⁵

Dembski considers such a line of thinking to be illogical and proposes, instead, that there is no reason why supernatural design could not be empirically detectable. He maintains that, in certain cases, it might be justifiable to deduce that science will never close the gap in knowledge and that a supernatural designer is the only reasonable explanation. This, of course, requires abandoning strict methodological naturalism.

Dembski argues that it is possible to reliably detect signs of design through the cri-terion of specified complexity developed by him (see Article I for details). Moreover, he maintains that examples of designed objects have actually already been found in the biological world.²²⁶

Dembski emphasises that the proponents of intelligent design do not need to prove that every biological structure is designed (in other words, that a structure exhibits specified complexity), but merely to “find some clear instances of design and nail them down”.²²⁷ Even one confirmed example of a designed object would be enough to make a convincing case against methodological naturalism, which is one of the goals of Intelligent Design. The possible implications of the theory of intelligent design to the methodology of science are examined in Articles II and IV.

221 Gould 1982. To be precise, Gould thinks that it is not possible to find evidence about God, either through science or by any other means.

222 See note 21.

223 Attie et al. 2006; Wise 2007.

224 Dawkins 2006, 151–161; Pennock 2007, 323–333.

225 Dembski 1999, 17.

226 Dembski 2002a, 292–302.

227 Dembski 2004b, 210.