The Terminology of Passio

Some scholars claim that Augustine tends to classify emotions into two groups on the basis of whether he regards them as good or bad. I shall evaluate this argument and examine whether there is any textual support for this in Augustine.

Thomas Dixon and Anastasia Scrutton maintain that most Latin words for

“emotions” in Augustine’s work need to be classified into two groups, passio and affectio, with passio attributed a negative connotation and affectio a positive connotation.² Dixon argues in From Passions to Emotions, that Augustine does not adopt the Stoic apathetic idea of excluding both affectiones and passiones, but instead expresses a positive attitude towards affectiones (which are obedient to reason), differentiating these voluntary affections from unruly passions that occur in a virtuous and healthy life.³ The distinction between affectio and passio, Dixon explains, is based on Augustine adopting the Peripatetic bipartite theory of the soul comprising a higher, intellective level as well as a lower, appetitive level.⁴ Dixon states the following: “For Augustine the most troubling passions, lusts, desires and appetites were involuntary movements of the lower parts of the soul, rather than voluntary judgments”.⁵ Consequently, affectio and passio (as well as other related terms) refer to two diametrical groups in Augustine: passio, perturbatio and libido

“Peripatetic” when referring to Augustine’s “(Neo)Platonic-Peripatetic position”.

2 See Dixon 2003, 26–61; Thomas Dixon, “Revolting Passions”, in Modern Theology (27:2, 2011), 299–302 (This article is also collected in Faith, Rationality and the Passions, ed. Sarah Coakley (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 181–195); Anastasia Scrutton, “Emotion in Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas: A Way Forward for the Im/passibility Debate?”, in International Journal of Systematic Theology (7:2, 2005), 169–177.

3 “Augustine poured scorn on the Stoic aspiration to attain apatheia, or complete impassivity, in this life…This forceful rejection of Stoic impassivity should be sufficient to illustrate that Augustine did not wish to exclude passions and affections altogether. It is worth noting, however, that the term he used here for proper affect is affectus rather than passiones. However, this provisionally positive stance on the necessity of human affections in this life was combined with a more negative attitude to the passions in Augustine’s other works”. Dixon 2003, 40–41.

4 Dixon 2003, 46.

5 Dixon 2003, 50–51.

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are the movements of the lower part of the soul, whereas affectio, affectus and motus are related to the intellective part. ⁶ Dixon also notes that the affection/passion distinction is closely connected to the distinction between virtue and vice, with virtuous movements being cultivated by reason and will.⁷ This twofold moral axiom regarding affections and passions, Dixon explains, became a standard view in moral philosophy, lasting until the nineteenth century.⁸ Anastasia Scrutton also states that “there is a tendency in Augustine’s work to use passiones (and related words such as perturbationes, libido and morbos) in a pejorative sense, and to contrast these with virtuous affectus, motus and affectiones”.⁹ In line with Dixon, Scrutton explains that passions refer to the improper movements of the appetitive part of the soul, while affections are proper acts guided by the reason, will, and love of the higher intellective self.¹⁰

Based on the above-mentioned distinction between affectio and passio as positive and negative phenomena, one could argue that there are no psychological Latin terms that would be equivalent to the modern term “emotion”.¹¹ Indeed, Scrutton and Dixon maintain that pathē, passio and affectio cannot be regarded as

“emotions” in the contemporary sense of the word. This is partly due to the aforementioned Greek and Latin terms having their own connotations as well as partly because the term “emotion” did not emerge in the English language until the

6 See the classification of emotional terms in Dixon 2003, 48. This classification is repeated in his article “Revolting Passions” in which he explains that “Augustine was suspicious of those movements of the appetite that he considered misdirected passiones, perturbationes, libidines or even, in Stoic vein, morbos; but he took a more positive stance towards higher movements of the will given milder designations such as motus, affectus, affectiones or simply voluntates, acts of will”. Dixon 2011, 300; Dixon 2012, 183.

7 “To live according to one’s highest nature was to live as a rational animal, with libidinous passions subdued and godly and sympathetic affections cultivated (by reason, by the will, by habit). This twofold moral axiom—subdue passion, cultivate affection—assumed a division between reason and the passions. A governed and rational passion, properly educated and smartly dressed, could be deemed to have won the approval of the will and intellect, and to have gained entry into polite society in the form of sympathy, affection and sentiment”. Dixon 2012, 185.

8 Dixon 2011, 301–302; Dixon 2012, 184–185.

9 Scrutton 2005, 170.

10 “In practice it is often the case that passions are sinful, because (as a consequence of the fall) the lower sensitive self is in rebellion against the higher intellective self, which should be its master and guiding principle. Whether a particular passion or affection is virtuous or vicious is dependent upon two factors: first, the agreement of the emotion with reason, and, second, the object of the emotion, which is closely related both to the direction of the will and to the orientation of the subject’s love…these two conditions which determine the moral status of an ‘emotion’ also incline passions to be sinful, and allow affections to be virtuous”. Scrutton 2005, 172.

11 “Statements by pre-modern theologians and their early-modern successors about either the terrible tyranny of the passions or the value of moral sentiments and religious affections cannot be taken as evidence of any generalized attitude to the ‘emotions’”. Dixon 2011, 302; Dixon 2012, 185.

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seventeenth century, acquiring its modern meaning only in the nineteenth century.¹² For example, the term “emotion” did not appear in the English translations of the Bible produced before the nineteenth century.¹³ Dixon points out that the transition from the category of “passions” to the modern term “emotion” can be attributed to some neuroscientists and psychologists – Thomas Brown, Thomas Chalmers, Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Darwin – who adopted

“emotion” as a scientific cachet to replace the former multifarious terminology.¹⁴ However, some scholars dissent from this distinction. For example, Johannes Brachtendorf notes that “Augustine treats the terms, perturbationes, affectiones, affectus and passiones as equivalent”.¹⁵ Brachtendorf supposes that this equivalence between different terms is based on Augustine’s deliberate aim to refute the Stoics and that Augustine uses these terms flexibly in his City of God.¹⁶ In discussing ancient views of emotions, Martha Nussbaum does not differentiate between “emotion” and “passion”. She follows this approach not only when discussing the Stoics, but also when discussing Augustine:

I shall use these two words more or less interchangeably, making no salient distinction between them. ‘Emotion’ is the more common modern generic term, while ‘passion’ is both etymologically closer to the most common Greek and Latin terms and more firmly entrenched in the Western philosophical tradition.¹⁷

Like Nussbaum, Simo Knuuttila is also inclined to support the position that Augustine does maintain a strict distinction between these emotional terms:

“Augustine sometimes calls emotions perturbations, as Cicero did, but he uses

12 Scrutton 2005, 170; Dixon 2003, 1–26.

13 “‘Emotions’, unlike ‘affections’, ‘passions’, ‘desires’ and ‘lusts’ did not appear in any English translation of the Bible…One word that was not used in the classical Christian account of passions and affections was ‘emotions’. There was no such term in classical Latin or Greek, nor in the Bible (nor, incidentally, do the words ‘emotion’ or ‘emotions’ appear in any of the major English translations of the Bible)”. Dixon 2003, 4 and 39.

14 See Dixon 2012, 186–187; Dixon 2003, 13–19. Dixon argues that with the employment of the word “emotion”, “previous distinctions between appetites, passions, affections and sentiments were gradually forgotten. Members of all these older categories could now be found masquerading as emotions”. Ibid., 187. Dixon credits this view to James Mark Baldwin and G. F. Stout by quoting their account of “emotion” in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology: “The use of the word emotion in English psychology is comparatively modern. It is found in Hume, but even he speaks generally rather of passions or affections. When the word emotion did become current its application was very wide, covering all possible varieties of feeling, except those that are purely sensational in their origin”. See Dixon 2003, 1 and 17.

15 Brachtendorf 1997, 299.

16 Brachtendorf states that “Augustine is not interested in a positive evaluation of the passions”, adding that “although Augustine was well aware of these [terminological] differences, he deliberately omits them in his City of God”. See Brachtendorf 1997, 299–300.

17 Nussbaum 1994, 319 (n. 4).

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more neutral terms, such as affections (affectiones), affects (affectus), or passions (passiones)”.¹⁸ Furthermore, Gerard O’Daly emphasises that Augustine “adduces a series of scriptural and secular texts (the latter from Terence, Cicero and Virgil) to show that linguistic usage does not distinguish between good and bad when describing emotions”.¹⁹ Timo Nisula agrees with O’Daly: “Augustine’s terminology of emotions is flexible. Terms occur such as adfectus, passiones, perturbationes, or even libidines in the general sense of ‘emotion’”.²⁰ Richard Sorabji likewise states that he prefers to use the term “emotion” to express all the Hellenistic and early Christian usages of emotional terms in his book Emotion and Peace of Mind.²¹ It could also be mentioned that some translators of Book 9 in City of God, such as David Wiesen, Gerald Walsh and Grace Monahan, prefer to adopt a flexible approach by translating Augustine’s use of passio, affectus and motus as

“emotion”.²²

With respect to these different perspectives on passio and affectus, it is evident that the main question concerns our understanding of the term passio.

Those who maintain a dichotomic position predominantly posit passio (or perturbatio) as a movement of the lower part of the soul, or as a perturbation of the mind, often involving a strong impulse, such as appetite and sexual or evil desire.

For this reason, they translate passio as “passion”. Affectus, on the other hand, is a movement of the higher part of the soul or a virtuous feeling in accordance with a person’s will and intellect, and scholars who posit a dichotomy translate it as

“affection”. Thus, none of these terms could be regarded as equivalent to the modern term “emotion”. On the contrary, those who dissent from this distinction assert that passio cannot be confined to the same limited scope of meaning as the

18 Knuuttila 2004, 156.

19 Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 155. For a more detailed discussion, see also G. O’Daly and A. Zumkeller, “Affectus (passio, perturbatio)”, in Augustinus-Lexikon (vol. 1), ed. C. Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1986), 166–180.

20 Nisula 2012, 193 (n. 2).

21 “I shall speak of ‘emotions’ rather than ‘passions’ when rendering the Greek term pathē. This is for the reason given in the Introduction, that, in so far as there is a distinction nowadays, passion is thought of as a very strong type of emotion”. Sorabji 2000, 17. He prefers the term “emotion” in discussing ancient Latin psychology as well.

22 See, for example, Wiesen’s Loeb Classical Library translation. In some instances, he translates passio and affectus as “emotion” and “turbulentus affectus” as “violent emotion” in CD 9.5. “Si enim mente ab his libera eisque dominante motus huiusce modi paterentur” in CD 9.6 is translated as follows: “The point is that if their minds remained free and in command of these emotions which they experience”. However, in many places, he also translates passio as passion, perturbatio as perturbation, affectus as affection.

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modern term “passion” and that it is incorrect to translate passio simply as

“passion”. I shall examine Augustine’s texts and his quotations from Hellenistic philosophers in order to analyse the use and characteristics of the term passio in Augustine’s works and to consider whether they contain a systematic terminological distinction.

I. Cases for passio as a negative term and affectus as a positive term

As mentioned earlier, those who argue that Augustine uses passio (perturbatio) as a negative term maintain that it refers a perturbation of the soul or a movement of the soul’s lower part. It seems that Augustine borrowed from²³ the semantic views of the Stoics, Academics, and Cicero who regarded passio as a perturbation or mental agitation. Augustine equates Cicero’s term perturbatio with passio and pathos and interprets them to refer to mental agitation and perturbations of the soul that are contrary to reason:

…for the Greek word pathos means ‘disturbance’; and this is what Apuleius means when he says that the demons are ‘passive in soul’, because the word passio, which is the same as pathos, signifies a commotion of the mind contrary to reason…when these disturbances occur in men, this is brought about by foolishness or misery; for we are not yet blessed by that perfection of wisdom which is promised to us at the end, when we shall be redeemed from this mortality.²⁴

Moreover, Augustine follows the Platonic and Stoic doctrines of passions, classifying the types of passions into four subspecies which he refers to as the four perturbations: “all four of the most notable disturbances of the mind: desire and fear, joy and grief, which are the origin, as it were, of all sins and vices”.²⁵ Furthermore, Augustine also refers to these as being so influenced by earthy limbs

23 Augustine presents similar arguments in De civitate Dei as Cicero does in Tusculanae disputationes, which cites examples from other philosophers before presenting his own different opinions.

24 CD 8.17: …perturbatio est enim quae Graece πάθος dicitur; unde illa voluit vocare animo passiva, quia verbum de verbo πάθος passio diceretur motus animi contra rationem…In hominibus autem ut sint istae perturbationes, facit hoc stultitia vel miseria; nondum enim sumus in illa perfectione sapientiae beati quae nobis ab hac mortalitate liberates in fine promittiture. Similar statements can be found in Cicero’s Tusc. 3.4.7: Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines, libidines, iracundiae? Haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant;

ego poteram morbos et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet: nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantes; nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, nisi quid aliud tibi videtur.

25CD 14.3: …omnesque illas notissimas quattuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem timorem, laetitiam tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque vitiorum.

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and dying members, “that they derive from them their unwholesome desires and fears and joys and sorrows. And these four ‘perturbations’ (as Cicero calls them) or

‘passions’ (which is the usual term, rendered exactly from the Greek), embrace all the vices of human conduct”.²⁶ Augustine also quotes many similar views from the Platonists, Stoics and Peripatetics, which indicate that he possessed a considerable knowledge of his predecessors, often acquired through Cicero’s writings.²⁷ Therefore, in some places, Augustine adopts the traditional Stoic approach by using passio or perturbatio in a negative context and contrasts this by using affectus in a positive one. For instance:

(a) Hoc enim esse volunt in potestate idque interesse censent inter animun sapientis et stulti, quod stulti animus eisdem passionibus cedit atque adcommodat mentis adsensum; sapientis autem, quamvis eas necessitate patiatur, retinet tamen de his quae adpetere vel fugere rationabiliter debet veram et stabilem inconcussa mente sententiam.²⁸ (CD 9.4)

(b)…perturbatio est enim quae Graece πάθος dicitur; unde illa voluit vocare animo passiva, quia verbum de verbo πάθος passio diceretur motus animi contra rationem.²⁹ (CD 8.17)

(c)…quibus quattuor vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat, vel passionibus, ut plerique verbum e verbo Graeco exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum vitiositas continetur.³⁰ (CD 14.5)

(d)…confitens eorum mentem, qua rationales esse perhibuit, non saltem inbutam munitamque virtute passionibus animi inrationabilibus nequaquam cedere, sed ipsam quoque, sicut stultarum mentium mos est, procellosis quodam modo perturbationibus agitari.³¹ (CD 9.3)

26CD 14.5: …hinc eis sint morbi cupiditatum et timorum et laetitiae sive tristitiae; quibus quattuor vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat, vel passionibus, ut plerique verbum e verbo Graeco exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum vitiositas continetur.

27 For Augustine, the main channel for acquainting himself with this tradition were Cicero’s writings. It has been stated that 750 out of the 1150 abstract nouns in De civitate Dei are from Cicero, which illustrates that Cicero had a significant influence on Augustine. See Ruokanen 1993, 121.

28 “For such consent, they hold, is within our power; and the difference between the mind of a wise man and that of a fool is that the fool’s mind yields to these same passions and adapts them through an assent, whereas the wise man, though he experiences them of necessity, nonetheless retains with mind unshaken a true and steadfast perception of those things which he ought rationally to seek or avoid”. [transl. Dyson, with changes]

29 “For the Greek word pathos means ‘disturbance’; and this is what Apuleius means when he says that the demons are ‘passive in soul’, because the word passio, which is the same as pathos, signifies a commotion of the mind contrary to reason”.

30 Translated above; see note 26.

31 “For he confesses that their minds, in respect of which he has asserted that they are rational, are

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(e) Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes si vitia vocanda sunt, sinamus ut ea quae vere vitia sunt virtutes vocentur. Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones quando ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc morbos seu vitiosas passiones audeat dicere?³² (CD 14.9)

In (a), (b), (c), and (d), Augustine adopts, through Cicero, the Stoic orientation to passions (passiones) and interprets them as perturbations of the soul and the opposite of reason. Scrutton maintains that Augustine attaches affectus to voluntas and passio to concupiscentia or appetitivus, the lower sensitive part which is in rebellion against the higher part of the soul, and renders the term voluntas as a criterion to distinguish between affectiones and passiones.³³ Referring to case (e), Scrutton emphasises that affections are movements of the rational soul and further that “what makes an emotion a passion or an affection is not its moral status, but what it relates to the sensitive or intellective self”.³⁴ This argument involves two facets that occur in the Stoics and Cicero: 1. Passions are the psychological motions or perturbations of the soul (in Zeno).³⁵ 2. Passions as mistaken value judgments can be judged by good and bad (in Chrysippus).³⁶ Cicero adopts these two Stoics ideas in his works and uses the term perturbatio instead of passio to refer to a disturbance or a movement of the soul against reason.³⁷ These perturbations (gestiens et libido, metus et aegritudo) can be

not imbued and fortified even with sufficient virtue to resist to any degree the irrational passions of the soul. Rather, they are themselves agitated by storms and tempests, as it were, as is usually the case with stupid minds”.

32 “If these emotions and affections, which come from love of the good and from holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow that real vices should be called virtues. But since, when they are exhibited in the proper circumstances, these affections are the consequences of right reason, who would then dare to say that they are unwholesome or vicious passions?”

33 See Scrutton 2005, 171.

34 Scrutton 2005, 172.

35 This is a basic part of the Stoic doctrine of passions, widely known as πάθη. Zeno defined them as impulses or an instability in the movements of the soul. In Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Vol. II), Zeno 7.110, Diogenes Laertius comments on Zeno’s viewpoint of passions: “Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in

35 This is a basic part of the Stoic doctrine of passions, widely known as πάθη. Zeno defined them as impulses or an instability in the movements of the soul. In Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Vol. II), Zeno 7.110, Diogenes Laertius comments on Zeno’s viewpoint of passions: “Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in

In document Freedom from Passions in Augustine (sivua 24-38)