4. THE RENEWAL AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF PASSIONS IN
4.4. Libido dominandi, Just War and Earthly Peace
In expressing his negative attitude toward war, Augustine believed that removing the disguise of military glory from the act of conquest leaves only the naked “lust for domination” (libido ista dominandi) and this lures the human race into inflicting great terror and suffering.161 In war, “all were wounded together: the smitten in body and the smiters in soul”.162 Furthermore, the lust for domination drives the earthly city to enslave other nations and offer false glories.163 In brief, wars are always an evil that should be either avoided or prevented.164 Some scholars consequently presume that Augustine is a pacifist and that he maintains the tradition of early church pacifism. Others, however, notice that in specific situations, Augustine permits the application of violence and active attacks, and his support of the Christian wars against “unjust” nations implies an acceptance of violence rather than pacifism. Let us now review the competing interpretations.
161 CD 3.14: Quid mihi obtenditur nomen laudis nomen que uictoriae? Remotis obstaculis insanae opinionis facinora nuda cernantur, nuda pensentur, nuda iudicentur…Libido ista dominandi magnis malis agitat et conterit humanum genus.
162 CD 3.22: mutuis dicam omnino uulneribus, cum percussus in corpore et percussor in animo feriretur!
163 As Augustine notes in Praefatio of CD: Unde etiam de terrena ciuitate, quae cum dominari adpetit, etsi populi seruiant, ipsa ei dominandi libido dominator…
164 CD 19.7: “Let everyone, therefore, who reflects with pain upon such great evils, upon such horror and cruelty, acknowledge that this is misery”.
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David Lenihan contends that Augustine’s thought is deeply rooted in the pacifist tradition of the earlier fathers and the spirit of the Gospel and should not be associated with the later theory of just war.165 Lenihan maintains that those who believe that Augustine is the principal originator of the just war theory are misled by both forged manuscripts and misinterpretations of some decretalists. He follows F. H. Russell’s argument that several spurious letters such as Gravi de pugna were falsely attributed to Augustine during the sixth century, which led to the misconception that the medieval just war theory was established by Augustine.166 By interpreting Augustine’s ideas on war and peace in eight Augustinian sources,167 Lenihan concludes that Augustine is not a “just warrior”, but rather a genuine pacifist. Lenihan also holds that Augustine’s peaceful position was misinterpreted by some medieval theologians such as Aquinas who wrongly surmised that Augustine had justified the Christian service in war.168 According to Lenihan, Augustine rather adheres to the ideas of earlier fathers such as Origen and Tertullian, advocating a genuine love of peace,169 being “a personal pacifist who would have himself killed rather than exercise a legal right of self-defense against a criminal”.170 Lenihan offers evidence for his claim as follows: (1) As a criterion to evaluate the character of war, Augustine uses the inner order of society, referring to the attack of the Visigoths as injustice since it disrupts social order. This serves to illustrate that his concept of war differs from that of the just
165 “I attempt to show that the just war theory is not on a continuum from Augustine, whose thought is much more complex and that, on the contrary, Augustine is on a continuum with the pacifist tradition of the earlier fathers”. David Lenihan, “Just war Theory in the Work of Saint Augustine”, in Augustinian Studies 19 (1988), 37.
166 Lenihan 1988, 37–38.
167 These works include: (1) De libero arbitrio 1.5; (2) Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22; (3) Ep.
138, to Marcellinus; (4) Ep. 189, to Boniface; (5) Ep. 222, to Darius; (6) Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10; (7) De sermone Domini in monte 30; (8) De civitate Dei. Ibid., 42.
168 “It would seem that Augustine has been cast into this position by theologians who, like Thomas Aquinas, answered the moral question of whether it was always sinful for Christians to engage in warfare by ferreting, out of context, small proof texts from Augustine to justify Christian participation in warfare”. Ibid., 38.
169 “Augustine, in my estimation, is not a ‘just warrior’ and the medieval just war is not a direct descendent, but a mis-interpretation and simplification by the decretalists who failed to see the full Augustinian position with its spiritual complexity. In his interiority, deep spirituality, and genuine love of peace, Augustine is in continuity with the earlier fathers and the spirit of the Gospel”. Ibid., 41. For Augustine’s adherence to predecessors such as Origen and Tertullian and his discontinuity with Aquinas on the issue of just war, see Lenihan 1988, 40–46; 55–56.
170 Lenihan 1988, 41.
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war theories.171 (2) Augustine distinguishes the concept of the justice of God from the justice of the law, arguing that wars may be just in terms of human laws but do not represent “true justice” according to God. His dichotomy of “justice” differs from the account by Aquinas of “natural justice”.172 (3) Augustine does not form a unified theory of “just war”, but discusses it in a disorganised way. In effect, minor inconsistencies in his formulations should not be taken to affect his pacifist position.173 (4) War is evil and inevitable, but it is needed in God’s plan in the world.174 (5) Augustine never advocates militarism, but always underscores peace and love.175 (6) Augustine does not forbid Christians from taking up arms, but he states emphatically that those who participate on the battlefield should harbour love in their hearts.176 Through these points, Lenihan concludes that Augustine is
“a saint of peace and love”, as he bases the concept of the justice of war on the spirit of God, and Augustine’s reluctant permission to use military means is related to his considerations concerning God’s plan.177
In line with Lenihan, Robert Holmes argues for Augustine’s personal pacifist position and his ties to earlier fathers, but Holmes adds that Augustine regarded war as a necessary part of historical reality and often justified it from the Christian perspective.178 Holmes suggests that when examining Augustine’s position, it is important to take into account the concepts of motive and intention, because the moral character of outward acts is determined by the interiority,
171 Lenihan maintains that Augustine did not consider the sackings by the Vandals and the Visigoths to be foreign wars in the modern sense, but rather civil wars within the Roman Empire.
Therefore, the question of justice is based on whether or not the war maintains social order.
Lenihan 1988, 53.
172 “[For Aquinas], ‘justice’ is one and unchangeable, and always takes its origin from the naturally just…For Augustine, justice was a subjective question, dependent on motivation”. This produces distinct notions of just war in Augustine and Aquinas. See Lenihan 1988, 54–55.
173 Lenihan 1988, 55.
174 Lenihan 1988, 56.
175 Lenihan 1988, 56.
176 Lenihan 1988, 56.
177 Lenihan 1988, 57.
178 “That Augustine was almost certainly a personal pacifist may be granted…it is arguable true that Augustine stands on a continuum in many respects with earlier Christian writers…Moreover, as I shall suggest, nothing in the preceding precludes the possibility that Augustine has carved out a position that distinguishes him from both the pacifists of the early church and the just war theories of the later church”. Robert Holmes, “St. Augustine and the Just War Theory”, in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth Matthews (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 324 and 330.
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intentions and motives.179 According to Augustine, in comparison to the true justice of God, a temporal order can be somewhat just, in other words, not completely just, or entirely unjust. The right intention in waging war is to aim for true justice and peace.180 As for motives, Augustine values the role of love in maintaining order. When God commands people to wage a war, it is clearly just.
However, even without this divine command, good motivations combined with the right intentions makes a war similarly justified. Nonetheless, Christians can also accept military action that fulfils the temporal criteria of justice without its leaders having good motivations, because “good deeds” can be done intentionally with either good or evil motives, the inner motive being morally decisive.181 The ultimate motivation is difficult to determine and this presents a problem in Augustine’s discussion on the justification of war. For this reason, Augustine tends to accept wars that show temporal justice, but this remains an abstract principle for Augustine in comparison to later theories of just wars. As for the Christians’ participation in war, the fundamental imperative is to obey the state and avoid evils such as cruelty, love of violence, or a lust for power.182 Holmes concludes that Augustine’s position is partially in line with the later just war theory that foregrounds the unification of pacifism and an acceptance of just war.
He maintains that Augustine “should have been [a personal pacifist] and, to be consistent, should have been a universal pacifist as well”.183
Herbert Deane suggests a contrary position: “Augustine follows Athanasius and Ambrose in rejecting the pacifism and antimilitarism of many of the Church Fathers, such as Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius”.184 Deane refers to two instances when Augustine regards an offensive war as a just war. One instance occurs when a country does not make restitution for wrong actions committed by its citizens; the other occurs when a country does not return
179 In discussing Augustine’s view of the relation between motivation, intention, and action, Holmes states that “both motives and intentions can determine the moral character of acts…But motives are basic, because they determine the character of intentions as well as of acts”. Holmes 1999, 326.
180 “Peace, for Augustine, entails order, and a given temporal order can be just or unjust (at least, can vary in degrees of injustice, since, strictly, no temporal order can be completely just). One ought only to aim for a just peace”. Ibid., 332.
181 Ibid., 326–327.
182 Ibid., 333–336.
183 Ibid., 337.
184 Deane 1963, 155.
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misappropriated properties.185 Moreover, Deane refers to Augustine’s defence of violent acts by the prophet Moses in a way that differs from Faustus’ pacifism:
Against the doctrinaire pacifism of the Manicheans, he [Augustine] argues that when God commanded Moses to carry on wars, He [Moses] “acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and warning those who needed warning”.
The pacifist who regards death as the great evil involved in war is ready to buy life at the price of subjection to injustice…If he [the monarch] decides that war is necessary, he has the right to begin hostilities, and the soldiers and citizens under his command must obey his orders, whether or not they agree with his judgment.186
Deane does not believe Augustine to be a pacifist who will sacrifice justice to save lives in wars, since anarchy and injustice are the worst evils in Augustine and he accepts violent means necessary to correct wrongs, including wars.187 Augustine’s approval of fighting, Deane adds, is in accordance with the commandments of Christ who never advocated absolute pacifism or tolerance of wrongdoings.188 It is thus clear that Augustine deviated from the earlier church fathers’ tendency to be opposed to any Christian military service.189
The above interpretations agree on Augustine’s understanding that the moral evils of warriors are associated with detestable passions such as “the desire for violence, cruelty of revenge, fierce and implacable enmity, furious rebelliousness, and the lust for power”.190 They also note that Augustine teaches us how to eliminate these desires and restore earthly peace and order. However, they hold contrary positions regarding Augustine as a pacifist. I shall suggest that neither pacifism nor militarism best describes his thinking on war. The commandments of God form the core of his theory of just war and they should transform the evil driving passions of war into a sublimated spiritual state through the participants’ obedience. Let us turn to some of his writings, such as Contra
185 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10: “If some nation or some state which is warred upon has failed either to make reparation for an injurious action committed by its citizens or to return what has been wrongfully appropriated”. [transl. Deane] See Deane 1963, 160 and 312 (n. 24).
186 Deane 1963, 161–162.
187 Deane 1963, 161–162.
188 Deane 1963, 164.
189 See Deane 1963, 155 and 309 (n. 4).
190 c. Faust. 22.75: Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, inpacatus atque inplacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et si qua similia. For English texts of Contra Faustum Manichaeum, I adopt Stothert’s translation with modifications (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers IV) in this chapter.
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Faustum Manichaeum 22, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10, Epistulae 93, and De civitate Dei, to examine how faith factors into his notion of war.
The Command of God as a justification for war
Augustine emphasises the decisive role of divine command in justifying wars and he thus distinguishes between the true and qualified human justice in the doctrines of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.191 From the perspective of jus ad bellum, just causes are the primary criteria for evaluating the justifiability of wars. In seeking just causes for undertaking a war, the command of God should rank the highest.
Augustine regards the divine command as the sufficient and necessary condition for true justice, whereas other supporting just causes belong to qualified human justice that should comply with God’s plan. As explained in Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22.75, Augustine stresses the authority of God as well as the control of human passions in a just war in accordance with divine command:
When war is undertaken in obedience to God to rebuke, or humble, or crush the pride of man, one should not doubt that it is undertaken in a righteous way; for even the wars which arise from human desire cannot harm the eternal God, not even hurt His saints; for in the trial of their patience, and the chastening of their spirit, and in bearing fatherly correction, they are rather benefited than injured. No one can have any power against them but what is given him from above. For there is no power but of God, who either orders or permits.192
It is unjust to be disobedient to God’s command to wage offensive attacks. This may be motivated by people being captivated by earthly temptations, such as a desire for temporal happiness, and their excuses for sustaining order and peace are unjust in the sight of God. Augustine refuses to regard conniving evil endeavours as a valuable type of pacifism. Arguing against Faustus’ criticism of the Israelites’
191 The doctrine of jus ad bellum is primarily concerned with just causes and conditions for undertaking wars while jus in bello concerns behaviour in war. There are different dimensions of evaluating the righteousness of war. For a detailed discussion on the distinction of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, see John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War (London·New York: Continuum, 2006), 45–60.
192 c. Faust. 22.75: Bellum autem, quod gerendum Deo auctore suscipitur, recte suscipi dubitare fas non est uel ad terrendam uel ad obterendam uel ad subiugandam mortalium superbiam, quando ne illud quidem, quod humana cupiditate geritur, non solum incorruptibili Deo, sed nec sanctis eius obesse aliquid potest; quibus potius ad exercendam patientiam et ad humiliandam animam ferendamque paternam disciplinam etiam prodesse inuenitur. Neque enim habet in eos quisquam ullam potestatem, nisi cui data fuerit desuper. Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo siue iubente siue sinente.
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invading the Egyptians, Augustine contends that it is rather a sin not to punish those who revolt against God:
In this Moses not only did not sin, but it would have been sin not to do it…The people at that time were still carnal, and engrossed with earthly affections; while the Egyptians were in open rebellion against God…Thus the Egyptians deserved the punishment, and the Israelites were suitably employed in inflicting it.193
This intolerant attitude concurs with Augustine’s statement in CD 1.9, where he rebukes those who love the temporal sweetness of refraining from fighting against the damnable sins of the wicked, claiming that the affliction of good men together with the wicked in this world is the right punishment by God:
Because they are lenient towards the damnable sins of the wicked, the good are justly scourged alongside them in this world…It is right that they should know bitterness in this life when they are afflicted by God in common with the wicked; for, because they loved the sweetness of this life, they neglected to be bitter to the wicked.194
It is clear that Augustine’s consideration of whether to wage war is not based on a pacifist conviction, but on the principle of justice, especially as a decree of God.
Augustine does not intend to sacrifice justice either to spare the wicked or to sustain an evil order, but rather suggests shedding blood to defend divine justice, which he considers to be true justice that is preferred above human causes.
From the standpoint of jus in bello, Augustine appreciates just behaviour, but does not object to military deceptions. He emphasises, however, that the application of deceptive tactics should be based on faith. For example, in the case of Joshua conducting an ambush to conquer the city of Ai under the command of God, Augustine notes, “Once an individual has undertaken this kind of war, it does not matter at all, as far as justice is concerned, whether he wins victory in open combat or through rushes”.195 Violence and deceptive acts are accepted in a justified war, which serves to illustrate that his attention is concentrated on ends
193c. Faust. 22.71: Quod faciendo Moyses usque adeo non peccauit, ut non faciendo peccaret…Carnalis itaque adhuc ille populus erat et rerum terrenarum cupiditate occupatus, Aegyptii uero sacrilegi et iniqui…Digni ergo erant et isti, quibus talia iuberentur, et illi, qui talia paterentur.
194 CD 1.9: Tamen, quia propterea peccatis eorum damnabilibus parcunt, dum eos in suis licet leuibus et uenialibus metuunt, iure cum eis temporaliter flagellantur…iure istam uitam, quando diuinitus adfliguntur cum eis, amaram sentiunt, cuius amando dulcedinem peccantibus eis amari esse noluerunt.
195 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10, quoted in Mattox 2006, 64. Cf. Louis J. Swift, The Early Fathers on War and Military Service (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1983), 138.
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rather than means. This point is explained in Ep. 93.7–8, where he reminds us not to be misled by similar performances without paying attention to intentions:
Let us learn, brethren, when actions are alike, to distinguish the intentions of the actors;
otherwise, if we shut our eyes to this, we might judge falsely, and we might accuse well-wishers of doing us harm…It is clear that the bad have always persecuted the good, and the good have persecuted the bad; the former to do harm unjustly, the latter to bring about amendment by punishment; the one unboundedly, the other within bounds; those as slaves of passion, these out of love.196 [transl. Parsons]
Among all the goals in war, the goal of God ranks highest because that objective constitutes absolute good even when it involves violence and punishment. This is fundamentally different from the pacifist position that avoids the evil of death and maintains the existing order at the cost of saving the wicked. According to Augustine, this pacifism is a greed for self-interest to avoid enmities or an infirm fear of revenge and injury, which are sins.197 These facets of jus ad bellum and jus
Among all the goals in war, the goal of God ranks highest because that objective constitutes absolute good even when it involves violence and punishment. This is fundamentally different from the pacifist position that avoids the evil of death and maintains the existing order at the cost of saving the wicked. According to Augustine, this pacifism is a greed for self-interest to avoid enmities or an infirm fear of revenge and injury, which are sins.197 These facets of jus ad bellum and jus