Augustine and His Predecessors on the Psychology of Passions

Stoicism and Neoplatonism are the two philosophical schools that served as major influences on Augustine’s understanding of the passions.⁷⁰ Some scholars assert that Augustine primarily follows Neoplatonic theories of passions and that his viewpoint is more in line with Platonism than with Stoicism. On the other hand, other scholars insist that Augustine follows the Stoic tradition. By way of an example, I shall first explain the Platonist interpretation by Van Riel as well as the Stoic interpretation by Marcia Colish.

Gerd Van Riel maintains that Augustine displays a clear adherence to the Neoplatonic creed of passions. In his article, “MENS INMOTA MOTA MANE:

Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine’s Theology of the Passions”, Van Riel

69 Sorabji 2000, 208. Peter King also supports this viewpoint and believes that Augustine follows Cicero’s usage: “Cicero even proposes morbus as literal translation of πάθος, though in the end he adopts ‘disturbance’ (perturbatio), in which he is later followed by Augustine”. See King 2012a, 14 and n. 15.

70 Augustine’s knowledge of Stoicism is acquired predominately through Cicero, but the question of Augustine’s Platonic sources is somewhat more complicated. Although he mentioned Platonism at different stages, the time he spent in Milan and Rome was important in this respect. Peter Brown points out that some works of Christian Platonists such as Marius Victorinus (an African professor of rhetoric), Simplicianus (the teacher of Ambrose), Ambrose, and earlier pagan writers such as Plotinus (in the Latin translation by Marius Victorinus) and Porphyry (a lost work De Regressu Animae) influenced Augustine’s comprehension of Platonism during the year 386. See Brown 2000, 83–85. However, Cicero’s comments on Platonism also influenced Augustine. Therefore, I shall also focus on Cicero’s influence on Augustine’s concept of emotions in this section.

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maintains that Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Virgil, and Aristotle have a profound influence on Augustine’s conception of passions, which includes the function of the sensory soul, the physiological basis, and the operations of passions in both this life and the afterlife. He also argues that when Augustine absorbs some scattered points from Stoicism, they are interpreted from a Neoplatonic perspective.⁷¹ Van Riel points out that some Stoics (such as Posidonius) even abandon their standard theory and return to the Platonic camp, which serves to illustrate how Platonism tends to dominate in Augustine as well. In what follows, I shall list those Platonic-Aristotelian or Neoplatonic doctrines that Van Riel considers to have in one way or another influenced Augustine’s orientation on passions. It is important to note that when Van Riel argues for Augustine’s Neoplatonic tendency, he focuses more on the philosophical and doctrinal relationship between Augustine and his Platonic-Aristotelian predecessors than on their historical connection. Therefore, when Van Riel lists relevant documents for comparison, he primarily focuses on similarities instead of genetic connections, although he does occasionally comment on the historical connections as well. The similarities he points out are the following:

(1) Plato (Philebus): There is a division between the body and the soul.

The body is addicted to lust and material desires, and only the soul has the possibility to attain truth and perfection. When the corporeal movement is weak, the soul will not sense it and will be in a state of “neutral condition” or contentment without the perturbations of passions. In De quantitate animae and De musica 6.5.13 (and 15), Augustine accepts Plato’s view of this division and the

“neutral state” (Philebus 42c–44a) and that the soul reacts to any sufficiently intensive affects (or passio) from the body.⁷²

(2) Plotinus (Enneades): There is not only a division between the body and the soul, but also between the sensible and the intelligible soul. Passions can only originate from the “ensouled body”, which is the combination of a sensible soul

71 “Augustine’s interpretation of Stoicism is mediated through Neo-Platonic doctrine”. Van Riel 2004, 510 (n. 14).

72 However, Augustine does not agree with Plato’s view that the intensity of the physiological movements determines the alterations of the soul. Some physiological movements or pains, such as cancer, will not be perceived, but they will nevertheless disturb the soul. Van Riel argues that Augustine considered Plato to have linked perception too closely to a bodily explanation and moved to Plotinus’ view of “consciousness”. See Van Riel 2004, 512 (n. 15)–513.

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and body (in Enneades I 8, 15.14–18).⁷³ The intelligible soul is the higher part of the soul which possesses cognition and knowledge of objects that are higher than sensible forms. In this “body-sensible-intelligible” structure, the soul’s descent towards the corporeal impulse is the principal source of passions that serve as a link between bodily suggestions and the psychic “consciousness”. In De musica 6.5.10, Augustine accepts the above views and expresses his adherence to Plotinus’ notion of “consciousness” in Enneades IV, 4.20.18–20 and V, 1.12.12–14.⁷⁴

(3) Porphyry (De abstinentia): Passions originate from the corporeal soul or sense perception which fixes the soul to bodily pleasures (De abstinentia I, 31 and 38).⁷⁵ The soul cannot reject these passions, but it can shift its attention to avoid them. The attentio is a pivotal function of the higher soul, a good faculty to prevent the soul from dropping into the body. By ignoring the sensible world and remaining impassive to it, the soul is able to avoid passions. Porphyry quotes Plato’s descriptions of this impassivity in Theaetetus (173c–174a) and explains it in De abstinentia I, 37.⁷⁶ Van Riel thinks that Porphyry’s conception of attentio is based on Plotinus’ “consciousness” and that Augustine, in De musica 6.5.9–10, paraphrases this idea from Porphyry’s De abstinentia I, 38 and 39.⁷⁷

73 Ibid., 520.

74 Van Riel uses the following example from De musica 6.5.10 to illustrate how the soul directs attention to the influence that the sensory organs cause: “At the moment, it is said that the soul sees, hears, smells, tastes or feels by touching; by these activities, it gladly associates with things appropriate to it, and painfully resists to what is not appropriate. These, I think, are the operations which the soul exhibits over against affects of the body, when the soul senses, without, however, undergoing the passive states themselves”. Ibid., 511. This description shows similarities to the passages in Plotinus’ Enneades quoted above, as Van Riel demonstrates on p. 514.

75 Van Riel points out that Porphyry inherits Plotinus’ conclusion that passions are originated from the combination of the lower soul and the body, namely, the soul “nailed” to the body as Phaedo (83d) described it. Ibid., 520 and n. 38.

76 De abstinentia I, 37: “In these words Plato says that one remains impassive to these things [i.e., the sensible world] and out of their reach, not by descending to them, but by not lowering oneself to any of them”. Van Riel links this argumentation and Plato’s Phaedrus (246c–d) to Augustine’s Soliloquiae I, 14: Unum est quod tibi possum praecipere; nihil plus novi: penitus esse ista sensibilia fugienda, cavendumque magnopere, dum hoc corpus agimus, ne quo eorum visco pennae nostrae impediantur, quibus integris perfectisque opus est, ut ad illum lucem ab his tenebris evolemus: quae se ne ostendere quidem dignatur in hac cavea inclusis, nisi tales fuerint ut ista vel effracta vel dissoluta possint in auras suas evadere. Van Riel 2004, 517–518 (n. 30).

77 De musica 6.5.9–10: Et ne longe faciam, videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur. Referring to Porphyry’s De abstinentia I, 38–39, Van Riel writes: “This Porphyrian προσοχή, or attentio, is literally taken over by Augustine in his De musica”. Van Riel 2004,

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(4) Virgil (Aeneid): Heroes may have emotional reactions that are manifest in the body (for example, shedding tears), but their soul can nevertheless remain unmoved and without passions. Van Riel draws attention to Virgil’s sentence

“mens inmota mota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes” (Aeneid IV, 449), quoted by Augustine in CD 9.4.3, which in his opinion shows that whether due to moderation or eradication, there is no difference between Platonists and Stoics on the notion that the mind of heroes is not afflicted by passions.⁷⁸ He maintains that while Augustine is more inclined to Virgil and Cicero’s view regarding the bipartition of the soul than the Stoic view of the soul as a united whole, they all suggest eliminating the disturbance of passions.

(5) Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics): μετριοπάθεια (metriopatheia) and gaudium. Augustine uses the Aristotelian concept of μετριοπάθεια or “tempering the passions” to interpret the Stoic notion of εὐπάθεια. Van Riel notes that in CD 14.8, Augustine uses the Aristotelian idea of moderation and right reason introduced in Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 to explain the Stoic εὐπάθεια.⁷⁹ Furthermore, Augustine postulates two passions in the afterlife, joy (gaudium) and love (amor), which indicates that “he follows Aristotle rather than Plato. The notion of gaudium rests on the Aristotelian definition of pleasure as the supplementary effect of an unimpeded activity, namely, of the perfect activity of the will that has attained its final goal”.⁸⁰

(6) Posidonius (135–51 BC). Posidonius advocated a threefold division of the soul, dividing between the impulses of the soul as either irrational or rational;

the irrational impulse produces passions, whereas the rational leads to εὐπάθεια.⁸¹ Van Riel regards this as evidence of some Stoics rejecting their traditional view

514–515.

78 Ibid., 518 (n. 33).

79 “As a matter of fact, Augustine’s reinterpretation is not Stoic at all any more. Rather, Augustine’s viewpoint is in line with that of Aristotle, though expressed in a Stoic terminology”. Ibid., 522.

Metriopatheia (moderation of passions), which Cicero and Seneca refer to as a Peripatetic view, is often recommended by Platonic authors. See Knuuttila 2004, 88.

80 Ibid., 530–531.

81 “Posidonius strongly disagreed with the standard Stoic doctrine. He rejected Chrysippus’ unitary view of the soul, and returned to the Platonic, threefold division of the psyche. He thus drew an opposition between reason and the irrational parts of the soul, which had important repercussions for the theory of passions…This was the version of Stoicism that was the most influential in the Platonic schools, and the Neo-Platonic reformulation rests on this Posidonian theory”. Van Riel 2004, 523–524. This Platonic tendency of the Stoic Posidonius was rehashed by Galen and Plutarch who argued for a rejection of the classical Stoic theory of a unitary soul without a passionate part.

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and transferring to the Platonic idea of the bipartition of the soul, which influences Augustine deeply. Augustine applies this idea to reinterpret the Stoic terminology of εὐπάθεια, arguing that both εὐπαθεῖαι and passions can be good as well as bad.

Peter King agrees with Van Riel’s judgment that “Augustine’s opposition to the Stoics stemmed from his deeper commitment to a ‘Neoplatonic’ account of the passions”.⁸² King also draws attention to Augustine’s comments on anger (ira) and lust (libido) in CD 14.19 to demonstrate that Augustine accepts the Platonic-Peripatetic theory of the bipartition of the soul and their view that turbulent passions (such as anger and lust) are the turmoil of the lower, irrational part of the soul: “those philosophers who have come closer to the truth than others have acknowledged that anger and lust are the vice-ridden parts of the soul, in that they are turbulent and disorderly emotions, inciting us to acts which reason forbids”.⁸³ King points out that the notion of the bipartition of soul that Augustine approves is derived from Plato (Republic 436a–441c) and Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1.13 and Rhetoric 1.10).⁸⁴

Some researchers, however, refer to other sources in order to demonstrate that Augustine’s approach to passions is, in fact, rooted in the Stoic tradition.⁸⁵ For example, Marcia Colish, Johannes Brachtendorf and Richard Sorabji emphasise this connection by foregrounding the doctrines of the structures and stages of passions. Marcia Colish maintains that Augustine is “the single most important figure in the history of the Stoic tradition in the Latin West between the third and the sixth centuries”.⁸⁶ According to Colish, Augustine adheres to many

82 King 2012a, 17 (n. 24). King believes that even though Augustine criticises some Neoplatonic notions, his Neoplatonic tendency is obvious. For detailed discussion, see King 2012a, 17–22.

83 CD 14.19: Hinc est quod et illi philosophi qui veritati propius accesserunt iram atque libidinem vitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate moverentur ad ea etiam quae sapientia perpetrari vetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione.

84 King 2010, 171.

85 Gérard Verbeke, Charles Baguette and Michel Spanneut present detailed surveys on Stoic passages and themes in Augustine. They believe that Augustine displays a strong attachment to the Stoic position in relation to semantics, epistemology, ethics, psychology and philosophy, among others, especially in his early works. See Gérard Verbeke, “Augusin et le stoїcisme”, Recherches augustiniennes, I (1958), 67–89; Charles Baguette, Le stoїcisme dans la formation de saint Augustin (Université de Louvain, Ph.D. diss. 1968), 256–260; Michel Spanneut, “Le stoїcisme et saint Augustin”, Forma Futuri: Studi in onore del Cardinale Michele Pellerino (Torino, Bottega d’Erasmo, 1975), 896–914. For the studies, see Colish 1985 (II), 145–146.

86 Colish 1985 (II), 142. Colish argues that Stoicism had a profound impact on Augustine throughout his life and that he employed their doctrines in his discussions on Christian dogma, ethics and other fields. “Augustine applies his consistent uses of Stoicism to a host of different types

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Stoic principles familiar to him, even though he occasionally criticises the Stoic philosophy. Colish lists the main Stoic predecessors that Augustine mentions or quotes. These influential Stoic thinkers are Zeno, Chrysippus, Aulus Gellius, Seneca, Epictetus, Persius, Cornutus, Lucan, Cincinnatus and Cato of Utica,⁸⁷ of which the former five figures are the most relevant sources to Augustine’s understanding of passions. Focusing on the different aspects of passions (perception, intellectual acts, and psychological state), Colish concludes that Augustine displays a clear adherence to the Stoic theory of passions. As evidence, the first point by Colish is that Augustine agrees with the Stoics that passions originate from the irrational, intellectual judgement of the mind which is located in the soul rather than in the body.⁸⁸ In other words, Colish maintains that Augustine adopts the Stoic doctrine that a passion can only originate when the judgment of the mind is involved. This means that involuntary stimuli or first movements are not regarded as passions. The second point by Colish is that after the formation of passions, Augustine emphasises the importance of intellectual acts in the process of passions, especially a correct, intellectual control that promotes moral acts and virtues. This is also an important part of Stoicism.⁸⁹ The third and final evidence that Colish mentions is that Augustine adopts the Stoic view of removing passions (or triumph over the passions) through correct judgement and will, which allows the soul tranquility and happiness (tranquillitas animi).⁹⁰ In other words, Colish’s position is very different from that of Van Riel.

As regards passions, Colish argues that Augustine adheres to Stoic psychology

of works in a wide range of contexts…In some respects, also, his fidelity to Stoic positions is so thorough and is elaborated so repeatedly in this category of his thought as to make him their fullest expositor and transmitter to Latin readers in the later Middle Ages”. Ibid., 169, 152 and 213.

87 Ibid., 166–167. Colish also emphasises the indirect connection between Augustine and the early Stoics such as Zeno, Chrysippus and Epictetus. She argues that Augustine’s most detailed discussions on these early Stoics are presented in his early works such as Contra Academicos (for instance, in Contra Academicos 2.5.11–12, 2.6.14, Augustine supports Zeno’s theory of phantasia).

See Colish 1985 (II), 177–179.

88 “Augustine endorses their [the Stoic’] insistence that the passions arise from false intellectual judgments, similarly locating the passions in man’s mind and will, not in his body”. Ibid., 236.

89 “His [Augustine] endorsement of the idea that moral acts are primarily intellectual acts, not consequences of infrarational functions or material aspects of the human personality, informs his assent to the Stoic principle that virtues lies within, in the good conscience of the individual who possesses a correct moral intention”. Ibid., 209.

90 “The definition of summum bonum as virtue alone, as an end in itself, as attainable by correct intellectual judgments and the exercise of a rationally instructed will, as the sole and sufficient possession of the sage…is a constellation of Stoic ideas which Augustine expressly attributes to that school and toward which he shows a marked partiality in his earliest work”. Ibid., 213.

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and further emphasises the following points:

(1) The Stoic theory of perception and the role of pneuma in psychology have a strong influence on Augustine.⁹¹ I shall not enter into the details of this notion; a more comprehensive account of the Stoic elements in Augustine’s doctrines can be found in O’Daly 1987.

(2) Zeno of Citium (fl. 300 BC). The mind or intellect judges the sense information it receives. Adopting the theory of pneuma, Zeno asserts that the cognitive sequence of truth-mind-phantasia (sensible image) eliminates false data:

“Truth is impressed on the mind so accurately that the phantasia, or sensible image, bears the marks of such certitude as to rule out completely the possibility that it is false”.⁹² Colish notes that Augustine gives an authentically Stoic description of this rational assessment in his Contra Academicos (2.5.11–12;

2.6.14; 3.9.18–3.11.26) and De musica.⁹³

(3) Chrysippus (280–206 BC). Passions originate from the judgement of the intellect (they are false judgements), but if one relies on the capacity of reason when it functions without mistakes, it is possible to attain the optimal psychological state, summum bonum. Colish argues that Augustine consistently adheres to the Stoic creed that passions (laetitia, tristitia, cupiditas, metus) originate from the mind. This adherence is apparent in Augustine’s De sermone Domine in monte 1.9.24 and De immortalitate animae 5.7.⁹⁴ Furthermore, Colish points out that Augustine related this psychology to summum bonum (or finem boni) by intellectual contemplation, which is reflected in his early works such as Contra Academicos (1.2.5; 1.5.15; 1.8.22–23; 3.7.16–3.8.18) and De beata uita 2.4. Augustine accepts the assertion by Chrysippus that the mind serves a crucial function in generating passions as a type of judgement.⁹⁵

91 See Colish 1985 (II), 170.

92 Ibid., 178.

93 In Contra Academicos (2.5.11–12; 2.6.14; 3.9.18–3.11.26), Colish notes that Augustine accepts this cognitive sequence and makes the intellectual judgment as a primitive criterion for the perception. Ibid., 178.

94 “…he [Augustine] insists over and over again that they [passions] originate not in the body but in the mind”. Ibid., 207 and n. 168. Colish repeats this view on p. 236: “Augustine endorses their insistence that the passions arise from false intellectual judgments, similarly locating the passions in man’s mind and will, not in his body”.

95 “…on the nature of the summum bonum for the first time in his Contra Academicos Augustine clearly prefers the views of Zeno and Chrysippus…that man’s capacity to know the truth with certainty is necessary for his understanding of the nature of the good life and of how to attain it”.

Ibid., 213.

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(4) Epictetus (AD 55–135) retailed by Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae). In CD 9.4, Augustine cites the story of “Stoic fear in the storm” from the philosophical journalist Aulus Gellius. This story refers to the reflection lag between the arrival of the suggestions of phantasia and intellectual assessment.⁹⁶ Noctes Atticae (19.1.14–20) paraphrases the argument from Epictetus’ lost fifth book of Discourses that influences Augustine’s comments in CD 9.4.

On the basis of these doctrinal connections, Colish concludes that during his career, Augustine exhibits a clear orientation toward Stoicism. In other words, Augustine incorporated a large number of the Stoic categories, themes and doctrines of psychology in his works and these are all central and integrally connected to Augustine’s concerns.⁹⁷ Therefore, to Colish, Augustine displays a strong Stoic orientation in his psychology of passions, especially in certain aspects of his sense perception theory, intellectual functions (elevating the intellect over passions), and in the moral judgment of passions.⁹⁸

According to Brachtendorf, Cicero follows the Stoic orthodoxy on the

According to Brachtendorf, Cicero follows the Stoic orthodoxy on the

In document Freedom from Passions in Augustine (sivua 38-0)