Augustine’s Consideration of the Therapy of Passions

Thus far I have traced Augustine’s thoughts in his early, middle, and late works on a series of concepts related to his moderation and control of passions, and have noticed that he has controversial formulations in his late pivotal work De civitate Dei, and that the controversy is linked to his attempt to shift the scope of discussions to a theological context. Besides those critics who argue that these problems are based on Augustine’s misunderstandings, there is an alternative interpretation of them. Some scholars maintain that in Augustine’s theological

149CD 14.9: …quae si Latine posset inpassibilitas diceretur…bona plane et maxime optanda est, sed nec ipsa huius est uitae… cum animum contingere omnino non potest ullus affectus, quis hunc stuporem non omnibus uitiis iudicet esse peiorem?...auersanda est in hac uita, si recte, hoc est secundum Deum, uiuere uolumus; in illa uero beata, quae sempiterna promittitur, plane speranda est. Augustine displays a complicated attitude toward impassibilitas in the mundane life, rather than simply refuting it on all occasions. What he does not accept is the impassibility without caritas as well as the perpetual apatheia, which he considers to be impossible. I will analyse the details at the level of social life in the next chapter.

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context, some “inconsistencies” confirm that he has deviated from the Stoic doctrine entirely. Others propose the contrary view that Augustine’s aim is in line with the Stoics or the Platonists since he retains their goal of freedom from passions (apatheia and eupatheia) without leaving their doctrinal frameworks completely. I shall evaluate the different positions on the issue of whether philosophical traditions have been retained in Augustine’s new treatment of the passions.

Gerard O’Daly argues that in Augustine’s late work De civitate Dei, he does not accept the Stoic ideal of freedom from passions (apatheia) neither in the earthly city nor in the Heavenly City.¹⁵⁰ As for the earthly city, O’Daly maintains that Augustine does not distinguish passions from constantiae (O’Daly uses the term

“the stable states”) nor does he differentiate good emotions themselves from bad, since they may be either good or bad according to whether the will is good or bad.

Moreover, Christians should have appropriate passions and “fear eternal punishment, desire eternal life, fear to commit sin, and to feel pain over sins committed”, the emotion of “fear” and “desire” showing a righteous and appropriate sense.¹⁵¹ Augustine does not adopt the Stoic doctrine of passions that associates emotions with diseases or evils, but thinks that freedom from emotion in the mundane life is inhumanity and insensitivity. At the level of the Heavenly City, O’Daly observes, humans can also feel some emotions, such as love and gladness, and “some emotions are not peculiar to our earthly condition”.¹⁵² O’Daly states that Augustine provides a positive account of emotions and the emotions in the City of God are approved.¹⁵³ Thus, Augustine also does not adopt the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotions (apatheia) at this level. On this basis, O’Daly notes that Augustine’s theory is obviously distinguished from the Stoic doctrine of passions and that in his interpretation of passions, Augustine does not retain the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotion.

150 “Augustine is unimpressed by the Stoic ideal of freedom from passions (‘apatheia’). He quotes Crantor from Cicero (Tusc. 3.12) in calling it mental inhumanity and bodily insensitivity. Augustine also finds it an unattainable ideal in this life. Moreover, in their heavenly state, the good will feel love and gladness. Some emotions are not peculiar to our earthly condition”. O’Daly 1999, 156.

151 O’Daly 1999, 155.

152 Ibid., 156.

153 “Having given such a positive account of emotions, Augustine feels obliged to add a postscript stressing the wrecking potential of emotions misused. The emotions of the denizens of the city of God may be approved…” Ibid., 156. Gerd Van Riel also advocates the view that Augustine retains some passions (e.g., joy and love) in the afterlife and he thinks that Augustine is in line with the Neo-Platonic definition of pleasure. See Van Riel 2004, 524–531.

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Marcia Colish also advocates the position that Augustine does not adopt the Stoic view of apatheia in his late works, whereas during his early years, Augustine adheres to the Stoic position and appreciates the state of immovability and tranquility of the mind. He nonetheless revises his position on the basis of both theological and psychological grounds during the late 380s and early 390s.¹⁵⁴ Colish contends that in Augustine’s late thought, he harbours the negative belief that the Stoic goal of impassibilitas was neither present in Adam and Eve, nor is it attained in the present life.¹⁵⁵ Colish states that Augustine presumes that Adam and Eve did not possess apatheia before the Fall; otherwise they could not have desired for the forbidden fruit.¹⁵⁶ While apatheia is impossible in the present life, some of the passions, such a love and joy, will be also possessed eternally in the next life.¹⁵⁷ Colish therefore concludes that the Stoic ideal of freedom from passion has been wholly removed from Augustine’s late thought of passions.

Peter King makes some modifications to Colish’s observations, arguing that

154 “He [Augustine] defends the possibility and desirability of apatheia in his earliest works but subsequently modifies or rejects this position on both theological and psychological grounds. This process of revision had begun by the late 380s and early 390s”. Colish 1985 (II), 221.

155 “The goal of apatheia or impassibilitas…is unattainable in this life…Not even Adam and Eve before the Fall possessed apatheia, Augustine maintains, otherwise they could not have felt the desire for the forbidden fruit”. Colish 1985 (II), 225.

156 Ibid., 225. Colish’s statement that the first human beings did not have the psychology of apatheia before the transgression is not exact. In CD 14.10, Augustine states that before sin, there was no sin in paradise and Adam and Eve were living an entirely tranquil and happy life in Eden without perturbations nor temptations. This is a psychology of contentment toward the genuine good that is in accordance with the Stoic description of apatheia. Augustine makes his point as follows: firstly, in paradise, Man lived in the enjoyment of God with an entire tranquility of soul, no want, no desire, nor the corruption of body. He lived in the genuine good (CD 14.26: Uiuebat itaque homo in paradiso sicut uolebat, quamdiu hoc uolebat quod Deus iusserat; Uiuebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono erat bonus;Uiuebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper uiuere habens in potestate…Nihil corruptionis in corpore uel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas). Secondly, in the process of sexual intercourse, there was no excitement of passion aroused; the first man poured seeds into his wife’s womb in tranquility of mind without any corruption of her body’s integrity (CD 14.26:…et sine ardoris inlecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris). These two points illustrate that Adam and Eve had the life of apatheia in Eden before the temptation and sinful desire. Augustine notes that only when Eve was enticed to taste the forbidden fruit, the desire aroused shows the origin of sin. See CD 14.10: Si enim habebant, quo modo erant beati in illo memorabili beatitudinis loco, id est paradiso?... Amor erat inperturbatus in Deum atque inter se coniugum fida et sincera societate uiuentium…Erat deuitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum omnino alicunde malum quod contristaret inruebat… Absit, inquam, ut ante omne peccatum iam ibi fuerit tale peccatum, ut hoc de ligno admitterent, quod de muliere Dominus ait: Si quis uiderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo.

157 “Augustine adds that, even in the state of blessedness, some of the passions, such as love and joy, will not only be retained but will also be consummated, enjoyed and possessed eternally in a perfect and perpetual security”. Colish 1985 (II), 225.

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Augustine rejects the Stoic doctrine of passions except for their ideal of dispassionate passions (apatheia). However, when commenting on this notion in Augustine’s late theological schema, King proposes that Augustine formulates it without adhering to the Stoics.¹⁵⁸ King disagrees with Colish’s position that after his early period, Augustine eliminates the doctrine of freedom from passions, and King states that such an ideal has been retained in Augustine for a longer time.¹⁵⁹ But when referring to the new structure of passions in Augustine’s late writings, King claims that it is difficult to estimate the degree of success in Augustine’s formulation of a new theory of dispassionate passions, since Augustine has abandoned the Stoic arguments. In other words, Augustine’s new theory has completely deviated from the Stoic doctrine of freedom from passions.

Contrary to the above-mentioned positions, Johannes Brachtendorf argues that Augustine is in line with the Stoic ideal of freedom from passions (apatheia) without deviation, even though Augustine and the Stoics assume different approaches to it. Brachtendorf maintains that in adopting the model of Christ’s passions, Augustine is not criticising the Stoic moral psychology, but echoing their ideal of apatheia and reaching for the goal of freedom from passions. Brachtendorf states the following:

The Stoic ideal of apatheia has to be compared with what Augustine says about the state of perfection. To criticize this ideal by reference to Jesus Christ makes no sense…Through Christ’s perturbationes we can regain tranquility, and through his infirmitas we become firm again. Christ’s evocation of passions aims at deliberating humans from their passions.¹⁶⁰

Brachtendorf believes that for Augustine, a necessary condition for salvation is freedom from negative passions. No one can attain Christ’s degree of confronting passions in meditating and imitating Him because Christ is both a man and God who decides to deliberately experience passions as a way of therapy. Christ’s life provides an unattainable therapeutic model, as does the Stoic ideal of apatheia, but

158 “Augustine rejects the Stoic account of the passions, but he retains their ideal of a state in which there are only dispassionate passions…Assessing the degree to which Augustine is successful in forging a theory of dispassionate passions isn’t easy, since he does not usually give precise accounts or technical details…No need to engage the Stoic arguments; Augustine has disposed of them. And it became a part of Christian dogma that human nature, prior to Original Sin, is free of desire and fear; that in Heaven there are dispassionate passions, which, even more paradoxically than anything the Stoics came up with”. King 2012a, 21–22.

159 “Colish…maintains that Augustine abandoned the ideal of passionlessness after this early period. I disagree, as will be evident shortly”. King 2012a, 20 (n. 34).

160 Brachtendorf 1997, 304.

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Christ’s model is embedded in a different salvific narrative.¹⁶¹ Thus, these approaches concur on the point of establishing an ideal and unattainable model in reality. Secondly, Brachtendorf maintains that for Christ, suffering is to realise the aim of saving humans from passions and helping them regain the state of tranquility without perturbations. This does not deviate from the Stoic goal.¹⁶² Brachtendorf explains that Augustine’s aim is not to attack the ideal of apatheia, but to criticise the dropping of the group of positive passions.¹⁶³ Both the Stoics and Augustine are directed to the state of firmness and perfection, sharing the same ideal of freedom from passions.¹⁶⁴ Brachtendorf’s opinion is that Augustine’s formulation of apatheia and eupatheia does not differ from the Stoic position in theory; it is only Augustine’s religious therapy model for achieving these ends that is different.

According to Gerd Van Riel, Augustine incorporates philosophical ideas in his late thought rather than deviating from them, but he argues that Augustine adopts the Neoplatonic scheme of pleasure. Van Riel mentions that Augustine’s account of eupatheia is to a certain extent “reinterpretation” instead

“misinterpretation”, as has been stated in the previous section. As for the passions in the afterlife, Van Riel emphatically points out that Augustine does not deviate

161 “Christ’s state of mind is different from that of a human mind, because in us the rulership of reason is always endangered, whereas he due to his Deity has full command over his passions and even produces them deliberately…To criticize this ideal [apatheia] by reference to Jesus Christ makes no sense, because Christ’s state of mind can not be reached by humans, neither on earth nor in heaven”. See Brachtendorf 1997, 304.

162 “Augustine’s reflection on Christ’s passions is not an attack on Stoic moral psychology. Instead, Augustine uses Cicero’s analysis of the passions to explain Christ’s way of therapy…In fact, freedom from passions is a necessary condition of salvation as far as negative second-order passions are concerned; there is no way to heaven for somebody who despairs of the chance of rescue. But since Christ deliberately suffered from passions, the Christian’s fear of death does not prevent him from reaching the goal of goals”. Brachtendorf 1997, 305–306. When interpreting the Stoic theory of passions and apatheia, Brachtendorf borrows Cicero’s view and underscores its Stoic nature.

163 Brachtendorf concludes that there is a distinction between first-order passions and second-order passions in the Stoics, Cicero and Augustine. First-order passions are perturbations and motions of the mind, whereas second-order passions are always about first-order value judgments of good or evil, that is, emotions. Brachtendorf argues that the main difference between the Stoics and Augustine is the second-order passions, since the Stoics regard them as bad, but Augustine believes that some of them are positive and good. “Augustine harshly criticizes the Stoics for not allowing for these positive versions of passions. He polemically calls apatheia dullness (stupor). His objection against Stoic ethics in the tractatus LX [In Iohannis Euangelium tractatus] is not aimed at the ideal of apatheia as such but at the missing of a positive evaluation of second-order passions”.

Brachtendorf 1997, 304.

164 “In order to avoid falling victim to Augustine’s polemics, it is important to compare the descriptions of the state of perfection…In his polemics Augustine likes to make his doctrine appear very different from the Stoic theory by emphasizing this point [passions in this life] and by concealing that his ideal of freedom from passions is the same as the Stoic one”. Brachtendorf 1997, 296 (n. 24).

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from the Platonic framework.¹⁶⁵ Van Riel concludes that Augustine accepts the passions of love and joy in the redeemed life, summarising his position in the following way, “Augustine points out that our will is accomplished or perfected (perficitur) when it attains what is was tending to, and when it takes rest in this attainment. The result of this is that the desire of the one who was seeking (appetitus quaerentis) is modified into the love of the one who feels joy (amor fruentis)”.¹⁶⁶ Van Riel further asserts that there are two conditions for this type of pleasure in Augustine, one is the satiation of the body and the other is the everlasting rest of the will in the harbour of God. Van Riel observes that in his theology, Augustine unites both the redeemed body and the will to the everlasting good without any deficiency and so that it is in line with the Aristotelian definition of pleasure (gaudium).¹⁶⁷ Thus, Van Riel argues that Augustine retains the passions of joy and love in his theology of salvation without leaving the overall Platonic framework.

Concerning the debate of whether Augustine deviates from his philosophical predecessors on the issue of freedom from passions, it seems that both opposite interpretations have some correct insights, but they do not explore the underlying reason for Augustine changing his previous account of philosophical concepts, such as will, love, justice, propatheia, apatheia, eupatheia, nor do they explain his preference for a provocative writing style that some contemporary critics construe as his misunderstanding. I think that in his late thought, Augustine examines the Stoic and the Platonic teachings from the perspective of theological anthropology, providing a pessimistic perspective, using the lenses of original sin to interpret the human condition; at the same time, he is optimistic about the redemptive state of the citizens in the City of God by the grace of Christ. He therefore adopts a theological vantage point to evaluate philosophical values and terminology.

165 “…pleasure is worthwhile in itself. As we have seen, the gaudium in the redeemed life is a pleasure without any possible distress. This is in line with his acceptance of the passions in the good life. But this does not mean that he is leaving the overall Platonic framework. For the question of how to say that this gaudium can be called a pleasure is addressed by taking over peculiar Neo-Platonic schemes”. Van Riel 2004, 530.

166 Van Riel 2004, 530.

167 “Thus, we can conclude that when Augustine transposes pleasure to the state of the redeemed body, he is doing the same as the pagan Neo-Platonists: he follows Aristotle rather than Plato”. Van Riel 2004, 530.

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As distinct from the Stoic and the Platonic doctrines, Augustine employs two pivotal theological concepts, original sin and grace, which allow his worldview to include various levels. At the mundane world level, Augustine espouses a pessimistic orientation that is associated with the doctrine of original sin and he criticizes philosophers who “overrate” their personal powers and virtues, living in a state of “pride” (superbia) and egocentricity. On the one hand, Augustine argues that in the fallen condition, there is a weakening and distortion of the human will, love, and rational power. That condition also reveals a perverted tendency (pondus).¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, the model of Christ established a righteous and undeflected value system and it offers new criteria for evaluating human conduct.

To Augustine, philosophers themselves cannot become aware of their moral defect (for example, their arrogance) and depraved nature without an awareness of the uncontaminated values in Christ. At the eschatological level, Augustine believes that two cities of men will be differentiated. One will be saved by the grace of Christ and enter the City of God with corrected values and recovered cognitive abilities, receiving gifts of grace and participating in God with eternal rejoicing.

The other (without redemption) will remain in the sinful state together with the Devil and receive eternal punishment from God.¹⁶⁹ Augustine’s theological doctrine consists of five crucial points: 1.The overwhelming power of original sin leads to a condition of misery; 2. Humans cannot save themselves through their own powers because their values and thinking are corrupted; 3. The Saviour is not infected by original sin and provides a correct value model; 4. In order to rectify the depraved condition, the Saviour voluntarily enters human reality and participates in human life as a sign of divine love and as a gift of grace; 5. The Saviour has sufficient power to deliver fallen humans from both their suffering and perverted condition. In comparison to the Stoics, it is evident that Augustine displays a

The other (without redemption) will remain in the sinful state together with the Devil and receive eternal punishment from God.¹⁶⁹ Augustine’s theological doctrine consists of five crucial points: 1.The overwhelming power of original sin leads to a condition of misery; 2. Humans cannot save themselves through their own powers because their values and thinking are corrupted; 3. The Saviour is not infected by original sin and provides a correct value model; 4. In order to rectify the depraved condition, the Saviour voluntarily enters human reality and participates in human life as a sign of divine love and as a gift of grace; 5. The Saviour has sufficient power to deliver fallen humans from both their suffering and perverted condition. In comparison to the Stoics, it is evident that Augustine displays a