How are the explorations in climate governance in the North, complexity and scientific theory related to each other? What general conclusions can we make concerning climate change on the basis of these insights? The answers lie in a formulation which we may call the climate regime.
As part of this regime the climate is considered as a physical system whose boundaries are defined by a (human) observer. This makes the climate an anthropogenic object; the climate is not natural if this implies a possible existence outside of human existence.
Physical systems like the climate as an object of analysis are open systems and engage in energy exchange. Also, physical systems change, for otherwise they could not be observed. Thus, change and observation enter into mutual dependency, leading to the emergence of the described climate regime.
Incidentally, this means that anthropogenic climate change is normal. Moreover, only living systems transform energy; they do so through their own capacity (cf. Heylighen ). Unless the climate was itself a living system, it could
not produce physical change on its own. A purely physical system is always observer-made.
There are potentially countless observations of the climate system, not just one. Thus, different conclusions about the climate are possible, which might appear contradictory, but might equally be complementary in a description of climate. Furthermore, the projected climate regime does not exist in isolation.
The climate regime likewise exchanges energy with other systems. Here, it is useful to look at Luhmann’s (4) description of functional social systems to understand in what ways the climate regime might interact with other parts of society, say, economy, politics, other areas of science, law, etc. It must be kept in mind that while there is an energy exchange, there is no information exchange;
communication in society always refers to the continuation of the internal process of social systems. Hence, responses to the observation of the climate system are varied.
Viewpoints which are not compatible can nevertheless be true in their own right: that is to say, based on their respective frame of reference, their own peculiar logic. What is interesting here, however, is the consequence for the understanding of climate, climate change and its potential impact when considering the diversity of descriptions of the climate system. The climate regime which results from the observation of the climate can be understood as a structural coupling of different logics, that is to say, structural couplings of the social systems of science, politics, the economy and others. These systems advance in their own peculiar ways at the emergence of the climate regime.
In accordance with systemic and evolutionary principles the climate regime evolves likewise, exhibiting progress towards higher complexity in accordance with Casti’s assertion (Dijkum , ) that the complexity of a system as seen by an observer is directly proportional to the number of such descriptions.
The growth of complexity makes it less possible to predict how the climate regime is going to evolve, that is to say, how the meaning for society will change.
Thus, deciding on climate change as a phenomenon which is characterised, for instance, as global warming or global cooling becomes a speculative endeavour.
Consequences of integration
Realising that from the perspective of governance mechanisms to combat climate change integration is never sufficient raises the question of the consequence of
further and increasing integration. The logical approach in science implies reliance on the concept of the complex system. From this perspective it is interesting to understand the consequences of the existing and increasing integration in society in terms of possible feedback affecting the afore-mentioned couplings of social and physical systems such as the climate regime.
Analysing the consequence of the increasing integration in society can be done by referring to the phenomenon of acceleration, which reflects the continuous progress in society during its further historical development (Walter
). Acceleration – achieving more in less time – has led to an increasing utilisation of energy. Political agencies are well aware of this, as the following quotation from the Commission of the European Communities shows:
Global demand for energy is increasing. World energy demand – and emissions – is expected to rise by some % by . Global oil consumption has increased by % since 4, and global oil demand is projected to grow by .% per year. (Commission of the European Communities , ) Not surprisingly, but in line with the rationale of governance for climate change, further enhancement of this situation is underway. Thus, accelerating measures are widely proposed. For example, the Development of an Action Plan on Climate Change in the Barents Region, which was published by the International Barents Secretariat, and which has been developed as a follow-up to the declaration of the th Meeting of the Ministers of Environment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Tromsø, Norway, in , suggests “expedient implementation of energy efficiency measures, incl. accelerated development of alternative sources of energy and cleaner production strategies” (Lindgren , ).
This is consistent with other policies for combating climate change, including the energy policy. Thus, the Commission of the European Communities is eager to propose to make “more from less: leading on energy efficiency”. As a consequence, it is promised that “an effective energy efficiency policy does not mean sacrificing comfort or convenience. Nor does it mean reducing competitiveness. In fact an effective policy in this area means the opposite; making cost-effective investments in order to reduce the waste of energy, thereby increasing standards of living and saving money, and using price signals, that would lead to more responsible, economical and rational use of energy. Market-based instruments, including the Community energy tax framework, can be a very efficient tool in this respect”
(Commission of the European Communities , ). These policies imply that an acceleration of energy use can be mitigated by an increase in energy efficiency.
Once more, it is a good example of why the discourse on climate change, its causes and impacts exhibits a high degree of complexity.
Furthermore, the explorations in the section on the climate regime suggest that the regime can be understood as a structural coupling of observer and observed or social and physical systems. Thus, the evolving regime is a model of social-physical change. This means that any consequence of climate change, its impact on a variety of physical systems, is a correspondent to social change.
This must be perceived in the sense that global climate change, as well as local and regional impacts, are not independent of social change. In the following quotations, a number of examples from the Arctic indicate accelerating changes as corresponding events of accelerating measures in society:
The loss of glacial mass through melting is very likely to accelerate throughout the Arctic, with the Greenland Ice Sheet also starting to melt.
These changes will tend to increase the rate of sea-level rise. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 5, ; emphasis added here and in the following quotations)
Ongoing or accelerated coastal-erosion trends are likely to lead to further relocations of coastal communities in the Arctic. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 5, )
Increased freshwater input into the coastal zone is likely to accelerate the degradation of coastal permafrost. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
5, )
Finally, the following quotations present some examples of ‘feedback’ effects on Northern cultural aspects:
Hunter mobility and safety and the ability to move with changing distribution of resources, particularly on sea ice, are likely to decrease, leading to less hunting success. Similarly, access to caribou by hunters following changed snow and river-ice conditions is likely to become more difficult. Harvesting the threatened remaining populations of some marine
mammals could accelerate their demise. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
5, )
Changes in diet, nutritional health, and exposure to air-, water-, and food-borne contaminants are also likely. Adjustments in the balance between the
‘two economies’ of rural areas (traditional and wage) will be accelerated by climate change. This suite of changes will be complex and largely indirect because of the mediating influences of market trends, the regulatory environment, and the pace and direction of rural development. (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 5, )
Thus, as a final point, it has become clear that governance efforts to combat climate change follow the rationale of all governance efforts and reflect the recurring process of responding to increasing complexity. This conforms to the ideas of Heylighen (), who confirms the accelerating effect of sustaining governance structures over time.
The consequences of this phenomenon for the North have additionally been illuminated by Walter ( and ), in which the impacts of acceleration are emphasised, including, for example, the need for shorter innovation cycles in the Nordic and Northwest Russian forestry industry and continuing efficient investments to create a structure for sustainable development.
Conclusion
Contemporary climate and energy policies, which are currently having a significant impact on socio-economic development in the North, exhibit a strong hierarchical set up in the sense that such policies are based on a monocontextural outlook. As such, these policies are founded on a reductionist viewpoint, which does not correspond to the real world.
The logical approach which has been presented in this paper, in turn, leads to the understanding that there are, in fact, a potentially large number of observers and systems involved, which makes the described climate regime a reality.
Consequently, not just one viewpoint is true, but always the complementary picture as well, which incorporates all viewpoints on the subject matter. This conflicts with political wishes.
The outcome of this process is great complexity. Complexity in climate change means that we lack knowledge of the individual futures of each of the observers/systems involved in the regime. After all, people have personal preferences which change continuously. This is also reflected in the lack of predictability of the future of any social system. Thus, in terms of predicting and establishing goals, governance is largely a process of trial-and-error. However, changes leave room for surprise and interpretation, which is indispensable for the indeterminacy and contingency of the future.
The persistence of governance in pressing forcefully for an increase in energy efficiency and the introduction of new alternative energy technologies may lead to rather indeterminable effects. From the examples provided in the paper, it seems that governance efforts do not mitigate the acceleration of energy use in order to curb emissions that lead to climate change. Rather, the efforts may, in fact, only redistribute the burden and the risk of climate change impact in the North.
The structural coupling of social and physical systems leads to mutually dependent social and physical changes. This coupling connects efforts to combat climate change in the North, together with socio-economic development, to actual physical consequences. The coupling itself is evolving in a complex fashion and, therefore, is not predictable using a simple linear outlook. The coupling remains a subject that has not been studied sufficiently and is not well understood, especially from the rationale of climate politics.
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part ii
Governance in practice
chapter Vladimir Didyk