The contemporary concept of governance is largely concerned with the integration of a variety of social interests, ranging from cultural, economic and public to ecological aspects, reflecting the diversity of interest groups seeking power. Governance seeks to integrate these interests so as to create a common regime through which control of a planned outcome is possible. Because of this, it is closely related to the concept of sustainable development, in which different dimensions of our social existence ought to be incorporated into a common effort, such as the environment and the economy, in order to produce
social well-being. As is well known, this concept takes into consideration not only the present generation but also generations not yet born so that the present does not overexploit and threaten the regenerative capacity of certain resource ecologies (cf. World Commission on Environment and Development ).
Hence, sustainability has a strong future orientation.
The persistent orientation of governance – and, particularly, of the governance of sustainability – towards the future is likely to result in the conclusion that integration is never sufficient. This is particularly visible in political theories on the resolution of conflicts – be they political, judicial, economic, or environmental – which commonly suggest stronger integration and cooperation to overcome disagreements (cf., e.g., Heininen ). However, it is important to remember that there is not just one rationality, not just one
‘global’ value to follow in society. For example, in Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, social systems as agents of control are self-organising. Systems define the criteria according to which they control. Thus, the method of cognition of one system differs from the method of another system. Perception and knowledge are transformed from absolute to relative (cf. Luhmann 4).
A social system observes and thereby applies its own logic of distinction that separates the system from its environment (Luhmann 4, ). The logic is based on a binary code, which makes it possible to filter stimuli from the environment in order to organize them in a way that is acceptable to the system. Most notably, society includes functional systems such as politics (which distinguishes itself according to the logic coded as power/opposition), economy (solvency/insolvency), science (true/untrue), education (being better/
being worse), law (legal/illegal) and religion (immanence/transcendence) (cf.
Luhmann 4, ).
Governance in the struggle against climate change, however, is in opposition to this theory of social systems. It follows, rather, the rationale of politics.
Generally, climate governance aims broadly at the implementation of two different strategies, namely mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation is particularly well known in the context of climate change and is concerned with stabilising and reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere so as to slow down or stop global climate change. Thus, mitigation has attracted a great deal of attention, particularly in political agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.
Adaptation, however, has become increasingly important due to the assumption that the environment and global climate will continue to change
even under the strictest of emission control regimes (see, e.g., Solomon et al. ). In addition, adaptation is said already to be occurring in areas where climate change leaves people particularly vulnerable, especially in the Arctic regions, where a changing climate is projected to have greater effect than in the temperate regions of the earth. As an object of analysis in terms of policy recommendations, adaptation is, however, difficult to assess, given the complexity of adaptation measures. This difficulty is exacerbated by the uncertainties surrounding climate change and its impact (Smit et al. ).
Even though there is uncertainty, it appears that we must continue governing in any case in order to combat climate change. This reflects the common position of governance as described above, which is to suggest continuity and more integration to solve problems. This continuity is reflected, for example, in the following quotation from the Commission of the European Communities (), which is typical of governance efforts to comply with sustainability goals by trying to counteract climate change:
The EU is already at the forefront of approaches to decouple economic growth from increasing energy consumption. Its action has combined robust legislative initiatives and energy efficiency programmes with encouragement to competitive and effective renewable energy. However, the EU’s commitment to fighting climate change is a long-term one.
(Commission of the European Communities , )
Furthermore, present levels of commitment, integration and cooperation are never sufficient in governance. They can always be increased, as shown by the following quotation:
Although Europe is already one of the world’s most energy efficient regions, it can go much further. In its 5 Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, the Commission showed that up to % of EU energy use could be saved:
equivalent to spending as much as € billion less on energy, as well as making a major contribution to energy security and creating up to a million new jobs in the sectors directly concerned. (Commission of the European Communities , )
As stated above, governance appears to be superficially interested in building up platforms for conflict resolution. According to Koivurova (), dispute mechanisms are either political or legal in nature. Governance processes in combating climate change can therefore be said to include both. I will introduce examples of both political and legal governance efforts in the North, starting with a political effort: the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.
political climate governance: the Barents euro-arctic Council The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) was established in as a security organisation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. Sreejith () explains that the BEAC’s rationale concerning environmental and particularly climate protection is based on the understanding of their region as a fragile area. This general outlook is appropriate for the BEAC, given the artificial structure of the modern Barents Region and the peculiar approach through which climate change is addressed as an issue. Sreejith (, ff.) calls this approach
“subjective environmentalism”.
Thus, the BEAC’s general strategic outlook on environmental issues is that of environmental security. While the environment was important from early on, climate change emerged as a priority area of the BEAC only as late as
. Through the scientific expertise of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), the BEAC was able to form, as Sreejith puts it, “a ghastly picture of the threats of climate change and its impacts on the region” (Sreejith , ).
Strategic cooperation in the Barents Region was reformed as climate change cooperation. Organisationally, this required extensive cooperation across different sectors and work groups of the BEAC. Following the theoretical explorations on the concept of governance, these decisions make cooperation much easier. Sreejith himself confesses as well that the raising of fear unites the region and helps governments gain power.
The BEAC acts predominantly through its working groups, including the Working Group on Economic Cooperation, the Working Group on Energy and Research, and the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples. The first group, the Working Group on Economic Cooperation, is naturally concerned with economic development in the Barents Region. Thus, its views on environmental protection and measures to combat climate change are rather limited. However, its main cooperation on climate change comes about through its Forest Sector
Task Force, which is primarily concerned with forestry development. A priority for forestry development is the construction of a model forest which not only has an economic function but also provides an ecological function.
Furthermore, it is expected to act as a forum for social interaction, both at the local and regional levels (Sreejith ).
Sreejith explains that since climate change is expected to have an impact on the balance of such a model forest with corresponding consequences for economic welfare, the Task Force focuses on market-based mechanisms, including financial mechanisms and types of management that favour carbon storage. This is in line with other programmes that support environmentally sound investment projects. It must be said, however, that any model, even a model forest, is an ideal. In other words, it is a construction which has no correspondence in the real world. It is, after all, due to the invention of an ideal type that a disruption can be identified, which then calls for a governance intervention. Furthermore, financial development tools, even if they are market-based and environmentally sound investments generally, only lead to greater inefficiencies in the use of available resources. The implementation of those measures will lead to a lower level of social welfare. These are, thus, good examples where the rationalities of politics, economy and science collide.
The Working Group on Energy has a number of focal points in its work, among others energy efficiency, project financing and bioenergy. Its priority is to promote the adoption of strategies and goals in order to make exploration, production and transmission of energy in the Barents Region more sustainable.
The Group also pushes for broad acceptance and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol for the limitation of carbon dioxide. Immediate measures include the reduction of energy consumption in the Barents Region and general energy savings. In connection with those goals energy efficiency should be enhanced.
Furthermore, the Group envisions the region having an investor-friendly energy market (Sreejith ). It is important to understand here that energy is not actually produced. Neither can energy be destroyed. The emphasis from a physical point of view is on transformation, which is the process by which energy achieves different forms for use. Sustainability, from this perspective, acquires a rather different meaning, one which is best served through the market, where energy is transformed in the most efficient and effective ways. In addition, energy taxation as part of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, subsidies and the creation of an investor-friendly market may turn out to be incompatible goals.
The Working Group on Indigenous Peoples generally advises the BEAC regarding the indigenous peoples in the Barents Region. The environment has been a priority area for a decade, with a particular focus on threats of security and accessibility with regard to natural resources. Pollution of the environment, unprofitable development and climate change, which have serious consequences for the lives of indigenous peoples, are the special areas that the Group addresses.
Ideally, the group supports the development of optimal conditions so that the uniqueness of indigenous cultures can be protected (Sreejith ). Of course, it can be conceded that pollution is connected with unprofitable development.
Projects which prove to be unprofitable tend to grow in number with government subsidies. Hence, goals laid down may be contradictory in practice.
While generally the issue of climate change is multidimensional (a factor that makes it complex), the BEAC has incorporated the issue of climate change on the basis of its being a threat to security. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, the BEAC supports the fight against climate change through an approach called subjective environmentalism. There is an economic impulse which is particularly represented by the Working Groups on Economic Cooperation and Energy, and which suggests that environmental solutions on their own are not economical. However, the BEAC, with its overarching umbrella approach, does not address climate change separately. Rather, the BEAC “becomes an example for how global issues such as climate change are contextually altered and subjectively dealt with”, as Sreejith (, 5) describes it. The importance of this particular contextualisation and its consequences will become clear in a later section on complexity.
By choosing not to address climate change outside the notion of climate change as a security threat, the BEAC keeps its options open. The issue of threats is especially significant when one keeps in mind that fear creates unification, a particularly clever method of region building. This is especially significant in the context of globalisation, where regions are counter-concepts in a way, but also, through regional integration, offer combined economic infrastructures with heightened appeal for investors (Sreejith ). Thus, it is not climate change as, say, scientific concept that counts. Rather, the BEAC’s efforts are fully in line with the theoretical explorations done on the nature of governance, leading to increasing cooperation and integration over time.
Legal climate governance: the inuit petition
The Inuit do not, arguably, inhabit the Barents Region. However, the governing effort undertaken by the international community in the context of combating climate change and its impact on Arctic indigenous peoples is rather unique.
Therefore, I will describe it briefly.
At present the only initiative by an indigenous people to actively petition against a major emitter of carbon dioxide is the petition of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) against the United States on the grounds that the country is violating the human rights of the Inuit (Koivurova ).
Remarkably, this case recognises the connection between human rights and environmental quality. Hence, if climate change affects environmental quality in a negative way, human rights are violated. This is the case even though the complexity of the matter concerning the impact of climate change does not allow for a clear picture with regard to concrete causes and impacts.
The Inuit petition incorporates many different sources of scientific evidence which are intended to prove that climate change is the result of human activity and also that the impacts of climate change are indeed taking place (Koivurova
). While there are many uncertainties regarding cause and effect, and the existence of many sources appears to resemble – following system thinking – a worldview where different rationalities co-exist side by side, the process of governance continues to proceed seemingly undisturbed towards greater control through integration, confirming the political rationality of gaining or maintaining power.
Nevertheless, the Inuit petition represents a significant effort towards creating a perception of climate change as a human rights problem (Koivurova
). The question is, however, to what extent any other environmental change can be considered a human rights problem. By extension, even social change could be seen as a human rights problem if it has a negative impact on particular cultures. Koivurova sheds light on the actual intention of governance efforts to combat climate change. The aim is to enact a more efficient and long-term climate policy. While implementation is national and regional, as in the case of Arctic climate governance, the regime as such, in any case, is ‘global’.
The global regime presses for the implementation of a universal standard of what is considered just and efficient. This omits the fact that value judgements (what is seen as just and efficient) are always subjective. Human action exists
on the basis of subjective decision-making. Goal seeking, again, occurs on the basis of subjective estimates of costs and gains. Thus, values are subjective (cf., e.g., Brownstein ). There is, effectively, no way of defining a collective social problem. This fits the variety of rationalities present in society and which ultimately constitute the climate change discourse.
political climate governance ii: sami concerns
With regard to the Barents Region, the most important among its indigenous peoples are the Sami. The efforts of the Sami in relation to climate change concentrate on political influence. Within the boundaries of these efforts, the focus is especially on aspects of traditional knowledge and age-old ways of adaptation and living and the right to practice them.
Retter () writes that climate change is a problem particularly because it occurs in combination with increasing development in the Sami area and globalisation. This confirms the assessment by O’Brien and Leichenko ().
A great concern is increased access to non-renewable resources. Equally important, however, is the fact that general governmental efforts to mitigate the effects of climate change are causing big problems for the Sami, due to the accelerating interest in renewable resources. Thus, the Sami are said already to be suffering from the impact of climate change, recognising that the actual impact of climate change is in the form of changing governmental plans to adapt to and mitigate the impact of climate change.
While the Sami consider themselves to have the capacity to adapt successfully to environmental changes, climate change poses a challenge which the Sami have not faced before. As a result, decision-making ought to be based on the best available knowledge (Retter ). While this may be the case in general, there is a call to value traditional and scientific knowledge equally, with the objective of merging them in order to create new and better knowledge to deal with climate change. Although this may sound like a useful aim and, consequently, there are policies demanding just that, knowledge is rather personal. Values are likewise personal. A value cannot be extracted and formed to become someone else’s knowledge. Therefore, on the basis of the writing of Brownstein (), as explored earlier, I assert that different people’s knowledge cannot be valued equally. This exemplifies a range of expectations, many of which incorporate contradictions when looked at from a logical point of view.
nordic industrial policy for climate change
Highlighting industrial policy for climate change makes for an interesting case. To some extent, it challenges or even contradicts mainstream views that combating climate change and its impact is in strict opposition with industrial activities.
In any case, the Nordic business sector shows great engagement and determination in the formulation of policy positions for the governance of climate change in the North. A report published by the confederations of Nordic industries, enterprises and employers makes it clear that action is needed to combat climate change in the North (Juhler-Kristoffersen ).
In the context of mitigation and adaptation, Nordic business is particularly interested in fair and equal chances. Thus, all large emitters of greenhouse gases should be involved in making significant contributions to combating the global challenge of climate change. There is also, however, in this statement a clearly expressed fear of losing out if everyone is not involved. Nevertheless, business has to thrive. Thus, welfare expectations have to be met so that sustainable economic growth can take place. Therefore, climate change needs to be addressed in the most cost-effective way so that business competitiveness can be maintained within the Nordic region and the wider European theatre.
According to the confederations, there is no apparent contradiction between economic growth and reduction of emissions. Both are necessities for sustainable development, but they need to be appropriately coordinated.
In particular, the importance of the European Union (EU) as an example on the forefront of combating climate change is emphasised. The EU’s goal is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within its territory by at least percent by
(Juhler-Kristoffersen ). Remarkably, and displaying a rare feeling in favour of the abolition of the market, the EU is associated with implementing appropriate rules and also technology for energy efficiency in order to reduce energy consumption to the planned level. This is even more astonishing as it is rare for a political agent to be the one implementing the desired changes.
The business sector acknowledges political leadership in setting goals and implementing concrete policies. It is feared, however, that competitiveness will suffer when companies can invest more cheaply outside the EU. Hence, a global regime which ensures fair competition is desirable (Juhler-Kristoffersen ).
Rothbard (5, 4) remarks, in such a context:
[W]hen businessmen talk of ‘fair trade’ or ‘fair competition’, it means
[W]hen businessmen talk of ‘fair trade’ or ‘fair competition’, it means