POST-NORMAL SCIENCE

The philosophers of science, Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz (1991, 1992, 2003), described the new role faced by scientists in a situation in which the risks inherent in decision-making and the uncertainty of information are significantly multiplied. These create the circumstances of a situation, which they call the post-normal science phase: facts are uncertain, values disputed, stakes high and decisions urgent (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991). Behind Ravetz and Funtowicz’s concept of post-normal, we find one of the classic concepts of philosophy of science – namely, Kuhn’s concept of normal science, from which the authors distance themselves.

Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) considered progress as occurring through periods of transition and upheaval. Kuhn’s (1970) key concepts were “paradigm” and “normal science”, by means of which he defined the nature of scientific revolutions. Kuhn distinguishes three types of phases in the development of science:

The pre-paradigm phase is characterised by scattered theories, rivalry between various schools of thought, hypotheses and research programs, and lack of coherent starting points.

In the phase of normal science, a paradigm has been successfully emerged from the competition, becoming the dominant paradigm or discipline matrix that forms the framework for scientific discussion. Researchers adopt their starting points for research “dogmatically” and concentrate on expanding their knowledge of issues that are important for the matrix and support it (Niiniluoto 1983: 209).

According to Lakatos, normal science is “a research programme that has achieved a monopoly” (Niiniluoto 1983:199). Lakatos’ concept of a “research programme”

corresponds substantially with Kuhn’s paradigm, apart from the fact that he considers the simultaneous competition between research programs to be a more realistic view of science that the dominance of one paradigm. Larry Laudan’s concept of “research tradition” also comes close to Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ views.

Whereas Lakatos’ research programs compete and advance in a way that the more encompassing and broader theory replaces the lesser, it is also possible, according to Laudan, for a good theory to “withdraw”, i.e., be less encompassing. (Niiniluoto 1983: 199, Godfrey-Smith 2003: 103–110)

At times, normal science ends up in a crisis, as when the paradigm gets caught in a deadlock because of “anomalies”, i.e. conflicts between the theory’s predictions and observations. In such a situation, the complexity of the theory will increase more quickly than its accuracy, and the paradigm will lose its position as a monopoly.

The replacement of one matrix or paradigm by another, in such a case, implies a scientific revolution.

In the revolutionary science phase, the boundaries of officially approved knowledge fluctuate, and the selection between the competing paradigms cannot take place on the basis of terms set by normal science. The ensuing competitive situation is, according to Niiniluoto, reminiscent of the pre-paradigm phase of

science in that there no longer are mutually approved standards for discussion and, thus, the persuasion and conversion between scientists takes a more central role than usual. Gradually, one of the new interpretations grows into a dominant paradigm, which implies a return to the stable phase of normal science. Kuhn notes that normal science sows the seeds of its own destruction, for it is exactly the perfecting of the original theory that makes it possible to find anomalies. (Niiniluoto 1983:210–211, Haaparanta & Niiniluoto 1986)

But what is the concept of post-normal science actually needed for, as even so-called normal science has proven its elasticity and ability to renew itself, as demonstrated by the Kuhnian theory of scientific progress? “Post-normal” extends the view to a situation where there is a large amount of information available, generated by various fields of science, and at the same time great uncertainty and controversy, urgency and political pressure prevail (Hulme 2009a: 78). Behind the concept launched by Funtowicz and Ravetz is the concept of “yearning” proposed by Gregory Bateson, a British cultural anthropologist and psychologist. As early as 1958, Bateson, a cultural conversationalist and well-versed cultural analyst, claimed a new kind of science describing the interaction between nature and man, for which

“there was not yet a satisfactory name” (Tognetti 1999).

According to Bateson, it is one of the greatest fallacies of the scientific community to assume that human beings can have total control over any interaction in which they participate themselves. He thought that the assumption of such an ability to control ecosystems constituted an incorrect background assumption for environmental science, leading it astray. Therefore, what is needed is a concept of science that takes into account human beings and the dimension of human interpretation in the human-nature relationship (Tognetti 1999:691).

Such ideas aroused interest among Bateson’s contemporaries but were largely regarded as academic and impractical. Only after the environmental crises foreseen by Bateson achieved wider awareness, did a more favourable atmosphere emerge, and the problem-solving methods offered by science for environmental problems were increasingly found insufficient. (Tognetti 1999)

Kuhn’s concept of normal science has been criticised for the fact that it views science internally without taking account the relationships between science and the rest of society (Väliverronen 2000). It is exactly these relationships that Funtowicz and Ravetz try to specify, using environmental research to illustrate. Environmental science is characterised by problems that were considered central during their time, and to which practical solutions are still being sought. Risk management, practical applicability and “customer service” have more and more clearly become the motives for the production of information (De Marchi & Ravetz 1999). The importance of scientific fields for setting objectives and frameworks for research has decreased correspondingly. In these situations, the boundaries of science, politics

and administration become blurred, and universities have lost their monopoly on information production. The researchers that are working on a research problem form a so-called hybrid community, which consists of the representatives of several scientific fields – no longer the representatives of science only, but also of technical, administrative or political actors who apply the results (Väliverronen 2000).

The concept of post-normal science includes also social and epistemic relationships, which are outside the scientific community while still influencing research programs (Bray & von Storch 1999). According to Funtowicz and Ravetz, the situation calls for the recognition of “an extended peer community”, whereby those whom the decisions concern and whom they affect, participate in the discussion.

They provide the “extended facts”.

Funtowicz and Ravetz say that an inclusive dialogue implies a new scientific culture, in which the need for transparency is even more significant than before.

Since the interests and values are present in decision-making and discussions, these must also be shown openly.

Behind Funtowicz and Ravetz’ observation was the special nature of environmental research in resolving environmental problems, and its close contact with political decision-making. According to Ravetz (2004), an irreversible change has taken place in science: the traditional scientific system faces a trust and legitimacy crisis when confronted with these new challenges.

Post-normal science is characterised by a commitment to the precautionary principle and more extended participation than what there is in the conventional scientific community. This denotes a great change in the culture of science and, according to Ravetz, it will arouse resistance among scientists. But there is no returning to the past: post-normal science should be understood as an extension of democracy, suitable for our current circumstances.

Ravetz (2004) and Funtowicz defend post-normal science in the light of its historic task of safeguarding the existence of humankind. What we call science has undergone many changes over hundreds of years in terms of its objectives, methods and functions. In the 19th century, mathematical science became an unquestionable model for other fields of science, regardless of its suitability for their specific circumstances. According to Funtowicz and Ravetz, post-normal science illustrates the changes in science that are necessary, in order for the civilisation to become sustainable and worth surviving. For this reason, the presence and application of the precautionary principle is integrally linked to post-normal science; it aims to take into account and assess unintentional consequences and avoid them (Ravetz 2004).

In fact, they claim that all science has become, in a sense, post-normal, for “what important area of scientific progress is immune from problems of uncertainty and value-conflict? ” (Ravetz & Funtowicz 1999:641).