• Ei tuloksia

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A PERSONAL ENCOUNTER

It was essential for my personal development story to be able to recognise that being worried about climate change is not automatically followed by expertise in resolving the problem. With time, I became more and more critical towards the selected means, and at times, I pondered whether climate change was being fought in earnest or whether it was just a question of making showy politics. I had to ask myself, whether something other than saving the climate was attempted, such as seeking political attention, acquiring a missing political mandate, or aiming to concentrate power to a certain circle? Or even economic collapse? Why else would means that are obviously so inefficient be declared the right ones? Secondly, my critique towards defining the problem itself grew as the kind of exaggeration and catastrophe rhetoric – that was certainly not conveyed by the IPCC reports – appeared. I pondered how an entire generation of children and teenagers has been affected by the fact that the future has been depicted to be so threatening. Therefore my political enthusiasm changed into a certain kind of political critique, even guardedness.

I recognised a similar kind of personal development history in the scientist whom I am probably citing most in my thesis. This scientist is Mike Hulme, a professor of climate change at the University of East-Anglia. He founded the renowned British interdisciplinary climate change research centre called Tyndall Centre for

33 The socio-psychologist Lorraine Whitmarsh distinguished various associations between these concepts in the British debate the level of anxiousness aroused by the term “climate change” was lower than that by “global warming”, which was considered to be associated with effects related to heat and erroneously also with ozone depletion (Hulme 2009a:234).

Climate Change Research. Hulme, a natural scientist by background, is one of the most famous British professors in climate science, who has published over one hundred peer-reviewed climate change publications, has participated actively in public discussions and also acted as the leading writer of the IPCC’s reports in 1996 and 2001.

Hulme explains his own encounter with climate change in his book Why We Disagree About Climate Change (Hulme 2009a: xxix–xxxiv). He became interested in climate change as a young geography student at the end of the 1970s, after having read up on the history of changed climate conditions. Hulme names this first decade as the “youthful idealism” period. As he researched the changes in rainfalls in Sudan, and realised that familiarising oneself with the causes of climate change could provide an opportunity to alleviate human suffering, we could also see the influence of humanitarian ideals rising from Christianity.

Hulme describes the following period as “quantitative analysis”, a phase of scientific research, during which he concentrated on collecting data on climate change and on observation. At that time, climate change appeared to him as a primarily physical phenomenon. The time period that Hulme calls “political ideology” partially coincides with the analytical period: climate change was the result of free market economies and the consumer-based capitalist economic system – precisely the ideologies he was against. A fourth period followed, a phase of “lifestyle choices”. He became motivated to reduce his own carbon footprint and began to consider his own consumer choices critically. He also began to give presentations on climate change in churches and local communities. The fifth period began as Hulme signed research agreements with the EU and the government of his own country. This phase of “scenarios for policy” included research collaboration in the field and responsible tasks within the UN’s climate panel, the IPCC. Climate change started to increasingly appear as a policy issue and a matter of strategic decision-making, rather than as the object of quantitative scientific analysis.

After this, a sixth period followed. Hulme calls this his “cultural enlightenment”

phase, after which the previous ways to perceive climate change started to look unsatisfactory. During this phase he founded the Tyndall Centre, held various public lectures and travelled a great deal, which led Hulme to notice in how many ways climate change can be experienced and understood. At that time, Hulme, the natural scientist, also took a degree in history. His studies in the history of science and in the sociology of scientific knowledge broadened his horizons. Hulme emphasises that while he considers climate change a serious problem, he is more and more embarrassed with the catastrophic and apocalyptic prophecy linked to it, as well as the talk of it being the greatest problem that trumps all other problems of humankind. He desires more creative discussions on climate issues, a less moralistic and a less pejorative way of approaching the matter. He does not believe either that the way in which climate targets are currently defined is the only possible way –

and perhaps it is not the most suitable one.

During the past years, there has been a strong demand for orthodoxy when addressing climate change – this is a kind of climate orthodoxy or climate puritanism that allows and prohibits what can be said in this field. Climate change has become a striking weapon, a criterion to classify people as responsible or irresponsible, as ethical or unethical. I have experienced this myself many times: criticism of the selected strategies has been willingly interpreted as climate scepticism or ignorance.

Therefore, it is not a wonder that Hulme experienced similar criticism when he started warning of the risks associated with exaggerating climate change or when referring to climate change as a matter to which it would be wise to adapt in any case. In 2008, after he had left the leadership of the Tyndall Centre the year before, Hulme published a personal testimonial (Hulme 2008b) in which he admitted to having been the object of harsh criticism: “I have spoken out against the use of exaggerated language in the description of climate change risks; I have spoken about the limits and fragility of scientific knowledge; I have suggested that we should focus on nearer-term policy goals to improve human welfare rather than be so pre-occupied with one large longer-term goal of global climate management.

As a consequence I have been accused of burying my head like an ostrich in the sand; of undermining the power of science; of lacking passion about ‘solving’ the

‘problem’ of climate change.” (Hulme 2008b)

The above is one of the reasons why this thesis has been written. It is an attempt to describe the narrative of climate change – including the stages and the process of defining the problem and the numerous ways in which the problem can be understood. It is a depiction of the decision-making crisis while tackling wicked problems. It is a depiction of religious trench warfare. It is also an attempt to ponder the relationship between science and political decision-making. This book is written for anyone who wants to understand why climate change is complicated as a political problem, why unnecessary and false hope has been created, and why so little has been achieved in climate negotiations.

I want to raise the issue because I have become frustrated with climate policy and the legislation created on the basis of it - as well as their consequences, which have often turned against their actual objective.

Climate has actually become a super wicked problem — and that helps to explain the exceptional character of the climate science, the competing worldviews and narratives around it and the various messes of policy strategies.

This is a politician’s view of what super-wicked means in practice. So far people talking about wicked problems have been academics, but in practice super-wicked has particular implications for how the political process is organized and for when and how that process fails. I find my own area of expertise Emissions Trading Scheme, ETS, an excellent example of the wickedness of the problem. Once policy strategies are adopted then issues like competitiveness, carbon leakage, windfall

profit, hot air etc. all arise. Gradually the politics end up getting seized by those problems. Finally the side effects end up torquing the larger debate, creating lock-in effects and then a variety of patchwork responses such as backloading or windfall tax. In fact, solving super-wicked interdisciplinary problems may require splitting them into parts — to do, in effect, exactly the opposite of what the interdisciplinary mavens have been saying we should do.

The reader undoubtedly asks the question: why so many themes? Already the climate conferences, the position of climate science within the realm of science, wicked problems or emissions trading alone could be topics of a doctoral thesis.

It is, however, a conscious choice in which I have benefited from the opportunity of crossing the frontiers between research and political decision-making – albeit that it forces one to only scrutinise the tip of the iceberg in many areas. I wanted to describe the problem as versatilely as possible in order to be able to demonstrate one of the major issues that the climate-scientific discussion suffers from, i.e. the lack an overall picture. Both scientists and politicians suffer from this. In decision-making the issue is rather aggravating. I have met politicians who believe that scientists are on top of the issue and also know how to resolve it. I have met scientists who believe that the problems could be easily resolved by means of legislation – if only the politicians were willing to do so. I have met scientists who assume that other researchers are more certain that they are with regard to the matter of facts. I have also met similar politicians. All in all I have realised that most parties assume things on behalf of one another and think too highly of each other’s abilities. There is much more uncertainty and persuasion in the field of climate policy than it is commonly assumed. This is not easily noticed as the environmental NGO’s appear like a self-confident clergy, which makes complicated issues sound more simple that they are in reality.