CERTAINTY TROUGH

Donald MacKenzie, a British researcher of science, has developed the so-called

“certainty trough” theory. His idea is intriguing: it suggests that the closer one is to the origin and the production of knowledge, the more cognitive uncertainty will be emphasised. The producers of knowledge are the ones who know best the deficiencies, risks and problems associated with their materials and theories, which creates uncertainty among them.

McKenzie gives an example from the field of technology: both those who know nothing about technology and those who know it best are remarkably uncertain.

Nuclear engineers and the soldiers that develop missile systems are aware of the risk factors and the uncertainty related to new technologies. The same uncertainty is, according to Hulme, inherent in climate science: it is always uncertain. “Science always speaks with a conditional voice, or at least good science always does”

(Hulme 2009a:106).

According to “certainty trough” theory, uncertainty decreases decisively when it comes to the intermediaries of information instead of its producers. Those who have the most superficial knowledge of technology have the most trusting attitude towards it. (MacKenzie 1998)

Thus, as knowledge decreases, certainty increases until it begins to increase again as it approaches the level of minimal knowledge. The certainty of information is emphasised precisely by those who are most apt to convey it: teachers, journalists, politicians and communication consultants.

The “certainty trough” theory gives a helpful explanation of the climate change discussion: it is precisely the users and transmitters of information, such as journalists and politicians, that express the most certainty about all the details related to climate science.

One exception has to be mentioned, however: climate modelling. According to Lahsen (2005), the traditional “certainty trough” theory does not befit climate modelling, i.e. climate simulations. The processes and dynamics relating to modelling challenge the simple model of the “certainty trough” theory, according

to which uncertainty reigns at the source of information production. This is especially because in computer modelling, it is not easy to distinguish between the users and the producers of the knowledge. Many parties are involved with the production of information through model construction. In this case, the producers of information are not the best evaluators of the accuracy of the research either. From this research based on interviews with climate modellers and atmospheric researchers, Lahsen also drew the conclusion that the producers of information are sometimes even less capable that others in the recognition of their models’ weaknesses.

Of course, MacKenzie’s theory could be criticised for the fact that it confuses understanding as an ability with understanding as a feeling. The certainty of an expert, which is based on ability (expertise) cannot be directly compared to an ordinary person’s certainty, which is founded in a feeling of their own expertise.

Despite this tangential remark, in my opinion the “certainty trough” metaphor illustrates and explains nicely the climate change discussion: it is exactly the users and the intermediaries of information (journalists and politicians) who convey the impression of most certainty about all the details relating to the phenomenon.

Figure 10: The Certainty trough. Adapted from MacKenzie 1990, Woolgar, 1996

Mika Pantzar (2006) says that the “certainty trough” can yield a certain fossilisation of information related to a number of issues. One of these concerns division of labour: the producers of information are allowed to express uncertainty but the intermediaries are not. A second has to do with information: the producers of information know the sources of uncertainty better. A third issue is technical:

the production of information is not technically and institutionally as automated and streamlined as conveying information is – even in an information society:

“Whatever the causes are, the fact that the conveyance of information is becoming stronger and more professional can result in the weakening of the self-correction typical of scientific knowledge.” (Pantzar 2000:64).

Uncertainty also increases when moving far enough from the origin of information. In other words, the most uncertain are those who know the original source of information hardly at all, and those who know it best.

The role of politicians becomes an interesting question in this regard. Why do so-called expert committees (e.g., various environmental committees, or temporary ad hoc committees on climate change) not experience this uncertainty but, on the contrary, make proclamations with great certainty? Does this entail the blurring of the principled role of the decision-maker, putting politicians in the same category as teachers, journalists and communication consultants? Are they now in the business of issuing declarations rather than making decisions?

It is a different question why the fossilisation mentioned by Pantzar does not trouble the ordinary experts of working life – i.e. those who do not convey or produce information but are simply well-informed (nuclear engineers, safety experts, doctors, professional pilots, etc.). Why does fossilisation label so radily apply to political experts? Is this because politicians have adopted the role, not users– but of conveyors of information (i.e. the mediatisation of politics)?

The self-confidence of politicians is aptly characterised by a formulation, which almost became part of a resolution approved by the European Parliament. In May 2008, the temporary Committee on Climate Change of the European Parliament was finalising its work that had lasted for one year, and submitted a resolution with the title “Scientific facts of climate change: findings and recommendations for decision-making” for approval by the Parliament.

In paragraph 12 of the original version of the draft, the resolution stated that the Parliament “condemns efforts to portray the results of studies into the causes and effects of climate change as doubtful, uncertain or questionable.” I suggested toning down the wording because of its unscientific attitude. In practice, the formulation also condemns Popperian-style attempts to falsify data, thereby freezing the further development of science. Self-correction, criticality and the exposure of research results to public discussion would be jeopardised, as would probably the courage of researchers to bring forward anomalistic findings. Secondly, it betrays an attitude of scientific illiteracy as it creates the impression that uncertainty is incompatible

with science. Thirdly, this attitude is worrisome in the light of history. My group accepted my criticism and agreed to a reformulation of the relevant paragraph in the resolution. However, in public, I was reprimanded by two Finnish colleagues for the attempt “to attenuate the wordings on climate change”¹⁰⁶. Nevertheless, the final wording of paragraph 12 clearly showed signs of slighty more moderation:

“Does not accept scientifically unsubstantiated efforts to portray the results of studies into the causes and effects of climate change as doubtful, uncertain or questionable; understands, however, that scientific progress has always been marked by doubt, the progressive elimination of such doubt and the search for explanations or models beyond the current scientific mainstream.”¹⁰⁷

It is noteworthy that many of those who declare their knowledge “certain”, convey their information through the media. It is important to consider the role of media in the delivery of the message. According to Niiniluoto (2010), even when it is a researcher conveying the information, the media have the effect of simplifying the message. Even the conception of the operations of a scientific community may acquire new features when research results are transmitted through the media or other channels to those who apply them, to decision-makers and to citizens: “In such a case, the often cautious and accurate formulations in scientific articles have to be condensed and simplified, and even made more entertaining. The boundary conditions of the research frame and the degree of the uncertainty of the results are perhaps not expressed. Particularly in the field of applied science, such as clinical medicine, environmental sciences and economics, it is often hoped that researchers would give straightforward recommendations for action, whereby the underlying value assumptions will remain hidden.”