Nigeria

The Nigerian state has its unique historical antecedents like every other nation.

The Nigerian state emerged as a British concept, which is also the main reason the political and economic histories of Nigeria have strong links to Great Britain.

Prior to 1900, the Nigerian state did not even exist as a single country, but was collection of provinces loyal to different authorities. On the 1^st of January 1900, Great Britain formally established its authority and began to administer Nigeria as a single entity in 1914 with the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern pro-tectorates. Western influence and education proceeded more rapidly in the south than in the north, with the social, cultural, and political consequences still evident today. Following World War II, Nigerian nationalism and demands for independ-ence resulted in successive constitutions, legislated by the British Government moving Nigeria toward representative self-government. (Edevbaro 1998: 23 &

US Department of State 2010b.)

Created out of a motley of nationalities and ethnic groups (different estimates of various language groups range from 250 to 400), of which three (3) are dominant- the Hausas, the Ibos, the Yorubas and some six (6) large ethnic minorities. Nige-ria is today's Africa's most populous country and one of the largest in terms of territory. It has a population, which is estimated over one hundred and fifty (150) million. Nigeria's central problem is how to evolve a workable socio-political and economic order since it acquired political independence on October 1, 1960. The departing British colonial administration left three key principles of governance- federalism, democracy and a mixed economy with major roles for both public and private sector organizations. The federal system in Nigeria contains a three-tier structure, though it began with the parliamentary system with a ceremonial presi-dent and a prime minister, which was abruptly cut short with the a military take-over in 1966 that also led to the civil war. In reality, the post-independence exist-ence of Nigeria has been unstable to large extent, which has seriously affected its citizens’ expectations and the collective state vision. ((Ekeanyanwu et al. 2004: 8

& Olowu, Otobo & Okotoni 2008.)

Corruption in Nigeria is endemic and pervades every aspect of life, including eve-ry strata of society; the manifestations have become so mutative that it has defied various initiatives and strategies aimed at arresting it (Ekeanyanwu et al. 2004: 6).

The name Nigeria in most recent discourses at individual, national, and interna-tional levels goes with corruption. According to Dike (2002: 1):

“There are many unresolved problems in Nigeria, but the issue of the upsurge of corrup-tion is troubling. And the damages it has done to the polity are astronomical. The menace of corruption leads to slow movement of files in offices, police extortion at tollgates and slow traffics on the highways, port congestion, queues at passport offices and gas stations, ghost workers syndrome, election irregularities, among others. Even the mad people on the street recognize the havoc caused by corruption - the funds allocated for their welfare dis-appear into the thin air. Thus, it is believed by many in the society that corruption is the bane of Nigeria.”

Efforts to fight corruption in Nigeria since independence to present date have been surrounded with high suspense and drama at various levels and intervals.

Nigeria in the past had instituted a lot of policies to tackle corruption; it had wres-tled with the Public Complaints Commission to no avail, fiddled with the Mass Mobilization for Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), experi-mented with National Open Apprenticeship (NOA), and then General Buhari clobbered Nigerians with his horsewhip branded War Against Indiscipline Coun-cil (WAIC), but all without success (Dike 2002: 13). The patron–clientele phe-nomenon, which is an extension of the elite phephe-nomenon, has been responsible for this to a large extent. Keefer and Vlaicu (2005, qtd. in Keefer 2008) argue that: “the inability of political competitors to make credible promises to citizens lead them to prefer clientelist to policies, under provide non–targeted goods, over

provide targeted transfers to narrow groups of voters, and to engage in excessive rent-seeking.” In present day Nigeria, those that run the patron-client network mainly belong to the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP).

One popular representation of this was events that surrounded the former chair-man (Olabode George) of the Nigerian Ports Authority; who was sentenced to prison in 2009 for fraud, but was released to rapturous welcome by his family and political associates and collaborators. He traded the Prison fatigues for native at-tire and as he stepped out he was embraced by his wife, close family members and few party chieftains. He later moved to a church where a thanksgiving service was organised in his honour. Leaders of the PDP, including former president, Olusegun Obasanjo and some senior government officials were also present at the occasion and those that could not make it sent representatives. (Ajikobi 2011.) A former head of operations of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), another anti-corruption body in Nigeria Mr. Tunde Ogunsaki had to be expelled by the University of Abuja (UniAbuja) for engaging in examination malpractice; putting into consideration the office he held, it was really astonishing (Abubakar 2010).

The prolonged military dictatorship in the Nigerian polity and the culture of im-punity, which became institutionalised; the absence of political will to tackle the issue of corruption evidenced by the “sacred cow syndrome”, and also the failure to investigate and prosecute glaring cases of corruption; weak anti-corruption and watchdog agencies and other enforcement mechanisms; insufficient legal frame-work with the absence of freedom of information and whistleblowers’ legislation;

the role of tribalism\ethnicity and religion in national politics; elastic tolerance for corruption encouraged by social-cultural norms and attitudes towards public property that were nourished under colonialism; distortion of the African princi-ple of hospitality gifts giving; and mismanagement of oil resources evidenced and represented by the bourgeoisie life styles and flaunting of wealth by the political elite and their supporters are factors that have aided corruption in Nigeria.

(Ekeanyanwu et al. 2004: 6 & 12.)

In every civilized state structure or advanced democracy in the world, government is generally made of three arms and they are: 1) The Executive; 2) The Legisla-ture; and 3). One thing that is common in all the three arms is the absence of in-tegrity (both institutional and individual respects) (Hassan 2010; Bashir 2010a;

Suleiman 2010; The Sun News Online 2010; Ameh & Oyedele 2010; Falola 2010; & Oyedele 2010). Due to the systemic nature of corruption in Nigeria, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and some media executives of late, have suggested a Ministry of Integrity and

Anti-corruption Affairs be created to scrutinize the operations of all anti-corruption agencies in the country (Samuel 2010). Concerned citizens on their path have requested the establishment of anti-corruption agencies like ICPC and EFCC at the states and local levels, because corruption is most pervasive at the states and grass roots levels (The Nigerian Observer 2010). Both national and international agencies have proposed different mechanisms and framework in putting things right in Nigeria (Tribune Nigeria 2010).

Nigeria has experienced negative transformation in its political leadership, public management, economic development, industrial organisation and quality perfor-mance. Transparency international has consistently grouped Nigeria as one of the most corrupt nations; because administrators lack the dynamics to organise and manage public policy, and industrial operations in an effective and efficient man-ner. The administrative environment in Nigeria has taken various structural and cultural forms. Public planners lack the desired knowledge to engage in planning processes. Extended family and ethnic ties have affected the impartiality of public managers; and private invested interests in competition for state patronage. (Dibie 2003: xi.)