Evaluating the Effectiveness of the UN Approaches to Conflict Resolution

The United Nations was formed in 1945 with the mandate to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”⁹¹ The organization was thus structured by its designers to avoid the pitfalls that led to the demise of its predecessor, the League of Nations. Hence, under the UN Charter, the primary purpose of the United Nations is described:

88 Sens, supra note 86.

89 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly called the Brahimi Report, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 17,2000. Available at <http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations >, last visited, September 8, 2009.

90 Sens, supra note 86, p. 153.

91 Para 1 of Preamble to the UN Charter.

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.⁹²

By assessing its past performance, however, it is difficult to conclude that the UN is successfully meeting these expectations. Initially, the breakout of the Cold War made it virtually impossible for the UN to be effectively engaged in its core task of maintaining international peace and security.

The end of the Cold War was therefore to have introduced an era of peace with an emphasis on a stronger multilateralism towards global security.⁹³ However, these expectations were soon found to have been misplaced. Despite a new thrust on multilateralism heralded by the United Nations, the organisation is often accused of being ineffective in settling conflicts, preventing genocide, and other crimes against humanity. The failure of the UN to prevent human suffering in both the relatively old cases of Somalia (1992 / 93), Bosnia (1992 / 93), Rwanda (1994), the Iraqi war on weapons of mass destruction (2003) as well as in those considered as recent events like the UN’s delayed response to Darfur crisis, its impotence in South-Ossetia and its failure to stop the recent invasion of Israel into Gaza Palestine, have demonstrated the limits of the UN’s ability to prevent and manage violent conflicts wherever they occur. Ineffective performance of the UN, especially in crisis prevention, has caused great frustration, contributing to the growing image of an impotent UN among its opponents. As David Kopel criticizes: “waiting for the United Nations to act is often just as futile as waiting for Godot, and hundreds of thousands or millions of people die while waiting”⁹⁴ Both in Rwanda and in Bosnia, the UN failed to prevent genocide from taking place. In each case there was plenty of warning of the forthcoming mass killings, but the UN mishandled both of them.

Two reports examining these cases assume a high profile and could have a big impact on future policy-making in conflict prevention and conflict management within the UN.⁹⁵

In the case of Rwanda, the inadequate resources and the major countries’ absence of political will were the underlying causes of failure. The report sums up that the UN presence in Rwanda was not

92 Article 1 of the UN Charter.

93 See O’Neill, J & Rees, N. (2005), United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era, New York, Routledge, p.

1.

94 Kopel, D, Gallant, Paul & Eisen, J. (2006). ‘Is Resisting Genocide a Human Right?’ The Nortre Dame Law Review vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 101-169 at p. 162.

95 United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into United Nations actions during the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, UN Doc. S/1999/1257,December 16, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rwanda Report”), and United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35:The fall of Srebrenica (hereinafter referred to as “the Srebrenica Report”), UN Doc. A/54/549, November 15 1999.

planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way that provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble.⁹⁶ The mission lacked well-trained troops, functioning material and military capacity. The seriousness of strong political commitments was made worse by the unilateral withdrawal of the national contingents during crucial moments of the unfolding crisis.⁹⁷ In the case of Srebrenica, with the lack of commitments by outside powers to an effective resolution of the war in Bosnia, a consensus absent in the Council, lacking a strategy, and burdened by an unclear mandate, UNPROFOR was forced to chart its own course.⁹⁸

It becomes clear that the peace implementers should be able to continually adjust mission mandates, rules of engagement, troop strength and military capacities of peace missions to changing realities on the ground. The Rwanda mandate changed in nature from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the Charter at a stage of the conflict when it would still have been possible to stop the genocide. But UNAMIR II failed, in the final analysis, because of the unwillingness of UN member States to provide troops for it. Two months after the Security Council agreed to the mission, UNAMIR II still only had 550 troops instead of 5,500. In the case of Srebrenica, after the Security Council had established the safe areas, the force commander requested 34,000 troops, but finally had to settle for a light option with a minimal troop reinforcement of around 7,600 that was to be defended, if necessary, by NATO air strikes.⁹⁹

In its recommendations, the Rwanda Report points prominently to the need to improve the early warning capacity. It argues that it is essential to improve the ability of the UN Secretariat to analyse and respond to information about possible conflicts, and its operational capability for preventive action. In this context, the report suggests that further enhancement of the cooperation between different Secretariat departments, agencies and outside actors, including regional and sub regional organizations, NGOs and the academic world, is essential.¹⁰⁰ The Report presented to the Millennium Summit of the General Assembly in September 2000 internalizes the lessons from

96 Rwanda Report, Ibid, p. 21.

97 By its resolution 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994 the UNSC adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR, Expressing its deep concern also for the safety and security of UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel. Parallel to that, the UN cut its forces in the UNAMIR from 2,500 to 250 following murder of ten Belgian soldiers assigned to guard the moderate Hutu Prime Minister, Agathe Uwiliyingimana.

98 Srebrenica Report, supra note 4, p. 17.

99United Nations Protection Force, UN Department of Public Information, September 1996, see

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>, last visited, September 8, 2009.

100 Rwanda Report, supra note 90 p. 41.

Rwanda, Srebrenica and other conflicts where the UN has missed opportunities for conflict prevention and management.¹⁰¹

Furthermore, several problems currently exist related to the UN's preventive capacity. First, the Security Council is already overwhelmed by armed conflicts, and is largely unable to deal with potential new crises. As Peck points out, although both the UN Charter and the 1988 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field,¹⁰² urge the UN to become involved ‘early in a dispute or situation’ or ‘at any stage of a dispute or situation,’ the fact is that most disputes do not reach the Security Council’s agenda until they have escalated into armed conflict.¹⁰³

A second problem, common to all multilateral organizations, is that ultimately the decision for action rests with member states that act in accordance–or at least not contrary to their national interests. Security Council decisions to intervene are often more dependent upon the domestic imperatives of the dominant powers, particularly members of the permanent five, rather than on agreed upon normative criteria.¹⁰⁴ The unwillingness of these states to support action, whether directly or indirectly through authorization for regional organizations limits the ability of the UN and other actors to undertake collective action.

A third problem is that some of these weaknesses are natural and inevitable. In almost 64 years since the UN was formed, the nature and location of armed conflicts has changed. It is no longer wars of the type envisaged in the Charter that occupy the attention of diplomats and militaries;

rather than wars between states, we are seeing more and more violent conflicts located within state borders. The UN was not set up to deal with the complexities and controversies associated with maintaining peace and security within the borders of nation states.¹⁰⁵

Thus the UN Secretary General has noted that perhaps the most delicate kind of preventive diplomacy is that which seeks to bring about reconciliation between antagonistic political forces

101United Nations, Millennium Assembly’s Challenge: Put Summit Commitments into Action, Says General Assembly President, as General Debate Concludes, UN Doc. UNIS/GA/1701 September 25, 2000.

102 UN Doc. A/RES/43/51 of December 5, 1988.

103 Peck, supra note 10, p.70.

104 Weiss, G. (1996). ‘Collective Spinelessness: UN Actions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,’ in Ullman, R.

((Ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p. 62.

105One of the Principles of the UN as listed under Article 2 (3) requires Member states …to settle their international disputes by peaceful means… Reference to “International disputes” is, by necessary implication exclusion of non-international disputes, including civil wars. Refer also to Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter.

within a country, in the hope of preventing or resolving conflicts, which, if left to escalate, might in time become a direct threat to international peace and security.¹⁰⁶ Due to the prohibition on intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, any outside initiative to assist in the resolution of disputes between parties must be invited by the state party, and accepted by both parties.¹⁰⁷ This is often complicated by unwillingness on the part of the state to recognize opposition forces in a particular conflict.

3.5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the various approaches to conflict prevention, management and resolution; and to determine their effectiveness or otherwise, in preventing and resolving the currently prevailing intra-state conflicts like those in the DRC. The chapter examined the historical perspective of the concept of conflict prevention within the UN and various methods of conflict prevention and management. A wide range of dispute settlement options, both the UN Charter-based and non- Charter-based mechanisms were highlighted.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of these approaches reveals that both at the time of the Cold War and even thereafter, only a very limited part of their potential is used. The approaches to conflict resolution under the UN dispute settlement system were drastically curtailed by the all-consuming bipolar power-struggle, which developed between the East and the West; and the reign of terror, which was brought on by the production and proliferation of nuclear weapons. The UN’s major organs with dispute settlement potential were all constrained in what was perfectly within the capacity and mandates.

Following the end of the Cold War, the UN began to utilize a wider range of alternative disputes settlement mechanisms and strategies not necessarily provided for under the UN Charter. Thus there is a significant increase in the use of peacemaking, peacekeeping, sanctions and peace-building.

Preventive diplomacy however, continued to be largely neglected, despite the fact that it was more frequently mentioned as central to the UN dispute settlement system.

106 Annual Report, 1998. p.39.

107Vogt points out that sovereign authority over purely internal political and social situations is increasingly challenged:

“The pressure for the review of the constraint in intervening by regional and international organizations in internal security situations will likely increase in importance and urgency as it is becoming apparent that internal conflicts will likely increase…” See Vogt, M ‘Alternative Strategies for Conflict Resolution’ in Vogt, M and Ekoko, E. (Eds.), (1992). Nigeria in International Peacekeeping 1960-1992. Lagos: Malthouse Press, Ltd., p. 320. Although at present this challenge is occurring primarily in the realm of Chapter VIII enforcement mechanisms, it seems more logical that non-forcible intervention would be more acceptable and in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter than military action. This may ultimately require orienting the entire framework of peace-related activities in the international system towards the cultivation of democratic systems of governance, arms reduction, and sustainable development.

The discussion in this chapter indicates that even long after the end of the Cold War, institutional, practical and many other limitations continue to hamper the effectiveness of the UN as world’s dispute settlement system as demonstrated by failure to prevent or resolve a number of ongoing intra-state conflicts. Indeed, success and failure of the UN in conflict resolution determine the different conflict resolution approaches to be adopted by the international community. The weakness in dealing effectively with conflict within the UN has created a loophole for lawlessness within the international community, with the current prevailing unilateralism, including the concept of coalitions of the willing which is slowly replacing the requirement that actions relating to international peace and security be done with authorization of the UN. Of course, my argument does not imply that the UN is completely inactive to resolve full-blown conflict or to ameliorate suffering of victims, but the fact that this is the least opportune moment for intervention means that there has been a major flaw in the system.

Various conflict resolution researches have come up with a number of proposals for the improvement of the UN conflict prevention and management systems.¹⁰⁸ Besides the emphasis on resort to less confrontational non-charter based mechanisms, some of the proposed changes involve the development of new mechanisms. In Figure 3 above, for instance, parts of the existing system which have a role to play in international and intra-state disputes are shown.

Some of the new mechanisms, which might be created to augment the system, are presented in Figure 4. The strengthening of a human rights approach to conflict prevention and management, which is indicative of figure 4 above, is discussed in details in Chapter 6 of this work. It should be noted however, that some of the proposals require sound financial basis and dramatic increase in the UN budget.

Throughout this discussion, it is also noted that the UN Charter-based conflict resolution methods were designed to deal with international conflicts and not internal armed conflicts situations. It might be opportune time to think of a new conflict resolution regime that takes into account the latter situation. In the mean time, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, and other peaceful means including a human rights approach to conflict resolution as discussed in subsequent chapters of this work, is ideal.

108 One more strongly emphasized proposal relates to the establishment of UN Conflict Prevention and Resolution Centers. For a detailed discussion on this proposal, see Peck, supra note 10, pp. 150–163.

4 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT