Assessing Success and Failure

The literature on peacekeeping missions offers a variety of determinants of success and failure, ranging from mandate implementation to more demanding criteria (whether a self-sustaining peace exists after peacekeepers withdraw) to even more exacting standards (whether root causes of conflict have been resolved and whether institution building has been successful).¹²² These ambitious standards reflect unrealistic expectations about the impact that a mission can have within a limited time. This is essentially true in countries that present a very difficult environment. In the DRC, MONUC is also an ongoing mission, and it is thus impossible to determine the long-term viability of peace. Therefore two relatively modest criteria are used here: whether the mission mandate has been implemented and whether human suffering and human rights violations have been reduced.

The mandate implementation is the most widely used criterion to assess success and failure. It is also the most equitable one because it examines standards that the UN has set itself.¹²³ It is also the politically most relevant one since decisions of the UNSC about ongoing peacekeeping missions take into account the extent to which mandates are being implemented. The second yardstick is used because it directly relates to the reduction of large-scale violence, which is the overall goal of every peacekeeping mission. But because violence is difficult to measure in civil wars, I refer here to human suffering as a consequence of violence, which can be roughly assessed by considering the level of human rights abuses and internal displacement.

120 Refugees International, DR Congo: Transition Without Military Transformation, Washington DC, December 13, 2007.

121 MONUC Human Rights Division, ‘The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo January to June, 2006,’ Kinshasa, July 27, 2006, para 42.

122 For overview of these criteria, see Howard, M. (2008). UN peacekeeping in civil wars, Cambridge /New York:

Cambridge University Press, pp. 6-8; Durch, W and Berkman, T. ‘Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know so Far’ in Durch, (2006), supra note 97, pp. 15-16; See also Fortuna, supra note 2, pp. 269-92.

123 See Howard, Ibid, p. 7.

Mandate Implementation

In the following paragraph, I examine whether MONUC succeeded in implementing the core tasks of its mandate.¹²⁴

Facilitating the DDRRR of foreign combatants.

The presence of foreign-armed groups in the eastern DRC has been central to the regional dimension of the war. Of particular concern was the security threats posed by the continued presence of the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an offshoot of the forces responsible for the Rwandan genocide in 1994. To address this issue, MONUC was mandated to facilitate the DDRRR of foreign combatants.¹²⁵

Repatriation of the insurgents was agonizingly slow. In 2007, it was estimated that 6,000 rebels remained in the DRC. The Rwandan government did not play a constructive role, as it did not publish a list of the FDLR members it sought on charges of genocide, a clarification that may have encouraged lesser members of the movement to return home. Moreover, the FDLR leaders held their fighters hostage, killing those who attempted to defect. But the most important reason for the slowness was that MONUC’s mandate rested on the principle of voluntary repatriation. As early as 2004, MONUC had warned that the continued pursuit of its voluntary repatriation would not succeed in resolving the problem within an acceptable time.¹²⁶ The UNSC never seriously considered a mandate to forcefully repatriate the FDLR. This left the mission with a few other means than seeking to persuade foreign fighters to return to their countries.¹²⁷ In late 2005 and since 2006, MONUC also gave logistical support to Forces Armees de la Republic Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) operation against the FDLR. Considering the mandate, the slow repatriation was the best result that the MONUC could realistically achieve. It fulfilled its mandate but was unable to sufficiently speed up the return of the FDLR fighters.

Military Tasks

Deterring violence and Protecting Civilians. MONUC was authorized to use all necessary means to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions and discourage violence and spoilers.¹²⁸ Regarding this element of its mandate, MONUC’s record has sometimes been one of dramatic

124 I omit here the monitoring of the arms embargo: it was inconsequential because MONUC did not have the mandate to enforce it.

125 UNSC Res.1355, June 15, 2001, para 32.

126 UN, ‘Twenty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, supra note 118, para 74.

127 For a revealing example, see Second-Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN Doc.S/2003/566, May 27, 2003, para 21.

128 UNSC Res.1565, October 1, 2004, para 6.

failure. It performed abysmally during crises in Bunia and Bukavu and not much better during other emergencies.¹²⁹ The resumption of fighting in North Kivu since November 2006, which escalated in later in 2008 and triggered massive civilian displacement, did not galvanize a determined response by MONUC. The same was true during early episodes of fighting in Kinshasa in 2006 and 2007, which resulted in the deaths of some 400 people. MONUC’s inaction in preventing the violence has been accompanied by a poor record in protecting civilians, a notable failure in the light of the UNSC’s emphasis on this task.¹³⁰ Although MONUC received ‘the most assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians,’ protecting civilians largely remained a written ambition.¹³¹ In analysing further the strength and weaknesses of the MONUC in this aspect, the perception on the operation’s role on the ground in the DRC, from MONUC personnel, local and international NGOs and the Congolese citizens has been sought. The difficulty of such an analysis in terms of what is working, what is not working and what can be learned to help future operations succeed is that the definition of “success” and “failure” depends on who and where you are. Opinion is highly divided. On the part of the UN headquarters, the operation is basically doing according to the plan.

If you are talking to local NGOs and Congolese, they are wondering why armed soldiers either sit around their bases or drive their UN vehicles on the country’s dirty roads without protecting civilians or stopping the fight between conflicting parties.¹³² Yet MONUC personnel feel frustrated for lack of both sufficient mandate and adequate resources they require in fulfilling their mission.¹³³ A senior MONUC official in Bukavu summarized that frustration. “Look, people should not have thrown stones at MONUC if they have given us the mandate and people to do the job. Where is the P-5? Where are the Western troops”? MONUC officials therefore point out that despite many skirmishes, and some regrettable massacres, the ceasefire between the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement is holding. They however find that the DPKO needs to take MONUC more seriously by providing more personnel, finances and mandate. In their view, DPKO does not think the Congo is a priority. Although the world is aware of what is happening in the Congo, no one takes it seriously.

The head of a Congolese Human Rights NGO in Bukavu represented the often-expressed view of the Congolese people about the MONUC: “The mandate has never been understood by the people.

We thought they were here to restore peace. Now we learn they are only here for themselves-not to

129 On Bukavu, see Turner, T. (2007) The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth & Reality, New York: Zed Books, pp. 96-105;

On Bunia, see Ulriksen, S, et al, supra note, 111.

130 See Månsson, K. (2005). ‘Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo,’ International Peacekeeping, vol. 12, No.4, pp. 503–519.

131 Holt, V and Berkman, T. (2006) The Impossible Mandate? Military Operations, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, p. 91.

132 From interviews with Congolese locals, residents of Bukavu town on June 12, 2007.

133 Many of the Senior MONUC personnel interviewed voiced their frustrations.

intervene.” It becomes important therefore, that the local population understands the mandate of a particular UN peacekeeping operation. When the MONUC first came, everybody in the DRC celebrated, but as time went by, there is disappointment.

Reducing Human Suffering

The second yardstick to assess MONUC-reducing human suffering-was chosen for methodological reasons over other criteria. Examining alternative indicators, for example, whether large-scale violence was brought to an end, raises significant challenges in terms of the availability and quality of data, particularly in war-torn countries like the DRC. While the day-to-day peacekeeping activities of MONUC soldiers have probably done little to alleviate insecurity in the DRC, their presence may have prevented more atrocities.

Many Congolese acknowledge that their country is better off with MONUC than without it. They acknowledge the value of observing violations of human rights and reporting them to the rest of the world. Many also acknowledge that MONUC’s presence is a source of revenue for local business communities. But they usually come back to what they see as the fundamental issue, namely: its perceived inability or reluctance to intervene and contain the ongoing conflict in the country, and this has sometimes led to serious negative sentiments from members of the local population, against the force.¹³⁴ The MONUC operation is perceived by many Congolese as being too passive, especially when massacres are reported to it without any action being taken by them. As such, either out of ignorance or given the reality on the ground, they would like to see the MONUC mandate changed to make it a force for peace.¹³⁵ Furthermore, there is the impression that MONUC is operating with an unspoken slogan: “How soon can we get out”?

Despite the clear gap between the official MONUC opinion and the voice from the field, in the opinion of the locals the presence of the MONUC has had a very positive effect, and if it were to be enlarged that positive effect would be enhanced dramatically.¹³⁶

134UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports “Demonstrators Stone MONUC Headquarters”

(June 2004); “Anti-MONUC Protest in Rutshuru turns Violent” (September 2008).

135 This is based on views from another Congolese NGO leader in Goma.

136 Butts, H & Brandshaw, H. (Eds.), (2002), ‘Central African Security: Conflict in the Congo’, Proceedings Report No.

A715324 Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa.