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4 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND

4.2 Defining Peacekeeping

Despite the lack of a universally agreed-upon definition, peacekeeping as it is usually understood rests on certain principles which derive from those previously listed by the former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in regard to UNEF I.9 They include consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission; non-use of force except in self defence; voluntary contributions of the contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force; impartiality and non-intervention; and day-to-day control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary-General.

Peacekeeping refers to the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned,10 normally involving United Nations military and/or police

8 Durch, W. (Ed), (1993), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis, New York: St.

Martin's Press, p.12.

9 The United Nations Emergency Force I; This was the first armed UN mission explicitly labeled “peacekeeping” and it was dispatched to the Sinai Peninsula in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis to observe the cease-fire and withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory.

10 Peacekeeping operations are undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter although in most cases also Chapter VII authorization is added. See for instance the 1993 UNOSOM II in Somalia, the 1999-2005 UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, the 1999 MONUC in the DRC, the 2003 UNMIL in Liberia, etc. But on the issue of consent, see the Darfu Conflict where the Sudanese Government initially refused peacekeeping forces deployment in their country. Finally, with concerted negotiation efforts, a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force has now been deployed in Darfur since May 2007.

personnel and frequently civilians as well.11 It has been referred to elsewhere as “preventive deployment,”12 and is meant to be a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.13 This definition shows the flexibility of “peacekeeping as a concept that can even be described as ambiguous. The word “hitherto” implies the possibility that the condition of obtaining the consent of all the parties may be dispensed with.14 The definition proposed by the Peacekeepers Handbook compiled by the International Peace Academy has been used by the UN for many years. It defines peacekeeping as,“…the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multi-national forces, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”15 The question of consent, the difficulties in obtaining it and consequences of deployment of peacekeeping without the consent of all parties to a dispute needs more treatment in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

Although the evolution and historical developments of UN peacekeeping operations date way back to the nascent period,16 there had been no consensus on a particular definitional context or on the principles of peacekeeping. In general, the definitions provided in textbooks and elsewhere are so vague that it is best to understand the nature of any single mission by examining its mandate and how it sets about achieving the mission. According to the Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations,17 depending on its mandate and with a significant civilian component, a multidimensional peacekeeping operation18 may be required to:

• Assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement

11 See proposals for reforms under Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, popularly called the Brahimi Report, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 17,2000, found in (2000) 39 ILM 1432, also Available at

<http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations > last visited September 8, 2009.

12 Preventive deployment consists of dispatching non-armed and impartial support personnel into a zone of crisis in order to enhance the vitality of diplomatic processes. For more on this description, see generally Levitt, J. (2001)

‘Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution: Africa -Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and Protection of Displaced Persons: The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law. Vol.11, No. 39, p.5-34. See further Katayanagi, M. (2002). Human Rights Functions of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.20.

13 See Report of the UN Secretary-General (Boutros Boutros-Ghali), No. A/47/277 - S/24111, An Agenda for Peace:

Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, New York: United Nations, 1992, para.47.

14 Katayanagi, supra note 12, p.49.

15 International Peace Academy (1984). Peacekeepers’ Handbook, New York: Pergamon Press, p.31.

16 The period between 1946 to 1956 when several observer Missions and Commissions, such as the UNTSO and the UNMOGIP were set up. According to some scholars, the history of peacekeeping is divided further into an Assertive period (1956-67); a Dormant Period (1967-73); a Resurgent Period (1973-78); and a Maintenance Period (1978-85).

See further descriptions of these periods in Katayanagi, supra note 12, p.37.

17 United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit. (2003). Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. New York: United Nations, p.1-2

18 Also referred to as “peace operations.”

• Monitor a cease-fire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political negotiations and a peaceful settlement of disputes

• Provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal life

• Prevent an outbreak or spill over of conflict across borders

• Lead territories or states through a transition to stable government based on the democratic principles, good governance and economic development and

• Administer a territory for a transition period, thereby carrying out all functions that are the normal responsibility of government.19

The proliferation of peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War brought with it a generational approach to the definition of peacekeeping operations. This approach does not give a correct account of peacekeeping operations since features of one generation may overlap with those of the other; however, to avoid confusion and keep in perspective the complexity of its evolution, it has been common to analyze the theories of peacekeeping by using divisions into three generations.

The first generation is characterized as a situation where a political organ of the UN deploys a military force between two or more armies, with their consent, pending and in the absence of a particular political settlement. The second generation, or “new peacekeeping” are best defined as UN operations authorized by political organs or the Secretary-General, responsible for overseeing or executing the political solution of an interstate or internal conflict, with the consent of the parties.

Third-generation peacekeeping operations20 are those deployed with the expectation that they will employ more coercive measures beyond self-defence, linking the type of peacekeeping with peace enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

As one can see from this “generational shift” from classical peacekeeping operations originally conducted during the Cold War, contemporary peace operations are increasingly complex.

According to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada, they are:

• deployed into both inter-state and intra-state conflicts;

• conducted in every phase of the conflict spectrum, from prevention through to post-war reconstruction;

• dependent on close cooperation among civilian, police and the military organizations from the international community , with parties to the conflict and war affected populations;

19 United Nations, supra note 17.

20 Katayanagi, supra note 12.

• opening in new areas of international activity with conflict-affected countries such as reforms to the security sector.21

Because of the paradigm shift, “peace support operations” (PSO)22 is now an umbrella term used to cover a multiplicity of UN field activities in support of peace, ranging from essentially preventive deployments to long-term state-building missions. They include conflict prevention, conflict mitigation, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building.23 The position of peacekeeping in a framework of Multifunctional Peace Support Operations and war is illustrated below (Figure 5). For a peace enforcement force, which finds on deployment that it is able to lower its operational profile to one more akin to peacekeeping, the consent divide is of little immediate significance. For a peace enforcement force with robust rules of engagement (ROE),24 the transition to a peacekeeping profile or the exercise of coercion can be left to the judgment of the Joint Force Commander (JFC).

Figure 5 - Framework of peace support operations25

21 Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada, available at <http://www.peaceoperations.org/en/peace_operations.asp.> last visited, September 8, 2009.

22 The term is used widely to describe activities in complex humanitarian emergencies. When used in relation to military activities, it refers to multifunctional operations in which impartial military activities are designated to create a secure environment and facilitate the efforts of the civilian elements of the mission to create a self sustaining peace. See further definitions in Peace Support Operations: A Working Draft Manual for African Military Practitioners, DWM 1-2000 (February 1-2000), available at <http//www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Other/PeaceSupportManualMM,> produced as a result of a workshop held at the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe, 24-26 August 1999; last visited, September 8, 2009.

23 Murphy, Ray. (2007). UN Peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: Operational and Legal Issues in Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

24 The ROEs are instructions of when and how to use force-the Bible/Koran of the military components of peacekeeping operations.

25 See supra note, 22 above.

There is currently a great deal of semantic and conceptual confusion surrounding peacekeeping and peace enforcement. For this reason, Figure 6 below tries to clarify the distinction between the two operations on the basis of consent and capability of each operation.

The horizontal dotted line indicates a minimum level of consent necessary for the conduct of peacekeeping—‘you cannot keep peace unless there is a peace to keep’—and the vertical dotted line indicates the minimum force level, in comparison with any potential opposition, below which peace enforcement is not feasible—‘you cannot fight wars from white-painted vehicles’. In the top left quadrant, consent is high, thus a force can successfully conduct a peacekeeping operation with low combat capability. This is traditional, classic peacekeeping, e.g. UNFICYP.26 In the top right quadrant, consent may appear high, but is assessed as uncertain or fragile and there is an expectation that it might be withdrawn. In such circumstances, the judicious option is to deploy, prepare for peace enforcement, with the expectation that the deployment of such a force will deter hostile acts and ensure compliance from the outset. However, the deployment of a peace enforcement force may not always be the most prudent option. If, for example, all the parties perceive themselves to be responsible and trustworthy partners in any peace process, the deployment of a peace enforcement force may be regarded as indicating a lack of trust and thus prove counterproductive. In the bottom right quadrant, the anticipation is that the PSO will be opposed and that the use of force will be necessary to ensure compliance with the mandate. In the bottom left quadrant, consent for the operation is below the critical level necessary to conduct peacekeeping, yet the force does not have the combat capability necessary to enforce compliance against opposition. A peacekeeping force deployed in this quadrant will eventually lose credibility and the operation may become untenable. This quadrant should be avoided.

While decisions concerning the PSO posture are stark, as indicated by the choice of quadrant, the multidimensional nature of PSOs requires that commanders are allowed maximum flexibility to develop the operation towards the attainment of military objectives and the political endstate. PSOs concern the management of change and transition and co-ordination with a great number of civilian elements. The arrow marked ‘strategic direction’ indicates the direction that a PSO should aim to progress as compliance is enforced and built into consent and the PSF is able to switch its efforts to support civil development and the peace-building process.

26 United Nations Force in Cyprus.

Figure 6 - The relationship between consent and capability (Adopted, mutatis mutandis, from Hayes: 2001)