Adornian critiques of reason : autonomy, morality, and education

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Publications of

the university of eastern finland Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology

ISBN 978-952-61-2778-1

Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology

Publications of

the university of eastern finland

Hanna-Maija HuHtala

adornian critiques of reason

Autonomy, Morality, and Education

Hanna-Maija HuHtala

dissertations | hanna-Maija huhtala | AdorniAn Critiques of reAson: Autonomy, morAlity, And eduCAtion|

The concept of reason is central in the philosophy of education. It is reflected in the way we understand ourselves as human beings—in relation to ourselves,

others,and our surroundings, i.e. to the questions of autonomy and morality.

In the dissertation the entry point to this discussion is in the philosophy of Adorno

who understands reason as particular, historical, and material. From this viewpoint,

the dissertation examines the interrelated nature of reason, autonomy and morality.

AdorniAn Critiques of reAson

Autonomy, morAlity, And EducAtion

Hanna-Maija Huhtala

AdorniAn Critiques of reAson

Autonomy, morAlity, And EducAtion

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology

No 123

University of Eastern Finland Joensuu

2018

Suomen Yliopistopaino Oy Tampere, 2018

Sarjan vastaava toimittaja: Päivi Atjonen ISBN: 978-952-61-2778-1 (nid.)

ISSNL: 1798-5625 ISSN: 1798-5625 ISBN: 978-952-61-2779-8 (PDF)

ISSN: 1798-5633

5 Huhtala, Hanna-Maija

Adornian Critiques of Reason: Autonomy, Morality, and Education, 33 p.

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland.

Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology; 123 ISBN: 978-952-61-2778-1 (print)

ISSNL: 1798-5625 ISSN: 1798-5625

ISBN: 978-952-61-2779-8 (PDF) ISSN: 1798-5633

ABStrAct

The concept of reason is central in education and the philosophy of education. It is re- flected in the way we understand ourselves as human beings—in relation to ourselves, others, and our surroundings. In the history of the philosophy of education, reason has often been conceived as generic and ahistorical. Furthermore, reason continues to be prevalent in today’s educational theorizations, where the concepts of autonomy and morality are understood and constructed through conceptions of reason.

This dissertation takes part in the philosophical discussion concerning the con- cept of reason. The entry point is in the philosophy of Theodor W. Adorno. Adorno’s concept of reason challenges the understanding of reason as rational self-regulation.

Instead of viewing reason as formal and generic, Adorno understands it as particular, historical, and material. Thereby, Adorno rejects what he took to be Immanuel Kant’s enterprise of reconciling morality and autonomy in terms of reason. However, he does not deny the interrelatedness of these concepts: Adorno’s concept of reason is also strongly connected to the concepts of autonomy and morality.

The dissertation consists of three articles that together sketch out the interplay between these three concepts. In line with Adorno’s views, reason is conceived in the framework of psychoanalytic theory; autonomy is understood through interrelated- ness to nature and others; morality is seen as the ability for resistance. Based on these views, it is argued that morality can require actively not identifying with the prevail- ing cultural and moral norms. The point is not to deny rational aspects of assessing moral choices, conducts, and theories or the rational component of autonomy; it is rather to point out that morality and autonomy are not only rational constructs or due to reason. This dissertation offers an Adornian perspective on these educationally important concepts, which can enable further theorizations.

Keywords: Reason, autonomy, morality, Adorno, the philosophy of education

Huhtala, Hanna-Maija

Adornolaiset järjen kritiikit: autonomia, moraali ja kasvatus, 33 s.

Publications of the University of Eastern Finland.

Dissertations in Education, Humanities, and Theology; 123 ISBN: 978-952-61-2778-1 (nid.)

ISSNL: 1798-5625 ISSN: 1798-5625

ISBN: 978-952-61-2779-8 (PDF) ISSN: 1798-5633

ABStrAkti

Väitöstutkimus osallistuu järjen käsitettä koskevaan filosofiseen keskusteluun. Se, mi- ten ymmärrämme järjen, heijastuu tapaan, jolla ymmärrämme itsemme ihmisinä: suh- teessa itseemme, toisiin ja ympäristöömme. Kasvatusfilosofian traditiossa järjen käsite on ollut hallitseva, eli järki on usein ymmärretty geneerisenä ja ahistoriallisena. Järjen käsite on ajankohtainen ja tärkeä myös nykypäivän kasvatuksen teorioinneissa. Järjen merkityksen korostaminen on osaltaan vaikuttanut siihen, että myös järjen käsitteelle läheiset autonomian ja moraalin käsitteet usein tulkitaan ja rakentuvat muodollisen järjen käsitteen kautta.

Tutkimuksen lähtökohtana on Theodor W. Adornon filosofia. Adornon mukaan järki on partikulaarinen, historiallinen ja materiaalinen. Adornon käsitys järjestä haastaa käsityksen järjestä rationaalisena itsesäätelynä, sekä siihen läheisesti kytkey- tyvän kantilaisen yrityksen sovittaa moraali ja autonomia järjen avulla. Adorno ei kuitenkaan kiistä kyseisten käsitteiden välistä yhteyttä: myös Adornon järjen käsite kytkeytyy vahvasti autonomian ja moraalin käsitteisiin.

Väitöskirja koostuu kolmesta itsenäisestä, toisiinsa liittyvästä artikkelista, jotka yhdessä tulkitsevat näiden käsitteiden välisiä suhteita. Adornon filosofian mukai- sesti, väitöstutkimuksessa järjen käsitettä lähestytään psykoanalyyttisen teorian viitekehyksen kautta: autonomia ymmärretään jännitteisenä ja yhteen kietoutuvana suhteena luontoon ja muihin ihmisiin; moraali tulkitaan paitsi subjektin vaistomai- sena ja reflektiivisenä toimintana suhteessa oikeaan ja väärään, myös kykynä vas- tustaa tarvittaessa normeja. Normien vastustaminen tarkoittaa, että moraali vaatii myös aktiivista ei-identifioitumista vallitseviin moraalisiin ja kulttuurisiin normeihin.

Tarkoituksena ei ole kuitenkaan kieltää rationaalisia perusteita moraalisten valintojen, tekojen tai teorioiden arvioinnissa – tavoitteena on pikemminkin argumentoida, että moraalisuus ja autonomia ovat myös paljon muuta kuin rationaalisuus. Väitöstutki- mus korostaa kasvatuksellisesti tärkeiden käsitteiden taustalla olevien oletuksien ja arvojen tiedostamista ja analysoimista. Väitöskirja tarjoaa adornolaisen näkökulman kasvatuksen ja kasvatusfilosofian jatkoteorioinneille.

Asiasanat: järki, autonomia, moraali, Adorno, kasvatusfilosofia

7

ACknowledgements

First and foremost, I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Katariina Holma, who has offered time and time again her intellectual expertise and wholesome support, without which this doctoral thesis would not have been possible. It has truly been such a privilege to have her as a supervisor and I look forward to our future collaborations. I also thank my second supervisor, Senior Lecturer Olli-Pekka Moisio, whose expertise on critical theory was very important during this process.

I am grateful for the financial support of the Kone Foundation. I have also received financial support from the University of Eastern Finland (UEF) for this doctoral dis- sertation. In this connection, I would also like to express my gratitude to fellow UEF doctoral student and university teacher Heli Mutanen and Ph.D. university researcher Päivi Siivonen for opening their homes to me during my teaching periods in Joensuu.

Such generosity is touching and rare. In addition, I thank the University of Helsinki for providing me with facilities for the first three years of my doctoral studies and the Loyola University Rome Center for enabling my research visit to Rome in the spring of 2014.

I would like to thank the fellow philosophers of education at the University of Helsinki: Anniina Leiviskä, Katariina Tiainen, Tarna Kannisto, and Lauri Ojalehto;

our research seminars and informal meetings have been truly inspiring. Thanks also go to philosophers Arto Kuorikoski, Henrik Rydenfelt, Jussi Kotkavirta and Senior Researcher Tomi Kiilakoski, who have offered their intellectual input regarding the doctoral thesis. I also thank Jussi for our valuable conversations. I am grateful to Pro- fessors Paul Standish and Naoko Saito and their doctoral students for the interesting collaborations during these years. Looking back to the dawn of my academic life, my warmest thanks belong to Dr. Mari Mielityinen-Pachmann, who is largely responsible for evoking and encouraging my philosophical curiosity, particularly in Adorno. I thank my former neighbor and fellow doctoral student Touko Vaahtera for the mutual peer support regarding the doctoral studies. It has meant a lot to me.

I also thank the pre-examiners of this thesis, Professors Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe. I am further indebted to Professor Päivi Atjonen at UEF for helping me with the practicalities related related to the defense, in her role as custos.

Olen erityisen kiitollinen isälleni Reijo Huhtalalle tuesta jota hän on osoittanut näinä vuosina niin moni eri tavoin: sydämelliset kiitokset isi! Anne-Majta tietenkään unohtamatta! Kiitän myös sisaruksiani Tuulaa, Jarkkoa ja Pasia perheineen. Kuopuk- sena kasvaminen on osaltaan auttanut kohtaamaan tohtoriopintojen hankaluuksia.

Kiitän kaikesta rakkaudesta ja huolenpidosta kultaakin kalliimpaa Eeva-Liisa Verros- ta! Eeva-Liisan viisaus on myötävaikuttanut useisiin elämäni tärkeimpiin päätöksiin.

Kiitän myös sydänystävääni Maarit Säilynojaa lujasta ystävyydestä, jonka jatkumi- seen voi luottaa niin hyvinä kuin huonoina aikoina. Heartfelt thanks belong to my best friends, Carrie Phelps and Nina Hemmoranta. I am lucky to have such amazing persons in my life! Finally, with all that I have, I thank my husband, Professor Michael Mathioudakis, for all the love and support. I love you so very much!

Helsingissä 28.1.2018

Hanna-Maija Huhtala

list of tHe originAl publiCAtions

I

Huhtala, H.-M. (Accepted for publication) Morality, culture, and the educational stigmata of capitalism. SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy.

I I

Holma, K., & Huhtala, H.-M. (2014) Non-idealizing the theory of autonomy:

Theodor W. Adorno’s psychological and political critique of Immanuel Kant.

In M. Moses (Ed.), Philosophy of Education Yearbook, 2014 (pp. 373–381). Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society.

III

Huhtala, H.-M. (2016) Finding educational insights in psychoanalytic theory with Marcuse and Adorno. Journal of Philosophy of Education 50 (4), 689–704.

All publications are reprinted with the kind permission of the copyright holders. The

author of this dissertation was the main and corresponding author in all three studies

and was in charge of planning, designing, and writing the research articles.

9

tAble of Contents

ABStrAct ... 5

ABStrAkti ... 6

AcknowlEdgEmEntS ... 7

liSt of originAl puBlicAtionS ... 8

1 introduCtion ... 11

2 tHe tHeoretiCAl frAmework ... 14

3 reseArCH questions And CentrAl Arguments ... 17

4 “morAlity, Culture, And tHe eduCAtionAl stigmAtA of CApitAlism” ... 19

5. “non-ideAlizing tHe tHeory of Autonomy” ... 22

6 “finding eduCAtionAl insigHts in psyCHoAnAlytiC tHeory witH mArCuse And Adorno” ... 24

7 ConClusions ... 27

referenCes ... 30

originAl ArtiCles ... 33

11

1 introduCtion

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the philosophy of Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969) from the perspective of the philosophy of education. At the heart of the dissertation is the concept of reason, one of the most central and well-worn topics in Western philosophy, as well as in the history of education. In the various attempts within the philosophy of education and the Enlightenment tradition to understand what being human is all about, already from the time of the ancient Greeks, reason has played a central role . In the dissertation, I will examine certain interpretations of reason and the way in which these interpretations come to interplay with morality, culture, subjectivity, and autonomy. Drawing on Adorno’s philosophical thinking, I aim to scrutinize and reconceptualize the basic concepts of reason, autonomy, and morality and their mutual relations in the philosophy of education.

One reason the philosophical scrutinization and reconceptualization of these con- cepts and their mutual relations are important is that they are significant to, and have strong ramifications for, contemporary educational aims and ideals. Autonomy, for instance, is considered to be a central educational aim (Cuypers, 2004; Dearden, 1972; Drerup, 2015; Piper, 2011; Scheffler, 1973; Siegel, 1988, 1997; White, 2010). As I demonstrate in the dissertation, the concept of autonomy is closely connected to the concept of reason; namely, the former is often interpreted in terms of the latter. Un- derstanding autonomy in terms of reason has a long history that reaches back to the transformation from the pre-modern era to the pedagogy of the Enlightenment, where the undertaking of producing autonomous, self-regulating subjects was designated as the central aim of education. In the dissertation, however, I argue that autonomy is not satisfactorily defined in terms of reason, and this view limits our understanding of and formation of subjective autonomy.

I will further argue from Adorno’s point of view that accounts that take reason to be the main authority in morality do not adequately address either the problems of moral philosophy or the practical moral considerations of everyday life. Instead, I suggest that factors such as social contradictions and the subject’s ability to engage and to take a critical stance in relation to prevailing culture has an important role in morality. In Adorno’s view, morality and moral conduct can require actively not identifying with the prevailing cultural and moral norms. This is a central aspect that of what makes Adorno’s theory a critical one. Furthermore, facilitation of the pre- requisites for such autonomy concerning morality begins in early childhood. Here, the notion of culture refers to a multiplex system consisting of beliefs, (institutional- ized) customs, moral norms, and the spiritual and material circumstances of a given society intertwined with the psychological dimensions of the human beings. From the point of view of Adorno’s psychoanalytically inspired critical theory, facilitation of the prerequisites for such independence of the prevailing culture begins in early childhood. Deriving from Adorno’s critical theory, my argument is that morality is not simply due to rationality and reasoning but requires the involvement of a more material (referring to the subject’s corporeality as well as to the concrete structures of society) and unmediated level.

The main impetus for choosing Adorno as a philosophical source of the dissertation

lies in the original way in which his philosophy attends to the interconnected nature

of the societal and psychological dimensions. Taking these dimensions into account is

important in analyzing and rethinking the theorizations of education as education has a decisive role in contributing to the development of a subject’s moral agency as well as an autonomous personality structure (see Holma, 2012). Education is not neutral with respect to the society that frames it. This is to say that the underlying assumptions of the concepts and theories of education, and their mutual relationship, eventually resonate in the practices of education. If, for example, we consider a multicultural and plural society to be a valuable goal, it is necessary that education support this goal and thus that we investigate the central educational concepts and their mutual rela- tionship. Here, the point of the Adornian critique is to bring forth scrutinized views of phenomena without an attempt to find a solution (e.g., an alternative fixed ground for constructing an ultimate theory of education).

It should be noted that in some ways, Adorno, a German philosopher and one of the founding members of the Frankfurt School, is not an obvious choice as a source for theorizations of the philosophy of education; neither was he a philosopher of education nor did he write much about education. Adorno was born in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, as the only child of a Jewish merchant father and a Protestant musician mother. Even though Adorno never fully identified himself as a Jew (or as a Protestant), his family background in Judaism strongly affected his philosophy and life path in general.

¹

Adorno’s most direct educational ideas and comments are the articles and interviews collected in Erziehung zur Mündigkeit (1970). However, edu- cationally relevant material is also found elsewhere in his oeuvre: for example, in his work concerning music theory. Due to the framing of this doctoral thesis, however, this material is not utilized in this research. Although known as a vigorous critic, Adorno refrained from offering any straightforward alternatives. In fact, holding an extremely cynical view regarding society and its possibilities for genuine progression, he believed that any such recommendation would go astray. Adorno’s only impera- tive was “to arrange … thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen” (Adorno, 1966/1973, p. 365). While Adorno did not write significantly about education, he wrote much about philosophy. His entire philosophy is an extensive critique that comprehends the entire Western philosophi- cal tradition, with particular thoroughness regarding the philosophies of Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Martin Heidegger, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche, to mention just a few.

Despite his influence elsewhere, Adorno’s philosophy has remained in the mar- gins of the philosophy of education, especially among the English-speaking philoso- phers of education. Taking the potential that his philosophical thinking holds for the philosophy of education seriously, this dissertation seeks to contribute to filling this

1 Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s co-written book Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, in par- ticular its last section, “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment,” explores how the enlightened civilization reverts to barbarism. Besides the philosophical impact, Adorno was compelled into exile from Nazi Germany at the threshold of the Second World War (Fagan, 2017). It was not only Adorno who was forced into exile, but as the rising tide of anti-Semitism also led to the shutdown of the Institute for Social Research in 1933, almost the entire first generation of the Frankfurt School emigrated to the United States.

One exception was Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), who committed suicide under extremely unfortunate circumstances after being stopped at the French-Spanish border by officers cutting short his attempt to flee to the United States (Wiggershaus, 1986/1994, p. 310). Adorno escaped first to Oxford, England, where he stayed for three years, and then continued to New York, where the institute resumed its research at Colum- bia University. Eventually, the institute settled in Los Angeles. After the war, most of the members returned to Frankfurt, Germany, and the institute resumed its operations in 1951. For comprehensive reading on the Frankfurt School history, see Wiggershaus (1986/1994).

13

void.

²

Furthermore, the dissertation aims to demonstrate that the central themes of Adorno’s philosophy do not only align with contemporary trends in the philosophy of education but also offer untapped resources for counterpointing them. The common thread of the articles in this doctoral dissertation is the Adornian understanding of the human–nature relationship, or the “remembrance of nature in the subject” (Adorno &

Horkheimer, 1947/1979, p. 40), the “realignment” (Huhtala, 2016, p. 695) that echoes in the notions of reason, autonomy, morality, and culture. Adorno’s historical materi- alism

³

lays the foundation for the reorientation of the human–nature relationship as inherently contributing to the notions of reason and morality.

This introduction, and the summary as a whole, lay out the theoretical frame of reference that gives rise to these research arguments. In addition, the dissertation contains three individual articles, each of which forms an independent piece and addresses a specific theme relevant to the philosophy of education. Each article also presents its own research questions and draws its own conclusions. Besides discussing the themes of the articles, the summary at hand introduces the theoretical framework of the dissertation and reflects on the larger frame of reference that connects all the individual articles. The dissertation exists within the field of the philosophy of educa- tion. The intersection of the two disciplines, education and philosophy, is apparent throughout the research. Philosophy offers the methodology and meta-theoretical standpoint, which is a requisite for constructing the new theoretical understanding regarding education, where the main interest of the research lies.

2 See the work by the contemporary philosophers of education Thompson (2006) and Stojanov (2012) on Adorno.

3 For Adorno and other critical theorists, the materialist understanding of history meant the perception of the class structure and the power structure of the extant society, and of the way in which social existence shapes consciousness (Wiggershaus, 1986/1994, p. 118). The first to formulate the concept of historical materialism was Karl Marx (1818–1883). The original Marxist idea of historical materialism implies that the changes in society’s more spiritual spheres, such as religion, morality, and law, are a follow-up to the changes occurring in the economic and political spheres (Ingram, 1990, p. 19).

2 tHe tHeoretiCAl frAmework

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the dissertation, which is rooted in the Frankfurt School and its critical theory, particularly in the works of Adorno.

Before proceeding further with Adorno, I will briefly outline the characteristics of the Frankfurt School, also known as the Institute of Social Research.

The Frankfurt School was founded in 1923 in Frankfurt, Germany, and it refers to a group of Marxist intellectuals who are best known for their critical theory. The Frankfurt School consisted of scholars from different disciplines (such as philoso- phy, sociology, economics, psychology) whose common denominator was Judaism and a strong interest in both Freudian and Marxist theory. The core members of the Frankfurt School included the founder, Max Horkheimer, Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Löwenthal, Erich Fromm, Walter Benjamin, and Friedrich Pollock. The main motivation for this critical theory was to identify human oppression and thus liberate human beings from their unjust circumstances and social structures (Horkheimer, 1968/2002, pp. 245–246). According to the critical theorists, one of the main hin- drances to an emancipated society is ideology, referring in particular to an internal- ized oppression by external structures. Hence, the Frankfurt School understands the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis to be a necessary counterpart to the Marxist theory of society (Geuss, 1981, p. 1; Ingram, 1990, p. 31).

The key component in deciphering ideologies is the critical reflection to which the psychoanalytically orientated theories, together with the broad analyses of society, give rise. Whereas “traditional” theories aim to explain the investigated reality, the members of the Frankfurt School assert that explaining reality is insufficient, as it needs to be transformed.

⁴

Critical theorists further assert that by merely explaining the investigated reality, traditional theories actually reinforce the status quo (see, for example, Horkheimer, 1968/2002, pp. 3–9, 184–243). The purpose of critical theory, therefore, is to transform social reality (ibid.). Critical theory was particularly de- signed to fight against an idealistic dogma with its Marxist component by grounding theory in a materialism that is informed by historicity. Thus, critical theory maintains a strong normative character, and the identification of oppression points to the nega- tivity of the status quo (See Adorno, 1966/1973, pp. 3–4; Bohman, 2016; Horkheimer, 1968/2002, p. 251). One of the salient features of critical theory is its strict refusal to offer any straightforward solutions or alternatives; instead, critical theorists maintain that by outlining an attentive and sharp description of negative social conditions, the potentiality for a different, more eligible kind of state of affairs is established (Bohman, 2016; Held, 1980, pp. 15–16). While critical theory can be considered an active research program

⁵

, in the dissertation I refer to the first generation of the Frankfurt School and particularly to the critical theory of Adorno. In what follows, I will outline the main characteristics of Adorno’s philosophy.

4 See Horkheimer’s (1968/2002, pp. 188–243) outline regarding the distinction between traditional and critical theory.

5 To name a few contemporary critical theorists: Deborah Cook, Raymond Geuss, Jürgen Habermas, and Axel Honneth.

15

Adorno considered his most important method to be his style of writing, which comprised the contradictory use of concepts and exaggerative expressions. The aim of his method was to evoke the dialectical character of language and the demand for the reader constantly to adopt an active position in relation to his philosophy (see Paddison, 1982, p. 203). His style, however, is often viewed as opaque, leaving the reader ill at ease.

⁶

As mentioned in the introduction, the main characteristics of Adorno’s philosophy are its negativity and materialism. Negativity refers to Adorno’s idea that the possibility to alter the status quo is reached through radical immanent criticism. This means that the investigated phenomenon is approached from inside, with its own terms, logic, and concepts. Thus, an increased awareness regarding the negativity of the present state enables the potential for something qualitatively different. According to Adorno, a philosophy that is embedded in materialism and, furthermore, informed by its historicity enables society to break out from the status quo. Adorno maintained that the task of critical theory is not to reconcile contro- versies—as, according to him, social reality is profoundly antagonistic to the extent that the possibilities to reconcile controversies even theoretically, are fallacious—but rather to keep the controversies and tensions visible. Adorno utilized Walter Benja- min’s concept of “constellation” as his philosophical method (Adorno, 1966/1973, pp.

162–164). The concept of constellation refers to the idea that it is possible to achieve an overall image of the “tensioned reality” through the medium of juxtaposed criti- cism. Hence, by approaching the investigated phenomenon from various angles, with integrated methods from different disciplines (sociology, philosophy, psychoanalytic theory, for example), it is possible to capture the investigated phenomenon momen- tarily before it dissolves again. The image that reveals itself is always historically de- fined. While the critique of reason holds fundamental importance in the philosophy of Adorno, he is committed to the Enlightenment process, and his philosophy can be taken as an attempt to continue the Enlightenment’s intellectual tradition through radical self-reflection.

As stated above, the two founding stones of critical theory are psychoanalysis and Marxism. Adorno’s critical theory repudiates, in particular, the practical function of psychoanalysis and utilizes it only to point out the damaged social fabric. That is to say, Adorno was strongly against psychoanalysis, which he saw in all its practical forms as a means for adjusting individuals to a repressive and exploitative society (Adorno, 1966/1973, pp. 351–352). Hence, the root of (most) psychological factors that lead individuals to psychoanalysis can be found in the structures of society; thus, Adorno thinks that the solution is not to adjust individuals into such conditions and thereby reinforce the status quo. To be sure, Adorno did not hold any beliefs about historical progress. Instead, in order to actualize critical reason, it is necessary to identify the forces of history that have been embodied by institutions and the material surroundings of society. Furthermore, just as with the case of psychoanalysis, Adorno refuted the practical character of Marxist theory and utilized it only in a selective way. Namely, he found especially important the notion of the exchange principle and the way the logic of the exchange principle extends itself to accommodating social relations between individuals and the relation of individuals to themselves. Adorno emphasized the importance of historical materialism with respect to his critical theory

6 Thus, the dissertation at hand is “non-Adornian” in the sense that it seeks to communicate its substance through established and generally accepted academic conventions, such as the consistent use of concepts and commitment to clarity.

but stressed the exchange principle by pointing out how the superseding economic and cultural fluxes become intertwined with the more private dimensions of culture and the inner dynamics of the subject’s psyche.

The primary scholarly literature of this dissertation is based mainly on the works of Adorno, particularly Negative Dialectics (1966/1973), which I consider to be his most important philosophical work. In addition, the research draws upon Adorno’s Prob-

lems of Moral Philosophy (1963/2000) and on Adorno and Horkheimer’s co-written book, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (1947/1979). Marcuse’s work Eros and Civilisation (1987), Freud’s texts Civilization and Its Discontents

(1930/2002) and

On Metapsychology, the Theory of Psychoanalysis: ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1991)

were important regarding the research that focused on Marcuse’s philosophy and his reconceptualization of the Freudian concept of sublimation. Part of the research that examines the notion of autonomy utilizes Kant’s work Critique of Practical Reason (1788/1997). The following works formed the most important secondary literature:

Zuidervaart’s

Social Philosophy after Adorno (2007), Cook’s articles “Nature, Red in

Tooth and Claw” (2007) and “From the Actual to Possible: Non-Identity Thinking”

(2005), and Ingram’s Critical Theory and Philosophy (1990). Ingram’s book, in particular,

spurred me to investigate further Marcuse’s notion of sublimation and to counterpoint

it with Adorno’s notion of the addendum. It seemed that this composition offered a

fruitful way to discuss the differences between viewing reason with an emphasis on

sublimation and viewing reason by emphasizing the element of non-identity. Adorno’s

concept of non-identity is complex, employing different meanings depending on the

applied context. Regarding the notion of reason, to put it roughly, it connects to in-

stinctual energy but foregrounds it in the experience.

17

3 reseArCH questions And CentrAl Arguments

This chapter introduces the research questions and unpacks their significance by link- ing them to contemporary discussions on the philosophy of education. Each of the articles represents and examines a more specific research question that contributes to answering the broader, main research question: What does Adorno’s critique of reason

offer for educational theories?

In the doctoral thesis, my overall aim is to develop critiques of reason that can be utilized in the service of educational theorizations. Deriving from the philosophy of Adorno, this critique pertains to two different notions of reason: First, it concerns a philosophical notion of reason as a rational self-regulation. In this conception, which Adorno derives from his interpretation of Kant, reason is understood as capable of formulating guiding principles that could be accepted at any given time. Second, it concerns the notion of reason that Adorno calls instrumental and to which I also refer as “neoliberal” reason. Characteristic of this account of reason is the idea that only means belong to the realm of reason, whereas ends are demarcated beyond the scope of reason.

In answering the objectives of the dissertation, the research questions are formu- lated in the following manner:

What does Adorno’s critique of reason offer for educational theories?

a) What is the relation of moral agency, reason, and culture in Adorno’s philosophy?

b) What is the relevance of Adorno’s critique of reason for the concept of autonomy?

c) How do Adorno and Marcuse’s psychoanalytically inspired critical theories contribute to the concept of reason?

The purpose of this chapter, and the summary in general, is to reflect on the main research question. The order of the research questions is thematic, proceeding from the societal level toward the more individual level. The first article, “Morality, Culture, and the Educational Stigmata of Capitalism,” examines Adorno’s moral account and how it connects with his conception of culture and education. The nexus of morality and culture is occupied by the individual subject, whose task has traditionally been conceived as carrying out the collective moral ideals, virtues, and rules that foster the progress of a given society. Adorno takes a contrary view: Under the prevailing circumstances, the moral subject needs to act as the very force of resistance against the powers of collective ideals. The article approaches these thematic tensions by presenting a more specific research question: What is the relation of moral agency, reason,

and culture?

The second article, “Non-Idealizing the Theory of Autonomy,” examines Adorno’s understanding of autonomy as reflected in the Kantian idea of autonomy. The research question motivating this article is: What is the relevance of Adorno’s critique of reason for

the concept of autonomy?

Questions of autonomy are fundamentally linked to those of subjectivity and (non-)identity, and therefore these accounts by Adorno are also examined.

The third article, “Finding Educational Insights in Psychoanalytic Theory with

Marcuse and Adorno,” explores the psychoanalytic thinking of Adorno and his col-

league in critical theory, Marcuse, with a focus on its educational bearing. As educa- tion deals mostly with the cognitive part of the psyche, the article also examines their conceptions of reason. The research question discussed in this article is the following:

How do Adorno and Marcuse’s psychoanalytically inspired critical theories contribute to the concept of reason? This article approaches the notion of reason from a psychoanalytic

framework.

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4 “morAlity, Culture, And tHe

eduCAtionAl stigmAtA of CApitAlism”

The next three chapters, the present one included, all take a specific angle on reason, the main topic of the dissertation. Each chapter also offers an introduction to the arti- cles included in the dissertation. In this chapter, I will examine how the questions of morality, culture, and reason are mutually interrelated.

In the article “Morality, Culture, and the Educational Stigmata of Capitalism,” I claim that Adorno’s moral philosophical thinking has a central relevance to the phi- losophy of education in today’s neoliberal context. In the philosophy of education, the rational idea of morality has been and continues to be central. By employing Adorno’s philosophy, the article examines the rational idea of morality as insufficient and con- tends that this insufficiency of reason as the scrutinizing force for morality has not been examined satisfactorily. In the article, I assert the importance of resistance and critique in respect to morality. I argue that resistance and critique offer central benchmarks for morality in the context of neoliberal education. I explore the salient features of neolib- eral education through Adorno’s critique of the culture industry. In doing so, it becomes evident that education should be conceived as a means to enrich the individual, not as a commodity or a driving force of the economy. The enrichment that begins with fostering preconditions for the basis of autonomy in early childhood rejects the homog- enization and standardization of neoliberal education and instead furthers the ideals of continuous critical self-reflection and a resistance to prevailing norms when necessary.

Adorno argues that the marriage of reason and morality did not come without difficulty but in fact contributed to the rising crises of Western society, the human condition, and a misconception of subjectivity. For Adorno, these difficulties are epitomized in the commodity culture: a culture that is geared toward the increase of consumption and that offers declining resources for perceiving the world differently.

Adorno’s notion of the culture industry is another embodiment of this problematic

union—more precisely, the dominating relationship to nature. As Adorno argues, it

is this relationship in which we humans undermine our own living conditions on

earth through the exploitation of the environment’s limited resources in the name of

efficiency, standardization, and hence rationality. Underlying Adorno’s critique is his

anthropological account of reason, according to which reason has developed as a tool

for domination. According to him, some of the characteristics of late-modern society

further strengthened this trend. However, contrary to the commonly received view,

Adorno does not take this development path as necessary but as contingent. Things

also could have gone differently. His rejection of the teleological view suggests that his

theory contains a possibility for fundamental societal change (see Zuidervaart, 2007,

pp. 117–118). In this connection, as education is traditionally seen to have an important

role in social change, with the possibility for shaping a better future, I address the

limitation in cultivating the paradigmatic reason of neoliberalism that is inherent in

the current trends of education. Adorno’s moral theory emphasizes materialism and,

as stated before, his moral approach challenges moral theories that ground morality in

terms of reason. According to him, due to their abstract and formal nature, such moral

accounts lead to a misconception of morality. This is to say, universal moral principles

and transcendental moral theories cannot take into account the particularity of each

situation, the uniqueness of the individual, and the socially constructed situation.

Formulation of ahistorical and abstract moral theories can lead one astray because reason is historically conditioned and thus susceptible to manipulation and influence.

⁷

Instead, the existing moral conflicts and tensions function as a starting point for moral inquiries. Adorno asserts that moral knowledge does not aim for reconciliation but is more of an interruption in a situation that calls for moral conduct. His moral theory puts forth the material and social aspect of morality, which he associates with human anthropological development. The main component is the ability—the psychological strength—to refuse. Hence, resistance against social and even moral norms can be po- tentially morally valuable to Adorno (1963/2000, pp. 7−8, 169−170; see also Kotkavirta, 1999, p. 164). Thus, Adorno rejects the idea that moral good can be fostered solely in the social realm of an established community. According to him, a genuinely moral conduct is evoked by becoming holistically (socially, emotionally, etc.) immersed in a situation that requires moral agency.

Adorno calls for “the general enlightenment that provides an intellectual, cultural, and social climate in which a recurrence [of Auschwitz] would no longer be possible, a climate in which the motives that led to the horror would become relatively conscious”

(1963/1998, p. 95). Adorno emphasizes the importance of the early childhood, as he sees it as central in nurturing the psychological strength that enables one to sustain reservations toward the surrounding cultural norms and to avoid identifying oneself straightforwardly with the established norms. Hence, the ability to think for oneself is not merely a question of critical cognitive skills but is instigated already in early childhood. Perhaps surprisingly, Adorno takes the internalization of authority in early childhood as a necessary step in becoming an autonomous individual. According to him, the internalization of authority unravels into autonomy. However, it must be ac- companied by compassion and gratification of the child’s material and psychological needs. Thus, it is fundamental that in early childhood a safe environment is provided, one in which the child can develop an “ego firmness.” The structures of our emotions and bodily experiences contribute to the ways in which we orientate to the world cog- nitively. They have an impact on what kinds of thoughts one is able to think or what choices one is able to formulate. Hence, the subject’s intimate way of experiencing within themselves shapes the ways of thinking. Adorno stresses the role of compas- sion and emotions, which serve as the basis for later cognitive development. This is also important from the viewpoint of the contemporary philosophy of education.

Thus, the main task of education would be to foster the moral–psychological devel- opment of the individual in terms of strengthening the ability to think differently and not identify oneself straightforwardly with the prevailing modes of culture and moral norms. This, together with the ability to employ multiple perspectives with a certain reserved orientation toward the exterior environment, appears particularly urgent in a time of extreme standardization and unification. In the context of contemporary neoliberalism, where market-driven policies narrow down the possibilities for differ-

7 In her book Giving an Account of Oneself, contemporary philosopher Butler (2005) discusses the notion of moral narcissism derived from Adorno’s moral philosophy. Relying on abstract moral principles, one runs the risk of failing to acknowledge how the impetus of moral conducts actually rests in the empirical real- ity—more precisely, in the modes of our desires. In this way, morality can actually attend to moral narcis- sism “whose pleasure resides in its ability to transcend the concrete world that conditions its actions and if affected by them” (p. 105). Echoing Adorno, Butler suggests that by taking corporeal injury as a starting point of morality it is possible to avoid the pitfall of collapsing into moral narcissism (pp. 103–105). Facing the inescapable nature of our temporal and material existence enables morality that is informed of our interrelatedness.

21

ent modes of conduct, it seems necessary to commit to this kind of negating criticism.

Furthermore, it seems important to encourage students to find ways to scrutinize their relationship with established forms of culture. A valid moral theory takes into consideration the inner emotions and drives that are an irreducible part of the human being. It fosters an intellectual climate that does not suppress the corporeality of the individual. Morality cannot be based on idealized descriptions of humanity as these are set to fail when associated with real-life circumstances. Early childhood is crucial for creating a safeguarded space that provides an authority that attends to autonomy and fosters the psychological strength to reject established norms when necessary.

Thus, compassion and reservation are necessary components for leading a moral life.

5 “non-ideAlizing tHe tHeory of Autonomy”

In the article “Non-Idealizing the Theory of Autonomy: Theodor Adorno’s Psycho- logical and Political Critique of Immanuel Kant,” co-written with Katariina Holma,

⁸

we argue that Adorno’s philosophy offers central insights into a redefinition of the concept of autonomy, which is one of the key concepts in the philosophy of educa- tion. As stated in the introduction, in the tradition of the Enlightenment, individual autonomy has been understood in terms of reason, and education has been seen as responsible for producing autonomous subjects. The Enlightenment-era formulations, highlighting the role of reason in relation to autonomy, are still present and relevant in contemporary discussions on the philosophy of education (Roth, 2014; Siegel, 1988;

Winch, 2006). In the context of critical theory, autonomy refers to emancipation from the submissive instrumental reason directed toward the subject’s “self.” Adorno ar- gues that the dominating, instrumental relationship with nature eventually led to the narrow rationality of human beings, dehumanization, and domination over others.

This standpoint clearly erodes the traditional view that autonomy has been grounded in reason. Adorno rejects this view by arguing that, first, certain modes of reason actu- ally work against the formation of autonomy; second, even though reason necessarily contributes to the subject’s autonomy, it is not the only component of autonomy.

Adorno not only criticizes Kant’s idea of reason but also the idea of reason as the actual basis of autonomy. Adorno believes that perceiving oneself as a reflective and mindful part of nature is a precondition for autonomy. In doing so, he rejects the Kantian view, according to which (according to Adorno) autonomy and human freedom are based on overcoming nature. Besides rejecting the account of autonomy based on reason, Adorno argues that the dichotomy between reason and nature is a fallacious one. In view of this, Adorno’s account of autonomy goes against the Western philosophical tradition, where reason and nature are often understood in contrast to each other. This dichotomy has manifested itself as, for example, separation of reason and emotion.

⁹

In the context of Adorno’s psychoanalytically inspired thinking, nature points to the suppressed needs, emotions, and drives of the subject. He further stresses that unconscious needs, emotions, and drives have an important role in the formation of a subject’s autonomy, and these aspects should not be downplayed.

In the article, we first introduce Adorno’s critique of the Kantian idea of autonomy.

The starting point for our investigation is Adorno’s philosophical reading of Kant, not Kant’s philosophy per se. While addressing the Kantian orientation on autonomy, we also see ourselves as contributing to the contemporary discussion of a non-ideal theory of education (see Moses (2014, 2015). Drawing on Adorno’s philosophy, we formulate an Adornian concept of autonomy that views nature both inside and out- side human beings as a necessary component of autonomy. Reason is not understood as essentially different or demarcated from nature but, rather, as a reflective quality of nature (see also Wiggershaus, 1987, p. 40). Pointing particularly to the psycho-

8 The authors made equal contributions to writing this article.

9 Aristotle, for example, regarded emotions, women, and nature as analogous and opposite to reason (Holma

& Huhtala, 2014, p. 379).

23

analytic understanding of the human psyche, nature is viewed as a central source of information that contributes to the development of individual autonomy. In this, the Adornian orientation of autonomy differs not only from the Kantian formulation of autonomy but, interestingly, also from Freud’s conception of the unconscious (see also Kotkavirta, 2008, pp. 65, 68). Drawing on Adorno’s theory, which incorporates both the political and the psychological dimensions of the development of autonomy, we present two reformulations of autonomy. First, in contrast to more individualistic accounts of autonomy, we outline an account of autonomy that takes the subject’s relations to others and nature as an irreducible part of their autonomy. Second, with regard to the political emphasis of critical pedagogy, the Adornian approach of the combined analysis of the political and psychological causes of oppression highlights the importance of the emotional dimension necessary for autonomy. This is to say that the subject’s own vulnerability and dependence on others, and their ability to relate empathetically to others, are inescapable dimensions of autonomy. In the article, we further suggest that strengthening the ability in children to experience difficult feel- ings in themselves and to take changing positions in relation to others, as well as to their own self-image, fosters the development of genuine autonomy. As the article demonstrates, Adorno’s thinking aligns with the contemporary discussion on reason.

Furthermore, it also heeds the concrete social conditions under which the composition

of society and its citizens’ personalities form complex interactions with each other.

6 “finding eduCAtionAl insigHts in psyCHoAnAlytiC tHeory witH mArCuse And Adorno”

In the article “Finding Educational Insights in Psychoanalytic Theory with Marcuse and Adorno,” I examine how Adorno and his critical theory colleague Herbert Mar- cuse (1898–1979) formulate their accounts of reason. In addressing the relevance these accounts might have with respect to the philosophy of education, my entry point is in their psychoanalytic framework. Marcuse and Adorno argue in quite different ways about how the established conceptualizations of reason lack the dimensions of human sensuality and historicity, which are vital for a more all-encompassing understanding of the human condition as well as fostering a society for greater solidarity. Despite the difference, Marcuse’s and Adorno’s theories are congruent, as they take reason and the sensuous side of the subject to be central constituents in critical reason. They also agree that the external environment has a significant role in enabling the materialization of critical reason: Civilization, which represses natural drives and impulses, works against the realization of critical reason.

According to Marcuse and Adorno’s critique, the calculative logic of late-capitalist society is the dominant mode of reason, extending from areas of public to private life. It embodies forms of contemporary culture that are geared toward the material world, particularly forms of culture that are increasingly interpreted as consumption.

The problem that Marcuse and Adorno detect with this kind of culture is that it has a reifying effect on the human mind. The cultural objects that are outcomes of the calculative logic of the exchange principle are devoid of the “spiritual substance” that would challenge the subject in their world relations and promote the possibilities for changing their perspectives toward reality.

The main difference in their approaches is that Marcuse sees that through sublima- tion, which is a rechanneling of instinctual energy, it is possible to establish human potentiality to its fullest. As I state in the article, citing Freud (2002, p. 17):

For Freud, sublimation refers to the rechanneling of sexual energy to some secondary object. … In other words, sublimation means that biological, instinctual impulses are blocked and subsequently revised from the standpoint of their original, free expression, in order to assure order in society. (Huhtala, 2016, p. 692)

Contrary to Freud, instead of suppression, Marcuse sees sublimation as a source for liberated society. In a society where sublimation is established in the way that Marcuse outlines, work is organized in a manner that is not alienating. Marcuse asserts that contemporary society overlooks the needs for aesthetic and intellectual development and instead promotes a culture of consumption that works against the balanced devel- opment of the individual. Adorno stresses the importance of understanding how the exterior environment shapes the nature inside the individual. According to Adorno, Western reason misidentifies the natural impulses and dimensions of the psyche as something external. Thus, the repression of inner nature eventually distorts the experi- ence of the self. This is to say that the subject also over-rationalizes the “non-rational”

dimensions of its psyche. This development is further heightened by the contem-

25

porary consumption culture. Adorno’s psychoanalytically inspired thinking stresses unconsciousness as a possible source for an undistorted relationship with nature.

The experience of freedom lies in the archaic impulses that are more fundamental than ego, preceding the consciousness. These impulses become suppressed because of the salient characteristics of the late-modern society. The ego, the original function of which was to mediate between the demands of society and the natural impulses, takes control of all the subject’s impulses. This distorts the dynamics of the psyche; the addendum is taken as a source of unfreedom, and the ego is mistakenly thought to signify freedom. Thus, in Adornian terms, nature is the source of freedom and neces- sary for establishing autonomy. However, Adorno is not implying that emancipation is found in “returning” to nature. Instead, he stresses the reorientation of the nature relationship.

Adorno and Marcuse both share the view that contemporary society functions against the balanced development of the individual by imposing arbitrary, even ir- rational needs (e.g., excessive consumption and over-production) and the need for work that is alienating. Education has become more market-driven and increasingly aims to produce skills that particularly serve the demands of late-capitalist society.

Whereas Marcuse stresses the role of biology in establishing a non-dominating form of reason, Adorno asserts that the understanding borne of instrumental reason promotes identity thinking, which refers to the manner in which we use concepts to pick out the particulars they denote (Rose, 1978, p. 44), and mistakenly assumes that the identifi- cation of the object is complete. Critical theorists stress that the conflicting needs of society and individuals can lead to the use of psychological defense mechanisms such as rationalization or self-deception. Adorno asserts that the necessary interruption to the established social conditions is enabled only through negation and by attentive investigation of the status quo, with a historically informed insight. He rejects the idea of possessing intact knowledge of oneself. Hence, there is always a dimension in our psyche that remains outside our scope and thus unfamiliar to ourselves. The aim of critical consciousness would then be to cancel false projections, instead of attempting to resolve difficult emotions of disquiet.

Moreover, I suggest in the article that Adorno’s notion of non-identity can be un- derstood as a request for “the subject to step back and allow the other to remain as an

‘other,’ instead of trying to identify the ‘otherness’ of the other.” As I continue,

[t]he philosophy of education has been entranced by the question of recognizing the

‘other.’ In education, these well-intentioned attempts can unfold surreptitiously in a new assertion of sovereignty: The assumption that one has insight into what this otherness consists in may actually constitute a new kind of discrimination. The act of recognition draws the other into a parallel with itself, assuming that this enables a kind of knowledge of difference, when it actually lets us know only itself. (Huhtala, 2016, pp. 699–700)

Adorno’s philosophy helps us understand at a profound level how even our own

identities are not for us to pin down and that the attributes that project to others are

both excessive and defective. The attributes that we associate with others might not

be found in them at all, or sometimes they fall short. Moreover, non-identity also

points to ourselves. Thus, education can support the ways in which children learn

not to identify themselves with their thoughts or emotions as “me” or “my” but as

something that they are experiencing at the time. According to my interpretation, the

materiality of Adorno’s philosophy suggests meeting the prevailing situation more directly. The experience of non-identity within oneself then means to acknowledge the entwinement of our socially structured selves with instinctual human nature. In education, critical reflection on the materiality of the mind enables children to become aware of their interconnectedness with the rest of the living materiality. As I also state in the article, by investigating the indirect nature of concepts, children can learn to acknowledge the conceptually mediated reality. In this way, children reject identity thinking and are able to meet others and the environment in a way that doesn’t call for knowing or getting a grasp of the other. This thinking moves toward something other than identification.

Understandably, education is orientated toward the rational dimension of the

psyche. Adorno claims, however, that more primitive dimensions of the psyche are

embedded in the socialized self. This means that children encounter contexts of teach-

ing and learning with the deeper dimensions of their psyche, too. Hence, the object of

teaching and learning can evoke dynamics that are not fully rational or transparent

to the student. These situations can then push the student toward a process in which

they need to adjust the conception of themselves. However, the student might be

unwilling to do this, for unconscious or conscious reasons, in which case the learning

context can be experienced as a threat (see Britzman, 1999, p. 1). Understanding the

dynamics of early psychic events and nurturing the sense of non-identity in oneself

in the context of education indicates the decreased need for the individual to utilize

their psychological defense mechanisms. Taken for granted in education is the idea

that education can nurture a standpoint in relation to the social self, which can be

potentially transforming. As teaching and learning are not aimed at the closure that

comes with identification, the subject is able to open up to the vicissitudes of experi-

ence and increasingly accept the unfamiliar.

27

7 ConClusions

This doctoral dissertation aimed to investigate certain interpretations of reason and their interplay with morality, culture, and autonomy. The investigation was carried out by utilizing Adorno’s philosophy in the service of the philosophy of education. The combined findings of the doctoral dissertation suggest that the conception of reason as rational self-regulation is embedded in the contemporary conceptualizations and theorizations of the philosophy of education. It was argued that autonomy, morality, and culture are constructed and understood through conceptions of reason. It was also argued that the Adornian understanding of reason offers a more nuanced relationship with the subject’s self, others, and the surroundings and that this conception of reason would be fruitful for the concepts of autonomy, morality, and culture.

Adorno’s interpretation of reason is based on a different kind of human–nature relationship than what he took to be Kant’s conception of reason: one in which rea- son is conceived in broader terms. In Adorno’s interpretation, reason is not restricted just to the cognitive functions but also involves non-rational aspects of human cor- poreality. In this dissertation, these aspects were associated with the biological and psychological constitution of the human mind and corporeality. Furthermore, it was suggested that this interpretation aligns with, and contributes to, contemporary trends in the philosophy of education. The Adornian concept of reason stems from subjec- tive intimacy—that is, from a deeper involvement of human corporeality (in Negative

Dialectics, Adorno uses the term “somatic”)—as well as from porosity and reciprocity

in terms of the interconnected relationship with our organic environment. It portrays reason as deeply personal and intimate and, at the same time, as the profound con- nection between the subject and the surrounding vital environment. From Adorno’s perspective, the Kantian conception of reason offers a narrow and limited view of hu- man understanding and nature and thus downplays the potentiality that reason holds.

In my view, Adorno’s interpretation of reason avoids the problematic dualism often associated with Kantian accounts of reason. It highlights the particular, mate- rial, and historical aspects of reason. In this view, the heightened awareness of the above-mentioned aspects of reason counteracts its conformist and ideological tenden- cies. Acknowledging this vulnerability of reason as a starting point initiates a more nuanced conceptualization of reason: The acknowledgment of reason’s proneness to err provides an impetus for persistent and open-ended processes of self-reflection.

From this viewpoint, Adorno’s interpretation of Kant’s understanding of reason fails to reach the self-reflection necessary to broaden and deepen human understanding and our interconnectedness with our surroundings. By insisting on the timeless and generic principles of reason, reason becomes susceptible to its blind spots, namely the conformist and ideological tendencies that are intertwined with the historical and particular conditioning of reason. Furthermore, without this acknowledgment of the reciprocal relationships between particular conditioning and historicity, reason fails to provide sufficient grounds for interrogating the pre-existing norms and ideals of a given society.

Coupling morality with reason and higher cognitive mechanisms is actuated

by the view that reasoning is foremost a human phenomenon that heightens and

ultimately defines humanity. In moral accounts that draw on this view, reason un-

derstandably serves as grounds for morality. In contrast to these moral accounts,

the findings of this dissertation indicate that morality is not validly assessed only with the criterion of reason. Rather, morality and thus moral agency are also deeply embedded in the processes, which are beyond cognitive thinking and spheres of communication. This is to say that morality is about much more than linguistically worded formal principles connected to universal reason. When it comes to the as- sessment of moral principles, moral choices, or moral conduct, and the only possible forum is by means of reason and language, the aim is not to develop an alternative (non-rational or irrational) benchmark against which this moral assessment could be achieved. Compared with the moral accounts that take reason as the main authority of morality, Adorno’s understanding offers a psychologically sound account of moral- ity. Exposure to complicated social relationships and the fragmentary structures of society instigates a moral agency that is construed in the tension between the exterior and inner environments of the subject, and that thus challenges the view according to which moral agency is successfully defined in the nexus of timelessly valid rational principles. This point was further expanded in the dissertation by examining the salient features of neoliberal education, together with the application of Adorno’s critique of the culture industry. The research illustrated how neoliberal education complements the ideals of the surrounding culture by orientating to education as a commodity driver of the economy. Abstract, often unconscious collective ideals are materialized and institutionalized into the surrounding culture, but culture, too, has a role in sustaining and further shaping these abstract ideals and norms. Thus, critical self-reflection on pre-given norms and moral and cultural ideals impinges on the psychological factors and emphasizes the role of an early childhood that lays the foundation for moral autonomy.

Furthermore, as argued in the research, reason is not only subject to conscious higher cognitive mechanisms, but it is set in motion by processes that are uncon- scious. In connection to this, subjectivity is, for Adorno, something that does not become fixed or entirely transparent to the subject’s self. Rather, it is connected to the continued dialectical movement between identity and non-identity, and to the acknowledgment of the unfamiliarity within ourselves—unfamiliarity that is not touched by rational self-control. This conception of reason and subjectivity has evi- dent consequences for the definition of autonomy—namely that, from the Adornian viewpoint, the accounts of autonomy that assert autonomy as rational self-regulation lead to the misperception of subjectivity. As demonstrated in the dissertation, these accounts often draw on arbitrary ideals of self-sufficiency and mastery. As educa- tional ideals and aims are instituted by the theorizations and practices of education, it is crucial to investigate the possible pitfalls caused by them. Abstract and generic ideals are drawn from particular and historical social conditions. Misperception of their historicity and particularity has undesired consequences as the act of pursu- ing such ideals leads to a subtracted rather than an enriched subjectivity: Adjusting subjectivity around the static, arbitrary ideals of the wished-for realities of the past stagnates the organic, dialectic relations within ourselves as well as the relationships between ourselves, others, and the surroundings.

Finally, this doctoral dissertation takes the view that in the contemporary philoso- phy of education, reason, autonomy, and morality form a tripartite in which reason functions as an active, latent background for the other two. The critiques and recon- ceptualization of these educationally important concepts from the Adornian perspec- tive enable an enriching viewpoint for theorizations on the philosophy of education.

Thus, by offering an understanding of the utter interconnectedness of the education-

29

ally central concepts of reason, autonomy, and morality, and the ways in which these concepts attend to the contemporary philosophy of education, Adorno’s philosophy opens an alternative avenue for the rigorous attempt of the philosophy of education to improve the status quo of tomorrow.

I hope that this doctoral thesis is the first step in this direction. In future research,

I see (at least) the two following directions. First, from a philosophical perspective, it

would be worthwhile to extend the discussion to the philosophers and philosophical

traditions that have also engaged with the problems associated with the generalized

and abstract notions of reason. Secondly, from an educational perspective, I propose

that studying the empirical conditions of contemporary education more closely could

poignantly illustrate the shortcomings of educational theories when portraying moral

education as autonomous judgment and self-regulation. This research direction could,

for example, examine the governing role of social media and what it means in regard

to conceptualizations of autonomy and subjectivity. Thus, the starting point would

be analyzing in closer detail the material and social conditions in which children are

growing up today.

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