ConClusions - Adornian critiques of reason : autonomy, morality, and education

This doctoral dissertation aimed to investigate certain interpretations of reason and their interplay with morality, culture, and autonomy. The investigation was carried out by utilizing Adorno’s philosophy in the service of the philosophy of education. The combined findings of the doctoral dissertation suggest that the conception of reason as rational self-regulation is embedded in the contemporary conceptualizations and theorizations of the philosophy of education. It was argued that autonomy, morality, and culture are constructed and understood through conceptions of reason. It was also argued that the Adornian understanding of reason offers a more nuanced relationship with the subject’s self, others, and the surroundings and that this conception of reason would be fruitful for the concepts of autonomy, morality, and culture.

Adorno’s interpretation of reason is based on a different kind of human–nature relationship than what he took to be Kant’s conception of reason: one in which rea-son is conceived in broader terms. In Adorno’s interpretation, rearea-son is not restricted just to the cognitive functions but also involves non-rational aspects of human cor-poreality. In this dissertation, these aspects were associated with the biological and psychological constitution of the human mind and corporeality. Furthermore, it was suggested that this interpretation aligns with, and contributes to, contemporary trends in the philosophy of education. The Adornian concept of reason stems from subjec-tive intimacy—that is, from a deeper involvement of human corporeality (in Negasubjec-tive

Dialectics, Adorno uses the term “somatic”)—as well as from porosity and reciprocity

in terms of the interconnected relationship with our organic environment. It portrays reason as deeply personal and intimate and, at the same time, as the profound con-nection between the subject and the surrounding vital environment. From Adorno’s perspective, the Kantian conception of reason offers a narrow and limited view of hu-man understanding and nature and thus downplays the potentiality that reason holds.

In my view, Adorno’s interpretation of reason avoids the problematic dualism often associated with Kantian accounts of reason. It highlights the particular, mate-rial, and historical aspects of reason. In this view, the heightened awareness of the above-mentioned aspects of reason counteracts its conformist and ideological tenden-cies. Acknowledging this vulnerability of reason as a starting point initiates a more nuanced conceptualization of reason: The acknowledgment of reason’s proneness to err provides an impetus for persistent and open-ended processes of self-reflection.

From this viewpoint, Adorno’s interpretation of Kant’s understanding of reason fails to reach the self-reflection necessary to broaden and deepen human understanding and our interconnectedness with our surroundings. By insisting on the timeless and generic principles of reason, reason becomes susceptible to its blind spots, namely the conformist and ideological tendencies that are intertwined with the historical and particular conditioning of reason. Furthermore, without this acknowledgment of the reciprocal relationships between particular conditioning and historicity, reason fails to provide sufficient grounds for interrogating the pre-existing norms and ideals of a given society.

Coupling morality with reason and higher cognitive mechanisms is actuated

by the view that reasoning is foremost a human phenomenon that heightens and

ultimately defines humanity. In moral accounts that draw on this view, reason

un-derstandably serves as grounds for morality. In contrast to these moral accounts,

the findings of this dissertation indicate that morality is not validly assessed only with the criterion of reason. Rather, morality and thus moral agency are also deeply embedded in the processes, which are beyond cognitive thinking and spheres of communication. This is to say that morality is about much more than linguistically worded formal principles connected to universal reason. When it comes to the as-sessment of moral principles, moral choices, or moral conduct, and the only possible forum is by means of reason and language, the aim is not to develop an alternative (non-rational or irrational) benchmark against which this moral assessment could be achieved. Compared with the moral accounts that take reason as the main authority of morality, Adorno’s understanding offers a psychologically sound account of moral-ity. Exposure to complicated social relationships and the fragmentary structures of society instigates a moral agency that is construed in the tension between the exterior and inner environments of the subject, and that thus challenges the view according to which moral agency is successfully defined in the nexus of timelessly valid rational principles. This point was further expanded in the dissertation by examining the salient features of neoliberal education, together with the application of Adorno’s critique of the culture industry. The research illustrated how neoliberal education complements the ideals of the surrounding culture by orientating to education as a commodity driver of the economy. Abstract, often unconscious collective ideals are materialized and institutionalized into the surrounding culture, but culture, too, has a role in sustaining and further shaping these abstract ideals and norms. Thus, critical self-reflection on pre-given norms and moral and cultural ideals impinges on the psychological factors and emphasizes the role of an early childhood that lays the foundation for moral autonomy.

Furthermore, as argued in the research, reason is not only subject to conscious higher cognitive mechanisms, but it is set in motion by processes that are uncon-scious. In connection to this, subjectivity is, for Adorno, something that does not become fixed or entirely transparent to the subject’s self. Rather, it is connected to the continued dialectical movement between identity and non-identity, and to the acknowledgment of the unfamiliarity within ourselves—unfamiliarity that is not touched by rational self-control. This conception of reason and subjectivity has evi-dent consequences for the definition of autonomy—namely that, from the Adornian viewpoint, the accounts of autonomy that assert autonomy as rational self-regulation lead to the misperception of subjectivity. As demonstrated in the dissertation, these accounts often draw on arbitrary ideals of self-sufficiency and mastery. As educa-tional ideals and aims are instituted by the theorizations and practices of education, it is crucial to investigate the possible pitfalls caused by them. Abstract and generic ideals are drawn from particular and historical social conditions. Misperception of their historicity and particularity has undesired consequences as the act of pursu-ing such ideals leads to a subtracted rather than an enriched subjectivity: Adjustpursu-ing subjectivity around the static, arbitrary ideals of the wished-for realities of the past stagnates the organic, dialectic relations within ourselves as well as the relationships between ourselves, others, and the surroundings.

Finally, this doctoral dissertation takes the view that in the contemporary philoso-phy of education, reason, autonomy, and morality form a tripartite in which reason functions as an active, latent background for the other two. The critiques and recon-ceptualization of these educationally important concepts from the Adornian perspec-tive enable an enriching viewpoint for theorizations on the philosophy of education.

Thus, by offering an understanding of the utter interconnectedness of the

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ally central concepts of reason, autonomy, and morality, and the ways in which these concepts attend to the contemporary philosophy of education, Adorno’s philosophy opens an alternative avenue for the rigorous attempt of the philosophy of education to improve the status quo of tomorrow.

I hope that this doctoral thesis is the first step in this direction. In future research,

I see (at least) the two following directions. First, from a philosophical perspective, it

would be worthwhile to extend the discussion to the philosophers and philosophical

traditions that have also engaged with the problems associated with the generalized

and abstract notions of reason. Secondly, from an educational perspective, I propose

that studying the empirical conditions of contemporary education more closely could

poignantly illustrate the shortcomings of educational theories when portraying moral

education as autonomous judgment and self-regulation. This research direction could,

for example, examine the governing role of social media and what it means in regard

to conceptualizations of autonomy and subjectivity. Thus, the starting point would

be analyzing in closer detail the material and social conditions in which children are

growing up today.

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originAl ArtiCles

ArticlE i

Huhtala, H.-M. (Accepted for publication) Morality, culture, and the educational stigmata of capitalism. SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy.

ArticlE ii

Holma, K., & Huhtala, H.-M. (2014) Non-idealizing the theory of autonomy:

Theodor W. Adorno’s psychological and political critique of Immanuel Kant.

In M. Moses (Ed.), Philosophy of Education Yearbook, 2014 (pp. 373–381). Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society.

ArticlE iii

Huhtala, H.-M. (2016) Finding educational insights in psychoanalytic theory with

Marcuse and Adorno. Journal of Philosophy of Education 50 (4), 689–704.

Morality, Culture, and the Educational Stigmata of Capitalism¹

Theodor Adorno’s moral philosophical thinking has relevance to the philosophy of education in today’s neoliberal context. Traditionally, the rational idea of morality has been essential in the philosophy of education.

However, the Adornian idea of the insufficiency of reason as the foundation of morality is something that has not been thoroughly explored. By examining the characteristics of neoliberal education through the lenses of Adorno’s critique of the culture industry, it becomes clear that education must be approached not as a commodity or driver of the economy but as a means to enrich the individual. This enrichment, which begins with facilitating prerequisites for the foundation of autonomy in early childhood, rejects the homogenization of neoliberal education and instead promotes the ideals of ongoing critical self-reflection and the resistance of norms.

Keywords: Capitalism, morality, reason, neoliberalism, education

1 Accepted for publication at SATS – Northern European Journal of Philosophy

1. Introduction

The overall aim of this article is to flesh out the relevance of Adorno’s moral and educational thinking in the contemporary neoliberal context. To achieve this, I first discuss Adorno’s analysis of instrumental reason and its salient characteristics. Considering that Adorno’s philosophy is a critique of reason as an attempt to continue the project of Enlightenment, it is necessary to unpack his concept of instrumental reason. Thus, the purpose of the next section is to provide the background upon which Adorno’s moral theory and the philosophy of education are to be understood.² After sketching out this background, I use the subsequent sections to draw the connections between his moral philosophy and the philosophy of education. In the first part of Section 3, I examine Adorno’s moral philosophical and educational thinking as important parts of his criticism of the project of Enlightenment. In the second part of the section, I focus on his moral philosophy and its relationship with the moral philosophical tradition. As I explain there, he builds on the Enlightenment tradition, particularly the philosophical thinking of Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel. Interestingly, deriving from these sources of idealism, Adorno then puts forth a moral theory that emphasizes materialism. In Section 4, I examine the relevance of Adorno’s educational thinking regarding the basic tasks of education in the neoliberal setting of contemporary societies. I focus on Adorno’s philosophy as a way to critique the neoliberal idea of education and, consequently, the culture industry as manifestations of instrumental reason. In the last section, I draw the conclusions of the article.

2. The Critique of Instrumental Reason

The critique of instrumental reason—a hallmark of critical theory—sets the foundations for understanding Adorno’s moral theory and the philosophy of education. While the critique of reason holds fundamental importance in the philosophy of the Frankfurt School, critical theorists are not adherents of unreason. Rather, their critiques of instrumental reason are an endeavor to extend and remodel the process of the Enlightenment and its trust in reason through a radical self-reflection.³ The notion of reason is also highly central to the philosophy of education: The task of producing enlightened, autonomous subjects has been assigned to education, and the idea of reason has played a crucial role in this(Cuypers 2004; Dearden 1972; Drerup 2015;

Piper 2011; Scheffler 1973; Siegel 1988 and 1997; White 2010). In its different formulations, reason has been conceived as “mastering the passions and achieving a detached view of reality” or, in the Kantian tradition, as a rational self-regulation closely associated with autonomy (Winch and Gingell 2008, 176–177). In the last five decades, there has been a strong trend within the philosophy of education to view reason as critical thinking, which Siegel has described as an “educational cognate” of reason that involves “skills and abilities which facilitate or make possible the appropriate assessment of reasons … dispositions, habits of mind, and character traits as well” (Siegel 2013, 1). Thus, the idea of a free, enlightened society has been constructed in different ways around individuals who each possess the ability to think for themselves and use their reason independently.

Departing from the preceding tradition, the critical theorists also find reason to be a source of domination.

Critical theory aims to emancipate individuals from the repressive and unjust societal conditions that, according to the critical theorists, are dominated by instrumental reason. Adorno and other authors associated with critical theory see that besides presenting opportunities for a multitude of practices, institutions, and cultural phenomena, society is a source of beliefs and ideologies that do not necessarily align with the best interests of its members (Geuss 2005, 112–113). Moreover, the deep structures of society are not transparent (Ibid.). Accordingly, the opportunities to change such undetected structures are few. By highlighting the close connection between the structure of society and the structure of the individual’s psyche,

2 It should be noted that Adorno (mainly) wrote in German in the middle of the twentieth century and thus this article situates his philosophy into a discussion about education that he could not envisage.

3 The Enlightenment’s intellectual movement brought about many benefits for the individual as it questioned the old authorities.

Resigning from the powers of church and tradition pushed forward many advancements in the spheres of culture and science, such as scientific revolutions and improved living conditions. Adorno and Horkheimer (1973) do not deny the value of these achievements.

1 1. Introduction

2. The Critique of Instrumental Reason

The critique of instrumental reason—a hallmark of critical theory—sets the foundations for understanding

In document Adornian critiques of reason : autonomy, morality, and education (sivua 28-85)