2. BACKGROUND
2.5. Theological Critiques and Defences of Natural Theology
Two theological critiques of natural theology also relevant for the ID movement are the fideistic critique of natural theology and the critique of idolatry. The fideistic critique concerns the place of natural theology in the Christian faith, and the critique of idolatry concerns the relationship between the Trinitarian God of Christianity and the “God of the philosophers”
of natural theology. Both are also relevant for the discussion on Intelligent Design. First, if evidence has no place in Christian religious belief, then approaches like natural theology and ID are religiously irrelevant, perhaps even harmful. Second, if natural theology’s argument for the existence of theistic God cannot help but construct an idol, then surely ID’s design arguments aiming to show the existence of an unspecified “intelligent designer” will also do so. I will begin with the fideistic critique.
The Fideistic Critique of Natural Theology
Broadly understood, fideism is the idea that religious faith is independent of philosophical arguments for theism or even opposed to such evidential reasoning. In my view, this viewpoint is correct in arguing that religious rationality should not be reduced to that of the natural sciences, and we should avoid excessive rationalization of theological language. The generation of religious beliefs is a complex process involving many different types of reasons, many of which are not as important in science.179
The fideistic critique of natural theology emphasizes the differences of religious belief and scientific theories. For example, D. Z. Phillips argues that seeing God as a hypothesis to explain the world is contrary to the actual nature of religious belief. Hypotheses are always uncertain, but for many believers God is their fundamental ground of being, an absolute certainty and not a hypothesis.180 Though he does not classify himself as a fideist, Alvin Plantinga similarly argues that Christian belief does not originate in looking for explanations, but in the self-revelation of God: “Believers in God do not ordinarily postulate that there is such a person, just as believers in other persons or material objects do not ordinarily postulate
178 Compare Swinburne’s (2004a) and McGrath’s (2009b) uses of the fine-tuning evidence, for example.
179 Olli-Pekka Vainio (2010) provides a good classification of different types of fideism. Fideism is commonly defined as faith completely disconnected from rational reasons. However, I have used a broader definition, because Vainio argues persuasively that such extreme fideism is historically rather rare.
180 Phillips 1976; see also Koistinen 2000 for similar arguments against Swinburne’s evidentialist theism and Moore 2007, 398-399.
that there are such things.”181 According to Plantinga, hypotheses are necessary for scientific theories, but Christians do not postulate God as an explanation, but receive knowledge of God through the action of the Holy Spirit on their sensus divinitatis.182
A central difference between natural theology and theologies of nature is in how much knowledge of the divine can be gained based on reason (broadly understood, including observation, memory, rational intuition, arguments and so on) without reliance on divine revelation mediated through a religion like Christianity. In theologies of nature, interpreting nature properly as God’s creation requires a pre-existing religious view. For example, Alister McGrath argues that no concept of “reason” or “nature” is truly universal and objective.
Rather, these concepts themselves are cultural constructs, and an atheist’s conception of reasonability can be quite different from a Christian’s. Thus the same order of nature can be full of evidence of divine wisdom for the Christian, even while the atheist sees only the work of blind and uncaring chance and necessity. McGrath argues that nature is open to many interpretations, and though something of the transcendent can be glimpsed even starting outside any religious tradition, only the mind enlightened by Christ can perceive that nature testifies of God. However, McGrath simultaneously also argues that a Trinitarian Christian view also explains properties of nature like its comprehensibility and fine-tuning better than competing views. A theology of nature seeks to make such resonance between Christian views and natural science visible, but does not seek to conclusively prove the truth of Christian belief in creation.183
By contrast, the arguments of natural theology are based on the idea that there are sufficient commonalities in different views about reason and nature to make convincing arguments about God possible even without assuming Christianity as a starting point.
Natural theology can still be based on quite a broad understanding of “rational belief” and religious belief does not need to be understood merely as a scientific hypothesis. For example, one of Swinburne’s principles is that we should have a prima facie trust in human experience and the beliefs produced by our cognitive mechanisms. If I find myself with the belief that there is a book in front of me, then I am justified in believing that there is a book in front of me unless I am also in possession of some strong counterargument to this belief.
Swinburne is willing to grant that belief in God can also often be a “basic belief” like this.
Thus if someone believes that they are experiencing the presence of God, they are prima facie justified in believing that God is present. Trust in other’s testimony about the existence of God or trust in religious authorities can also function as a source of justified religious belief.
This means that medieval villagers, for example, were rational and justified in their belief in God. However, Swinburne argues that in modern times this sort of basic belief in God faces many challenges which make the arguments of natural theology necessary. In addition to
181 Plantinga 2000, 370.
182 Plantinga 2000.
183 McGrath 2008.
religious authorities and basic beliefs, there are also atheistic authorities, atheistic basic beliefs and atheistic arguments.184
Responding to the Fideistic Critique
I think the fideistic critique captures something essential about religious beliefs. The origins of religious beliefs are complex and different for different religious people, but for the historical Christian community belief in the Creator God has certainly not been conceived of as a hypothesis. However, as McGrath has argued, this does not mean that the doctrine of God could not possess explanatory potential. McGrath argues that Christian doctrine also has an important explanatory dimension. For example, the Christian tradition contains explanations for the religious experiences of Christians and the development of Christian beliefs such as the resurrection of Jesus. Furthermore, the doctrine of creation can help us understand why the world has a rational order.185
Stenmark has provided an interesting metaphor for why a religious believer might consider it useful to engage in a theoretical discussion about evidence for the existence of God, even if belief in God is not primarily a hypothesis for the believer. Consider my belief that my wife loves me and is a wise and loving woman. These beliefs are grounded in my entire life-experience with my wife, and my belief in them is not a hypothesis. Nevertheless, suppose that someone else does not believe that my wife loves me, or has doubts about her virtuous character. I could in principle discuss some evidences of this love, even though it will be difficult to convey the full grounds of my own beliefs. Similarly, Stenmark argues that a religious believer may discuss the evidence for God’s existence, though the grounds for religious belief are broader.186 So, if the reasons for belief discussed by Swinburne and other theistic philosophers (or the Intelligent Design movement) are at all relevant or interesting from the believer’s standpoint, then their evidential value can be discussed fruitfully, even if religious belief itself is based on broader grounds.187 Indeed, Olli-Pekka Vainio has demonstrated that historically even most of those who classified as fideists have wanted to find some sort of connections between Christianity and the broader culture.188
As I argued in chapter 2.3 normative statements about the relationship of theology and science can be difficult to argue in a way that will convince everyone, since there are many
184 Swinburne 2004b.
185 McGrath 2003, chapter 14.
186 Stenmark 1995, 325-327.
187 Stenmark’s parable succeeds in describing how natural theology might be possible without presupposing that religious faith in God is merely a hypothesis. It also depicts well the desire for dialogue and apologetics that is important for natural theology. However, the parable is incomplete because natural theology is not just theoretical dialogue to convince others of the truth of some proposition. Rather, it is also the theoretical exploration and systematisation of intuitions about the world and meditation before the mysteries of creation.
McGrath (2008, chapter 11), for example, emphasizes natural theology’s links to the theology of beauty and awe.
188 Vainio 2010.
different religions and sciences. If one adopts a non-realistic view of religious language, then the arguments of natural theology will appear to be completely uninteresting. However, if one adopts the theological realism of theologians like McGrath, then the prospects for dialogue begin to look more promising.189 Historically religions have themselves been formulated in dialogue with other traditions, and communicating religious truths has historically been seen as a valuable objective. So, for many forms of religious belief, finding commonalities in rationality and ideas between different traditions can be seen as valuable.190
The Critique of Idolatry
The second theological critique of natural theology relevant to the ID discussion is the critique of idolatry. There is often argued to be a large difference between the “God of the philosophers” and the God of Christianity. For example, the mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) described his mystical experience in 1654 as follows: “From about half past ten in the evening until half past midnight. FIRE. God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of philosophers and scholars. Certainty, certainty, heartfelt, joy, peace.” For Pascal this did not mean the rejection of philosophical apologetics, but he did think that the arguments of natural theology are insufficient for real religious belief.191 However, others have used this difference to argue that all images of God constructed on the basis of human reasoning are idols.
Though the main current of Christian belief has always accepted dialogue with philosophy, critique of philosophical ideas has also been commonplace in theology.
The critique of idolatry springs from two very different sources. The first is Barth’s argument that Christian theology and belief should be based on revelation, rather than fallen human reasoning, which will inevitably end up constructing an idol. Only the revelation of God can bring knowledge of God. Barth’s famous ”Nein!” (1934) to natural theology was written in response to his friend Emil Brunner’s (1889-1969) moderate defence of natural theology. Brunner had argued that some sort of human capacity for the reception of revelation and remnant of the image of God is required by Christian doctrine and tradition.192
The second source for this critique of natural theology as idolatry is quite different:
Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) philosophical critique of “onto-theology”.193 The critique of onto-theology is that using God as an explanation inevitably makes God into just another creature among creatures, part of the system of the world. In order to say that “God exists”,
189 E.g. McGrath 2001.
190 Vainio 2010, McGrath 2003, 110-117.
191 Adamson 1995, chapter 7.
192 McGrath 2008, chapter 7; 2001, chapter 6; Barr 1993; White 2010; Holder 2012. The critique of natural theologies based on fallen human reason is also important in Luther’s critique of the “theologians of glory” who construct an image of God in which the cross of Christ has no place (Kopperi 1997, 138n53).
193 McCord Adams 2014.
for example, one has to assume some sort of common concept of existence shared by both God and created being. Theologian Conor Cunningham has applied this critique to ID by arguing that speaking of God as a designer makes God into a watchmaker comparable with a human being. Cunningham thus argues that ID’s designer is actually closer to a devil than the true Creator, because the designer is just like a human being, only more powerful and more intelligent.194 Though the concept of onto-theology was popularized by Heidegger, the idea that God is very different from any creature is nevertheless a staple of classical Christian theology. In the theology of Aquinas, for example, God is not just a normal being among beings, but “being itself.” Any application of terms to God is analogical, not direct.195
Responding to the Critique of Idolatry
In my view, though the danger of creating a false image of God is always present in theology, the critique of idolatry is not a good argument against all natural theology. The Barthian critique of natural theology has an inner tension, because the Bible and Christian theology themselves seem to contain grounds for natural theology. In this situation, the Barthian reliance on the Bible should lead to the acceptance of some sort of natural revelation.196 McGrath’s theology of nature accepts the basic Barthian suspicion of human reason, though McGrath argues that Barth states the matter too extremely. Theologies of nature solve the tension by allowing for resonance between Christian doctrine and human reason, but arguing that nature must always be interpreted from the Christian viewpoint before it can be seen to reveal the divine Logos. Rather than neglecting Christ, creation is understood to happen through the same divine Logos who then becomes incarnate to redeem mankind. The Christian tradition itself is seen as warranting this kind of resonance between general knowledge and revelation, thus negating the Barthian objection.197
But will a natural theology of the Swinburnean type, starting from commonly shared premises, necessarily end up constructing a God of the philosophers with nothing in common with the Trinitarian God? It is important to note that the question of fitting together different images of God is not just a problem for natural theology, but all of Christian theology. The God of the Old Testament is not openly Trinitarian, though the Old Testament can be interpreted from the viewpoint of Trinitarian theology. Within Christian theology the Prophets of the Old Testament are thought to speak of the same God as the New Testament.198 So, could not philosophical natural theology also speak of the same God, even
194 Cunningham 2010, 275-280.
195 See also Turner 2004. Turner also defend’s the possibility of natural theology based on his understanding of Aquinas.
196 E.g. McGrath 2008; Barr 1993.
197 McGrath 2001, chapter 6. McGrath himself terms his though a “natural theology”, but as Runehov (2010) argues, its content is closer to what is usually meant by a theology of nature.
198 On the historical importance of the Old Testament for Christianity, see Pelikan 1971, 13-27.
if it does not speak always in the same terms? The two understandings of God are not wholly different: Proof texts for most of the attributes of the theistic God (such as omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, moral perfection and so on) can also be found in the Bible.199 Thomas Aquinas described the relationship of the God of the philosophers through an interesting metaphor. If we see someone from far away, we may be able to tell that it is a human person, and only later recognize that it is Peter. When seeing the person far away, we were seeing Peter, even while we did not recognize him. Similarly, the God of the philosophers can be interpreted to be, on closer inspection, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob who is known more fully through faith.200
The question of ontotheology requires thinking about the nature of theological language. In what sense can human concepts be applied to God at all? The question is not just about concepts like “being” or “design” but also applies to concepts like the love of God and the properties of God discussed in various Biblical passages. Because we are human beings, we must necessarily use human concepts when talking about God. Theologian Denys Turner has defended natural theology against the critique of onto-theology in his book Faith, Reason and the Existence of God (2004). Turner argues that we must simultaneously recognize both God’s unknowability and his knowability. Theological language balances between affirmation and negations, and forgetting either leads to problems. Claiming that God is wholly other and that human concepts cannot be applied to him would make God irrelevant to humans and dismiss the central Christian doctrines of God’s revelation and incarnation.
However, believing that we can wholly comprehend God would lead to creating a false image of God to fit into our philosophies. This would indeed lead to constructing an idol as feared by the ontotheologians, because Christian doctrine also requires admitting the transcendence and mysteriousness of God’s nature.
Turner argues that natural theology can be formulated in in a way that avoids the ontotheological error. The key is that in proving the existence of God (or at least providing evidence supporting this belief) natural theology is proving the existence of a mystery that reason cannot fully grasp. Paradoxically, just as natural theology leads us to understand that God exists and that God has certain attributes, it also leads us to understand God’s transcendence and mysteriousness.201 The same point is poetically expressed by Augustine, as quoted previously: “though the voices of the prophets were silent, the world itself, by its well-ordered changes and movements, and by the fair appearance of all visible things, bears a testimony of
199 For example, see the articles in Flint & Rea 2009, which discuss the attributes of God and often quote biblical passages alongside philosophical reflection.
200 Turner 2004, 18-19.
201 This is the central argument of Turner 2004. Turner is a representative of the tradition of negative theology, and all proponents of natural theology do not accept as strong a sense of the mysteriousness of God. As William Alston has pointed out in his article “Two Cheers for Mystery” (2005), modern Anglo-American philosophical theologians generally trust in the capacity of the human reason to understand quite a lot of the properties and intents of God, though no-one believes that they fully comprehend God. For two different perspectives of how we can talk of God’s “properties”, see also Holmes 2007 and Wainwright 2009. Dawes (2009, 46-48) argues that the analogical nature of theological language harms the explanatory power of the arguments of natural theology.
its own, both that it has been created, and also that it could not have been created save by God, whose greatness and beauty are unutterable and invisible.”202
Edward Feser’s statement of the theological problems of speaking of God as a designer is more positive to ID than Cunningham. Feser separates between five different gradations in our conceptions of God. On the first level (1), God is understood as a wizard-like bearded man who lives in a place called Heaven. On the second level (2), God is understood as an omnipotent and omniscient bodiless being who is nevertheless comparable to a human being. On the third level (3), God is understood as pure being or existence itself, as in the tradition of philosophical theology. The fourth level (4) is based on mystical experience of God, and is the highest achievable in this life. The fifth level (5) is the beatific vision of God.
Edward Feser’s statement of the theological problems of speaking of God as a designer is more positive to ID than Cunningham. Feser separates between five different gradations in our conceptions of God. On the first level (1), God is understood as a wizard-like bearded man who lives in a place called Heaven. On the second level (2), God is understood as an omnipotent and omniscient bodiless being who is nevertheless comparable to a human being. On the third level (3), God is understood as pure being or existence itself, as in the tradition of philosophical theology. The fourth level (4) is based on mystical experience of God, and is the highest achievable in this life. The fifth level (5) is the beatific vision of God.