The Separation between the Designer and God

Design arguments “focus upon finding and identifying various traces of the operation of a mind in nature’s temporal and physical structures, behaviors and paths.”²¹² The argument is also called the teleological argument, because it is based on apparently goal-directed (teleological) order in nature. Design arguments are a posteriori arguments based on the empirically discovered properties of nature, rather than a priori arguments based just on reasoning from first premises. Design arguments have historically been among the most popular and most widely believed of natural theology’s arguments in support of belief in the existence of God.

Even Immanuel Kant, critical of all proofs of the existence of God, wrote that the teleological argument

always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most accordant with the common reason of mankind. It enlivens the study of nature, just as it itself derives its existence and gains ever new vigor from that source. – – Reason, constantly upheld by this ever-increasing evidence which, though empirical, is yet so powerful, cannot be so depressed through doubts suggested by subtle and abstruse speculation, that it is not at once aroused from the indecision of all melancholy reflection, as from a dream, by one glance at the wonders of nature and the majesty of the universe – ascending from height to height up to the all-highest.²¹³

212 Ratzsch 2010.

213 Kant 1953, 520; quoted in Plantinga 1990 [1967], 95.

Kant did also criticize the design argument. He argued that the argument can provide evidence only for the existence of some kind of designer, not the existence of God. The crucial problem is the finiteness of the universe, which can be explained by supposing the existence of a very wise and very powerful being, without the need for an infinite Creator.²¹⁴ Kant further argued that using speculative reason to establish the existence of God is an error, because God is not spatio-temporal and cannot be the object of experience.²¹⁵

Modern natural theology and Intelligent Design diverge significantly in their responses to these critiques. Modern natural theologians have disagreed with Kant’s epistemological ideas and his conclusion. According to Swinburne, an infinite Creator is a simpler hypothesis than a finite Creator, and the cumulative theistic argument can give us good reasons to believe in an infinite God, even if they do not prove his existence absolutely. Whereas Kant assumed that our conclusions cannot exceed that which is required by the evidence, even theories within natural science go beyond this requirement. For example, on the basis of observation of a small part of the cosmos, we make theories about physics which concern the whole universe.²¹⁶ The ID movement agrees that the designer can be identified as God using additional theological and philosophical argument. However, the movement also emphasizes, with Kant, that design arguments alone can at most prove the existence of an unidentified designer.²¹⁷

Intelligent Design’s Minimalistic Design Argument

The ID theorists explicitly refer to the philosophical discussion on design arguments as motivation for their limitation of the design argument. Michael Behe admits that God is culturally the obvious candidate for the role of the designer, but nevertheless “the leap [from a designer] to God with a capital G short-circuits scholarly arguments that have been going on for millennia across many cultures.”²¹⁸ In the context of this quote, Behe supports this idea with the possibility that the order of nature could in principle be the product of some highly advanced technology, rather than the creation of God. The design argument by itself is not

214 Kant 1953, 520.

215 Rossi 2014.

216 Swinburne 2011b. See also Tapio Luoma’s analysis of Thomas F. Torrance on this point (Luoma 2002, chapter 5).

217 Sometimes the movement´s thinkers emphasize this so much that some critics even interpret them as agnostics.

(E.g. Nieminen, Mustonen & Ryökäs 2014, 277: "These ID proponents [Behe as the prime example] seem to have mostly agnostic worldviews.") This is a misunderstanding that is corrected by a broader reading of the ID literature, as I will show in the main text.

218 Behe 2007, 277-288. See also Behe 2001a, 699-700. Even in some defenses of natural theology, the selection of theism over other designer-alternatives can also be based on subjective personal and cultural reasons. For example, James F. Sennett (2005) argues that because of our cultural context and our background beliefs, then evidence for the existence of some mind which has ordered the cosmos is for most Western people quite reasonably also evidence for the Christian God rather than Hume’s spider-god or a polytheistic pantheon of gods.

enough to adjudicate between this idea and the doctrine of creation. Thus the design argument itself does not prove God. Willaim Dembski similarly argues that while ID is compatible with theism and creationism, it is also compatible with deistic views and Platonism, for example. Thus it does not “prejudge such questions as who is the designer”.²¹⁹

In some early ID works, the separation between the designer and God is not made this sharply. Phillip Johnson argues in his early book Darwin on Trial that believing in God as the designer of life is a reasonable alternative to Darwinism. Johnson's critique of methodological naturalism is based on the idea that supernatural explanations should be allowed within natural science.²²⁰ However, later Johnson has also defined the limits of the ID movement’s argument more minimalistically: “My personal view is that I identify the designer of life with the God of the Bible, although intelligent design theory as such does not entail that.”²²¹ Similarly, in an early article Stephen Meyer argues that intelligent design is part of the “return of the God hypothesis”. Citing the arguments of natural theology favorably, Meyer argues that many lines of evidence provide epistemic support for belief in God, though they do not prove his existence.²²² However, in his later writings Meyer has also emphasized the distinction between the intelligent designer and God: “neither the evidence from biology nor the theory of intelligent design”²²³ can prove the identity of the designer as God. Nevertheless, he continues to hold that “theism makes more sense of the totality of human experience than does any other worldview.”²²⁴

All of the major ID theorists make a connection between the designer and the Christian God, and regard making this connection as a very reasonable thing to do. For example, Dembski argues that Intelligent Design forms a “bridge between science and theology”²²⁵ and that “ultimately, the problem is whether reality at its base is purposive and intelligent or mindless and material.”²²⁶ According to Johnson, materialists reasonably fear that “even the most minimalist version of a deity will tend to become understood as something like the God of the Bible, who communicates with humans and cares about how we behave.”²²⁷ He thus sees Intelligent Design as a “wedge” which will open up an open discussion about the nature of the ultimate reality and make it easier to trust in the God of the Bible.²²⁸ According to Behe, evidence for design has the effect of strengthening a believer’s faith in God²²⁹, and philosophical, historical and religious arguments exist which support seeing the designer as the God of

219 Dembski 1999a, 252.

220 Johnson 1993.

221 Johnson 2007.

222 Meyer 1999c.

223 Meyer 2010, 439.

224 Meyer 2010, 440.

225 Dembski 1999. The traditionality of Dembski’s belief in God can also be seen from his critique of process theology in the introduction to Dembski, W. Downes, J. and Frederick, W. (ed) 2008. On process theology, see further McDaniel & Bowman 2006, Cobb & Griffin 1976, Nash 1987.

226 Wiker 2002, 11.

227 Johnson 2007.

228 Johnson 2000.

229 Behe 1998a.

Christianity. Behe even makes the same argument that Russell and Sober made after him: an infinite series of designers is implausible, and so God is the most plausible designer.²³⁰ Meyer and Dembski have argued together that evidence of an intelligent designer constitutes evidence for Christian theism when compared to atheism, even if design is also compatible with other non-naturalistic views.²³¹ So, the beliefs of the ID theorists and the natural theologians on the identification of the designer and God are quite close, though the practical rhetorical strategies are very different.

Given these views, it seems perplexing that the ID theorists so often emphasize the distinction between the designer and God, rather than the connection between the designer and God, which they clearly also make. Some critics of the ID movement have argued that the separation between the intelligent designer and God is merely a strategic ploy for the ID movement. By saying that ID does not reveal the identity of the designer, the design argument keeps the appearance of non-religiousity and can be taught in public schools in the U.S.²³² Elliott Sober (representing naturalism) and Robert Russell (representing theistic evolutionism) have argued separately that not identifying ID's designer as God is very difficult. Identifying the designer as space aliens, for example, leads to the additional question: where did these space aliens come from? If evolution is not a viable answer, then these space aliens must themselves have also been designed. If we do not want to end up with an infinite series of designers, then at some point the chain must stop with God. So, the designer is most credibly God.²³³

As persuasive as this line of thought can be, Russell and Sober don't represent these arguments as absolutely unassailable. The arguments from Kant and Hume for a distinction between the designer and God are still accepted by many philosophers and theologians. It could be that the ID theorists simply agree with Kant and Hume on this issue. Their language in the above quotations supports this possibility. It is argued that the mere idea that there is an intelligent designer of life is compatible with several ideas of what the designer is like, and it akes further argument to rule out space aliens. Given the strong traditions behind the separation of the designer and God, it seems plausible that the ID theorists seriously believe that it takes an extra step of reasoning to move from “there is a designer” to “this designer is God.” Even if they themselves think that taking this extra step is very reasonable, they can without contradiction think that this additional step does exist.

Once again, I think the truth lies somewhere in the middle of ID´s position and the critics´ argument. The ID theorists´ formulation of the logic of the design argument, which I will analyse in more detail in chapter 4, does support the possibility of a separation between the minimalistic hypothesis of design and God. So, the ID theorists have grounds to honestly believe in this distinction. However, the best explanation for the ID theorists' emphasis on this distinction is created by the unique cultural situation of the ID movement and its desire

230 Behe 2001.

231 Dembski & Meyer 1998.

232 Shanks 2004, Forrest 2001. For a critique of Shanks, see Del Ratzsch (2005).

233 Russell 2005, Sober 2007.

to break out of the intellectual ghetto of creationism, and to gain a foothold in science education. So, the emphasis is made for strategic reasons, even if the distinction is honestly believed.

It is easy to imagine that the ID theorists' emphasis would be quite different, if the cultural circumstances were different. In the debate on ID, defenders of the design argument emphasize the difference between the designer and God, while critics emphasize the supernatural nature of the designer. This is a complete reversion of the debate between Hume and Paley. Suppose that there was no pressure to get ID qualified as a part of natural science, and the central cultural issue was instead the credibility of theism. Wth this change, theistic defenders of Intelligent Design would likely emphasize the connection they see between the designer and God, while the atheistic critics of the movement would once again argue that the design argument can establish only the existence of some designer, but not God.²³⁴ Indeed, I will argue later that though the minimalistic conception of the designer does make some sense based on the logic of ID's design argument, ID's broader cultural agenda requires a more robust concept of the designer. In many cases, the ID theorists move between a minimalistic and theistic conception of the designer as it suits their purposes.