a. Waddams advocates concerted propaganda
The Rev. H.M. Waddams’ visit to Finland in December 1944 was not an isolated event in the relations between the Churches of England and Fin-land, but marked the beginning of a new era in which he was to play an im-portant role. Having returned home, he delivered a very detailed report of the visit to his employer, the Ministry of Information. The report contained a detailed account of his trip with sharply executed portraits of characters he had met, remarks about the general conditions and opinions in Finland and suggestions how the Ministry of Information should relate to the Finns.1
According to Waddams, Finnish opinion had become more optimistic, or at least less pessimistic, during the months following the truce. The Finns had not really found anything to complain about concerning Soviet behav-iour in Finland, and were more or less reluctantly concluding that perhaps
“the Russians may not want to occupy the whole of Finland after all”. Nev-ertheless, he thought that many of them secretly hoped to find some evi-dence to support their view that “the Russians are barbarians who only want to compass the downfall of poor little Finland.”2 Waddams had caught the sombre mood of the Finns at the time, but did not see any reason for it. For him there was no reason to doubt the good will of the Soviet Union.
Even if Waddams had seen his task as cultivating an understanding of the Soviet Union among the Finns his report made it quite clear that the
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”; Ketola 2004, 75-76, 99-101; Paju-nen 2006, 149-150.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 1.
same method of understanding was not applied to his own dealings with the Finns:
On the whole I was not very favourably impressed by the Finns. They seem to have a narrow outlook, and few of them seem to be capable of seeing any of the larger issues at stake in the political events in Europe. Finland is the centre of their world, and there is a strong nationalist spirit which affects all their views. Friendliness with other nations consequently appears to be tinged in their case with a self-interest which diminishes the real value of such friendship.
Whatever prejudices Waddams might earlier have held against the Finns, the visit had more than confirmed them.
The roots of Waddams’ inability to appreciate the Finnish point of view lay in his fundamentally different interpretation of the war, intensified by his imperialistic attitude towards what he considered the lesser European nations. This was what he suggested:
So far as possible Finland should not be encouraged to think itself more important than it really is. One of the ill results of the first Winter War was that Finland saw herself as the champion of Western Democracy against the Bolshevist hordes, and the publicity given to that war in the world press resulted in a dangerous swelling of Finland’s head, which was already rather too big for its hat. So long therefore as control is exercised over visitors to Finland in future, those Church dignitaries should be dissuaded from going, who regard as their main task the over enthusiastic exaggeration of the virtues of those small nations who live on the borders of the Soviet Union.
Even if Waddams was correct in his estimation that the Finns had indeed considered themselves “as the champion[s] of Western Democracy against the Bolshevist hordes”, this had been the general view in Christendom during the Winter War: the prayers offered for Finland at St Paul’s at its outbreak would otherwise have made very little sense.5
Waddams’ reference to church dignitaries who regarded “as their main task the over enthusiastic exaggeration of the virtues of those small nations who live on the borders of the Soviet Union” certainly applied to the Chair-man of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Bish-op A.C. Headlam of Gloucester.6 Waddams must have considered
Head-LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 1; Ketola 2004, 75.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 2.
Heikkilä 1988, 123-124.
Jasper 1960, 261, 265-266.
lam as ignorant as the Finns given his long-standing failure to understand the depravity of Nazi Germany while retaining the notion of the Soviet Union as a godless state fighting against all religion. Having this kind of CFR Chairman had indeed become a burden to the Church of England especially at the beginning of the war.7 Thus Waddams’ suggestion had an internal ecclesiastical political flavour.
However, dissuading the wrong kind of British visitors was not the only suggestion Waddams made. Throughout his visit, Waddams had tried “to enlighten Church leaders about Russia and about British opinion vis à vis Russia” and “tried to persuade them that the best thing the Finnish Church could do would be to throw their weight of its morale influence into the scales on the side of reconstruction in Finland and the creation of a new spirit of understanding and confidence between nations, especially with Russia.”8 The way to proceed was to circulate British propaganda in Finnish in an attempt to influence Finnish Church opinion. Waddams wanted “to broaden the outlook of Finnish people and in this way to give them a more balanced view of the place of Finland in international affairs.”9
Waddams regarded the church as a particularly important propaganda channel because of its dominant position in Finnish society. According to Waddams, “in large parts of Finland the Church has a strong hold on the people, whose religion is of a pietistic character, and is inclined to be associ-ated with nationalism.” As the church was probably “the only independent organisation -- in touch with the bulk of the people, -- an influence exerted on the clergy might have far-reaching results.” This, Waddams planned, could also counteract “the tendency to give religious tinge to anti-Russian prejudice.”10 Thus the British Ministry of Information could do well to try to use good church relations as a means to influence Finnish opinion.
In practice, Waddams suggested the implementation of a huge propa-ganda operation. He wanted “The Spiritual Issues of the War” to be issued weekly in Finnish and distributed to all clergymen throughout the coun-try, whose members are about 1,500.”11 Furthermore books like Christian Counter Attack and The British Churches in Wartime should be translated
Jasper 1960, 290-301; Hastings 1998, 321-329, 338-345.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 2.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 2; Ketola 2004, 75-76, 99-100.
0 LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 2.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 2.
into Finnish and sold or distributed. Waddams recorded that the British political representative in Helsinki, Mr. Francis Shepherd, had agreed with these suggestions in their conversation.12
On a more modest scale Waddams had already made arrangements for the circulation of The Spiritual Issues of the War, The Church Times and The Guardian through the Secretary of the Finnish Ecumenical Council, the Rev. Verner J. Aurola, who had promised to distribute them to those who could read English.13 The number of copies, 25, did not suggest that there were many important church people who could. This meant that the nur-turing of relations with the Church of England was bound to concern only a very small group of church leaders with sufficient knowledge of English.
In the sphere of broadcasting, Waddams recommended that the em-phasis should be on the activities of the Church in the Allied lands and the consolidation of relations between the Church of England and the Russian Orthodox Church.14 Such broadcasts should serve to provide the Finns with the desired model for the nurturing of ecumenical relations, while also as-sisting them to develop a more realistic understanding of their insignificant place in the world.
For translation, printing and circulation Waddams recommended Mr.
Georg Pimenoff of the British and Foreign Bible Society, who he believed was able to arrange the cheapest printing in Finland. He recommended Pimenoff be trusted to do the translations entirely on his own. Waddams trusted that Pimenoff would “probably do the job very well” and the whole project would also relieve the burden of the Press Department.15 Perhaps one reason why Waddams was so confident in Pimenoff ’s ability was that they shared a very similar view of Finnish society and the Finnish churches - and especially their shortcomings.16
The scope of all these efforts was clearly defined in the “Recommenda-tions” section at the end of the report. The aim of the propaganda was to reduce “the parochialism of the Finnish outlook.” This was to be done by providing “as much news as possible -- of the events in the rest of the world, and as little attention as possible given to Finnish affairs directly. The
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 2, 17.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 17.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 17.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 17.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 7-9; Ketola 2004, 97-98.
eral purpose should be to help Finland realise her true place and importance in relation to world developments.”17 This Waddams clearly considered in-significant.
However, one thing counted in the Finns’ favour: their opinion was guided more by their ignorance than their wickedness. Waddams stressed that “the majority of the Finns are very badly informed about occurrences during the war” and therefore they needed to be alerted to the true situation in the world through the provision of news which for most people elsewhere would have been “rather stale”.18 The Finns were as ignorant of the evils of Nazi Germany as they were of the goodness of the Soviet Union:
With regard to the Soviet Union two facts should be borne in mind. The first is that there is widespread ignorance in Finland about all changes in Russia since the Revolution, owing to the deliberate policy between the wars of cutting as many connections with Russia as possible. The second is that whatever may be their pro-fessions on the subject, many Finns cannot help secretly desiring a break between Britain and Russia. Everything possible should be done therefore to stress the reality and abiding nature of the British-Russian Alliance, and every opportunity taken to enlighten the Finns as to Russian opinion and progress.
I think there is still a need in Finland that the true nature of Nazi Germany should be exposed. For a number of years the Germans behaved very well in Finland, and in addition a strict press censorship prevented the Finns from learning the true facts about what was happening in the occupied countries. There is an improvement now, and the Germans have been extremely foolish in their behaviour in North Finland during the fighting. Yet I feel that it will take some time before the real facts sink into the consciousness of the ordinary Finn living in the countryside.
It is notable that even if Waddams had no sympathy for what he considered Finnish ignorance of religious development in the Soviet Union, he was able to see how the Finns were largely ignorant of “the true nature of Nazi Germany”. Whatever he thought the majority of Finns were, he certainly did not consider them Nazis.
The one exception to the rule of Finnish ignorance was the Swedish-speaking circles, who he considered fared somewhat better, as they were able to read newspapers from Sweden throughout the war.20 In addition to the traditionally close links between the Finnish-Swedish and the Swedes,
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 16.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 16-17; Ketola 2004, 99.
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 16-17.
0 LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 16.
it is likely that Waddams’ longstanding sympathy towards Sweden coloured his view of the Finnish-Swedish in his assessment of the Finnish situation.
The general tone of the report was sombre. The report criticised almost all things Finnish from people to the food at the hotel, which Waddams found
“rather trying, largely owing to the lack of sweet things.”21
It seems that Waddams’ negative attitude towards the Finns was based on at least two factors: the political situation of Great Britain; and the personal experiences of Herbert Waddams. First, on a political level the Finnish war against the Soviet Union had been on an unavoidable collision course with Allied war-time policy. The Soviet Union was still a major ally of Britain, fighting its way to the heart of Germany, and no mercy was to be shown to the enemies of the Allies.
Second, Waddams felt a deep personal sympathy for the Soviet Union and the Russian people, strengthened by his moving experience of visit-ing Moscow as a member of the Archbishop of york’s delegation in 1943.
Furthermore, the war was still far from over and if Britain’s war against Finland had been to a great extent theoretical, the real war was still very much raging in most parts of Europe. For all that the Finns were fighting off the Germans from Lapland, the war still posed a threat to British people both at home and abroad.22 It is likely that Christmas spent alone in ‘an en-emy country’ with very little company he appreciated, hardened Waddams’
views, and made him more hostile than he might have wished in normal circumstances.
b. The report discussed at the Allied Control Commission
Waddams’ position in the Ministry of Information ensured that his views and suggestions were received at the Foreign Office and later to some extent by the Church of England as well.23 The first results of his visit and the report were somewhat surprising. His views were introduced into discus-sions between the heads of the Allied Control Commission in Finland on 5 February 1945. Mr Francis Shepherd had read his report and informed
LPL CFR LR file 31/3 Memorandum “Finland”, 16; Ketola 1997, 240; Ketola 2004, 98-99.
Nevakivi 1999, 217-220; Manninen 2006, 42-45; Nevakivi 2006, 40-41.
Ketola 2004, 99-101; Pajunen 2006, 149-150.
Colonel-General Andrei Zhdanov about it.24 So Waddams’ impressions and suggestions reached the highest Allied political powers in Finland almost immediately.
The meeting was arranged at Colonel-General Zhdanov’s request and it consisted of discussion on the various topics relating to life in Finland and the fulfilment of the armistice terms, and the screening of British and Soviet propaganda films. The conversations happened through interpreters, both sides providing their own, and some other Soviet representatives of the Control Commission were present. It was quite evident to Shepherd that most of the Soviets were somewhat bored, as only he and Zhdanov were talking. The occasion was scarcely rendered more enjoyable by the English films, which were mostly incomprehensible to the audience, partly because of language, partly because of the haphazard order in which the Soviet pro-jectionist showed them.25
Shepherd found the discussions themselves hard work, as “it was very dif-ficult to get the Colonel-General to offer any definite opinions and it was nec-essary for me to attempt to formulate them for him and then get his views for or against.”26 In his formulations, he followed the line of Waddams’ report:
the conversation dealt with issues such as “pro-German feelings in Finland”,
“influence of Church in Finland” and “ignorance about Russian affairs”.27 The discussion began with “pro-German feelings”. Shepherd and Zh-danov “agreed about the slowness of the Finns in any kind of action, their absorption in themselves and their ignorance of affairs outside their own country.” Shepherd found Zhdanov inclined to think that there “was a defi-nite core of fascist influence in Finland, but thought that fascism was now at such a low ebb that this core no longer had real importance.”28 This was hardly surprising, as the Soviet understanding of ‘fascism’ included right wing ideas of all shades. The President of Finland at the time, Marshal Mannerheim, was a former General of the Imperial Russian Army with very little sympathy for either Stalin or Hitler.29
PRO FO 371/47369 Shepherd to Eden 6.2.1945; Pajunen 2006, 150.
PRO FO 371/47369 Shepherd to Eden 6.2.1945.
PRO FO 371/47369 Shepherd to Eden 6.2.1945.
PRO FO 371/47369 Shepherd to Eden 6.2.1945.
PRO FO 371/47369 Shepherd to Eden 6.2.1945.
Jussila, 1999, 108; Hentilä 1999, 199, 203, 208-211; Palmer 2006, 259, 308-309, 354, 365; Kirby 2006, 161, 201, 228, 230-231.
Nor were all Finland’s cultural ties with Germany especially ‘fascist’, as Shepherd tried to explain to Zhdanov. According to Shepherd there was
“a fairly widespread tendency, especially in certain classes, towards friendly feelings for Germany, as apart from Hitler Germany, for cultural reasons and because Germany had been the natural support for the traditional Finnish anti-Russian attitude.”30 No doubt these classes included a large portion of the Finnish clergy, who were tied over centuries to German Lutheran theol-ogy and church life.
The army and Finnish militarism was another matter on which the two did not agree. Initially, Zhdanov considered that “there was in fact a good deal of militarism in Finland rather on the German model”, whereas Shep-herd explained it in terms of a cultural evolution from Finland having been a battleground between Sweden and Russia for so many centuries. Zhdanov thought there was something in this explanation.31 Common history was an awkward matter: for all that Zhdanov was a representative of the So-viet Union he was the political successor of a Tsarist Russia whose Finnish legacy was not entirely positive.
However, both representatives agreed that there was a much more im-portant way in which the Finns differed from the Germans:
We agreed that the Finns had no conception of the darker side of Germany or of the atrocities which had been committed under the Hitler régime both before and during the war, and that the Finns could reasonably be accused of being deliberately blind to these matters. We also agreed that it was remarkable how little notice ap-peared to be taken by the Finns of the unreasonable devastation committed by the Germans in Rovaniemi and the north of Finland generally. I said that I considered it of great importance to do all that we could to enlighten the Finns on this subject and told him of the plans that the press attaché was working out for the dissemina-tion of British books, films and propaganda generally. It was, however, going to be very difficult to bring Finns to any realisation as to the kind of people with whom they had been collaborating during the war.
Shepherd’s analysis of Finnish culture and its links with Germany was defi-nitely of the type most of the Finns would have agreed upon. The remark that “the Finns had no conception of the darker side of Germany” and Shepherd’s resolve to shed some light on the matter by means of British propaganda, closely echoed the suggestions of Waddams’ report.
Shepherd’s analysis of Finnish culture and its links with Germany was defi-nitely of the type most of the Finns would have agreed upon. The remark that “the Finns had no conception of the darker side of Germany” and Shepherd’s resolve to shed some light on the matter by means of British propaganda, closely echoed the suggestions of Waddams’ report.