The Bolsheviks’ modernity - Soviet modernisation debated

2.2 Soviet modernisation debated

2.2.1 The Bolsheviks’ modernity

An analysis of the debates concerning the goals, history, and specifics of Soviet modernisation offers two contrasting visions of the phenomenon: the internal

vision (of Soviet and post-Soviet scholars) and the external vision. If the latter follows various streams of modernisation science and its variability in the international context, the former has traditionally been formed by Soviet social theory, based on Marxist-Leninism. Post-Soviet social theory has been unable to develop a critical vision of Soviet modernisation and largely continues the traditions of its predecessors.

There are several theoretical works on Soviet modernisation that were basic for my case study. An analysis of the Bolsheviks’ perception of modernity is presented by Rittersporn (2014): for the Bolsheviks modernity was more than merely a tool for the creation of the world they sought. “They equated modernity with a collectivist, consensual, and self-governing polity integrated through commonly shared ideals, as well as by the relationships that strict scientific management and highly developed economy were supposed to establish” (Rittersporn 2014, 250).

The consequences of the complex and paradoxical social and economic transformation of rapid Soviet modernisation are described and discussed in works by Davis (1989, 1998). The implementation of an anti-capitalist urban revolution in a country with a relatively weak capitalist system, the weakening of the peasants, and the decline of the commercial sector were tightly bound features of Bolshevik modernisation (Davis 1989, 456). The material of the case study demonstrates how this mechanism influenced rural households in practice.

In researching Stalin’s economic methods – the financing of industrial expansion and economic modernisation – I based my study on Chubarov (2001). They are viewed in parallel with Russia’s pre-revolutionary past. Under Stalin “capital was forcibly squeezed out of the reluctant population, mainly the peasantry, through the arbitrary price system. … The collectivization of agriculture enabled the state to exercise direct administrative control over large collective farms, whose profits could be ploughed back into the construction of new industrial plants” (Chubarov 2001, 9). The author contends that this radical and unprecedented policy, as with many other features of Bolshevik strategy, may be traced to the serfdom and village traditions of the past.

The view of Soviet economic modernisation between 1928 and 1984 presented by Autio-Sarasma in Kangaspuro & Smith (2006, 104) defines the various modernisation processes and the role of Western technology in them. Concerning the 1920s and 1930s, Autio-Sarasmo studies Stalin’s vision of modernisation as industrialisation, and its need to create a “technological base and increase the labour productivity in the main sectors of economics through ‘replication, modification and scaling up of existing Western models’” (Autio-Sarasmo 2006, 109). Rostow (1990) presents another view: “Socialist countries have, indeed, demonstrated that they can operate a modern economy; but they have paid a heavy price in ‘jobbing, careless, and ineffective’ enterprises and for the lack of strong individual incentives. And some have even turned to forms of competition to

In all modernising societies there is a tendency to rationalise state power and to extend it into new areas of social life. Modernisation and economic growth can no longer be seen as spontaneous phenomena or as a consequence of the actions of social groups. They should instead be seen as state projects, directed and determined by the regime. It is its political structure which “gives such a distinctive cast to autocratic modernization” (McDaniel 1991, 70).

The theory of modernisation could be seen as characterising actual historical developments and historical processes. Modernisation as seen in actual historical processes is described in the subsequent empirical chapters. These two approaches are not in opposition. Rather, they demonstrate the specifics of the reality of modernisation in certain national conditions. Indeed, the modernisation discourse is ambivalent: in practice a seemingly universal process will produce deviations and mutations.

2.2 SOVIET MODERNISATION DEBATED

In some works Soviet modernisation has been called a ‘social mutation’ or a conservative modernisation. This mutation was “instrumental” and was expressed simply by “adding sickle to hammer” (Vasiliev 2006, 6). To understand this mutation it is necessary to define and analyse the elements of Soviet modernisation which emerged from its Marxist transformation, Marxist-Leninist practice, and Stalin’s modernisation via rapid industrialisation. Debates about the Soviet modernisation process’s theoretical basis have been taking place now for almost a century, representing various visions of its goals and methods.

The Soviet and post-Soviet study of domestic modernisation has been varied, ranging from a complete denial of modernisation processes in the country to a suggestion that there was a hidden, Soviet-specific, modernisation. The aim of this section is to trace how the foundations of Soviet modernisation were transformed from a Marxist approach to the industrialisation based on Stalin’s purges. “Across the centuries Russians have articulated, through a process that may be called the interpretation or construction of geographical space, a variety of highly contrasting geographical or geo-political self-images: visions, in effect, of Russia as a particular sort of geographical entity… once created they nevertheless carried a certain aura of objectivity and so appeared to be incontestable in a way that no other factor could be” (Bassin 1991, 2). The way Stalin’s policy managed this geographical space during the 1920 and 1930s reflects an application of modernisation theory.

2.2.1 The Bolsheviks’ modernity

An analysis of the debates concerning the goals, history, and specifics of Soviet modernisation offers two contrasting visions of the phenomenon: the internal

stimulate sluggish economies overburdened with heavy, self-serving bureaucracies” (Rostow 1990, 120).

Detailed research on the processes in the agricultural sector of the Soviet economy has been undertaken by Conquest and Fitzpatrick (Conquest 1986, Fitzpatrick 1996). Conquest’s study of the collectivisation and repression of the peasantry between 1929 and 1932 covers the entire Soviet Union. “Collectivization meant the effective abolition of private property in land, and the concentration of the remaining peasantry in ‘collective’ farms under Party control. These two measures resulted in millions of deaths…” (Conquest 1986, 4). This work differs from previous ones in that it presents the facts of history “to register in the public consciousness of the West a knowledge of and feeling for major events” (Conquest 1996, 5).

Fitzpatrick (1994), in researching Stalin’s rural policy, examines the strategies Russian peasants used to cope with the state-inflicted trauma of collectivisation, and their attempts to modify the kolkhoz system through strategies of resistance (Fitzpatrick 1994, 4-5). Hughes (1996) sets the goal of breaking the paradigm of bipolarised state-peasant relations under Stalin in seeking an understanding of “the impact of the Stalin revolution on the Soviet countryside” (Hughes 1996, 6). After the grain crisis of early 1928 the Bolshevik regime aimed to prevent future difficulties by improving state organisation and management of the countryside.

“The goal for the Stalinist wing of the party was to stabilize grain collection, subdue the countryside and secure a ‘captured’ peasantry for the state” (Hughes 1996, 7).

Hoffmann (2003, 2011) presents a multifaceted analysis of the specifics of Stalin’s policy, dismissing the idea that Stalinism represented a retreat from socialism. “Far from being a partial retreat or a return to the prerevolutionary past, Stalinism remained, for both Party leaders and the Soviet population, a system dedicated to socialist ideology and progress towards communism” (Hoffman 2002, 3). All the fundamental elements of Soviet socialism (the role of the Party, the planned economy, and state ownership of the means of production) were maintained and even strengthened during Stalin’s modernisation. Rittersporn presents another view of Stalinism: “[A]lthough rarely defined in any precise manner and very often reduced to a vague synonym for ‘autocracy’ or ‘tyranny’, [Stalinism] has thus come to cover everything that happened in the USSR during the last fifteen years of Stalin’s life. … [I]t defines a political attitude rather than any characteristic of the Soviet system” (Rittersporn 1991, 183). A distinction certainly needs to be maintained between Stalinism as practised by Stalin and ‘verbal Stalinism’ as a ritualised official discourse (Rittersporn 1991, 184).

Gregory and Stuart (1980) argue that “there is no socialist paradigm; instead, the economic theory of socialism must be gathered from various sources. One is the Marxist-Leninist view of socialism and communism and the role of the state.

Another is the socialist controversy, a debate over the relative merits of socialism as an economic system” (Gregory & Stuart 1980, 146).

There is no single opinion among historians concerning the different aspects of the Purges. “[The] Soviet regime was from its inception a ‘terror’ state” (Goldman 2007, 2). Goldman (2007) offers a comparative analysis of the interrelationship between Soviet power and civil society, terror and modernisation, state initiatives, and social or community interests. Rittersporn argues that the purges were not a punitive exercise from above, but rather a battle within the apparatus (Rittersporn 1991, 184). Hoffman (2011) explores both the conceptual and practical prerequisites for the forms of state violence (large-scale deportations, incarcerations, and executions) employed by the Soviet leaders in seeking to answer two questions:

“How did political leaders come to categorize their population and presume to solve political problems through social excision?”; and “Where and when did technologies of social isolation, such as concentration camps, develop?” (Hoffman 2011, 240). Hoffman examines how Soviet leaders carried out “such massive programs of state violence, including bureaucratic, judicial, and police structures that allowed them to deport, incarcerate, and execute large numbers of people and how these practices became attached to Soviet leaders’ goals of refashioning society” (Hoffman 2011, 241). These techniques of social categorisation and excision did not themselves cause violence; violence was the result of the dictatorial force of Party leaders’ decisions.

Another important work on Soviet modernism is “Seeing Like a State” by James C. Scott. He describes high modernism as a “sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied usually through the state in every field of human activity”, through enthusiasm, revolutionary hubris, and the promotion of a new cultural identity (Scott 1998, 90-92). Lenin’s high-modernist outlook was based on the belief “that the science of dialectical materialism gave the party a unique insight into the revolutionary process and entitled it to claim the leadership of an otherwise disorganised and ideologically misled working class”, looking forward “to refashioning the human material that came under their purview” (Scott 1998, 157). Soviet modernisation may be categorised as high modernism: authoritarian high-modernist states attempt to impose, and succeed in imposing, such doctrines as quasi-civil war conditions, socialist transformation, and certain social arrangements on their populations (Scott 1998, 219).

Getty (2013) analyses the similarity of Bolshevik modernisation with modernisation in other countries: “One could point to many historical cases in which a self-conscious modernizing elite consciously uses certain tools to effect a transformation. In many modernizing Asian, African, and Latin American countries, the army fulfills the same functions. … Throughout history, elites have done very similar things” (Getty 2013, 17). It has become a commonplace of modern history “for revolutionaries to start with a powerful transformational mission but to degenerate after taking power into privileged bureaucrats and even hereditary elites” (Getty 2013, 17).

stimulate sluggish economies overburdened with heavy, self-serving bureaucracies” (Rostow 1990, 120).

“The goal for the Stalinist wing of the party was to stabilize grain collection, subdue the countryside and secure a ‘captured’ peasantry for the state” (Hughes 1996, 7).

Another is the socialist controversy, a debate over the relative merits of socialism as an economic system” (Gregory & Stuart 1980, 146).

Soviet modernisation largely used the language and symbolism of nationalism developed by Lenin and Stalin to mobilise the masses “to make the necessary sacrifices to realize the new socialist and supranational society” (Smith 1993, 150).

Works by Kangaspuro pay particular attention to the nationalities question in the USSR, where both large ethnic units such as the national republics and ethnic

In document Indigenous society in transition in northwest Russia : the fate of the Vepsians under modernisation (sivua 36-44)