The new Soviet person

“Modernization is a growth in capacity to apply tested knowledge to all branches of production; modernity is the social, cultural, and psychological framework that facilitates the application of science to the process of production” (Nash 1984, 6). It operates at both cultural and societal levels. At the cultural level modernisation involves a value system that is searching for new knowledge. This value system is integrated into the central areas of society. At the societal level modernisation implies the openness of political and class groups to an acceptance of the risks and consequences of innovation. The social structure of modernity is oriented towards spatial, social, and cultural mobility.

Following the specific criteria “pertinent to the modern condition, Soviet society can be understood as part and parcel of modernity. It was directed by an interventionist government claiming to privilege scientific norms, industrialism, efficiency, cultural homogenization, public welfare, mass production, mass consumption, and mass culture, and it favored people who did their best to develop a truly Soviet personality” (Rittersporn 2014, 250). In its modernisation policy, in addition to industrialisation and urbanisation, Stalin’s government was committed to social transformation and the creation of the new Soviet person. “This attempt at social and human transformation contrasts sharply with the social conservatism of tsarism; it presents a particular Soviet version of the more general Enlightenment impulse to remake and improve society. Stalinist propaganda relied on some traditional institutions and appeals, but … it did so for distinctly modern mobilizational purposes” (Hoffman 2003, 3-4).

Social modernisation and transformation required an understanding of how people’s thinking and behaviour might be changed. “Reformers across Europe sought to ‘civilise’ the masses through productivity campaigns, housing

scholars support the concept of multiple modernities and national modernisations in which the existence of a universal sample and of a lineal development are denied. Another Soviet modernisation issue is the attention paid to the individual as an element of the modernisation process. In Stalin’s socialist modernisation,

[E]verything served the main goal – the construction of an industrial basis for the economy. The needs of the industrial period defined both the construction of the economy’s material-technical basis via the reconstruction of national economics and industrialisation and the large-scale cultural revolution (the elimination of illiteracy, the foundation of a state system of education, mass education in the natural sciences and technical knowledge, the formation of a new intelligentsia) (Vasiliev 2006, 11).

The cultural revolution was focused on the reconstruction of ideology. The

“cultural basis of society was [therefore] technocratic; in this system a person could not be the subject of modernisation” (Vasiliev 2006, 11). The cultural revolution aimed to transform individual persons, who were now required to follow socialist ideology. This was seen as the precondition if this new type of state organisation were to surpass Western capitalism.

The victory of socialism in the Soviet country was announced by Stalin in 1934.

It was a period of new economic planning, accounted for in five-year plans and in the completion of collectivisation in the agricultural sector. The main remnants of capitalism were declared as defeated. “The achievement of socialism permitted the use of traditional institutions and culture to support and further a new order”

(Hoffman 2003, 4). Soviet leaders used various ways of categorising the population to coerce their own population.

Nineteenth-century disciplinary developments, including those in economics, de-mography, psychology, and criminology, made it possible to identify groups and type individuals who allegedly posed a peril to the political or social order. These disci-plines also replaced the traditional metaphorical relationship between the individual and society with a conception of individuals as component parts of the overall social body – a concept that implied that an individual’s illness or deviance might infect so-ciety as a whole (Hoffman 2011, 242).

Soviet society could be healthy only if it was populated by new Soviet persons, and

“the Bolsheviks, invoking a revolutionary mandate, were fully prepared to use state violence to refashion society” (Hoffman 2011, 267). This policy was aimed at all social strata, irrespective of ethnic identity.

Based on the understanding of modernisation as a universal process which varies according to historical and national conditions, Soviet modernisation –

‘forced modernisation’ – serves as a critical approach to modernisation theory in

general. Subsequent empirical chapters demonstrate the complexity and possibility of modifications in modernisation theory in general.

2.3 MODERNISATION AND SOCIAL PROCESSES

As the present research deals not with an abstract population of a particular modernising region’s transition to the ‘new Soviet person’ but with an ethnic group with specific ethnic features, the Soviet state’s strategy towards such groups requires outlining. Only the resolution of this multilayered complexity can provide a proper foundation for the case study’s theoretical approach in studying the fate of an ethnic group during the complex process of national modernisation. The mechanism of the transformation of this group’s life can only be revealed through the multifaceted theoretical prism of Soviet modernisation.

2.3.1 The new Soviet person

“Modernization is a growth in capacity to apply tested knowledge to all branches of production; modernity is the social, cultural, and psychological framework that facilitates the application of science to the process of production” (Nash 1984, 6). It operates at both cultural and societal levels. At the cultural level modernisation involves a value system that is searching for new knowledge. This value system is integrated into the central areas of society. At the societal level modernisation implies the openness of political and class groups to an acceptance of the risks and consequences of innovation. The social structure of modernity is oriented towards spatial, social, and cultural mobility.

Following the specific criteria “pertinent to the modern condition, Soviet society can be understood as part and parcel of modernity. It was directed by an interventionist government claiming to privilege scientific norms, industrialism, efficiency, cultural homogenization, public welfare, mass production, mass consumption, and mass culture, and it favored people who did their best to develop a truly Soviet personality” (Rittersporn 2014, 250). In its modernisation policy, in addition to industrialisation and urbanisation, Stalin’s government was committed to social transformation and the creation of the new Soviet person. “This attempt at social and human transformation contrasts sharply with the social conservatism of tsarism; it presents a particular Soviet version of the more general Enlightenment impulse to remake and improve society. Stalinist propaganda relied on some traditional institutions and appeals, but … it did so for distinctly modern mobilizational purposes” (Hoffman 2003, 3-4).

Social modernisation and transformation required an understanding of how people’s thinking and behaviour might be changed. “Reformers across Europe sought to ‘civilise’ the masses through productivity campaigns, housing

inspections, temperance movements, and primary education” (Hoffman 2003, 8).

The Soviet authorities promoted personal hygiene, sobriety, literacy, and mass politics. “Soviet society was modern because citizens were counted and categorized, socialized by schools and the health system, employed in industry, adhered to some idea of the regime’s norms, cultivated their selves to internalize officially upheld values, got hold of consumer goods, risked being moved around or decimated by the energetic government, and enjoyed movies” (Rittersporn 2014, 250-251). In this sense Stalinist values should be seen as part of broader European trends (Hoffman 2003, 8). For the Bolsheviks modernity was more than merely a means to remake their world – “They equated modernity with a collectivist, consensual, and self-governing polity integrated through commonly shared ideas”

(Rittersporn 2014, 251). During the first five-year plan industrialisation “cultural policy was distinguished not by a new cultural program but rather by the speed and militancy with which officials pushed modern cultural norms” (Hoffman 2003, 40).

“Scientifically determined norms, as well as economic modernization and industrialization, had done much to destroy village traditions by the twentieth century. It is therefore ironic that modern states in the interwar period began to promote traditional symbols and culture as part of official propaganda” (Hoffman 2003, 8). It was no secret that there was a short period during the Second World War when Stalin appealed for the support of the Orthodox church, and priests were sent to the army to offer moral support. This simply confirms that Stalinist values

“should be seen as part of broader European trends” (Hoffman 2003, 8). Traditional institutions and symbols not only served the instrumental purposes of political and military mobilisation, but were also used to pursue the ideal of social unity.

Marx’s prescription for the violent dispossession of the exploiting classes was also seen by the Bolsheviks as a step towards social unity. The Stalinist leadership sought to eliminate all ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘anti-Soviet elements’, at the same time as Party leaders were employing traditional symbols in an attempt to unite the population behind the Soviet government (Hoffman 2003, 9-10). The formation of the new person differed from similar processes in other modernising European states in only one respect: in contrast to liberal idealism the new Soviet person had to be able to sacrifice his or her personal interests for the interests of the collective.

This emphasis on awakening humanity was associated with the transformation of economic relations and the abolition of private property. “In Marx’s vision, described in The Communist Manifesto, the advent of communism would free people to pursue a range of activities that would restore the organic wholeness of their personalities and allow them to realize fully their humanity” (Hoffman 2003, 46).

Indeed, “what distinguishes Marx from the other classical growth economists is the Hegelian philosophic framework on which he built and the view of the individual in relation to the society it incorporated” (Rostow 1990, 121).

A substantial growth in the social infrastructure was another feature of the Soviet 1930s. In education employment increased more rapidly than in industry. A four-year education became almost universal during the first five-year plan (1928-1932), and by 1939 a seven-year education was almost universal in the towns (Davis 1998, 46). Adult education also became an important feature of the period, encompassing mass literacy campaigns and special academies for the higher education of industrial managers (Davis 1998, 46).

Evolutionary theory, essential for modernisation theory in its initial stage, is neglected in current understandings of modernity, which state “that the breakthrough to modernization is a genuinely revolutionary process, radically transforming all aspects of life, and that today modernity is becoming global, and, second, that multiple paths toward and through modernity are taking place in the contemporary world” (Martinelli 2015, 9). It is somewhat difficult to discuss the application of this theory to different regions and countries. Different approaches provide us with both culture-neutral and culture-specific visions of modernity. “An acultural theory describes the transition to modernity in terms of a set of culture-neutral operations” (Martinelli 2015, 9). These are viewed as an input which can transform any traditional society. A critique of this idea is that diverse non-Western encounters are not uniform. It suggests that “structural aspects of modernisation such as industrialisation, urbanisation, social and geographic mobility, modern institutions like the democratic nation-state, and the liberal market economy, or the research-oriented unviersity are closely linked to profound cultural changes in Western culture” (Martinelli 2015, 10). When and if these changes take place in non-Western cultures, they cannot be separated from their cultural roots. The processes of modernisation in Vepsian society were difficult and damaging. They were based on three main pillars: industrialisation, collectivisation, and the social-cultural sphere. The last could be classified as the most resistant to Soviet modernisation.

The Vepsian’s transformation by sovietisation was not a straightforward process, because they constituted a rural community with deep cultural roots and tight social relationships. All three pillars ended in large-scale assimilation processes which resulted in the decrease of the population without completely expunging the culture and language.

In this approach the cultural and institutional aspects of modernity are seen as unified within each culture. This therefore contradicts acultural theory: “modernity cannot be understood unless its grounding in profound cultural changes is recognized” (Schmidt 2007, 195). “European modernity was not simply a package of technological and organizational developments; it was intimately linked to a political revolution, to an equally important transformation of the nature of scholarly and scientific practices and institutions” (Martinelli 2015, 10). All the main Stalinist features in the process of creating the new Soviet person (cleanliness, sobriety, literacy, readiness to sacrifice his or her interests) presented a particular version of modernity – a set of norms, values, and state practices was the Soviet

inspections, temperance movements, and primary education” (Hoffman 2003, 8).

The Soviet authorities promoted personal hygiene, sobriety, literacy, and mass politics. “Soviet society was modern because citizens were counted and categorized, socialized by schools and the health system, employed in industry, adhered to some idea of the regime’s norms, cultivated their selves to internalize officially upheld values, got hold of consumer goods, risked being moved around or decimated by the energetic government, and enjoyed movies” (Rittersporn 2014, 250-251). In this sense Stalinist values should be seen as part of broader European trends (Hoffman 2003, 8). For the Bolsheviks modernity was more than merely a means to remake their world – “They equated modernity with a collectivist, consensual, and self-governing polity integrated through commonly shared ideas”

(Rittersporn 2014, 251). During the first five-year plan industrialisation “cultural policy was distinguished not by a new cultural program but rather by the speed and militancy with which officials pushed modern cultural norms” (Hoffman 2003, 40).

“Scientifically determined norms, as well as economic modernization and industrialization, had done much to destroy village traditions by the twentieth century. It is therefore ironic that modern states in the interwar period began to promote traditional symbols and culture as part of official propaganda” (Hoffman 2003, 8). It was no secret that there was a short period during the Second World War when Stalin appealed for the support of the Orthodox church, and priests were sent to the army to offer moral support. This simply confirms that Stalinist values

“should be seen as part of broader European trends” (Hoffman 2003, 8). Traditional institutions and symbols not only served the instrumental purposes of political and military mobilisation, but were also used to pursue the ideal of social unity.

Marx’s prescription for the violent dispossession of the exploiting classes was also seen by the Bolsheviks as a step towards social unity. The Stalinist leadership sought to eliminate all ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘anti-Soviet elements’, at the same time as Party leaders were employing traditional symbols in an attempt to unite the population behind the Soviet government (Hoffman 2003, 9-10). The formation of the new person differed from similar processes in other modernising European states in only one respect: in contrast to liberal idealism the new Soviet person had to be able to sacrifice his or her personal interests for the interests of the collective.

This emphasis on awakening humanity was associated with the transformation of economic relations and the abolition of private property. “In Marx’s vision, described in The Communist Manifesto, the advent of communism would free people to pursue a range of activities that would restore the organic wholeness of their personalities and allow them to realize fully their humanity” (Hoffman 2003, 46).

Indeed, “what distinguishes Marx from the other classical growth economists is the Hegelian philosophic framework on which he built and the view of the individual in relation to the society it incorporated” (Rostow 1990, 121).

A substantial growth in the social infrastructure was another feature of the Soviet 1930s. In education employment increased more rapidly than in industry. A four-year education became almost universal during the first five-year plan (1928-1932), and by 1939 a seven-year education was almost universal in the towns (Davis 1998, 46). Adult education also became an important feature of the period, encompassing mass literacy campaigns and special academies for the higher education of industrial managers (Davis 1998, 46).

Evolutionary theory, essential for modernisation theory in its initial stage, is neglected in current understandings of modernity, which state “that the breakthrough to modernization is a genuinely revolutionary process, radically transforming all aspects of life, and that today modernity is becoming global, and, second, that multiple paths toward and through modernity are taking place in the contemporary world” (Martinelli 2015, 9). It is somewhat difficult to discuss the application of this theory to different regions and countries. Different approaches provide us with both culture-neutral and culture-specific visions of modernity. “An acultural theory describes the transition to modernity in terms of a set of culture-neutral operations” (Martinelli 2015, 9). These are viewed as an input which can transform any traditional society. A critique of this idea is that diverse non-Western encounters are not uniform. It suggests that “structural aspects of modernisation such as industrialisation, urbanisation, social and geographic mobility, modern institutions like the democratic nation-state, and the liberal market economy, or the research-oriented unviersity are closely linked to profound cultural changes in Western culture” (Martinelli 2015, 10). When and if these changes take place in non-Western cultures, they cannot be separated from their cultural roots. The processes of modernisation in Vepsian society were difficult and damaging. They were based on three main pillars: industrialisation, collectivisation, and the social-cultural sphere. The last could be classified as the most resistant to Soviet modernisation.

The Vepsian’s transformation by sovietisation was not a straightforward process, because they constituted a rural community with deep cultural roots and tight social relationships. All three pillars ended in large-scale assimilation processes which resulted in the decrease of the population without completely expunging the culture and language.

In this approach the cultural and institutional aspects of modernity are seen as unified within each culture. This therefore contradicts acultural theory: “modernity cannot be understood unless its grounding in profound cultural changes is recognized” (Schmidt 2007, 195). “European modernity was not simply a package of technological and organizational developments; it was intimately linked to a political revolution, to an equally important transformation of the nature of scholarly and scientific practices and institutions” (Martinelli 2015, 10). All the main Stalinist features in the process of creating the new Soviet person (cleanliness, sobriety, literacy, readiness to sacrifice his or her interests) presented a particular version of modernity – a set of norms, values, and state practices was the Soviet

response to the modern world, along with the ambition to rationalise and reorder society that was reflected in wider European intentions. “And the Stalinist use of traditional institutions and culture for modern mobilizational purposes similarly reflected the more general demands of mass politics after the First World War.

Stalinist culture was a particular Soviet incarnation of modern mass culture”

(Hoffman 2003, 10). To create such a new person, the Soviet authorities relied on their control of the living environment and education.

No less important is that the new Soviet person was seen by Soviet ideology as a person thinking and acting in awareness of his or her role in building socialism.

This was supported by education, propaganda, and newly established Soviet social events and customs. The communist authorities were constantly working on the awareness and consciousness of Soviet citizens. It should be recognised that the Soviet authorities, as the executive governmental organs, were responsible for the state’s economic development, while it was the Communist Party and its organs

This was supported by education, propaganda, and newly established Soviet social events and customs. The communist authorities were constantly working on the awareness and consciousness of Soviet citizens. It should be recognised that the Soviet authorities, as the executive governmental organs, were responsible for the state’s economic development, while it was the Communist Party and its organs