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Responsibility within climate politics

3 POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

3.4 Environmental justice within climate politics

3.4.3 Responsibility within climate politics

Responsibility is a concept and a theme often discussed in the literature about justice in the politics of climate change and it is regarded as an important aspect when considering meas-ures against climate change. Ikeme (2003, 200), for instance, sees the distribution of respon-sibility as a major environmental justice issue in the climate change debate. He does not, how-ever, specify the meaning of responsibility. In a Pew Center report article on equity in climate change, Ashton and Wang (2003, 64), on the other hand, discuss responsibility as one of the dimensions of equity, the others being equal entitlements, capacity, basic needs and compara-bility of effort. They see that “In many circumstances, equity boils down to an allocation of responsibility.” Furthermore, they refer to the intrinsic fairness of the polluter pays principle which requires the party which is responsible for the harm to repair it and bear the costs, but in practice, it is harder to prove responsibility in environmental questions. Responsibility in climate change is usually mentioned when discussing about historic emissions and the histori-cal responsibility of the developed countries for climate change due to their greenhouse gas emissions during centuries as compared to the emissions of the developing countries. It is thus referred to as ex post responsibility (see Birnbacher 2000, 9-10). For example, Gardiner (2004, 583) discusses responsibility for past emissions and sees it as a justice issue of practi-cal and theoretipracti-cal importance. Paavola and Adger (2006, 595) and Paavola (2005, 310)

con-sider the question of the responsibility of developed countries for climate change impacts as one of the main justice dilemmas in terms of adaptation to climate change. Adger (2001, 923-924), too, discusses responsibility in this historic sense, but also in relation to current and fu-ture activities. He sees that “Justice within mitigation issues surrounds both the historical re-sponsibility for enhancing atmospheric concentrations of the main greenhouse gases and in allocating present and future responsibility for action” (ibid. 2001, 923). This, then, refers to ex ante responsibility, to obligations and duties (see Birnbacher 2000, 9-10), and responsibil-ity is thus something to be shared in relation to current and future mitigation and adaptation policies. Distribution of burdens in managing climate change encompasses, for instance, emission reductions (Tóth 1999, 2).

The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have many references to responsibility. Even if these both are legal treaties, only the Protocol is legally binding with lawful sanctions. The Convention and the Protocol and their commitments are already discussed to some extent ear-lier (chapters 3.3.3 and 3.3.4), but in short, the developed countries bear the main responsibil-ity both in mitigation and in supporting other countries in their measures.

There is reference to the historical responsibility of the developed countries at the out-set of the UNFCCC: “the largest share of historical and current global emissions of green-house gases has originated in developed countries” (UN/FCCC 1992). However, it is also stated that “per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs” (UN/FCCC 1992), which could refer to growing responsibility of the developing countries due to their increasing emissions. In addition, the Convention reminds countries about “the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of na-tional jurisdiction”. However, are not many countries still violating this responsibility all the time with their greenhouse gas emissions? Equity is recognised in the UNFCCC as its guiding principle (Article 3.1) as well as a criterion in defining differing commitments to the parties (Article 4.2 a) (Haukkala 2001a, 1). Therefore, the commitments vary between parties both in the Convention and the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol Article 3.14 commits Annex I countries to meet their emission reduction targets in order to minimise adverse social, environmental and economic impacts for developing countries, and thus discusses the responsibilities of An-nex I countries regarding adaptation (Paavola and Adger 2006, 598) as well as regarding mitigation. Otherwise, Haukkala (2001b, 19) sees that the Protocol includes justice only in a

minor role, and for instance, the emission reduction obligations were set without considering what is equitable.

The biggest justice question, according to Paavola (2005, 317), is the responsibility of the developed countries for the impacts of their greenhouse gas emissions. Although there is reference to the historical responsibility of developed countries in the Convention, Paavola and Adger (2006, 598), however, see that the UNFCCC has no clear stance towards this ques-tion. Responsibility would require compensation from developed countries to developing countries for the adverse effects of their emissions. One argument against developed countries assuming their responsibilities is that the impacts of climate change cannot be traced back to activities that caused them. Another one deals with the question whether current human be-ings can be held responsible for the actions of their ancestors. Paavola and Adger, however, see some reference to responsibility in Article 2, where the parties are required to ensure that climate change and its impacts do not exceed the adaptive capacities of ecosystems, food pro-duction nor economic systems; dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system is to be avoided, which requires stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.

In addition, the order in which the various systems are mentioned is worth of consideration; it is notable that responsibility to ensuring natural adaptation of ecosystems is prioritised before food production and sustainable economic development. (ibid. 2006, 598.) However, this Ar-ticle 2 that announces the ultimate objective of the Convention does not commit only the de-veloped countries but also other parties to the Convention accordant with their common but differentiated responsibilities.

The regime does commit developed countries to assist developing countries (Paavola 2005, 310). The duty of industrialised countries to provide assistance to developing countries is expressed in general terms in the Convention, but how much and how the burden of assis-tance is shared remains vague. Article 3.1 indicates that assisassis-tance is based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and thus “the duty to assist comes with the capability to assist and the right to assistance is based on limited capa-bility to deal with climate change” (ibid. 2006, 598). The UNFCCC Article 3.2 directs atten-tion to the special circumstances and needs of highly vulnerable developing countries and commits all parties to take precautionary measures on the causes and consequences of climate change, but Article 3.3 highlights the fact that the responses should be cost-effective. Fur-thermore, Article 4.3 commits Annex I countries to provide financial resources to cover the costs of the obligations of non-Annex I countries, for example, in preparing national invento-ries. In addition, the particularly vulnerable developing countries are to be assisted in

adapta-tion (Article 4.4). (Paavola & Adger 2006, 598-599.) All in all, the UNFCCC urges developed countries to assist the developing ones by covering costs, establishing funds, and other dis-tributive justice issues between states but according to Paavola (2005, 317) these commit-ments have not been fulfilled. This is because the current contributions are voluntary (Paavola

& Adger 2006, 599).