Discourses in climate politics

How is climate change, then, discussed and constructed as a problem within climate politics?

Tirkkonen (2000) examines these questions through climate discourses. He (ibid. 2000, 14-15) sees that in climate politics the hegemonic climate discourse, developed in the end of the 1980s, is based on scientific knowledge about climate change and its management through international environmental politics; it concerns with carbon balances underlining natural sci-entific changes as well as international politics and treaties to limit the greenhouse gas emis-sions. In his dissertation Tirkkonen (2000) analyses the relation of Finnish climate politics to international climate politics from the framework of ecological modernisation, and he identi-fies several linkages between the hegemonic climate discourse and ecological modernisation.

These are, for instance, the preventive aspects in climate politics, international management of the problem, market centricity and the idea of combining both environmental protection and economy, known as the idea of a positive sum-game (ibid. 2000, 203-204). Also Hajer (1996, 248) recognises that climate change and other global environmental threats are man-aged with “a regulatory approach that starts from the assumption that economic growth and the resolution of ecological problems can, in principle, be reconciled.” In this sense, it differs from previous discourses that emphasised either “demodernisation” (Järvikoski no date), some kind of radical social change or end-of-pipe solutions (Hajer 1996, 248). According to Järvikoski (no date) the basic ideas of ecological modernisation are that modernisation con-tinues and environmental problems can be solved within current institutional structures; the markets, enlightened consumers, science and technology are the forerunners of this develop-ment and eventually ecological problems are solved by promoting production and production methods that are not that detrimental from the ecological point of view. Society, in fact, by further modernising itself, avoids ecological catastrophes (Hajer 1996, 249). Furthermore, Ha-jer (1995, 26) points out that ecological modernisation includes a utilitarian logic, that pollu-tion prevenpollu-tion pays and is worthwhile because it advances economic growth. He sees that

“most notably ecological modernisation frames environmental problems combining monetary units with discursive elements derived from the natural sciences” (1995, 26). Ecological mod-ernisation also dominates in the other areas of Western environmental politics. According to Hajer (1995, 25-30) in the beginning of the 1980s in Europe and in Japan the ecological mod-ernisation discourse begun to dominate the way problems and solutions are conceptualised in the sense that it became “the most credible way of talking Green” in environmental politics.

Also Laine and Jokinen (2001, 64) argue that it has become a broad western environmental discourse. Furthermore, the hegemonic discourse has gained strength alongside with the for-mation of climate politics and in terms of scientific knowledge it has been institutionalised in the work of IPCC (Tirkkonen 2000, 202). In terms of international environmental politics the hegemonic discourse has been institutionalised in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and at the Conferences of Parties of the Convention. The milestones of the institutionalisation of international environmental politics Tirkkonen (2000, 15) sees in the agreement of the UNFCCC in Rio 1992 and in the COP 3 in Kyoto. These culmination points of institutionalisation have also been situations where hegemonic discourse has been rede-fined or challenged by counter or alternative discourses (ibid. 2000, 16). Following this idea, the newest IPCC Reports, the Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and following year the Protocol coming into force can be considered as the newest culmination points of institu-tionalisation. The hegemonic discourse and the western coalition behind it, however, still re-main the same.

The hegemonic climate discourse is largely founded on natural sciences. Demeritt (2001, 328-329), however, is critical of the role of science in framing climate change as a problem and calls for a more reflexive understanding of science as social practice (while not denying climate science altogether). He suggests that “the prevailing scientific construction of global warming embodies other important and yet also potentially contentious judgments, as-sumptions, and practices” such as anthropogenic climate change as a global-scale environ-mental problem as opposed to it being a political or economic problem, climate change as caused by greenhouse gases as opposed to ethical failings or underlying political structures, mathematical models to be scientifically the best way of understanding climate change, the most likely scenarios to be the focus of modellers as opposed to the most extreme outcomes, experts to be the best persons to evaluate the legitimacy and credibility of these practices, etc.

In short, science is not neutral but participates to climate discourses in different ways. Nor is there a neutral discourse about climate change. As Brown (2003, 229) points out, the

scien-tific and economic arguments as well as policy options of climate change that appear as ethi-cally neutral in fact contain important ethical considerations and positions.

In addition to the hegemonic climate discourse, there are also counter and alternative discourses. The counter discourses oppose the hegemonic discourse while still using the same framework (Tirkkonen 2000, 13). According to Tirkkonen (2000, 14-15) the counter dis-courses in climate politics are structural discourse and adaptation discourse. The main claim in the structural discourse, used, for example, by the developing countries, is that climate change is not merely about emission reductions, but it refers to a deeper global political, moral, economic, and cultural crisis (Wynne 1994 in Tirkkonen 2000, 15). The adaptation discourse, on the other hand, emphasises the need to face climate change impacts instead of concentrating on mitigation. Both counter discourses are constructed from the premises of the hegemonic discourse; they do not question the scientific basis of climate change or the inter-national environmental politics organised to address the problem, but they do question the measures the hegemonic discourse promotes. On the contrary, the structural discourse sees climate politics in a wider social context, and thus would primarily aim at reconstructing un-just economic structures and supporting developing countries, whereas the adaptation dis-course would allocate resources to adaptation to avoid climate change impacts. Tirkkonen also discusses two alternative discourses, that is, discourses that are not as dependent on the framework of the hegemonic discourse as the counter discourses. The first one questions the foundations of the hegemonic discourse, either climate change itself as a (natural scientific) phenomenon or the grounds of international climate politics, or both. Another alternative dis-course frames the concern about climate change as solely power politics or competition on research financing. Tirkkonen furthermore considers that the hegemonic discourse and its counter discourses have grown more powerful, whereas the alternative discourses have be-come more marginalised. (Tirkkonen 2000, 13-15.)