Queer political theory

In 1997 Shane Phelan edited a collection of essays entitled Playing with Fire. These texts apply

“queer” to the field of political theory. In the introduction, Phelan states: “Queer political theory brings together the recognition of the structures and patterns of electoral and legal politics with the imagination of new cultural forms and new political subjects” (Phelan 1997, 6). According to Phelan queer political theory should be a form of inquiry that has to be sensitive to the practice of U.S. politics. It is not merely about cultural critique; instead the focus should be on the concrete situation of sexual minorities in the USA and their struggle for recognition and inclusion. Although critical of the discourse of rights, Phelan does not advocate rejecting this discourse but proposes reworking it.

In Sexual Strangers, Shane Phelan (2001) constructs “queer” as a utopian category that has the potential for not only radical social critique, but it can also be thought of as the horizon of gay and lesbian politics. In relation to citizenship, “queer” is a promise of a more open society that would be more inclusive and accommodate more differences.

Phelan presents a focused consideration of the concept of citizenship and its relation to

“queer”. She begins by clarifying that citizenship “is about recognition and participation”

(Phelan 2001, 3). It seems that although Phelan is a political theorist in her conceptualisation of citizenship, the division between strict political sciences and cultural studies is blurred. She writes: “Citizenship is about participation in the social and political life of a political community, and as such it is not confined to a list of legal protections and inclusions. It is just

as much about political and cultural visibility” (Phelan 2001, 6). Phelan follows this by reflecting on the rights that gay couples do not have in the U.S., such as the ban on serving in the army or on marrying. If citizenship is about rights and duties, then if one group has full access to a set of right and others are not granted equal access to exercise these right or they do not have full protection, then we can say that citizenship is a normative concept granted to some more fully than to others.

Phelan defines citizenship in terms of recognition and participation and this opens up a space to interpreting citizenship in cultural theory. However, Phelan only occasionally discusses these issues and her focus is primarily on political theory. Phelan’s book is not a description of contemporary issues regarding citizenship and sexuality, but she clearly takes a political stance towards these problems. She claims that it is not enough to give sexual minorities the rights they lack. She states: “I argue that before political/legal citizenship can be achieved a thorough queering of public culture is needed” (Phelan 2001, 8). The task is, thus, to critically examine and challenge the existing concept of citizenship. As Phelan explains, the issue at stake is the relationship between the state, the family, masculinity, religion and sexuality.

Phelan claims that in contemporary politics, there is a gap between citizenship and homosexuality. In the public sphere, heterosexuality is symbolically dominant and other forms of sexuality are restricted to the private zone. According to Phelan, citizenship represents only a specific group of people and marginalizes the rest. The solution is not only to give rights to those who do not enjoy them, but to challenge the very construct of citizenship. Therefore, Phelan proposes a new term, “queer citizenship”: “Thus the road to queer citizenship, if such is possible, must take us from strangeness through the construction of polity that creates it”

(Phelan 2001, 32).

An important part of Sexual Strangers is the idea of the other – the stranger who is not included in citizenship. My contention is that this idea of “queer citizenship” refers here to a utopian concept of an alternative politics of belonging. It requires “full-scale refiguring of the body politics” (Phelan 2002, 40). In this context “queer” is not so much about assimilation or inclusion or even about gay visibility, as in the case of Berlant; it is about cultural and political counter-production. It involves opposing the dominant norms in politics, norms which are exclusive and oppressive. For Phelan, the meaning of “queer citizenship” is related to subversive practices that can result in undermining dominant forms of representation and participation in society.

The problem that I find in Phelan’s idea of “the stranger” is that it seems to be rather homogeneous. There are immigrants that do not have any legal status in a country and one might say they are without citizenship, even though they are protected by basic human rights.

But Phelan seems to relate this idea of the stranger merely to sexual minorities because they do not enjoy full rights or adequate representation, and do not participate in the public sphere on equal grounds. I find this construct problematic. Probably every person could find some aspect in which he or she is marginalized and ways in which his or her representation is not adequate.

“Queer” provides Phelan with the opportunity to construct a somewhat schematic vision of society divided between the privileged and the oppressed. To me, the very idea of “the stranger” should raise suspicions. Our identities are contingent and we often experience oppression and enjoy privileges. “The queer stranger” construct creates a binary opposition that is simply not adequate to the political complexity of our situation.

What I find crucial in Phelan’s work on queer citizenship is a call to reconfigure body politics. The task is not merely to achieve rights for marginalized groups, it is about changing the frameworks through which politics operates. This framework includes institutions, the law, education, political discourse and even the U.S. culture. Phelan questions the language that is used to discuss political matters because it assumes the liberal vision of the subject as an autonomous subject. Queer citizenship for Phelan is a proposal to oppose the dominant neo-liberal ideology and to build new models of agency sensitive towards issues of gender and sexuality. She writes: “Citizenship for those whose bodies and passions do not confirm to phallic modes will require not simply citizenship for queers, but a thorough queering of citizenship itself. Such a queering must include a challenge to the ideology of independence and masculinity” (Phelan 2001, 62).

Phelan does not offer a carefully formulated political theory in regard to citizenship but instead projects a normative stance on this issue. In fact, her ethics of contesting the state and one’s minority rights can only be exercised by a certain group of people, mainly white middle class sexual minorities from large cities. Those that need healthcare, public funding and finally those who do not have fully legal residence status in the USA or have some legal status but live in diasporas do not have the luxury of contesting rights. Such groups and individuals need legal recognition and protection, and only state institutions can provide them with this protection. To contest rights and institutions does not mean to reject them, nor do I think that this is Phelan’s intention. My contention is that she does not discuss in enough detail the actual practice of USA politics but instead builds a theoretical construction of future queer citizenship.

Politically, for Phelan “queer” is a sign of a radical democracy. It is a utopian concept that brings a vision of recognition and inclusion, and an equal community to come. Phelan writes: “Queer community is a process of democratic values, in which lesbians and gays and trans people and bisexuals and, yes, heterosexuals participate to loosen the bonds of gender”

(Phelan 2001, 137). Utopias are politically important and represent an interesting project that Phelan offers. According to Phelan, queer citizens are those that recognize an incompleteness in their identities. It is a vital task but when we look at the practice of American politics and the politics of other countries it does not seem to be a sufficient aim. It is important to contest rights but at the same time we need to fight for these rights and for those who need them.