Queer: between politics and academia

As discussed in chapter 2, among gay and lesbian communities, the term “queer” appeared at the end of the 1980s and was often used by activists who were fighting the stigmatization of those with HIV/AIDS. The term was used in an affirmative way and became better known through the public actions of Queer Nation. Queer Nation used “queer” to promote separatist and non-assimilationist politics. At almost the same time, “queer” entered American academia.

In chapter 3 I analysed the first major publication in this field, which today is considered canonical, a special issue of differences (3/2) from 1991, entitled: Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities. From the very beginning, the relationship between queer activism and theoretical discourse was anything but straightforward. As mentioned in the previous chapter,

de Lauretis ignores direct political activism and rather focuses on developing certain conceptual politics around the concept of “queer”.

Butler partly shares de Lauretis’ interest in developing a new language to talk about sexual minorities, but contrary to de Lauretis, Butler is clearly aware of and even in some ways enthusiastic about Queer Nation, even though she rarely specifically mentions it or other similar activist organisations²⁶ that began using “queer” as a quasi-identity and politically potent confrontational term. Although Butler does acknowledge direct political activism around the concept “queer”, her uses of this concept do not owe much to activists. Her stand towards direct political activism is complex and several times faced criticism.

Douglas Crimp (2002), a former ACT UP activist, is critical in his essays towards such trends in queer theory that are alienated from activism and the lives and needs of sexual minorities. Lisa Duggan presents a similar criticism in her essay: “Making it Perfectly Queer”

(1991) and “Queering the State” (1994) (Duggan 2006). She claims that certain thematics, such as the critique of essential identity, were already present in feminist activism from the 1970s onwards. According to Duggan, Butler’s work is alienated from activism and she sees this alienation as a problem for Butler’s theory. Duggan would appear to claim that any strong theory works against progressive activism, and affirms that “queer” in academia can be political only if it remains connected to activism. One could question here why activism should always be more progressive and politically more important than theories. Perhaps, some theory can be more radical than activism and on the other hand, activism can be more conservative than theory. Duggan does not dwell on this issue, but would seem to assume the political supremacy of activism.

Contrary to Duggan, I believe that Butler’s use of “queer” carries a significant amount of the primary political meaning of the concept that was originally developed by activists.

Compared with de Lauretis or Duggan, I find Judith Butler’s position regarding the concept of

“queer” and her debates about it very balanced. De Lauretis ignores activism whereas Duggan idealizes it. Butler does not establish a strong theory of “queer”, but her work does relate to activism and to certain theoretical traditions, albeit taking a critical distance towards them. The meaning of “queer” is not fixed in her texts, and she does not offer any total philosophical vision of the concept. Rather, it seems that she opposes any grand visions of “queer”, in this way avoiding a utopian vision of the concept. At the same time, she is careful not to idealize HIV/AIDS activism and its use “queer”. In her essay “Against Proper Objects” (2007), Butler

26 Judith Butler mentions Queer Nation only once in Bodies that Matter 1993 and also once in The Psychic Life of Power 1997

argues that “queer” in academia should combine the valuable elements of the gay and lesbian liberation movement with feminist thought.

4.2 “Queer” between different feminisms

In Gender Trouble, Butler does not use the term “queer”, instead she often refers to feminism.

Although she situates her own work within the field of feminism, she is critical towards its main currents. Later, however, Butler’s perspective shifts so that she no longer identifies directly with feminism, nor does she adopt a different stance under the sign of “queer” as an alternative to feminist thought. While the two terms, “feminism” and “queer”, are critical categories for Butler and constitute particular fields of research and political action, the relationship between these two terms is contingent.

It is in Bodies that Matter (1993) that Judith Butler first reflects on the concept, meaning and theoretical place of “queer”. The word itself appears a few times in the book and the entire last chapter is dedicated to its consideration. In no other book by Butler does the term

“queer” appear so often nor carry so many theoretical implications.

Up to the last chapter of the book Butler uses the word “queer” without proposing any specific meaning for the term. It is rather that the context in which the term is used prescribes its connotation. To me, it seems that around 1993, the concept of “queer” was already used in academic literature as a sign of a new kind of approach to sexuality studies. In the preface to Bodies That Matter, Butler writes:

This text is offered, then, in part as a rethinking of some parts of Gender Trouble that have caused confusion, but also as an effort to think further about the working of heterosexual hegemony in the crafting of matters sexual and political. As a critical rearticulation of various theoretical practices, including feminist and queer studies, this text is not intended to be programmatic. (Butler 1993, xii)

Butler does not ascribe any specific meaning or limit the references of the word “queer”. It can be a conscious choice but perhaps she assumes that the meaning, or at least the usage of this word in U.S. academia, is already somehow established and there is no need to discuss it in detail. Having said that, I nevertheless find Butler’s usage of “queer” original and politically important.

Approximately from the end of the 1980s, the term “queer” had achieved political potential and it had been used in opposition to the term “normal”. It appears that Butler takes

“queer” as it was used during that time in the United States, as a politically confrontational identity term for homosexuals and as a new critical academic term, but she expands it into an analytical and philosophical category. From these two sentences in the preface, which include the word “queer”, one can see that the term was associated with a critique of heterosexual

hegemony as well as with some new theoretical practices of analysing sexuality. It is also interesting that in the preface to Bodies That Matter Butler only partially identifies with what she calls “queer studies”. For example, nowhere has she stated that her book is a work within queer studies or is about the concept of “queer”, though she does say that it “includes queer studies”. In fact, the expression “queer studies” is never explained throughout the whole book.

In another passage from Bodies that Matter Butler writes:

Although the political discourses that mobilize identity categories tend to cultivate identifications in the service of a political goal, it may be that the persistence of disidentification is equally crucial to the rearticulation of democratic contestation.

Indeed, it may be precisely through practices which underscore disidentification with those regulatory norms by which sexual difference is materialized that both feminist and queer politics are mobilized. (Butler 1993, 4)

This is the second time that “queer” appears in Bodies That Matter. This case is interesting because here “queer” appears in relation to politics. Butler does not develop the idea of “queer politics” at this point, but she suggests that “queer” is a category which might be mobilized in the context of political struggles to rearticulate the concepts of sex and the body in democratic discourses. Therefore, politically, the concept of queer would be a type of critical category used in the field of collective identities and linked to sexuality. Regarding queer politics, for Butler, the problem of identity appears to be a crucial concern. I would not claim that Butler radically rejects identity politics. Although “queer” is for her a tool of criticism towards identity politics, she is aware that identity is a necessary element for political mobilization. I suggest that in Butler’s work, “queer” stands for a limited and temporal identification. Butler does not negate the fact that recognition is crucial particularly in cases of minorities and identity is a confirmation of recognition, and that politically it would be utopian to completely negate identity.

A radically different reading of Butler’s work in relation to queer politics is proposed by Claire Colebrook (Colebrook 2009). She provides a reading in line with Deleuzian philosophy and draws political consequences from this philosophy:

Thus queer politics would involve neither recognition of the self, nor a refusal of normativity, but the affirmation of the prepersonal. Rather than assessing political problems according to their meaning and convention – or the relations that organise certain affects and desires – we need to think desires according to virtual series, all the encounters that are potential or not yet actualised. (Colebrook 2009, 21)

For me, this comment on Butler’s queer politics is very controversial. Colebrook does not analyse in detail how “queer” functions in Butler’s texts but she assumes that there is something like “queer theory” and “queer politics” that is represented by certain ideas in the

work of Judith Butler. I argue that Colebrook’s interpretation is based on several suppositions that are not literally present in Butler’s texts. For instance, Colebrook interprets the concept of

“body” in Butler’s texts as related to Deleuze’s philosophy. Her interpretation also seems close to theories of “Affective Turn”. Butler herself never used Deleuze’s philosophy extensively and

“queer” in her work has a broader meaning than the body, desire and affect.

In the first two sentences in which the word “queer” appears in Bodies that Matter (Butler 1993, 4), “feminism” appears in the same line. These two words, however, constitute two different fields of research and Butler situates her own work in both of them, or somewhere in between. The difference between them is further discussed by Butler in 1994/1997 article,

“Against Proper Objects.” In this article, Butler argues against the strict division between feminist theory and politics and queer theory and politics, but the point of departure for her text is the existence of this division. As a primary interpretative key to social relations, Butler picks the term “queer” as being more related to sexuality, contrary to the term “feminism” that is more related to gender. At the point when the article was written, Butler notices that in the American academia, many researchers work either under the label of “queer” or under the label of “feminism”. This division is rather strong, for Butler notices that, “It seemed that the exploration of the “encounter” between feminism and queer theory was timely and potentially productive, but I forgot at that moment how quickly a critical encounter becomes misconstructed as a war” (Butler 1997, 1). Furthermore, in “Against Proper Objects” the relationship between these two terms: “queer” and “feminism” is conceptually very complex.

Butler first polarizes the scene in order to subsequently present herself as a theoretician who combines these two approaches in her analysis, or at least she postulates that. Readers are not informed of any of the names of these queer thinkers who reject gender and feminist conservatism in order to construct progressive social theories, but Butler points out that they are rooted in the work of Gayle Rubin. At this point it seems that Butler is drawn to Rubin’s essays that focus less on gender discrimination, but more on ways of theorizing sex and sexual practices. Nevertheless, Butler continues to avoid taking a clear stance on the queer side. She only mentions that many people take her Gender Trouble as the beginning of queer research.

“That the work (Gender Trouble) was taken as a queer departure from feminism signalled to me how deeply identified feminism is with those very heterosexist assumptions” (Butler 1997, 2). This statement is again rather ambiguous. It does not reveal us much about the content of this “queer departure”, nor does it disclose anything about Butler’s own position in relationship to it. What is clear is that “queer” emerged in connection to the publication of Gender Trouble

and as a reaction to a feminism that was predominantly focused on theorizing heterosexual issues.

Subsequently in the same essay, Butler points to the conservative currents within feminism during the 1980s. As an example, she mentions the anti-pornography stance of many feminists.

Butler clarifies her position further on the next page of the same article:

To mark sexuality off as a domain separable from gender seemed to many of us, especially of queer persuasion, to emphasize sexual practices rather than either gender or sexual identity and to allow for forms of “dissonance” to emerge between gendered self-understandings and forms of sexual engagement. (Butler 1997, 3)

Here it seems that Butler is part of the “us” that turns to studying sexual practices rather than dwelling on the traditional in the feminism problem of gender. Furthermore, she suggests that the aim of queer researchers is the emergence of “dissonance”. This term is reminiscent of the field of deconstruction, but at the same time it remains political as a call to rethink the relationship between gender and sexual identity, particularly since these categories were used almost uncritically at least since the 1960s by feminist theorists and by the gay movement.

Butler aims throughout this essay to balance her theoretical standpoint between feminism and gay and lesbian studies. She is critical towards both, while at the same time she wants to fill the gap that exists between theories of gender and theories of sexuality. In this text,

“queer” refers primarily to the gay and lesbian movement and to gay and lesbian studies, and one can even wonder whether in certain passages they are not synonyms for Butler, at least at the point when the theoretical focus is on sex and sexual practices and at the same time there is an absence of gender perspective. Clearly more positive examples relate to the gay and lesbian movement and gay and lesbian studies, although Butler also points out that “investment in misogyny and other forms of oppression” (Butler 1997, 2) should be acknowledged by lesbian and gay studies. Butler calls for an immanent critique and is a particularly harsh critic of feminism. She discusses conservative strains of feminism engaged in anti-pornography campaigns, but she is also sceptical towards the strong emphasis on gender that seems to be so important for certain currents of feminism. Moreover, Butler points to the deep “heterosexist assumptions” that exist in feminism.

Importantly, “queer” in this essay stands for a coalition of minorities or excluded individuals and groups. Butler recalls this meaning of “queer”, although she states that she is doubtful whether “queer” can really stand for “sexual minorities” in general. I find it important, particularly when I focus on the political aspect of “queer”, that Butler does not draw a clear

line of division between academia and activism as is the case with de Lauretis (1991) or Edelman (2004). It seems that for her texts might be a form of political activism and activism can have academic importance.

According to Annamarie Jagose, Butler uses “queer” politically to oppose identity politics represented by many currents of the LGBT movement and feminism. According to her, by strongly focusing on community, recognition and identity these organizations lost radical political potential. Jagose writes: “For queer is, in part, a response to perceived limitations in the liberationist and identity-conscious politics of the gay and lesbian feminist movement”

(Jagose 1996, 130). Clearly, Jagose has a point that Butler develops “queer” as a critical term that targets the politics of the major gay and lesbian and feminist organizations, but I think that Butler’s point is not to reject identity concepts and replace them with “queer”. I suggest that instead Butler uses “queer” to destabilize identity terms and to reformulate them so that they will always be open to new meanings and new positionings. “Queer” is different from traditional identity terms because it is a reiteration of an abuse and it is therefore self-critical, it reveals its own conditions and limitations (Butler 1993, 221). As a citation, “queer” is always theatrical and therefore it has a possibility to remain open and can be used even as a critique of those who use it, meaning both activists and theorists. Butler writes:

In this sense, the genealogical critique of the queer subject will be central to queer politics to the extent that it constitutes a self-critical dimension within activism, a persistent reminder to take the time to consider the exclusionary force of one of activism’s most treasured contemporary premises. (Butler 1993, 227)

A statement like this would not be easily accepted by many political activists. Most of them have a strong faith in what they fight for, but Butler is warning that even when fighting for a good cause one needs to remain self-critical. Many LGBT activists²⁷ consider such statements coming from academics either too theoretical or counter-political. The quote above illustrates Butler’s ambiguous relationship towards “identity”. I argue that, in this context “queer” is designed to represent an immanent criticism toward strong identity concepts but at the same time Butler does not reject identity concepts. She acknowledges the need for them, particularly in activism, but these identity terms need to be constantly re-examined.

Butler opposes queer theory as a discrete discipline and is against any theoretical institutionalization of “queer”. At the end of her article “Against Proper Objects”, Butler reveals what the function of “queer thinking” should be. She postulates that the role and

27A good example is Jeffrey Escoffier who in American Homo calls this type of criticism “ivory tower”, out of touch with the real politics of LGBT.

function of “queer” is to be a critical category, a form of social reflection on sexuality that would help to “map power” (Butler 2007, 25). In other words, the concept of “queer” in itself does not constitute a particular methodology or a field of study but should, according to Butler, help to provide “a more expansive conception of criticism” (Butler 2007, 24).

It is interesting that in “Against Proper Objects” Butler acknowledges that the concept of “queer” has to a certain degree a fixed meaning but she nevertheless seems to use “queer” as an open and mobile concept that one can take and use in different ways. Hence, the essay offers some ways to use “queer” that Butler finds to be most fruitful. She proposes a usage of “queer”

that would create a counterbalance to binary systems and divisions that are common in the field of feminism and lesbian and gay studies. Thus, Butler is against a clear gender / sexuality division as distinct analytical fields. Butler’s main concern in “Against Proper Objects” is to

that would create a counterbalance to binary systems and divisions that are common in the field of feminism and lesbian and gay studies. Thus, Butler is against a clear gender / sexuality division as distinct analytical fields. Butler’s main concern in “Against Proper Objects” is to