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4. The Occupation of Christ
Instead of direct military control, the revolution sustained its authority and power by social control. As discussed by Sierra Madero, the consolidation of power by the revolutionary leadership built on the social homogenization of the people and revolutionary culture, generating a shared sense of collectivity and moral communitarianism.208 In the construction of such uniformity in 1960, the government already embodied a zero-tolerance policy towards any forms of suspicious, possibly oppositional, behavior, leading to an unprecedented radicalization of attitudes and polarization among Cubans.209 While Castro himself assured people that the revolution allowed for freedom of expression, the parameters of permissible dissidence were never clearly pronounced. This ultimately served to authorize the revolutionary rulers to decide on the frames of acceptable critique and freedom of expression.210
In establishing the revolutionary rule, the mobilization of individuals and creation of bottom-up processes of support were key to building a solid foundation of legitimacy. The government created organizations and networks of social control for citizens to both produce and portray loyalty to the revolution. Committees for Defense of the Revolution, CDR (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución), were founded in September 1960. As the organization aimed at reinforcing social control of the revolution at a grassroots level, the committees became a form of collective vigilance. Known as the eyes and ears of the revolution, the committees focused
207 Among the extensive amount of examples are AHAH AC RJ Boletín Nacional, JEC Secundaria; AHAH AC RJ Boletín asesor JOC, La Habana: julio y agosto 1960; AHAH AC JN Órgano Oficial de la Acción Católica Cubana año 1960, numero 3; AHAH AC JD LH Iglesia parroquial de Bejucal: Semana Santa, del día 26 de Marzo al 2 de Abril 1961; AHAH AC JD LH Oración al Espíritu Santo por el Concilio Ecuménico, año 1961, numero 4;
AHAH AC JN COL Navidad: fiesta religiosa, fiesta del hogar 1961; AHAH AC JN M Orientación a la dirigente;
BE 1960; BE Enero-Abril 1961. See also Appendix 2, pictures 1, 2.
208 Sierra Madera 2016.
209 Guerra 2012, 126, 128.
210 Brenner et al. 2008, 11.
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on monitoring daily life in neighborhoods and on blocks.211 According to de la Fuente, they also served “to channel revolutionary enthusiasm, mobilize and control the population, and give symbolic power to groups whose participation in Cuba’s political life had been minimal before, such as women and Afro-Cuban citizens.”212
With CDR, vigilance became a civic duty. In their very nature, the CDR not only represented a top-down method for social control by the government, but also constituted a civic movement organized as a bottom-up process, and as such, they sometimes lacked both organization and order in the early stages. Individuals who became invested in the movement on their block often decided for themselves how to carry out the procedures of vigilance.213 Adding to the authority of individuals were, as historian Lillian Guerra points out, the loose frameworks for using such terms as “counterrevolutionary”: they granted individuals power and authority to decide what and who was actually seen as counterrevolutionary. The citizens were empowered to act as “self-appointed judges and mediators of other citizen’s attitudes and behavior.”214 The mobilization of citizens through collective vigilance became a method for maintaining domestic security through peer surveillance and evaluation of other citizens.215 Guerra also suggests that repression and toleration were decided by local activists in mass organizations and workplaces,216 in lieu of state-controlled mechanisms of punishment. This, perhaps, provides one explanation for why conflicts seemed to arise more easily between revolutionaries and Catholics in certain neighborhoods, while in other neighborhoods they maintained a non-violent form of coexistence, even if characterized by mounting suspicion and hostility.
The State expected social commitment from its citizens: active participation in revolutionary organizations, visible support for the government, and the renouncing of undesirable affiliations. Public commitment was also required to obtain a job or a position of trust in the administration and governance of the State. Correspondingly, redistribution of political and material rewards was awarded on the basis of loyalty to the revolution.217 Those who were not members of the CDR or other organizations of the revolution were considered suspicious. Particularly suspicious and even traitorous were those who, instead of claiming identity and ownership of the revolution in its grassroots manifestations, were affiliated with non-revolutionary activity, such as religious practices.218 Although the formation of the vigilance system was not solely aimed at the Catholic Church, participation in religious activity was one of the undesired features monitored by the CDR. In neighborhoods and on blocks, CDR officials kept watch over those entering the local church buildings.219
As a process intertwined with the newly defined framework of revolutionary participa-tion, the Church also demanded its followers to pledge allegiance to Catholicism and the Cath-olic Church in Cuba. In the heightened tension, Cuban CathCath-olics were asked not only to confess
211 Fagen 1969, 69–72; Pedraza 2007, 219; Pérez 2015a, 261.
212 de la Fuente 2001, 276.
213 Fagen 1969, 70–71.
214 Guerra 2012, 23.
215 Guerra 2012, 14.
216 Guerra 2012, 26.
217 Guerra 2012, 26.
218 Pedraza 2007, 216, 221, 223–224.
219 Schmidt 2015, 229.
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their faith in God but also in the Church.220 This, in turn, speaks well to the high stakes of the Church–State conflict. For many of the Cubans, loyalty to either the Church or the revolution was a matter of a supernatural, transcendent scale. This sentiment was echoed by the publica-tions of the Church, by the pastoral letters by bishops, and by the private periodicals edited by Catholic groups. Occurring simultaneously with the collapse of civil society, the revolution sought to revitalize participation and belonging through consciously constructed expressions of cultural religion. Together with the rites and symbols of adoration for the revolution, the great majority of Cubans began to regard the revolution as almost deterministically defined history, and Fidel Castro’s Messiah-like presence began to build a narrative of redemption and libera-tion via the revolulibera-tion.221
The disruption in Church–State relations reached a climax in the spring of 1961. Follow-ing the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, the failed U.S.-backed attempt to overthrow Castro, the revolution began to radicalize and aimed at establishing itself by suppressing all criticism and opposition. The external attack against the Cuban government generated more political central-ization on the island, and it reinforced the vast support of Cubans for the revolution. According to Louis A. Pérez, in radicalizing the revolution after the Bay of Pigs invasion, “the government moved against anyone suspected of opposition to the regime, including priests, foreigners, and ordinary men and women.”222 Detention and imprisonment were used to crush opposition, and vast numbers of Cubans left the island: between 1960 and 1962, almost 200,000 Cubans mi-grated to the United States. In the spring of 1961, Fidel Castro stated the socialist nature of the revolution; in November, he declared himself a Marxist-Leninist.223 According to Pérez, this was neither intrinsic nor premeditated, but nevertheless came to mark the future course of the revolution as a definitive framework of life on the island.224
In 1961, the government issued a ban on religious gatherings in public spaces, including processions held in the streets.225 The ban marked a concrete act of limiting the visibility of the Church in public spaces, pushing Catholics into the margins of the revolution’s frames of participation and citizenry. This was the beginning of the experience of Catholics as a physically marginalized and ostracized community in revolutionary society. Paradoxically, the marginalization aimed at decreasing the visibility of the Church and religious life in public, but the public way in which the first steps were taken ultimately marked the marginalization of the Church as a public act in and of itself.
As general opinion became more hostile towards the Church, the Holy See intervened in Cuban Church–State dialogue in order to facilitate authoritative support for the local church. In May 1961, the apostolic nuncio of the Holy See to Cuba, Luis Centoz, addressed the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Holy See and, most importantly, Pope John XXIII himself. In his letter, the nuncio referred to “the act taken against foreign clergy as well as the
220 For instance, AHAH AC CD Asociación Caballeros Católicos de Cuba Rama A de la Acción Católica Cubana:
Consejo Diocesano de La Habana, Informe del presidente diocesano a la VIII asamblea diocesana de La Habana.
Surgidero de Batabanó, 20.11.1960; Con Cristo o contra Cristo 23.12.1960.
221 Guerra 2012, 17.
222 Pérez 2015a, 262.
223 Drachman 2002, 180–181; Pérez 2015a, 261–263, 265.
224 Pérez 2015a, 261–263, 265.
225 Tweed 1997, 26; Pedraza 2007, 125–126; Guerra 2012, 37; Schmidt 2015, 224–225.
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news on nationalization of private education.”226 According to the correspondence, the Holy See wished to make its stance clear in the hope of the Cuban government changing its plan to take “such grave and hostile measures against the Church, that so deeply contrast [with] the Cuban people’s religious sentiments.”227
The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations replied to Centoz’s message. The official letter of correspondence stated that while the Cuban government wished to express its regret for the concern expressed by Pope John XXIII, it also wished to make the Pope aware of the fact that his concerns were based on false information. The Ministry stated that the acts taken against foreign clergy were a response to the clergy’s abuse of Cuba’s hospitality and spirit of democ-racy; that the foreign clergy were to be held accountable for turning against the principles of Cuban political life and urging the people to turn against each other. The Ministry called the division sowed by the foreign clergy a fratricide among the Cuban people,228 referring to the clergy’s open criticism of and opposition to the revolution and the polarization between those aligning themselves with the clergy and those committing themselves to the revolution. The letter also stated that, according to the Ministry’s estimation, this stance of the foreign clergy violated Christian morals and the teachings of the Catholic Church.229
However, in between the diplomatic communication from Cuba to the Vatican, the officials of MINREX held a round of internal correspondence discussing how to verbalize the government’s policy towards the Church. A memorandum documenting the preparation of the official response suggests that while the government found it crucial to illustrate the traitorous and counterrevolutionary nature of the Cuban Church, it also emphasized strongly that the revolution should seek dialogue and coexistence with both the Church in Cuba and the Holy See in the Vatican.230 Furthermore, this singular document shows that while more numerous bodies of documental evidence still remain undisclosed, the Cuban government in fact did consider its policies on religion and saw it also as a matter of urgent attention, particularly in regard to the Holy See.
While it is sometimes suggested in scholarly works that the government only established policies on religion reactively, evidence such as this correspondence suggest that the matter was also considered in authoritative, administrative settings and formulated as policies of the revolution in a proactive manner. The memorandum is signed by President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, which emphasizes the significance of the matter for the government: the response to the Holy See, addressing the personal reference to Pope John XXIII, required commentary from the President of Cuba at the time. Since the memorandum was prepared in the process of delivering an official response to the Holy See, it offers an outline of the government’s views and policy on Catholicism in 1961, or an outline of what the government wished to communicate on its stance towards religion.
While the document emphasizes the consistently respectful attitude of the government
226 Las medidas que se proyecta tomar contra el clero extranjero, así como la noticia de la nacionalización de la Escuela Privada. ACMINREX SS Luis Centoz al Dr. Raúl Roa Garcia 8.5.1961.
227 Medidas tan graves y tan hostiles a la Iglesia y que tanto contrastan con los sentimientos religiosos del pueblo cubano. ACMINREX SS Luis Centoz al Dr. Raúl Roa Garcia 8.5.1961.
228 ACMINREX SS Proyecta de nota al nuncio apostólico.
229 ACMINREX SS Santa Sede Proyecta de nota al nuncio apostólico.
230 ACMINREX SS Memorandum al Dr. Carlos Olivares, Ref: Respuesta a Nota del Vaticano 9.6.1961.
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towards the Catholic Church, it also defined the pastoral letters of Cuban bishops and their anti-communist views as the most problematic aspect of the coexistence of Catholicism and the revolutionary government. Furthermore, as the greatest point of difference from the letter of response to the Holy See, the memorandum stated that a significant part of the clergy and laity in religious organizations were involved in counterrevolutionary and clandestine activities. For the Cuban government, it was also crucial to emphasize the consistency of revolutionary ideals with those of “original Christianity,”231 from which the Cuban Church had strayed, according to the government, despite the discourse on Catholic participation in the revolution initiated by the Church in 1959. Through this reading of the sources, I concur with Guerra, who has proposed that the revolution began to appropriate Christian terminology and build the revolution’s legitimacy using the visions of Messianic redemption and the revolution as a pure spiritual and moral experience for its practitioners232, also by juxtaposing the revolution as a more authentic interpretation of Christianity than Cuban Catholicism that opposed to the revolutionary ideology.
Adding to the significance of the memorandum and the policies it outlines was the historical course of the revolution. Dated June 9th, 1961, the memorandum and the subsequent correspondence took place shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, which marked a turn towards public endorsement of Marxism and Soviet influence.233 It is noteworthy that according to the memorandum, in the spring of 1961 the Cuban government appears to have explored opportunities of coexistence for the Church and the revolution, and it wished to have the Holy See on its side in the project. In the document, governmental officials informed the Holy See that in Cuba, freedom of religion and religious culture would be sustained and the government would adhere to coexistence with the Church on the conditions of mutual respect and the Church not interfering in political matters.234 At the same time, the revolution’s frameworks for citizenry and social participation underwent radicalization, and the suffocating of resistance and opposition became a central objective of the Cuban leadership as a means of establishing a reinforced vision of internal control.235
Despite the government reassuring the Holy See of the Church’s autonomy on the island, almost immediately after the dialogue waves of nationalization swept over Catholic schools, convents, hospitals, and devotional properties in the summer of 1961.236 The events led to a dramatic shift in the Catholic community’s identity. For members of religious orders, most importantly, the loss of autonomy over buildings and domains marked a loss of purpose on the most profound and existential level. Having had their ministry dedicated to serving the people at these institutions and with their day-to-day work focused on running the institutions on a practical level, the nationalization effort brought an end to their work and tasks on the island.237
Nationalization was the most concrete act limiting the domain of the Church to just wor-ship: it laid the foundation for marginalization by not only pushing the Church concretely away
231 ACMINREX SS Memorandum al Dr. Carlos Olivares, Ref: Respuesta a Nota del Vaticano 9.6.1961.
232 Guerra 2012, 146.
233 Guerra 2012, 135.
234 ACMINREX SS Memorandum al Dr. Carlos Olivares, Ref: Respuesta a Nota del Vaticano 9.6.1961.
235 Pedraza 2007, 115; Pérez 2015a, 261–262.
236 Conde 1999, 34–36; de la Fuente 2001, 275; Super 2003.
237 Interview 13; Interview 14; Interview 15.
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from public spaces, into the confinements of church buildings, but by also forcing Church to place a predominant emphasis on spiritual and devotional life inside the physical domains des-ignated for worship. However, for Catholic communities, buildings also amounted to more than just walls; they were sacred spaces consecrated to God’s presence. Their integrity symbolized the integrity of the community and its faith; hence, the violation of temples of worship marked a violation of the community and its spirituality, even God. A telling example of this experience is a story from a small village in the Cuban countryside and the occupation of the local church there.
The history was relayed by a Catholic layman who was a young adult at the time. After a Catholic Action group meeting one evening in the fall of 1961, the man witnessed the arrival of the revolutionary officers and the occupation of the church from which he had just exited.
The Franciscan fathers serving the community were taken into custody and sent to Havana to await deportation while placed under State control in confinement. As the priests were being arrested, a crowd of lay Catholics was left to see their church put under guard to keep the vil-lagers out. After the fathers had been placed in a car and removed from the scene, the young man went back into the church to salvage the Eucharist substance from the preceding Mass from the occupiers.238
In the sacristy, he encountered three representatives of the government, two of whom were former practicing Catholics affiliated with Catholic Action. A few years earlier, they had shared a similar social context; now the man identified the guards as revolutionaries. Yet, de-spite their association with the revolution, with their consent the man was allowed to retrieve the consecrated hosts from the sacristy.239 The narrative suggests a certain significance of inter-personal exchange: the negotiation of identities and affiliations within the revolutionary reality, with an understanding of the complexity of identification in the midst of heated incidents and episodes in the revolution.
Despite his lay status, and the recognition that the Eucharist was administered by the clergy, the man collected the consecrated hosts from the sacristy and proceeded to the altar of the church. Laying out a corporal, as he had seen priests do,240 the man held the hosts and drew a cross in the air with his hands while pronouncing the Latin words Corpus Domini nostril Jesu Christi custodiat animam tuam in vitam aeternum. Amen.241 He then proceeded to eating the hosts, one after another, by himself. When he realized that he was unable to consume the entire container of consecrated hosts, he wrapped them in the corporal and took them with him from the church. The rest of the night the man spent summoning his lay friends, giving them the Eucharist. 242 When he later sought the opinion of the diocese’s bishop, relaying the course of events to him, the bishop embraced the man and called him “the new Saint Tarcisius, bringing
238 Interview 22.
239 Interview 22.
240 In 1961, priests celebrated the Mass ad orientem, facing the altar and not the congregation. For this reason, the young man was not entirely familiar with the liturgical gestures of the Eucharistic liturgy and imitated them to the best of his knowledge.
241 Eng. May the Body of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve your soul unto life everlasting. Amen.
241 Eng. May the Body of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve your soul unto life everlasting. Amen.