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II THE COLD WAR, CATHOLICISM, AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, 1959–1986

1. The Revolution and the Cold War Cuba in the Cold War Context

By the time Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in January 1959, the settings of the global Cold War seemed steadfast. Although Castro’s revolution stemmed from the Cuban national context, the Cold War came to mark the course of the revolution in its rivalries, tensions, and conflicts.

Throughout this study, the Cold War climate formed a backdrop against which the Cuban revolution was mirrored both on the island and internationally.

The roots of the Cold War were in World War II. In the geographical ruins of postwar-Europe, the Soviet Union sought to stabilize its presence and influence; opposed to this, the United States refused to recognize the Soviet Union’s position in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a contest for power and authority in the vacuum of power witnessed in the 1940s as a result of the reshaping of geography, ideologies, and alliances after the war.1 Factors contributing to the onset of the Cold War were simultaneously internal and external in both the United States and the Soviet Union. In the latter, the personality of Stalin met the country’s postwar reconstruction, the search for security, and the importance of ideology for the nation’s future development. In the United States, the fear of communism transformed into action boosted by a sense of global omnipotence in the economy and nuclear weaponry, further intensified by the ideal of self-determination and the United States as a global leader.2

The Cold War as a state of global polarization and competition both originated from and materialized in the contrasting aspirations of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Washington DC, as the home of Western, liberal capitalism, and Moscow, the capital of communism, marked the opposites in political thought and cultures of dominance. However, it can be argued that the confrontation arose as a joint effort of both the United States and the Soviet Union: as both of them continuously weighed each other’s intentions and responded accordingly, neither side was solely responsible for the Cold War.3 The competition between the two superpowers included not only contrasting ideological foundations and aspirations, but also economic dominance, weaponry, the nuclear arms race, rivalries and relations through the allying countries of the two, foreign policy reflected on domestic politics, and the personalities of the individual leaders of the respective countries.4 In his work on the Cold War, historian Ralph B. Levering remarks that the Cold War also ”grew from the contrasting national traditions, political ideologies, and approaches to foreign policy—that is, different assumptions and ways of looking at the world—that created a vast chasm between Soviet and western leaders.”5

1 Gaddis 2000, 356–357, 360–361.

2 Gaddis 2000, 356–357, 360–361; Gaddis 2010, 21.

3 Gaddis 2000, 356–357, 360–361; Gaddis 2010, 21.

4 Gaddis 1997, 261; Brands 2010, 1–4; Gaddis 2010, 9–12.

5 Levering 2016, 17.

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For more than four decades, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained an ideological and geopolitical state of competition. Never directly engaging in armed conflict with each other, the two superpowers imposed a “long peace” over the world.6 The Cold War was characterized by the shifting power struggle between the Eastern and Western hemispheres, the United States and the Soviet Union in particular. However, North America and Europe were not the only active agents in the process: the agency of South America, Africa, and Asia also contributed to the global setting.

In this context, Cuba may be observed as not only an intermediate object of the US–

Soviet-dominated perspective but also as an autonomous actor among the many agents actively invested in the Cold War with independent aspirations and perspectives. As has been discussed by numerous scholars, Cuba’s role in the Cold War was distinctive for the way it challenged the Eurocentric premises of the Cold War and integrated Marxism to Latin American political and intellectual discourses.7 Cuba became not only an object but also an active subject, both on the island and on foreign soil, in the shifting dynamics of power in the Cold War.8 The primary global context for the rise of Castro and the course of the Cuban revolution in its later years was the state of tension and hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union, for whom Cuba, in turn, became a crucial issue in the Cold War. As one of the superpowers had long-standing historical relations with Cuba, and the other was quick to establish new relations with the revolutionary rule, Cuba became one of the focal points of the Cold War for the two countries shortly after Castro’s ascent to power.

The influence of the United States had marked the course of Cuban history even before the revolutionary period. Already in the 19th century, Cuban political, social, and economic life had been strongly marked by U.S. presence although Cuba remained a possession of colonial Spain. A vivid, mutual exchange of influences was exercised as individuals, artifacts, and cultural influences traveled both ways; in this manner, the presence of the United States shaped the national identity of Cubans.9 From the United States, the Cold War entered Cuba already at its first stages in the 1940s as North American interests and presence strongly influenced Cuba’s internal affairs during the period of the second republic (1933–1958). Cuban economy, culture, and social life were tightly intertwined in U.S. influence and hegemony.10

In studies of the Cold War, such as the works by Piero Gleijeses and Hal Brands,11 Castro’s role and politics in the Cold War have been seen as direct attacks and assaults on U.S.

hegemony and the historically paternalistic relation of the United States towards Latin American countries, as experienced in Cuba already prior to the revolution.12 The joint prerevolutionary past of Cuba and the United States contributed to the revolution’s vision of the United States, and the continuous U.S. influence set the ground for Castro to resent the western, imperialistic hegemony and, consequently, perceive paternalism in the attitudes of the American government towards Cuba. After he came to power in Cuba, the long history of

6 Brands 2010, 1–2.

7 Gaddis 2010, 12–14; Brown 2013, 106.

8 Hatzky 2015, 6–7.

9 de la Fuente 2001, 10–11; Landau 2008, 41–44; LeoGrande & Kornbluh 2015, 8.

10 de la Fuente 2001, 10–11, 176.

11 Gleijeses 2002; Brands 2010.

12 Gleijeses 2002, 12; Brands 2010, 5.

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uneven power relations led to the revolutionary government connecting Cuba’s past with the United States to the revolutionary ideology.13 Consequently, in the Cold War, two opposing interpretations mirrored the development of the Cuba–U.S. relations. What Cuba saw as a war against U.S. imperialism, the United States fought as a war against communist terror. From Cuba’s perspective, the Cold War proceeded in continuity with the country’s long history with the United States: the historical experience of submission to the United States’, and the long history of bilateral exchange of influences, was transformed to the dynamics of the Cold War.14

If the ever-looming presence of the United States marked Cuban history15, the same can be argued from the perspective of the United States. From the early 1960s on, Cuban communism represented to the United States a global threat materialized close to home—not least in the context of the rapidly growing Cuban community in the United States, their influential public opinion about the revolution, and the participation of exile Cubans in U.S.-supported anti-Castro activities. Located in the Western hemisphere, with an ideal strategic location and a notoriously influent relationship with the United States, the revolution by Castro was feared to inspire new revolutions in Central and South America, which historically fell under the hegemonic influence of the United States. In the Cold War mindset, the Cuban revolution did not only shake the balance of alliances between the West and the East; it also threatened the hegemony of the United States in the Americas.16

The United States placed Cuba in an economic embargo in the autumn of 1960, extending the scope of the embargo to prohibiting all trade in 1962. The embargo remained in place throughout the periods addressed in this study. In January 1961, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.17 In the early years of the Cuban revolution and the stage of heightened tension in the Cold War, the most exemplary episode of the complex relations of Cuba and the United States was the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. Reflecting both the difficult history of the two, and the U.S.-vision of Cold War in Cuba, the attempt to overthrow Castro resulted in the United States’ first military defeat in Latin America. The CIA-operated invasion, whose troops consisted primarily of anti-Castro Cubans in the United States, became a groundbreaking symbolic victory for Castro in Cuba and an inspirational example of defying the hegemony of the United States for Latin America.18

The Bay of the Pigs was the culmination of the campaign of the United States to overthrow Castro’s regime by employing espionage and counterrevolution. In the 1960s, the United States made numerous attempts of sabotage and assassination of Fidel Castro. Much of the work, as was the case for the Bay of Pigs, was coordinated by CIA and operated by Cuban anti-Castro exiles in the United States.19 The aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuban domestic politics is discussed in chapter III. For the relations of Cuba and the United States, the

13 Valenta 1990, 3–7; Landau 2008, 41–44; LeoGrande & Kornbluh 2015, 8.

14 As discussed in the introduction of this study, the complex historical relationship between Cuba and the United States offers one but not the only perspective onto the Cuban revolution and the critical study of the revolution’s origins and dimensions.

15 Cottam 1994, 44–45. For a cultural history of the Cuba–United States connection and the emerging Cuban identity, see Pérez 1999.

16 Torres 2001, 54–55; Gleijeses 2002, 16.

17 Drachman 2002, 181, 206; Keller 2013, 133.

18 Gaddis 2005, 74, 76, 166.

19 Cottam 1994, 47; Brown 2013, 103–104.

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failure of the invasion and the victory gained by Cuba became a watershed moment. In the radicalization of the revolution that followed the attempt to overthrow Castro, the Cuban government approached the Soviet Union with unprecedented intensity. Castro declared the revolution communist, proclaiming Marxist-Leninism as the ideological foundation of the revolution.20

In the American-Soviet dynamics of the Cold War, also one of the most crucial episodes placed Cuba in the spotlight: the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In a period of only a few weeks in the latter half of October 1962, the Cold War culminated in a crisis that brought the world to fear a real and close threat of a nuclear war. In the middle of the mounting tension and escalating conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was Cuba: a neighbor of the former but a friend of the latter. In the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis may be seen as a historical singularity, as argued by Gaddis, in which all of the major areas of US-Soviet competition—

ideology, economy, and foreign relations—came together in the case of Cuba.21 While scholarship has analyzed the history of the missile crisis as a history of U.S.-Soviet relations, Cuba did play a significant role on its own. In global, transnational histories of the Cold War, the crisis was a watershed moment; in the history of Cuba, as seen from the island, it was an unprecedented moment of global attention. Fidel Castro’s Cuba was in the middle of two superpowers facing off, and the role of Cuba was both a catalyst and a result of the confrontation. The crisis momentarily placed Cuba in the middle of the Cold War on a global scale. 22 At the same, the Cold War context in which the United States and the Soviet Union operated also directed the course of the Cuban revolution.

Soviet Presence in Cuba

Closely related to the deterioration of Cuba’s relationship with the United States were the relations established from Cuba to the Soviet Union. Although the Cold War placed Cuba in the middle of the U.S.-Soviet contest for power, Cuba’s interest in the Soviet Union reached beyond the global antagonism as a bilateral relationship linking Cuba with the Socialist bloc. Bilateral relations with the Soviet Union provided Cuba with new trade opportunities and a way to resist U.S. hegemony. The cooperation included not only the advancement of mutually shared ideologies but concrete acts in Cuban domestic and foreign politics, economy, and culture.23 However, in the first years of the revolution, Cuba’s relations with the Soviet Union also built on improvisation, ideological comradery, economic and military interests, and, at heart, the defense of the revolution. The reinforcement of socialism as the ideological basis of the Cuban government contributed to and emerged from the development in the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union. According to Louis A. Pérez, “the revolutionary government was driven to adopt socialist structures by the logic of its reform agenda.”24

From the 1960s through the 1980s, Cuba received economic support and subsidies from the Soviet Union. The economic relations consisted of both trade and aid to Cuba from the Soviet Union. Consequently, Cuba’s crisis with the United States and its economic

20 Gaddis 2005, 75–78, 166.

21 Gaddis 1997, 261; Gaddis 2005, 77–78, 166; Hershberg 2010, 65–67.

22 Gaddis 1997, 260; Brown 2013, 106.

23 Valenta 1990, 6–17; De La Torre 2003, 123.

24 Pèrez 2015a, 263.

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consequences contributed to the increased engagement in economic relations with the Soviet Union and the reorganization of Cuba’s economic model, including Soviet exports and trade with the Socialist bloc.25 The success of the Cuban revolution did not depend on the Soviet alliance solely, although the relations strengthened the revolution’s international appearance.

For Cuba, a close relationship with the Soviet Union also provided military support against the United States, in addition to benefitting the Soviet Union by offering a site of military presence in the vicinity of the United States.26

Nevertheless, like with many aspects of the revolution, Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union was not static. After the initial establishment of cooperation, the Cuba–Soviet relations became strained in the late 1960s as a result of Castro’s interest in supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America. By offering his aid to the revolutionaries, Castro supported several attempts to overthrow governments with which the Soviet Union wanted to establish commercial and diplomatic connections. The tension was recognized by Castro himself, who was not willing to give in on Cuba’s internationalism in favor of the protégé position. Castro also directly criticized the Soviet Union’s domestic and foreign policies despite relating to both.27 As the evolving Cuba–Soviet relations suggest, Cuba maintained considerable autonomy in its foreign policy in the Cold War, regardless of its economic and ideological dependence on the Soviet Union.

Reaching the 1970s, Cuba–Soviet relations improved and Castro’s public criticism of the Soviet Union ceased. In addition to Cuba’s economic dependency on Soviet Union, the relationship also improved because of the shifts in the balance of power and influence of Cuba in Latin America. Latin America was no longer a geopolitical priority for the Cuban government: the revolutionary movements had been defeated, Cuba had cut its material support to the remaining groups, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara had died while promoting Cuban revolutionary ideas in Bolivia in 1967.28 Ideologically, Castro acknowledged the Soviet Union as the leader of the Socialist family. In international politics, Havana proceeded in accordance with Moscow. By the early 1980s, Cuba had also employed the Soviet model of institutionalized revolutionary structures.29

Cuban–American Connections

Although the periods examined in this study constitute a history of antagonism, polarization, and mutual hostility in Cuban–American diplomatic relations, the period entails also a history of bilateral communication—or at least bilateral efforts at dialogue and rapprochement. Since the beginning of Castro’s rule and throughout the Cold War, the Cuban government engaged in dialogue with every president of the United States to some extent. Sometimes the dialogue concerned specific, urgent topics; other times, the matters of mutual interest included some of the most deeply-rooted, long-standing issues between the two countries. Some attempts succeeded while others failed.30 Ultimately, the attempts at dialogue show that the complex

25 Pérez 2015a, 259, 281.

26 Valenta 1990, 6–17.

27 Gleijeses 2002, 217–218.

28 Gleijeses 2002, 220–221.

29 Gleijeses 2002, 226.

30 Gaddis 1997, 179–178; LeoGrande & Kornbluh 2015, 2–3.

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relations of the Cuban and U.S. government were not static at any point. Castro’s stance on the United States was not carved in stone: his vision of foreign policy evolved and adjusted to circumstances.31 Within the time frame of this study, there were seven presidents in the United States.32 Throughout the era, Castro remained in power in Cuba, thus defying also each attempt on his life or the continuity of the revolution from the United States.33

Apart from the global atmosphere, what made the relationship between Cuba and the United States even more complicated were the domestic dimensions of the bilateral connections. Most tangible and influent of the dimensions was the presence of a large number of Cubans in the United States and their experience of the island mirrored in both U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy regarding Cuba. By three waves of immigration, the Cuban community in the United States formed the largest Latin American immigrant community of the country.34 In the first wave, from 1959 to 1962, émigrés affected by the redistribution of wealth and loss of political power in the revolution left the island. By 1965, approximately 211,000 Cubans had left the country, and by the early 1970s, the number had increased by 277,000.35 In the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of Cubans left the island on boats and rafts, heading for the coast of Florida. In the months of the Mariel Boatlift alone, from April to October in 1980, as many as 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States after a particularly severe drop in Cuba’s economy.36

Throughout the Cold War era, the United States introduced and enforced specific laws on immigration from Cuba and the status of Cuban immigrants in the United States. The state of Florida became a central site for Cubans in the United States: from the southern tip of Florida, a distance of merely 90 miles separated Cubans on the island and in the United States. After Fidel Castro announced in September 1965 that Cubans could leave the island if they wished, the United States opened the borders for immigration and gave preference to those migrants with already existing family ties to the United States. In 1966, the law enacted by President Johnson allowed Cubans reaching the United States to pursue permanent residence after one year in the country. Regarding the connections from the United States to Cuba, in 1963, under President Kennedy, the United States issued a travel ban to Cuba for citizens of the United States and a ban on financial transactions with Cuba. President Carter allowed the easing of the

Throughout the Cold War era, the United States introduced and enforced specific laws on immigration from Cuba and the status of Cuban immigrants in the United States. The state of Florida became a central site for Cubans in the United States: from the southern tip of Florida, a distance of merely 90 miles separated Cubans on the island and in the United States. After Fidel Castro announced in September 1965 that Cubans could leave the island if they wished, the United States opened the borders for immigration and gave preference to those migrants with already existing family ties to the United States. In 1966, the law enacted by President Johnson allowed Cubans reaching the United States to pursue permanent residence after one year in the country. Regarding the connections from the United States to Cuba, in 1963, under President Kennedy, the United States issued a travel ban to Cuba for citizens of the United States and a ban on financial transactions with Cuba. President Carter allowed the easing of the