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Injustice based on economic maldistribution

5. CENTRAL CLAIMS OF DISCOURSE PARTICIPANTS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF LABOR

5.1 A CTORS PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF LABOR MIGRANTS

5.1.1 Injustice based on economic maldistribution

According to findings congruent with reports by all three parties, many labor migrants face improper living standards at labor camps where migrant workers are accommodated. These improper living conditions include squalid accommodation (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 6; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014 p.

5), overcrowded rooms with eight to eighteen workers per room sleeping in bunk beds (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 4), no drinkable water (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p.

4; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 5) and no working air-conditions (Human Rights Watch, 2012; p. 4, Amnesty International, 2013, p. 7).

Besides that, according to all four reports, migrant workers face several health issues.

These issues include limited access to medical care (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 6), unhealthy and dangerous working conditions due to improper safety measures (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 4; Amnesty International, 2013, p. 6; 2015, p. 5) and due to excessive working hours (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 6; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 16). Moreover, the ITUC and AI report cases of psychological distress of migrant workers caused by their precarious situations (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 6 International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 7). Based on statistics received by embassies of labor sending countries, the reports furthermore find an unusually high death rate of migrant workers in Qatar (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 4; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 6, Amnesty International, 2015, p. 3), which, according to calculations made by the International Trade Union Confederation, could raise up to 4000 by the time the World Cup 2022 officially starts

49 (International Trade Union Confederation, p. 15). However, Human Right Watch also notes that there are conflicting figures regarding death rates at construction sites, especially when comparing the numbers released by the Qatari Ministry of Labor with those from labor sending countries (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 4). An issue that HRW relates to Qatar’s inadequate labor law, as it does not require any public reporting on such matters (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 7). Amnesty’s most recent report moreover criticizes the Qatari government for its reluctance to investigate the death of migrant workers at construction sites (Amnesty International 2015, p. 5).

Both squalid accommodation and unsafe working conditions are against Qatari Sponsorship Law and local working standards, yet seem to occur frequently, as all three organizations report about such issues over a time span of three years. Human Rights Watch as the first report and Amnesty’s most recent report relate these issues to Qatar’s insufficient monitoring system. Accordingly, HRW criticizes Qatar of employing only 150 labor inspectors who are responsible to inspect the conditions of 1.2 Million workers (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 5). Even though AI acknowledges that the number of labor inspectors rose up to 243 until the AI’s latest investigation in 2015, they nevertheless criticize that the promised number of 300 inspectors is yet to be reached and that some of those inspectors are not sufficiently trained to exercise their tasks adequately (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 5).

Another issue raised by all four reports concerns wide spread flaws in the recruiting process of labor migrants from migrant sending countries. These recruitment flaws range from deceptive recruitment practices in which migrant workers are deceived about actual working conditions and wages (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 12;

Amnesty International, 2013, p. 7; 2015, p. 9; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 28), to the necessity for migrant workers to pay large recruitment fees (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 2, International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 20, Amnesty International, 2015, p. 9). In order to pay such fees, workers often need to take loans to high interest rates (International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 20).

While Qatari law prohibits Qatari recruiting agents to charge such fees (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 6 International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 20) and bilateral agreements between Qatar and several migrant sending countries require Qatari employers to cover recruitment costs, charging migrant workers recruitment fees are still common practices (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 5).

HRW, AI and the ITUC furthermore report several cases of no or inadequate payment of migrant workers’ salaries. These cases include illegal wage deductions or withholding

50 of salary for a couple of months by employers (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 2-3;

Amnesty International, 2013, p. 6; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p.

22) and payment of less salary than initially promised (Amnesty International, 2013, p.

6; 2015, p. 9; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 28). Even though HRW acknowledges that Qatari law requires work contracts to follow minimum standards of a model contract, it nevertheless criticizes the model contract of being insufficient, as no minimum wage guidelines are included (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 3). The absence of minimum wage and the indebtedness of many migrants due to above mentioned recruitment fees thus force workers to accept lower salary, as the HRW report concludes (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 3).

Partly based on recruitment flaws, partly based on the withholding of salaries and partly based on legal issues, all four actors furthermore present findings that indicate migrant laborers’ restrictions regarding their free movement. Such restrictions exist to some extent due to wide spread practices of employers withholding passports and identification documents of their workers, which leave migrants at the risk to be legally defined as “absconded” and thus potentially subjects them of being detained and deported by Qatari authorities (Human Rights Watch, p. 4, 2012; Amnesty International, 2013, p. 6; 2015, p. 9; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, pp. 28-29). Even though the confiscation of passports by employers is prohibited by Qatari law (Human Rights Watch, p. 6; Amnesty International, 2013, p. 9; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 29) and the government discusses to increase the penalty on employers confiscating passports, employers still engage in such practices. This is, as Amnesty further concludes, mainly due to the government’s reluctance to investigate such cases (Amnesty International, 2015, p. 9).

According to all four reports, the main issue regarding the lack of free movement of migrant workers is based on Qatari’s legal and policy framework. Especially the Sponsorship Law No. 14 of 2004, which prevents labor migrants from changing jobs or leaving the country without the employers’ consent, is by all three organizations considered as one the main issues (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 2; Amnesty International, 2013, p. 6; 2015, p. 4; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p.

28). The ITUC furthermore specifically highlights two local guidelines that prevent workers to change employers: the Qatar Foundation Mandatory Standards, which prohibits to freely transfer employer or exit Qatar (International Trade Union Confederation, p. 16), and the Supreme Committee’s Worker’s Welfare Standards, which fails to help workers leave abusive work conditions (International Trade Union