C ONFLICTING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS

The second example presents issues that are legal under Qatari Law but illegal by international standards. In doing so, I focus on two topics that widely dominate the reports of civil society actors and international organizations: the sponsorship system and the migrants’ right to freedom of association.

As already elaborated in chapter 2.2.2, the sponsorship system represents Qatar’s legal foreign labor recruitment and employment system and as such includes a wide range of different legislations. It also comprises the migrant worker’s requirement of an exit permit before leaving the country and the requirement of a No Objection Certificate before leaving or changing the employer. Almost all reports under scrutiny here claim that the sponsorship system facilitates abusive work conditions: Human Rights Watch claims that the sponsorship system facilitates abusive work conditions and thus recommends, especially in the light of the required exit permit and No Objection Certificate, to reform the entire system (Human Rights Watch, 2012, p. 9). Also the ITUC and AI reports coincide with the HRW’s call and urges Qatar to repeal or revise the provision regarding the NOC and the exit permit, as both contribute to abusive work conditions (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 9; International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 28). In addition to the human and labor rights actors, also the UNHRC and ILO call for a substantial review or even abolishment of the sponsorship system (U.N.

Human Rights Council, 2014, p. 8; ILO, 2014a, pp. 14-15). In doing so the Special Rapporteur reminds Qatar that parts of the sponsorship law violate the right to freedom of movement as declared in the UDHR and International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (U.N. Human Rights Council, 2014, p. 8).

However, while all these stakeholders recommend to extensively revising the system,

92 both organizations affiliated with the Qatari government do not make such suggestions to the same extent. While the SC report does neither make any references to the sponsorship system, nor to aforementioned provisions, the QF report acknowledges certain problems with these provisions. Accordingly, due to “loopholes” (Jureidini, 2014, p. xiv) the sponsorship system and the QF standards do not sufficiently protect migrant workers from abusive situations which are linked to the required exit via and NOC. Thus, the government should either address these loopholes or undertake the role of a sponsor (Jureidini, 2014, p. xiv).

Most stakeholders here urge the government to change its historic sponsorship law and give more rights to migrant workers. This is necessary because the current system violates international conventions and core human rights, as the Special Rapporteur notes. The QF, however, only recommends changes within the system and suggests addressing its so-called loopholes. Considering the injustices for workers allegedly arising from this system, these recommendations do not attempt to correct the underlying structures but rather the outcome of this system. In contrast to that, the solutions recommended by the international actors include the abolishment of the entire system. As shown above many reports identify violations of human rights emerging from the workers’ vulnerability due to their restriction to move freely. Thus, more rights to move freely empower migrant workers and lessen their vulnerabilities. Therefore, such steps would affect the underlying social structure of the injustices that stem from the sponsorship system and thus categorize these measures as transformative strategies.

The discussion on the foreign workers’ right to freedom of association represents another case in which the actors engage in a discourse about the contradiction between the Qatari legal framework and the international framework. As of Article 3 and 116 of the Qatari labor law, only Qatari workers, and only under given conditions, are allowed to form workers’ unions. This law is heavily criticized by the civil society actors and international organizations because it prevents foreign workers from exercising fundamental rights. The ILO and AI, for instance, allude in their reports that Qatar, due to its membership of the ILO and despite not having ratified Conventions No. 87 and 98 (freedom of association, right to organize and right to collectively bargain), is required to respect its fundamental principles (Amnesty International, 2013, p. 7; ILO, 2014b, p.

230). Not including migrant workers into the right to organize freely is therefore a discrimination based on nationality, as ILO further argues (ILO, 2014b, p. 231). Also the law firm DLA Piper acknowledges certain shortcomings of the labor law and hence

93 urges the Ministry of Labor to draft proposals ensuring migrant workers the right to freedom of association (DLA Piper, 2014, p. 18). The Qatari government, however, explains the exclusion of migrant workers from such rights with the immigrants’ high proportion in comparison to Qatari natives. Enabling migrant workers to engage in labor right activities thus bears risks to the “social demographics” of Qatar, as the government argues (ILO, 2014b, p. 228).

Instead of a national reform, the government therefore focuses on local standards.

Accordingly, the SCWWS, for instance, makes some attempts to negotiate between the restrictions of the national law and requirements of international conventions. In this regard, the SC points to the SCWWS and its provision for contractors to establish Workers’ Welfare Forums which shall comprise, among others, one elected worker’s representative of each nationality and discuss on a monthly basis issues relating to transportation, accommodation and health and safety (Supreme Committee 2014, p. 32;

SC Welfare Standards, Article 17). Notwithstanding such a provision, the ITUC report criticizes both local standards, the SCWWS and QFMS, as largely insufficient. The QFMS because it does not provide a provision for workers to discuss and negotiate working conditions with their employers (International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 16) and the SCWWS because it only considers issues relating to the aforementioned three topics and thus disregards other pressing issues, such as workers’

salaries (International Trade Union Confederation, 2014, p. 18).

Non-Qatari workers in Qatar have no legal rights to advocate their own rights. Due to the wide majority of the working population comprising of foreigners, the Qatari government is afraid of its social demographics if non-natives were given rights to advocate for themselves. Thus, the labor law regulates labor migrants very carefully.

Many above presented organizations therefore criticize the legal framework of Qatar extensively and use international conventions as a point of reference when recommending how to improve conditions of migrant workers. At the same time, Qatari authorities, however, focus on local regulations, such the SCWWS and QFMS, in order to strengthen migrant workers’ rights. Despite their shortcomings observed by the ITUC, these local regulations only apply at construction sites managed by the SC and QF and therefore include only to some construction workers, whereas the national labor law applies to workers in the whole country. While the here scrutinized reports by the international actors acknowledge the international legal framework as the only framework that ensures sufficient protection, Qatari entities attempt to circumvent the wide criticism of the labor law by shifting the focus towards local regulations and thus a

94 local solution.