Fusion of horizons

A further fundamental term for hermeneutics is “fusion of horizons”.

In hermeneutic tradition what is meant by “fusion of horizons” is a merging of a text’s and an interpreter’s horizons into an understand-able whole. The sole fact that fusing horizons is considered possible indicates that ‘commensuration’ is the focus of hermeneutics. When this is extended to the way we humans exist in the world, the fusion of horizon refers to the way we perceive and understand our environment and surroundings in general – and that too is commensuration. The metaphor that Gadamer uses for fusion of horizons is a conversation during which new realities and understandings are talked into being:

the conversation’s partners have a possibility to listen to what the other says and to change their insights. The fusion should not however be led by over-hastiness, as this can effectively maintain current illegitimate prejudices. Therefore the fusion achieves its name only when something can grow (Nietzsche 1988a: 252) or the vision can gradually expand (Gadamer 2004: 301). Operating with a limited horizon makes one overvalue that which is close to her/him. For Gadamer this is a point to criticize positivist scientific method: with a prescribed method the object is limited in advance.

The hermeneutic term horizon has been influenced by Nietzsche whose concept of horizon implies that each person has a unique and personal, rather closed horizon, which can be as limited and narrow as the view in an Alpine valley (Nietzsche 1988a). In Nietzsche’s termi-nology horizon is a metaphor for a person who has not realized how s/he is constrained by history and traditions (lat. tradere – to carry), that is, by prejudices one is not aware of. A horizon can be more or less open or closed, but it is always true for the one possessing it. For Gadamer, horizon characterizes the way understanding is embedded in culture and traditions, language, one’s origins and limitations.

Horizon in Gadamer’s terms is a dynamic concept that can grow and be expanded (Gadamer 2004: 301).

As a process, that is, as a continuation of happenings, fusion of horizons takes a form which Gadamer calls a hermeneutic conversation.

We normally call a conversation a communication situation where two people talk to each other, both arguing for their own cause. In contrast, a real hermeneutic conversation is unknown and not conducted by either of the parties (Gadamer 2004: 385–386). As the issue is ex-plored freely together and no one knows the outcomes, a hermeneutic conversation has the ability to surprise. This results in abandoning the certainty of the assumptions that thus appear as prejudices (Figal 2006: 7). In a good hermeneutic conversation something is allowed to emerge rather than forced to follow prescribed lines.

To try this out we can use the example of a work of art. The expe-rience of a work of art results in “increase in being” (Gadamer 2004:

135). “It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all” (Gadamer 2004: 296). This notion is backed up by the experience that the next time we see the same work, it is not the same: the relation between observer and phenomenon has undergone a process of change and becomes different. Another example of this is Heidegger’s Fieldpath conversation between the researcher, teacher and academic, where the discussion partners were led by the language (see above Chapter 2.1).

“Hence, there is no ‘original’ that can be grasped by means of inter-pretation”, Strati claims (1999: 80). In hermeneutic terms there is the impetus of something we refer to (Figal 2004: 26) and that gives the impulse for interpretation. A fusion of horizons shows itself by legitimate prejudices.

However, the fusion of horizons as a concept has also been criticized by Critical Hermeneutics for neglecting social power relations and for not being sensitive enough to implicit meanings in language (Kögler 1999) .

First, Foucault describes the power issue as follows:

“Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multi-ple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true (…)”(Foucault 1980: 131).

While fusion of horizons assumes horizontal power relations between interpreting subjects, it neglects the possible vertical and social power relations. For instance, it might be possible for a manager to go and start a conversation with an employee, but not vice versa. These kinds of relations imply that there are – in Foucault’s terms – general politics of truth, and practices and discourses that are socially more accepted than other ones.

Second, words are not innocent vehicles of meanings. Whenever we use the word leadership, for instance, it evokes images of leader and power, as illustrated by the anecdote in the prologue to this work.

Who gets to choose the words we use? Leadership in that respect is a language game too. From a philosophical perspective the issue at stake here is whether understanding is possible at all. In the famous Gadamer-Derrida controversy Derrida criticized hermeneutics for tak-ing uniform ltak-inguistic meantak-ings for granted, as understandtak-ing would automatically take place. Derrida’s point was that because of variety of meanings, the happening of understanding as fusion of horizons is merely an idealistic constellation.

How to deal with this “fear of violence” (Kögler 1999: 218) that we do to the other? Methodologically an option is to uncover power relations between the researcher and the materials. This is an essential step in hermeneutics, because otherwise the researcher’s inevitable connections and relations to his background might remain an invis-ible influence, in which case the researcher would not be interpreting in a hermeneutic sense, but rather imposing his prejudices without making these transparent. A hermeneutically sensitive theory of power also considers potential blind-spots and misuses of meaning making that emerge via the language use.

In practical terms the power and language issues are visible throughout a qualitative research process: What stories are neglected or marginalized? Who gets to choose the language that is used? What is not reported and what have I not paid attention to? How have I chosen to interpret the materials in this particular way? Whatever the empirical materials are, the responsibility of the researcher is to explain the origins of the language and of the key terms he uses. I will return to these questions in chapters 6 and 7, where I will explain my language use with reference to the chosen vocabulary.

As we have seen, understanding can only take place when a sensi-ble amount of largely implicit pre-understanding is at hand. All these hermeneutic terms – hermeneutic circle, prejudices, fusion of horizons – imply that accepting prejudices is a constitutive part of interpreta-tion. This inevitable structure is a starting point for a hermeneutically oriented research methodology. Yet hermeneutic analysis also acknowl-edges that its own methodology is possible only when the subject matter is regarded as a phenomenon, or as a hermeneutic object, as defined here. In the next chapter we shall see how this phenomenological-hermeneutic method was applied in practice in this work.