The ethic of care as a different form from the ethic of

In order to explore whether care and justice represent fundamentally different forms of morality, this chapter explores their underlying assumptions guiding research as well as normative-ethical assumptions derived from philosophical analysis. Kohlberg’s research program was characterized by an interdisciplinary effort to integrate psychological, educational and philosophical approaches (Kohlberg, 1986), thus offering the complex analysis of its grounds. Contrasted with Kohlbergian approach, the ethic of care seems, to quote an expression by Little (1998, p. 204), like “a poor second cousin to justice”, as Gilligan herself did not base her study on any philosophical assumptions (Sichel, 1985).²⁷ Nevertheless, the grounds of Kohlberg’s theory offer a starting point for comparing the two ethics.

The basic assumptions underlying the Kohlbergian approach are phenomenalism, structuralism and constructivism.

Phenomalism emphasizes that moral judgments are seen meaningful in their own terms, rather than treated as reflections or expressions of irrational feelings, of unconscious motives driven by guilt avoidance (as in psychoanalytical approach), or external forces (behaviorist approach). The researcher seeks to understand what the individual means in this study rather than to attribute meaning to the judgments from an outside system of interpretation

27Nevertheless, many others have been eager to do that. For more comprehensive presentations, see Meyers & Kittay (Eds.) 1987; the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1998, Volume 23.

not shared by the subject. It is the subject’s interpretation of moral reality that matters (Kohlberg & al., 1983; Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987.) In turn, structuralism means that the content of moral judgment is distinguished from the structure or form of moral judgments. Structure means general organization of principles or patterns of thoughts, whereas content refers to moral beliefs, opinions and values. Moral concepts are not learned or used independently of one another, but they are bound together by common structural features. It is the structure of thinking that exhibits developmental regularity and generalizability within and across individuals. In order to understand the meaning of the individual’s specific moral beliefs, one has to understand the more general moral view or conceptual framework within which those beliefs are embedded and from which they arise (Kohlberg &

Kauffman, 1987.) Developmental stages are those structural wholes that give the subject a specific sense of certainty when reasoning about moral conflicts (Rest, 1986). Finally, according to the assumption of constructivism, human beings actively construct and reconstruct reality in social interaction. Consequently, moral judgments are neither innate pre-dispositions known a priori (as Kant claimed) nor are they generalizations of empirical facts in the world, but they are meanings individuals construct for themselves (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987; Kohlberg & al., 1983.)

The assumptions of phenomenalism, structuralism and constructivism are closely interrelated. Developmental stages as

“structural wholes” have been derived from the interpretation of meanings subjects have attached to moral dilemmas. This kind of interpretation can also be called hermeneutic, but not as a form of extreme hermeneutics that denies the validity of the scientific method (Habermas, 1983; Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987).

Establishing the Standard Issue Scoring system (1987) meant a shift from intuitive scoring to a more standardized scoring technique, “a research activity employing an objective and reliable method of observation”, still resting “on the communicative stance of an interpreter, not on the positivist stance of someone trying to classify and predict behavior as distinct from meaning” (Kohlberg

& Kauffman, 1987, p. 40).

Gilligan’s original approach appeared to remain close to that of Kohlberg’s in many respects. Firstly, her methodology, relying on individuals’ subjective narratives, is based on the assumptions

of phenomenalism and constructivism as well. Secondly, even though she rejected structuralism in favour of neo-psychoanalytical framework, she established her developmental levels by searching for the whole in women’s thought with the same hermeneutic stance as Kohlberg did with the reference to William James’s remark: “Building up an author’s meaning out of separate text means nothing unless you have first grasped the center of his vision by an act of imagination” (Kohlberg &

Kauffman, 1987, p. 3). Finally, her study was centered on cognitive processes, even if care-based reasoning is toned by affects and emotions (Tronto, 1993; Vreeke, 1991). Gilligan’s early criticism against Kohlberg’s methodology and theory-building can be summarized in two points: using male rather than female data, and using hypothetical rather than real-life moral dilemmas.

According to Kohlberg et al. (1983), justice as the primacy of moral domain is basically a normative-ethical claim, but it is also indirectly based on the empirical evidence that has not falsified this claim (according to their interpretation, empirical studies can never verify normative-ethical claims, but can instead falsify them). The continuing research program, guided by the assumptions of constructivism, phenomenalism and structuralism, has not found any other moral concepts developing through Piagetian stages. So, the most important reason for focusing on justice is that it is the most structural feature of moral judgment..

The normative-ethical claim of the moral primacy of justice is based on neo-Kantian Hare’s (1963) concept of the moral point of view that include the criteria of prescriptivity and universality.

Moral language is not descriptive but fundamentally prescriptive, and consequently, moral judgments direct, command or obligate us to take some action. They are derived from some rule or principle of action, however idiosyncratic, which the individual takes as binding upon on his or her actions. Moral judgments must also be universalizable, meaning a viewpoint, which any human being could or should adopt in reaction to the moral conflict (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). The search for moral universality implies the search for some minimum value conceptions on which all people could agree, regardless of their differences in terms of their detailed goals or aims. Hence, “morality as justice best

renders our view of morality as universal” (Kohlberg & al., 1983, p. 93.)²⁸

With regard to the criteria of prescriptivity and universalizability, Gilligan’s theory appears to meet the former criterion, and to fail to meet the latter. The voice of care involves moral judgments prescribing what one ought to do, even though it admittedly also includes conceptions of good life and ideals of character, which refer to the virtue-areatic ethic. Consequently, Gilligan’s theory has been interpreted to contribute to feminist virtue ethics (for an example, see Tong, 1998). A closer reading reveals, however, that Gilligan’s description of women’s language is more aligned with their historical caring role than with virtue-areatic ethic in moral philosophy; society expects women to possess an inherent virtue of self-sacrifice (see Sichel, 1985). The prescriptivity of care is not however derived from rules, norms or principles, which is a case for justice, but from the unique particularities of persons and situations that evoke responsibility for care. Individuals retain their particular identities, and moral situations are bound by time and place; care is based on a representation of a concrete situation as fully as possible, individuals involved and their relationships (Carse, 1998; Sichel, 1985; Vreeke, 1991.) Most care situations are virtually so

28Kohlberg derived his original nine research dilemmas from Aristotle’s view on justice, and based his claim of justice as moral primacy also on his and, to a lesser extent, Plato’s moral philosophies.

According to Aristotle, justice is the first virtue of society, because it governs relations among persons in a society; according to Plato, the first virtue of a society must also be the first virtue of a person. (Kohlberg &

al., 1983.) Both claims have been criticized as highly controversial, as Kohlberg himself admits (p. 92), aligned with liberal political theory (see Flanagan & Jackson, 1987). Arguably, it might be that the stability of a just society and individuals’ ability to keep contracts presupposes caring relationships from early childhood (Baier, 1986). The deontological emphasis in Kohlberg’s theory can also be traced to Piaget’s study of children’s morality (1932), defining morality as a respect for rules (heteronomous morality) and as a respect for persons (egalitarian, autonomous morality). In case of moral primacy of higher stages, this claim is supported by “subjects themselves”. People regard judgments of higher stages more adequate, and prefer them, whereas they regard judgments below their current developmental stage as immature and childish (Rest & al., 1999.)

idiosyncratic that judgments about them cannot be generated from a universal rule or a principle (Blum, 1988; Flanagan, 1991).

According to this interpretation, the ethic of care not only differs from justice in terms of the content of reasoning, but also stands for a different form of reasoning, a particularistic one (Vreeke, 1991). If the ethic of justice represents a universalizable form of moral judgment and the ethic of care a particularistic one, it also suggests qualitatively different contributions to morality, incompatible with each other. Vreeke (1991, p. 39) gives an illuminating example. ”You find yourself in difficulties and someone helps you. Subsequently this person informs you that he would have helped anyone who was in a similar situation. Even though you don’t know the person in question, an effect of estrangement would still be produced from such a motivation of action. This is due to the fact that you do not register as a unique individual in his perception and thinking.” A moral imperative of care cannot be expressed in terms of rights and duties without losing its distinctive quality. Kroeger-Mappes argues (1994) that even if general moral duties existed towards dependent ones, such as children, the elderly and the sick, taking care of them plainly out of a sense of duty make those relationships deficient.

Noddings (1984) makes this point in extreme, when she defines the honest reception by a care-receiver as the ultimate criterion of morally valid caring.

By contrast, within the ethic of justice, prescriptivity bases descriptions and duties on the recognition of others’ rights Reversibility is the ultimate criterion of justice, which enables the construction of solutions to dilemmas in such a way that these solutions can be considered acceptable or just from the point of view of all relevant parties (Kohlberg & al., 1983, p. 95).

Reversibility is constructed from the concepts of reciprocity and equality which develop through the maturing socio-moral perspective towards the full reversibility at Stage 6. In other words, progress through developmental stages means that moral judgment gradually grows more reversible (see Kohlberg, 1981).

Table 2. Six stages of moral judgment according to Kohlberg (1976)

Level and stage What is right Reasons for doing right Sociomoral perspective of stage Preconventional level

Stage 1.

Heteronomous morality

To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own

sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property

Avoidance of punishment and the superior

power of authorities

Egocentric point of view. Doesn’t consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from

the actor’s, doesn’t relate two points of view.

Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion

of authority’s perspective with one’s own.

Stage 2.

Individualism, instrumental purpose, and

exchange

Following rules only when it is to someone’s immediate interest;

acting to meet one’s own interests and needs and letting others do the same.

Right is also what’s fair, what’s an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement

To serve one’s own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize

that other people have their interests, too.

Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that everybody has his own interests to pursue and these

conflict, so that rights are relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).

Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend etc. “Being

good” is important and means having good motives, showing concern about

others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty,

respect, and gratitude.

The need to be a good person in you own eyes and those of others. Your caring

for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority

which support stereotypical good behavior.

Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals. Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy

over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself

in the other guy’s shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.

Level and stage What is right Reasons for doing right Sociomoral perspective of stage Stage 4

Social system and conscience

Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases they conflict with

other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or

institution.

To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system “if everyone did it,” or the imperative of conscience to meet one’s

defined obligations.

Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.

Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the

system.

Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions that most values and rules are relative to your group.

These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like life and liberty, however,

must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.

A sense of obligation to law because of one’s social contract to make and abide

by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people’s rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties are based on rational calculation of overall

utility, “the greatest good for the greatest number.”

Prior-to-society perspective.

Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contract. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality,

and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to

integrate them. principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human

beings as individual persons

The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.

Perspective of a moral point of view from which social agreements derive.

Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends

themselves and must be treated as such.

At Stages 1 and 2 there is a concrete reciprocity. If Eskimos killand eat seals, it is right to kill and eat Eskimos (Stage 1). Reciprocity is interpreted in terms of exchanging acts, what one would do in another’s place. Stage 3 equates reciprocity with ideal role-taking, explicated by the Golden Rule (= putting oneself in another’s shoes). Ideal role taking entails differentiating the self’s perspective from the other’s one and coordinating them so that the other’s perspective influences one’s own in a reciprocal fashion. Stage 4 evidences a social order of roles and rules that are accepted by the entire community or society and that constitute the community. Each actor must orient to others’ perspective as a part of a larger, shared system to which they all belong. Positive reciprocity means a reward for effort or a merit. Negative reciprocity means that vengeance is the right of society, and is not conceived as vengeance any more but as “paying one’s debt to society”. A person who obeys the law, fulfills her/his duty expecting other people also to fulfill their duties;

equality means uniform and standard administration of law among all citizens (Kohlberg, 1981.) Rest et al. (1999) point out that reciprocity at Stage 4 is still partial; obeying the law might not benefit all participants in an equitable way.

Stages 5 and 6 require more reversible role-taking and recognition of universal human rights. As an example of Stage 6, Kohlberg refers to John Rawls’s (1971) formalization of procedural justice under a “veil of ignorance”, in which participants have to agree to organize principles in a society, each ignorant of their future actual position, leading to an agreement of the principles of justice. Another formalization of reversible role-taking is Habermas’s (1984) ideal communication situation, a dialogue among free and equal persons considering and modifying their claims in light of one another (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987, pp. 30-31). Kohlberg (1981) himself constructed a procedure of

“moral musical chairs” which leads to a fully reversible solution as follows: (1) The decision maker is to successively put himself imaginatively in the place of each other actor and consider the claims each would make from his point of view. (2) Where claims in one party’s shoes conflict in another’s, imagine trading places with them. If so, a party should drop his conflicting claim if it is based on non-recognition of the other’s point of view” (Kohlberg, 1981.)

Thus, Kohlberg (1986) critically distinguishes the first-order Golden rule, embedded in Stage 3 ideal role-taking (“what would you like to do in her/his place”) from the second-order Golden Rule, embedded in the procedure of moral musical chairs, because the first one does not yield

fully reversible, that is, just solutions, but rather can be based on the projection of self into the other’s place.

The two Golden Rules also constitute differences in emotional responsiveness. The first-order Golden Rule does not correspond to the actual feelings of the other, whereas the second-order Golden Rule requires an “emphatic” and “compassionate” component, while it is based on respect for the feelings and dignity of others (Kohlberg, 1986.) In Hoffman’s (2000) terms, the first one indicates self-focused role-taking, and the second one other-focused role-taking. To interpret Kohlberg; even if empathy and sympathy are cognitively regulated, they inform high-level moral reasoning about unique characteristics of other persons, in order to respect them as ends themselves.

Full reversibility as the ultimate criterion of justice is a normative-ethical claim (Kohlberg & al., 1983), but it is supported by the empirical evidence for development of sociomoral perspective that underlies the stage sequence (see Table 2, p. 70).

The sociomoral perspective is the characteristic point of view from which the individual formulates moral judgments. It is distinctive from cognitive or social perspective taking which are necessary but not sufficient conditions for moral perspective taking (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Development of sociomoral perspective leads gradually to more comprehensive understanding of co-operation, finally extending to ideals for guiding the creation of cooperative societies (Rest 1986). By contrast, the ethic of care, at least its recent formulations, does not require society-level perspective taking, because the ethic of care deals with actual relationships. Besides, Kohlberg (1986) remarks that Gilligan et al. make an unnecessary dichotomy between immediate response to feelings of the other, embedded in care reasoning, and role reversal, embedded in justice reasoning. In line with his criticism, Skoe et al. (1996) found that role-taking was more related to care reasoning than to justice reasoning on real-life dilemmas. Even though skillful role-taking is regarded as a cornerstone of justice reasoning (Selman, 1980), its role within care reasoning is far

The sociomoral perspective is the characteristic point of view from which the individual formulates moral judgments. It is distinctive from cognitive or social perspective taking which are necessary but not sufficient conditions for moral perspective taking (Kohlberg & Kauffman, 1987). Development of sociomoral perspective leads gradually to more comprehensive understanding of co-operation, finally extending to ideals for guiding the creation of cooperative societies (Rest 1986). By contrast, the ethic of care, at least its recent formulations, does not require society-level perspective taking, because the ethic of care deals with actual relationships. Besides, Kohlberg (1986) remarks that Gilligan et al. make an unnecessary dichotomy between immediate response to feelings of the other, embedded in care reasoning, and role reversal, embedded in justice reasoning. In line with his criticism, Skoe et al. (1996) found that role-taking was more related to care reasoning than to justice reasoning on real-life dilemmas. Even though skillful role-taking is regarded as a cornerstone of justice reasoning (Selman, 1980), its role within care reasoning is far

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