Correlations of role-taking with care and justice

Spontaneous role-taking was significantly related to both modes of moral reasoning at both times, in accordance with Hypothesis 4.

Correlations between role-taking and justice reasoning were r1(57)

= .40, and r2(58) = .35, ps < .01, in the total sample. Role-taking correlated even higher with care reasoning: r1(57) = .64, and r2(58)

= .57, ps < .001. The separate examination for genders however revealed that among women, correlations between role-taking and justice reasoning did not reach significance at either time. As Table 8 (p. 130) shows, correlations were more powerful for role-taking and care reasoning than for role-role-taking and justice reasoning across gender (p < .05) and in general, correlations were more powerful for men than women at both times (p < .01).

Correlations for role-taking and emotional empathy were nonsignificant across gender at both times, even though a positive trend among men at Time 2 can be noted.

The findings concerning women are consistent with the study by Skoe et al. (1996), who found significant correlations for role-taking and care reasoning, but not for role-role-taking and justice reasoning among women. By contrast, correlations for men were not significant in their study. Pratt et al. (1991) found a modest positive association between spontaneous role-taking and justice reasoning (with both real-life and the MJI dilemmas) in a larger sample (N = 64).³⁸ To conclude, men in the current study showed exceptionally strong association between role-taking and both modes of moral reasoning.

Correlations for role-taking and emotional empathy were nonsignificant across gender at both times, even though a positive tendency for men at Time 2 can be noted (see Table 8). There are no comparable studies available, but nonsignificant findings are

38The recent methodology is slightly different from those used in the aforementioned studies. In this study, role-taking was measured on real-life dilemmas and it was compared with moral reasoning on hypothetical dilemmas (the ECI and the MJI), whereas conversely, Pratt et al. (1991) and Skoe et al. (1991) measured role-taking on hypothetical MJI dilemmas, comparing it with moral reasoning on real-life dilemmas.

However, they used Chap’s (1986) classification which was also used in this study.

nevertheless in line with several studies pointing out that perspective-taking (embedded in role-taking) and emotional concern represent distinct factors in empathy (see Davis, 1994).

7. 1.10 Self-Concept domain

Self-Concept was measured only at Time 2. According to Lyons’s (1983) classification, 17% of the participants were connected (20% of women and 13% of men), 36% mixed (31% of women and 41% of men) and finally, 47% were separate ones (49% of women and 46% of men). The infrequency of the connected self-concept is consistent with Pratt et al.’s (1990) study; only 12% of their adult subjects were scored connected in their study, followed by 28% for mixed and 60% for separate self-concepts. A chi-square analysis did not reveal a significant Gender X Self-Concept association, χ²(2, N = 59) = 0.65, n.s. This results is at odds with Lyons’s (1983) initial study, reporting that 67% of women were predominantly connected, and 79% of men were separate ones, but consistent with the nonsignificant findings of Pratt et al. (1990).

It was predicted (Hypothesis 5) from existing literature that self-concept is related to moral orientation (Gilligan, 1982; Lyons, 1983). Because moral orientation is based on the analysis of real-life dilemmas, this hypothesis will be investigated later in the context of real-life moral reasoning. Instead, Hypothesis 6 and 7 will be explored here. In addition, self-concept classification also offered an option to explore its relation to developmental indexes, age and justice reasoning.

In order to investigate Hypothesis 6, which claims that subjects with connected self-concept are more empathic than subjects with more separate self-concepts, one-way ANOVAs were conducted on Time 2 empathy scores within each gender, given the huge gender difference previously reported. For women, Self-Concept had a significant effect, F(2, 27) = 3.89, p < .05, whereas it was nonsignificant for men, F(2, 20) = 0.21, n.s. Post hoc comparisons revealed that women with separate self-concept (n =16, M = 62.45, SD = 16.61) obtained higher empathy scores than women with mixed self-concept (n = 9, M = 42.62, SD = 24.72) or connected self-concept (n = 5, M = 44.49, SD = 11.37).

A 2 X 3 (Gender X Self-Concept) on ECI scores revealed nonsignificant main effects for Self-Concept, F (2, 53) = 0.16, and for Gender, F(1, 53) = 0.64, n.s, nor were there interaction effects, hence not supporting Hypothesis 7. Additionally, a 2 X 3 (Gender X Self-Concept) ANOVA on the MJI scores did not reveal any effect for Self-Concept F(2, 53) = 0.23, whereas a main effect for Gender was significant, F(1, 53) = 8.23, p < .01, unqualified by interaction effects. Men (M = 414.42, SD = 27.59) scored higher than women (M = 383.23, SD = 46.40), t(1, 57) = -3.04, p < .01.

Finally, age was not related to Self-Concept, F(2, 56) = 1.38, n.s.

To summarize, the only significant finding here was that separate women scored higher in emotional empathy, which is exactly opposite to Hypothesis 6. The finding that separate women scored the highest in empathy is at odds with Gilligan’s (1982) assumption, derived from Chodorow (1978) that connected self-concept enables higher empathic capacities, and requires further explanation. With regard to gender differences, while Lyons (1983) initially found a powerful association for gender and self-concept, this has been replicated neither in following studies (Pratt

& al., 1988, 1990) nor in this study. Extra analyses revealed no links between gender roles and self-concept either, even if they have been previously found, measured by the PAQ (Pratt & al., 1988, 1990).

According to Gilligan (1982) connectedness in self-concept provides the groundwork for the ethic of care. The lowest level of care is supposed to be associated with separation and isolation from others, turning into connection and dependence at Level 2, and finally, dependence on others is transformed into the dynamics of interdependence at the postconventional level of care development.³⁹ Alas, this proposal (Hypothesis 7) did not gain any support from this data. The separate concept, being the most frequent self-concept in this sample, was found to be frequent among subjects at the highest levels of care as well. 50% of men and 70% of women at Level 3, followed by 43% of women and

39On the other hand, Gilligan and Wiggins (1988) argue that connectedness and attachment exists from the early beginning of life “in the embryo form” and those capacities are lost in the course of development. It is difficult to conclude, how the connected self-concept may actually be related to care levels, as Gilligan seemed to drop the developmental levels from her theory in her later writings.

30% of men at Level 2.5 were scored to have separate self-concept. Connected self-concept, which proved to be the least common, was most strongly associated with Level 2.5, as all connected men and 71% of connected women were scored this level.

7. 2 Development of care and justice

reasoning