Dynamics supporting the securitization of climate change

Given the security implications mentioned above, climate change is increasingly perceived as a potential source of conflict and disruption of peace and as one of the most pressing potential threats to global security in the 21st century. Indeed, this issue has become prominent over recent decades, growing to be seen by many in the environmental movement as a problem of apocalyptic proportions.²⁴ Whilst the issue was first articulated by ‘green’ campaigners, gradually the socioeconomic, as well as ecological, implications of global warming are coming to the fore and being picked up by other interest groups. Many development analysts and multilateral organizations²⁵ are convinced of the potentially catastrophic climate effects on those already living with restricted resources, with the plausible scenario that poverty and vulnerability may become difficult to eradicate if effective climate policies are not

23 Recently, the World Bank found that, without climate-sensitive development measures, 100 million people would be pushed into extreme poverty by 2030. See Stephane Hallegatte et al, Shock Waves - Man-aging the Impacts of Climate Change on Poverty, (World Bank, 2016), available at <https://openknowl-edge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22787/9781464806735.pdf?sequence=13&isAllowed=y>

(visited 25 September 2016).

24 Geoffrey Lean, ‘Global Warming: Apocalypse Now: How Mankind is Sleepwalking to the End of the Earth’, The Independent, 6 February 2005.

25 See, for instance, Robin Mearns and Andrew Norton, Social Dimensions of Climate Change - Equity and Vulnerability in a Warming World, (World Bank, 2010); and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2014 - Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience (UNDP, 2014).

adopted. Human rights and refugee specialists²⁶ are increasingly dealing with the human implications of climate change, including climate-induced displacement.

Private sector and industry groups are now accepting the need to ‘mainstream’ cli-mate change both as a business risk and an opportunity for growth. Furthermore, over the last decade, the security policy community has come to regard climate change as part of its brief, as have civil society groups that work on defence, conflict analysis, and peace-building. ²⁷

Dwindling resources, massive population shifts, natural disasters, spreading epidem-ics, drought, rising sea levels, plummeting agricultural yields, crashing economies, political extremism, and terrorism are some of the expected consequences of climate change, and any of these could tip the world towards conflicts and instability with potential implications for national and human security. Although initially an issue of intra-state insecurity, the ramifications could potentially be felt both at the coun-try level and on a global scale. ²⁸

What is striking is that all nations are, in varying degrees since adaptive capacities differ and because climate effects will not be evenly distributed,²⁹ vulnerable to cli-mate-associated risks. A combination of exposure to climate risks and governance deficiencies determines whether or not a nation is susceptible to climate-related security risks. This includes all of poor, middle-income, and wealthy nations. None-theless, poor nations, especially in the Global South, are expected to suffer excessive-ly from the security implications of global warming, given their considerable vulner-ability and low coping capabilities. These countries are already experiencing social, economic, political, and environmental vulnerabilities, such as stresses around wa-ter supply, agricultural productivity, poor health systems, limited employment and business opportunities, demographic pressures, limited migration pathways,³⁰ social and political instability, and democracy and human rights deficit. Middle-income

26 See, for instance, Musa Shteiwi (ed.), Migrants and Refugees: Impact and Future Policies. Case studies of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Greece (European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2016); Frank Laczko and Chris ne Aghazarm (eds), Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence (Interna-tional Organization for Migration, 2009); Annalisa Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: An Equity Perspec-tive’ (2016), available at <http://www.benelexblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2016/01/29/the-paris-agreement-an-eq-uity-perspective/>; and Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) & CARE International,

‘Climate change: Tackling the greatest human rights challenge of our time- Recommendations for ef-fective action on climate change and human rights’, (2015), available at <http://www.carefrance.org/res-sources/themas/1/4566,CARE_and_CIEL_-_Climate_Change_and_.pdf> (both visited 22 June 2016).

27 Hannah Brock, Climate Change: Drivers of Insecurity and the Global South (Oxford Research Group, 2012), available at <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20 and%20Insecurity%20in%20the%20Global%20South.pdf> (visited 24 June 2016), at 3.

28 See Berel Rodal, ‘The Environment and Changing Concepts of Security’, 47 Canadian Security Intelli-gence Service Commentary (1994); and Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, ‘An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security’ (Environmental Defense, 2003), avail-able at <http://www.climate.org/PDF/clim_change_scenario.pdf> (visited 24 June 2016).

29 Joshua Busby, Todd G. Smith and Krishnan Nisha, ‘Climate Security Vulnerability in Africa Mapping 3.0: An Update’, Political Geography (2014) 51-67, available at <https://www.strausscenter.org/ccaps/

publications/articles.html?download=541> (visited 30 June 2016), at 1.

30 Pacific Institute of Public Policy, Climate Security, supra note 19, at 1.

and wealthy countries are also susceptible to the security risks of a changing climate.

For instance, states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, though mostly middle-income countries, are already facing declining water availability as a result of climate change, and the consequences of this are already fueling current instability dynamics.³¹ Many of these countries are also highly dependent on wheat imports from the global food market, which is in turn highly vulnerable to climate shocks. As the provision of basic services becomes less reliable, the social contract be-tween citizen and government can rapidly erode in countries experiencing situations of this nature. This can lead to unrest, as well as a greater incidence of authoritarian responses. Sea-level rise, and an increase in the severity and intensity of extreme weather events, can also threaten wealthy nations that have vulnerable energy, mil-itary, and agriculture infrastructures, both inland and along the coasts. Cascading disasters have the potential to place such enormous strain on even wealthy nations that economies and critical infrastructure can be severely disrupted.

It is increasingly perceived that climate change is not only a long-term risk. While the long-term security risks are projected to be very severe, climate change is al-ready having an impact on security.³² According to the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), ‘the globe is warming at a faster rate than it ever has before’.³³ The US Department of Defense Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap³⁴ noted that climate change ‘represents a complex homeland security challenge with strategic implications for the Department’.³⁵ In addition, many studies have already showed that climate change was likely responsible for the significant decline in win-ter precipitation across the MENA region during the last four decades.³⁶ Significant Arctic ice melt³⁷ is already changing the geopolitical landscape of the high North.

The IPCC 5th Assessment Report’s Human Security chapter³⁸ highlighted the fact that climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflict.

31 Caitlin E. Werrell and Francesco Femia (eds), ‘The Arab Spring and Climate Change’ (The Stimson Center, 2013), available at <https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/climatechangearab-spring-ccs-cap-stimson.pdf> (visited 24 September 2016).

32 Pacific Institute of Public Policy, Climate Security, supra note 19, at 6.

33 NASA, ‘How is the global Earth system changing?’, available at <http://science.nasa.gov/earth-science/

big-questions/is-the-global-earth-system-changing-and-what-are-the-consequences/> (visited 24 June 2016).

34 US Department of Homeland Security, ‘Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap 2012’, available at

<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Appendix%20A%20DHS%20FY2012%20Cli-mate%20Change%20Adaptation%20Plan_0.pdf> (visited 5 September 2016).

35 Ibid. at IV.

36 See, for instance, Mohamed Behnassi, ‘Geostrategic Implications of Climate Change in the Mediterrane-an’, IEMED Yearbook (2014), available at <http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/historic-de-publicacions/

anuari-de-la-mediterrania/sumaris/avancaments-anuari-2013/Anuari_ClimateChange_Behnassi.pdf>

(visited 6 September 2016), at 3-7; and Werrell and Femia (eds.), ‘The Arab Spring and Climate Change’, supra note 31.

37 Cappelletti et al, ‘Environmental Changes’, supra note 21.

38 W. Neil Adger et al, ‘Human security’ in Christopher B. Field et al, (eds), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 755-791.

In short, climate change impacts are already generating many consequences for hu-man societies and ecosystems and their security implications should be hu-managed.

The alarming picture of the future, when climate change will force the world’s pow-ers into a desperate struggle for advantage and even survival, thus endangering col-lective security, is already perceived by many actors, including governments, mul-tilateral institutions, scientists, and civil society actors. Indeed, given the growing perception of climate change as a security concern, this issue is now on the agenda of a number of national, regional and international security institutions.³⁹

The interrelation between climate change and security has been investigated by an increasing number of scholars in recent times, resulting in a growing conviction that the distribution of dwindling natural resources, due to environmental changes, can represent points of stress and conflict, especially when vulnerable layers of society are involved (cases studies from many countries like Syria, Egypt, Soudan, Sahel, etc. sup-port this conviction).⁴⁰ Climate change impacts are increasingly and clearly challeng-ing resource access, availability, and quality – mainly water, food, land, and energy – as major factors limiting socioeconomic development and fueling political instability.

While there remains academic debate concerning how the reactions to these challenges will spill over into traditional security concerns (i.e. conflicts and global instability), recent studies seem to confirm these trends.⁴¹ These studies have generally re-concep-tualized and redefined ‘security’ through a widening of its dimensions from the narrow political and military focus towards an inclusion of economic, societal, and environ-mental concerns. In addition, environenviron-mental issues have been increasingly recognized as major variables in regional instability and conflict, since they have the potential to exacerbate tensions resulting from forced population displacement and ethnic, reli-gious, and other local differences, such as socio-economic disparities between urban and rural areas, rapid economic development, and border disputes.

39 Scott, ‘The Securitization of Climate Change’, supra note 9, at 1.

40 See, for instance, Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates, ‘African range wars: Climate, conflict, and property rights’, 49 Journal of Peace Research (2012) 23-34; Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, ‘Cli-mate change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa’, 49 Journal of Peace Research (2012) 35-50; Clionadh Raleigh and Dominic Kniveton, ‘Come rain or shine: An analysis of conflict and climate variability in East Africa’, 49 Journal of Peace Research (2012) 51-64; and Caitlin E. Werrell, Francesco Femia and Troy Sternberg, ‘Did We See It Coming?: State Fragility, Climate Vulnerability, and the Uprisings in Syria and Egypt’, 35(1) SAIS Review of International Affairs (2015) 29-46.

41 See Des Gasper, ‘Securing Humanity: Situating “Human Security” as Concept and Discourse’, Journal of Human Development (2005) 221–245; Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Whither the weather? Climate change and conflict’, 49 Journal of Peace Research (2012) 3-9; Conor Devitt and Richard S. J. Tol, ‘Civil war, climate change, and development: A scenario study for sub-Saharan Africa’, 49 Journal of Peace Research (2012) 129-145; Patrick Regan and Matthew Sisk, ‘Climate Change, Water Scarcity and Armed Conflict’, ND-GAIN Working Paper Series 54 (undated), available at <http://gain.org/sites/default/files/WorkingPa-per54.pdf> (visited 15 September 2016); Tim Forsyth and Mareike Schomerus, ‘Climate Change and Conflict: A systematic evidence review’, Justice and Security Research Programme Paper 8 (2013) avail-able at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56352/1/JSRP_Paper8_Climate_change_and_conflict_Forsyth_Scho-merus_2013.pdf> (visited 6 September 2016); Dumaine Carol and Irving Mintzer, ‘Confronting Cli-mate Change and Reframing Security’, 35(1) SAIS Review of International Affairs (2015) 15-16; Werrell, Femia and Sternberg, ‘Did We See It Coming?’, supra note 40; and Michael Werz and Max Hoffman,

‘Climate Change, Migration, and the Demand for Greater Resources: Challenges and Responses’, 35(1) SAIS Review of International Affairs (2015) 99-108.

However, in practice, the links between climate change and security are not always clearly established because the climate aspect is rarely the only contributing factor in many conflict situations. For this reason, it is still challenging for decision-making processes to perceive climate change judiciously as a potential security threat and to deliberate accordingly. This seems to indicate that the gap between what is necessary from the scientific community’s point of view and what is possible from a political point of view is still wide.

In addition there are likely to be increased demands around the world for the de-ployment of armed forces as part of crisis management efforts, due to the increase in frequency and severity of climate change related extreme events.⁴² Indeed, it is be-lieved that internationally the security concerns associated with climate change are likely to engage the military sooner rather than later. Nevertheless, the securitization of climate change does not mean an automatic ‘militarization’ of the issue, such as through the adoption of military actions based on the threat or use of force in re-sponse to a changing climate. Some scholars who are skeptic about the securitization discourse, such as Buckland,⁴³ have argued that climate-related security implications may lead, among other things, to the military responding to issues for which a military response is unnecessary and potentially even detrimental. The Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77 have resisted the securitization of climate change during the two Security Council debates on climate change (2007, 2011); in part because of the perceived potential, and even risk, that Council members may abuse this approach by relying on it as an excuse for using military intervention to enforce legal obligations in respect of climate change.⁴⁴

Despite this resistance and skepticism, the security implications of climate change are already playing a large and increasing role in military planning processes: for instance, the national security establishment in the United States, including the US military and the US intelligence community, have already understood that climate change is a domestic security threat, and that they cannot wait for full certainty before acting via mitigation and adaptation efforts.⁴⁵ As a result of this understand-ing, the security implications of climate change have been considered in strategic documents like the Quadrennial Defense Review, and a Center for Climate Change

42 Institute for Environmental Security, Climate Change and Security at Copenhagen – II: The Contribution of the Global Security Community to Success, Summary Report of IES Conference (2009), available at

<http://www.envirosecurity.org/CCSC/CCSCIISummaryReport.pdf> (visited 24 June 2016), at 6.

43 Ben Buckland, A Climate of War? Stopping the Securitization of Global Climate Change (International Peace Bureau, 2007), available at <http://www.ipb.org/uploads/tbl_contingut_web/176/documents/pa-per.pdf> (visited 24 June 2015), at 1.

44 Scott, ‘The Securitization of Climate Change’, supra note 9, at 228.

45 See, for instance, US Department of Defense (2010), Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010, available at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41250.pdf> (visited 24 September 2016); and US Department of Homeland Security, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 34.

and National Security has been established within the CIA.⁴⁶ Femia and Werrell⁴⁷ explain that security implications of climate change may affect three elements of military effectiveness: Readiness, which refers to the ability of a military to carry out operations in a timely manner and involves having a stable and secure military in-frastructure that is increasingly stressed by sea level rise and extreme weather events, such as droughts and flooding; operations, since climate change effects may have impacts on military operations, whether these be war-fighting operations or hu-manitarian missions; and strategy, since climate change can have impacts on military strategy through increasing the possibility of destabilizing conditions in strategically significant regions of the world.⁴⁸ In addition, Rogers⁴⁹ makes the following obser-vations:

much of the analysis on climate change coming from military sources produces results that coincide with the ideas of radical environmental analysts, pointing to the social and political consequences, the risks of state failure and the rise of rad-ical oppositional movements. However, when it comes to responses, the primary military focus is on maintaining the security of the state, either on its own or in alliance with others. This is to be expected and is legitimate from the perspective of a military organization – its reason for being is to keep the state secure. Thus, the emphasis may be on increased border security and the patrolling of potential migratory routes, and the intervention capabilities necessary to stabilize failing states and ungoverned space that may be a consequence of the impact of climate change. What this almost never involves, is advocating the primary preventative measure that is required for responding to climate change – a rapid move to-wards an ultra-low carbon economy.

46 Francesco Femia and Caitlin E. Werrell, ‘Climate and Security 101: Why the U.S. National Security Establishment Takes Climate Change Seriously’, 14 The Center for Climate and Security Briefer (2012), available at <https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/update_climate-and-security-101_

why-the-u-s-national-security-establishment-takes-climate-change-seriously_briefer-232.pdf> (visited 4 September 2016).

47 Ibid.

48 The following risks and scenarios might increase the likelihood of militaries being called on to resolve conflicts, or provide post-conflict assistance, which has the potential of putting increased strain on mil-itary strategies: the geopolitical implications of reduced river flow in India and Pakistan might create increased tension between these two nuclear-armed states (Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars (Scribe Press, 2010); in the Arctic, a melting ice cap, coupled with increasing tensions between Russia and other Arctic nations, could increase the likelihood of conflict; in the MENA region, climate change effects on water security may increase the probability of instability in the future; in Central Asia, increases in glacial melt and flooding, coupled with existing security dynamics (such as terrorism and nuclear materials prolifer-ation), can create a volatile mix; in the broader Asia-Pacific region, rainfall variability will interact with a growing urban and coastal population, as well as an increasing demand for energy, to present enormous challenges to security in this increasingly important part of the world; migrating fish stocks in the South China Sea may place pressure on the fishing industry to move into contested waters, leading to increased tensions between China, its neighbors and the United States. For more details, see the Center for Climate and Security, ‘Climate Security 101’, supra note 20, at 4.

49 Paul Rogers, ‘Climate Change and Security’, Oxford Research Group International Security Month-ly Briefing (September 2010), available at <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/

Sept10En.pdf> (visited 24 June 2016) at 3.

2.3 Securitization of climate change: a discourse, an alarmist tactic or a