The EU’s possibility to maintain its unity and avoid far-reaching fragmentation is currently one of the core questions in European politics. Not only is the ongoing Brexit process casting a shadow over the EU’s political unity, but it also symbolizes those underlying trends of polarization and fragmentation that might still put this unity to a serious test.
The key trends fostering disintegration originate in the ongoing transition of the global economic and political system. The contestation of Western norms and values along with the emergence of alternative economic and societal models has also strengthened cleavages within European societies. This has led to a new type of polarization within the EU’s member states, where the ideals and goals of European integration have become increasingly contested.
Globalization, internationalization and European integration have become the centrepiece of political debate, as one of the key political dividing lines has been moved from the role of the state in domestic politics and economy to its role in the broader international system. In this environment of political discourse, state sovereignty has become a value common to the far right and left alike in their campaigns against the trends of globalization and internationalization.
First, the prolonged economic downturn has given further strength and credibility to the arguments against the European Union, as acute problems of everyday survival tend to put the emphasis on short-term means and local or national fora instead of global or European ones.
This atmosphere has given a boost to nationalism and protectionism, with a strong element of populism translating into programmes of the political right as well as the political left. The rise of the Greek Syriza
and the Spanish Podemos, both emerging out of the hardships of the economic crisis, are examples of the latter, whilst the successes of Le Front National, the Dutch Freedom Party or the Danish People’s Party represent the former.
Second, established political parties are also being challenged by movements with constituencies cutting across the old ideological right and left divisions, such as the populist Five Star movement in Italy with moderate Euroscepticism, and Ciudadanos in Spain and En Marche! in France with a pro-European vocation and anti-populist underpinnings. These movements, located in the political centre, also draw on electorates’ dissatisfaction with traditional parties and elites, and some clearly aim to challenge the emerged populist movements on the left and right.
The report at hand set out to study this phenomenon of strengthening contestedness of European integration and its implications within three major policy fields, where the role of the EU is currently in focus.
The broad objective of the report was to study the ongoing pressures against the EU’s unity, their character and future directions. To reach this objective, the changes in the European political space were studied first. The fields of common economy, common territory and common security were subsequently addressed to ascertain how the EU’s unity has been affected by the recent pressures directed against its role in these fields of common policy. All three chapters first assessed the character of these pressures – trends of macroeconomic development, migration as well as threats to European security – followed by an analysis of the EU’s responses to these pressures and their integrative or disintegrative implications.
A general conclusion drawn by the report is that the question of the EU’s unity remains far from resolved. One of the internal factors behind the strengthened dividing lines between the member states, as well as within them, deals with the current depth of European integration. With the current level of powers attributed to the EU, and the level of interdependencies created with the Union’s policies, it is no longer possible to avoid addressing the question about the character of the EU as a political union – even if any consensus on the finalité will be hard to reach. This became obvious in the context of the recent economic and migration crises.
The role of solidarity mechanisms has recently formed an open political issue within all three policy fields studied in this report, with a more immediate solution required in at least two of them. These discussions take place in the framework of the EMU’s character as
a fiscal and political union and the burden-sharing elements of the emerging common immigration policy. It is obvious that reaching a legitimate common solution is an issue that will put the EU’s unity to the test.
When it comes to the more detailed conclusions to be drawn, the report proves first of all that the reorganization of the European political space is a multifaceted phenomenon with different political and historical backgrounds in different parts of the EU, and in different member states. The opposition towards European integration consequently tends to have strong national and, to some extent, regional roots irrespective of certain common characteristics between groups of national parties and movements with regard to their criticism of the EU. Due to the ideological heterogeneity and varying ideological demands of the Eurosceptic parties, they do not represent a unified force for change within the EU. Moreover, efficient EU-level cooperation between the Eurosceptic parties is difficult. This stresses the importance of the national political arenas as their key channel for influencing EU politics. This does not mean that the various Eurosceptic movements would not be affected by each others’ role and electoral support. However, the more it is a question of formulating shared policy goals or positions, the more difficult cooperation between them becomes. It is also important to note that the ground from which the Eurosceptic movements take off is not unitary in terms of public opinion. Opinion polls show that whilst support for the EU declined in many parts of the EU during the economic crisis, there were also member states in which it remained stable, or even strengthened.
Recent years have seen a partial, albeit fragile, recovery in the level of support for the EU. This might create more room for an explicitly pro-European politicization of pro-European integration, as exemplified by the campaign of Emmanuel Macron in the French presidential election.
When it comes to pressures against the EU’s unity, there were both similar and dissimilar characteristics between the three large policy fields studied. The timing of the core political debates within these fields is interesting as the three major debates partly overlapped. The most heated debate on repairing the EMU (ESM, two-pack and six-pack legislation, Banking Union) took place in 2010–2013 and was followed by the emergence of a major security political crisis between the EU (and the US) and Russia, which started during the spring of 2014. The refugee crisis, for its part, accelerated during the spring of 2015.
The underlying common theme in all of these political debates was that there was a perceived pressure against the EU’s core values and principles, which was seen to require a new type of joint policy. What was common to all three fields was that these debates have accelerated many such steps in the construction of a common approach, which had been on the agenda but hadn’t been properly implemented.
Further, entirely new instruments in terms of deepening integration were created in all three fields, such as the ESM or Banking Union in the field of economy, a number of incremental steps taken within the common security and defence policy and the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, or the temporary emergency relocation scheme in the policy on common territory.
But the steps towards deepening integration led equally to the emergence of dividing lines of different types within the EU. First of all, in all three policy fields, the political dividing lines between member states – or groups of member states – were deepened when the EU became the target of the global economic and financial crisis, migration crisis and seriously deteriorated security political environment. The dividing lines were somewhat different in each case, and were less damaging and more manageable in the field of security than those of economy or common territory.
Both the economic crisis and the migration crisis led to a strong north-south divide, with the UK’s position being specific due to its role outside both the currency union and the Schengen area. Whilst most of the Central and Eastern European members were outside the Eurozone during the acute crisis years, their approach to the common policy was, in most cases, constructive and the three Baltic states even joined the Eurozone immediately after the crisis; Estonia even during its acute phase in 2011. This group of member states fragmented further during the migration crisis, when the Visegrad countries challenged the principles of the common policy.
When it comes to the emerging political dividing lines, it seems that, with the exception of the UK, the divisions inside the member states cutting across European societies grew deeper than those between the member states. Within the fields of common economy or territory, the dividing lines between the member states have now become compartmentalized, with consensus safeguarded about the general direction of the EU’s common policy. When it comes to the EMU and common immigration and asylum policy, the details regarding future burden-sharing are still an open political issue, whilst in the common security and defence policy the identity of the EU as an international
actor divides the member states. Also in this field, consensus prevails about the immediate policy instruments needed in support of the EU’s security, such as counter-terrorism measures, sanctions against Russia, or strengthened cooperation in the production and coordination of military capabilities.
The internal dividing lines, on the other hand, seem to have become a permanent characteristic of the European political space, as Eurosceptic parties or political movements have gained more systematic success in elections in many EU countries and reached important positions – even governmental responsibility – in the national political field.
When it comes to a more institutionalized differentiation in the EU, accelerated in recent years, the EMU seems to be far ahead of the other two policy fields studied. The institutionalization of the Eurozone, which thus far has been a development to be avoided for the sake of the unity of the Union’s institutional and normative system, has taken major steps forward. This means that a de facto institutionalized core has emerged within the EU with a differentiated set of norms and obligations within economic and finance policy, and mechanisms to scrutinize compliance with them. Decisions already taken will further strengthen the governance of the Eurozone and enhance its own fiscal capacity, with the scope of the latter still being an open issue. The political balance of power in this differentiation will be affected by Brexit, which will leave Poland as the only large member state outside the Eurozone with more than two-thirds of the future 27 members being members of the currency union.
Corresponding institutionalized differentiation might also be advanced in the field of common security, as the possibility to start using the model of permanent structured cooperation is currently being studied by the member states. This form of differentiation would, however, be relatively narrow in scope and likely to follow the normative framework based on its inclusiveness and respect of common institutions.
The current trends in consolidating the EU amid several severe European crises and the UK’s withdrawal suggest deeper integration, and an aspiration to forge cohesion while also accepting more differentiated integration in order to manage political dividing lines between the member states shaped by internal political fragmentation and polarization. This approach will pose a fundamental question to European societies with regard to the depth of their engagement in the EU.