Kristi Raik, Tuomas Iso-Markku & Teemu Tammikko1
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of external and internal shocks have induced the EU to strengthen its contribution to European security and defence.
From the annexation of Crimea and the rise of ISIS in 2014 to the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections two years later, various unexpected challenges have prompted calls for Europe to take more responsibility for its security. Member states largely share the understanding that unity is needed in order to address the manifold threats and risks to their security. However, they have different threat perceptions, security and defence policy solutions and strategic cultures. The emergence of new threats from both the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods in recent years has underscored the need for unity, but also the differences when it comes to priorities, national interests and foreign policy identities.
The first section below aims to map out major trends in the EU’s security environment since the 1990s and place the negative changes in recent years in a broader context. It will also briefly examine the expectations of EU citizens and member states in the field of security, looking at key similarities and differences. The two top concerns that emerge from this analysis are (unsurprisingly) the threat of terrorism and violent jihadism, which has grown due to prolonged violent conflicts in the South, and Russia’s belligerence, which has been most evident in Ukraine but is also targeted against the EU and the European security order.
1 The authors are grateful to Anna Wikholm for her excellent research assistance.
The second section will address the EU’s efforts to strengthen its security through common actions and policies, focusing on three key issues. Firstly, it will explore how deepening defence cooperation seeks to strengthen European military and civilian capabilities, which are necessary for both defending the EU and addressing external crises.
This will be followed by a brief analysis of the EU’s response to two more specific security challenges: terrorism and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In conclusion, it is argued that there is a great need and potential to strengthen the EU’s contribution to European security, but the Union is facing a dilemma over the wish to maintain unity, on the one hand, and the willingness of some member states to engage in much deeper defence cooperation, on the other.
THE EU A ND ITS CH A NGING SECUR IT y EN V IRONMENT 4.2
From expansion to self-protection
The end of the Cold War marked a sudden improvement in European security. It opened up space for the EU to move beyond its traditional EU-internal security function, namely to ensure peace among member states, and to engage in shaping the broader European security environment. The 1990’s optimism over Europe’s re-unification was overshadowed by the wars and atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, which served as an important motivator for the EU to develop its crisis management capabilities. At the same time, the success of the post-communist transition to democracy, the rule of law and a functioning market economy in Central and Eastern Europe was far from guaranteed, and the early signs of its failure in parts of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, can be pinpointed now with the benefit of hindsight. Yet it was a time of optimism and progress in Europe, as reflected in the EU’s agenda of deepening and enlargement, built on European norms and values as a largely unquestioned ideal. The launch of the Eastern enlargement process, Common Foreign and Security Policy (1993) and Common Security and Defence Policy (1999) had a strongly value-oriented and idealistic flavour. The EU’s agenda was driven by a belief in the supremacy and attractiveness of its own model.
A core precondition of the new European security agenda was external: the existence of a relatively, and perhaps uniquely, favourable global context. The 1990s was a decade devoid of major challenges to the Western US-led hegemony and the liberal political
and economic model. The reunification of Europe was a major strategic goal shared by the EU and the US.
Since the optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has been surrounded by a gradually deteriorating security environment, while building up its own security and defence policy in an effort to address the growing concerns. The major trends over the last quarter of a century have moved the EU from expansion to introversion, from exporting security to importing insecurity, from transforming the neighbourhood and even the world to protecting oneself, and from idealism to pragmatism. In the face of external events often evolving along undesired paths, the EU has had to scale down its belief in its own ability to shape developments in its neighbourhood and beyond. The shift towards pragmatism and self-protection has entailed adaptation to the revival of the relevance of military power.
The terror attack of 9/11 marked the start of a more difficult era globally and regionally. The unilateralism and militarism of the US ‘war on terror’ created tensions in the transatlantic relationship. In 2003, a sharp division emerged in Europe between those countries that joined the US-led coalition for the invasion of Iraq, including the UK, Spain and Central and Eastern European countries, and a group opposing the Iraq war, led by Germany and France.
Partly motivated by these tensions, in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 the EU attempted its first comprehensive assessment of the security environment and the necessary collective policy responses. The ESS aimed to create unity, often an important function of strategies.2 It succeeded in establishing consensus on five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. It did not tackle some of the more difficult and sensitive issues such as relations with Russia, which were relatively good at the time, although it was already apparent that the development in Russia was not moving in the direction of the liberal reforms desired by the EU.3 As the ESS deemed military aggression against any member state ‘improbable’, the CSDP focused on crisis management in nearby regions.
In spite of gathering storm clouds, during the first half of the 2000s the EU was at the peak of its transformative agenda in its neighbouring countries.4 The big bang enlargement was accomplished, representing
2 Stolberg 2012.
3 See e.g. Way 2005.
4 Börzel & Risse 2009.
a major strategic achievement that spread democracy, security and prosperity across the continent. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, tried to adopt largely the same approach towards neighbouring countries in the east and south – but without offering them membership.5 The transformation agenda was at the same time the EU’s indirect approach to security in nearby regions (including Russia): in a liberal spirit, political and economic reforms and ties were expected to increase security on both sides of the EU border.
Military threats and territorial defence were regarded by many as something that belonged to the past, but not the future of Europe.
The total military expenditure of EU member states declined from 1.81% to 1.40% of GDP during 2005–2015. At the same time, Russia increased its military spending from 3.3% to 5.4% of GDP between 2008 and 2015 (Figure 1). In absolute terms, from 2005 to 2015, Russia increased its defence spending by 110% and China by 170%, while the EU decreased its spending by 12% and the US by 2%.6
The US remained the key actor in European defence and globally superior in terms of military power. However, it was common among the EU elites to regard the EU approach as unique and better in comparison with that of the US, and to see the US not just as an ally, but also as a competitor.7 The ESS reflected the EU’s specific approach to security, characterized as comprehensive and cooperative, highlighting the importance of non-military aspects of security, dialogue, multilateralism and a less state-centric approach in comparison to the Cold War era.8 The EU approach placed relatively minor emphasis on military aspects of security and underlined the need to address the root causes of conflicts, including socio-economic development, respect for human rights, and sustainable climate and energy policies. It also called for, but in practice was not good at, bringing together different areas of EU external policy from trade and development to crisis management. Furthermore, the EU stressed dialogue and partnership as a means of preventing and addressing conflicts. In principle, these ideas are still pursued today, as the EU claims to be a ‘global security provider’, but they are overshadowed by heightened concerns about the EU’s own security, a more conflictual and ‘contested’ global environment, and the revival of power politics.9 5 Kelly 2006.
6 Data from the European Commission.
7 Smith 2011.
8 Biscop 2004.
9 European Union Global Strategy 2016.
Indeed, the 2010s ushered in a markedly more difficult period for the EU internally, regionally and globally. The internal crises (as described in the preceding chapters) overshadowed and strained the EU’s ability to address external instability. Security problems in both the eastern and southern neighbourhoods transformed into immediate threats to the EU’s own security.
The Arab Spring, initially greeted by many liberals in Europe as an aspiration towards freedom and democracy, soon turned into turmoil and new conflicts, notably the civil wars in Syria and Libya. As of today, Tunisia remains the only brighter spot, working on piecemeal reforms, among countries embraced by the revolutionary wave.10 Violent jihadism and extremism have spread in the Arab world and attracted new followers also in Europe.
In the East, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 turned out to be a prelude to a broader aggressive response by Russia to the extension of the EU’s influence in the common neighbourhood. The annexation of Crimea (2014) was an unprecedented violation of the OSCE- and UN-based European security order. Together with the Russian-orchestrated war in eastern Ukraine, it showed Russia’s readiness to use force in order to restore its control in the post-Soviet space. Russia has also increasingly directed its new anti-Western agenda against the EU. By 2017, concern about hybrid threats such as cyberattacks and 10 Cammack et al. 2017.
Figure 1:
Military expendi-ture in the eu, uSA and Russia in 2005–2015, as % of GdP.
Sources:
European Defence Agency and Sipri.
6 5 4 3 2 1
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
eu uSA Russia
disinformation campaigns originating from Moscow and other actors topped the security agenda of many EU member states. For instance, the Dutch security service notes the use of ‘Cold War methods like exerting covert political influence’ by Russia and the increase of cyberattacks aimed at influencing elections;11 Germany’s domestic intelligence agency has spoken out about Russia’s cyberattacks against the German parliament and other political actors;12 and the French defence minister has expressed concern about foreign cyberattacks aimed at manipulating the French elections.13
The regional challenges are interwoven with increased uncertainty about the global order. The idea of a liberal, norms-based order has a central place in the EU’s vision of European and international security. The challenges posed by the relative decline of the West and gradual movement towards a multipolar, multi-order, poly-centric or interpolar world order have been discussed in Europe for many years.14 The contours and implications of an emerging multipolarity of the European order, with Russia and possibly Turkey challenging the current setting, have also been debated.15 In 2014, the annexation of Crimea and subsequent war in eastern parts of Ukraine brought new urgency and materiality to these discussions. The election of Donald Trump as president of the US added to these concerns new uncertainty about the US commitment to European security and to international norms and institutions.
Member states’ and citizens’ expectations: Some convergence of concerns
While Europe’s security environment has been deteriorating, public support for a common EU foreign, security and defence policy has remained steadily high (above 60%) throughout the past quarter of a century.16 This is an oft-cited legitimization for calls for a stronger EU role and deeper integration in this field. Yet the impressive levels of support belie considerable differences with regard to what exactly the EU is expected to do, and how.
When it comes to threat perceptions, there are well-known and persistent differences between the priorities of Eastern and Southern
11 Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2017.
12 Deutsche Welle 2016.
13 Politico 2017b.
14 For example, Renard & Biscop 2016; Flockhart 2016; Grevi 2009.
15 For example, Bechev et al. 2010.
16 ‘Effects of the Economic and Financial Crisis on European Public Opinion’ 2013.
member states. Conflicts in the Southern neighbourhood that generate an increase in violent extremism and terrorism top the agenda, especially in the South where terror attacks threaten to undermine the lifestyle and values of open society. The increased assertiveness and aggressiveness of Russia worries the Eastern member states above all, notably the Baltic states and Poland, whose top security policy priority is to deter and be prepared to defend against an existential military threat from the East. The leadership of Germany has been crucial in generating consensus on Russia and Ukraine, while France has been a key actor in shaping EU policies towards the Southern neighbourhood and Africa.
Hence, geography matters and makes the differences quite unavoidable, but not necessarily insurmountable; they necessitate constant balancing, compromise and efforts to generate solidarity.
Concrete expressions of solidarity include the participation of a wide range of member states in EU operations,17 and the EU’s ability to reach and maintain – for almost three years now and defying many predictions – consensus on strong sanctions against Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine. On the other hand, solidarity has been undermined by the failure of most member states to fulfil their agreed commitments in distributing the burden of asylum seekers in the migration crisis.18 Likewise, the experience of the Eurozone crisis has weakened public support and attachment to the EU in the Southern member states.19 Security is not isolated from other policy areas.
In recent years, a degree of convergence of threat perceptions can be observed across Europe. The threat of terrorism has become a widely shared major concern. ISIS in particular was seen as a very serious threat by as many as 70% of Europeans in 2015.20 Concern about Islamic extremism increased sharply between 2011 and 2015.21 The most significant shift occurred in Poland where, differently from Western and Southern European countries, Islamic extremism was not a major concern in the 2000s.22 In 2016, however, the Polish opinion was on a par with the European average, with 73% of Poles seeing
17 For example, 20 or more member states have contributed to the cSdP operations in Mali and off the Somali coast (Operation Atalanta) in the South, and Georgia and Ukraine in the East. See more details in Tardy 2015.
18 See Chapter 3.
19 See Chapter 2.
20 Pew Research Center, 14 July 2015, p. 5. See also European Commission 2015, p. 6.
21 Pew Research Center, 16 July 2015, p. 4.
22 Pew Research Center, 14 July 2005, p. 18.
ISIS as a top threat to their country.23 Thus, perceptions also changed in countries where no major terrorist attacks had occurred, such as Poland. The shift can be explained by the attacks in Paris and Brussels in 2015–2016 as well as the rhetoric of populist radical right parties, which portrayed the simultaneous arrival of a large number of refugees as a source of terrorism.24 At the same time, however, there is still a gap between Poland and Southern and Eastern parts of Europe when it comes to public perceptions of Russia: in 2016, Poland was the only country among larger EU member states where a strong majority (71%) of the population viewed Russia as a major threat.25
Coming back to official positions, member states agree on the need to strengthen the EU’s role, but there is a kaleidoscope of views on how to do this. The departure of the UK, which has been both a key military power in the EU and the staunchest opponent of deeper cooperation in the field of the CFSP and CSDP, has created new dynamics, described in more detail in the next section.26 France and Germany have taken the lead in pushing for deeper cooperation, especially in the field of defence.27 There are significant differences, however, between their strategic cultures and visions of EU defence policy. While France wants stronger intergovernmental cooperation and the possibility to project military power through the EU, Germany speaks about a ‘defence union’, but is much more reluctant to actually use military force.28
At the same time, Brexit has brought to the fore other sceptical countries that could previously hide behind the UK: for different reasons, Poland and some of the militarily non-allied countries in particular have been reluctant to move towards deeper defence cooperation. Perhaps it is conducive to the EU’s coherence that there are no firm groupings and no regional blocs when it comes to readiness to deepen common security and defence policy. None of these groups have a unified position: the Nordic, Mediterranean, Visegrad or militarily non-allied member states. If closer integration is pursued by a smaller group of countries via ‘permanent structured cooperation’
23 Pew Research Center, 13 June 2016, p. 13.
24 See Chapter 1 on populist parties and Chapter 3 on migration.
25 In all the other countries covered by this survey the corresponding figure was below 40%.
The Baltic states and Finland were not included in the study. See Pew Research Center, 13 June 2016, p. 18.
26 Reuters, 13 July 2016; Keohane 2017.
27 Financial Times, 12 September 2016.
28 Keohane 2016.
(see more below), a possible ‘core group’ may well be broad, including countries from all geographical groupings.
Be it countering terrorism or bolstering defence capability, the EU’s contribution is generally seen as complementary to national and/or NATO efforts when it comes to military defence. The EU’s institutional framework for common foreign and security policy has been gradually strengthened, but national control over core issues of security and defence remains important for member states.29 The traditional notion of national sovereignty, albeit illusionary in many respects, imposes limits on the possibilities to strengthen the EU’s single voice and common action in global affairs. Brexit will, however, make a difference as to how far foreign and security policy cooperation in the EU can go. Possible future treaty change may therefore involve further steps towards stronger EU institutions and more streamlined common decision-making in this field.
Changing forms of terrorism
The stark increase in public concern about the threat of terrorism calls for a closer look at trends in this field. The change in threat perceptions cannot be fully explained by the actual increase in terrorist activities and incidents, which has been rather limited. Rather, new forms of terrorism have emerged that pose a new kind of threat to the liberal societal order and its core values. Statistically, terrorism in Europe was in a steady decline until 2013, but since then there has been some increase in the level of terrorist activities.30 The main reason for the increase is a peak in separatist action in Northern Ireland. There are, however, signs that the overall trends are changing regarding the
The stark increase in public concern about the threat of terrorism calls for a closer look at trends in this field. The change in threat perceptions cannot be fully explained by the actual increase in terrorist activities and incidents, which has been rather limited. Rather, new forms of terrorism have emerged that pose a new kind of threat to the liberal societal order and its core values. Statistically, terrorism in Europe was in a steady decline until 2013, but since then there has been some increase in the level of terrorist activities.30 The main reason for the increase is a peak in separatist action in Northern Ireland. There are, however, signs that the overall trends are changing regarding the