4. ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
4.6 Attitudes and social representations of animal biotechnology
The Eurobarometer (2003) showed that public clearly distinguished between different applications of biotechnology. While Europeans were neutral about agricultural biotechnology, Eurobarometer found a consistent pattern of opposition to animal biotechnology since 1991.
Widespread opposition to such technology was shared by all the 16 European nations participating to Eurobarometer with the exception of Portugal and Spain. Animal cloning had one of the higher percentages of opponents, together with GM food and crops (Gaskell et al., 2000).
Reviews of the relevant literature by Breakwell (2002) and by Macnaghten (2002) showed that people’s reasoning about the justification of the application of animal biotechnology was characterised by the following features: 1) the perception of lack of information about the issue; 2) whether the technology was useful and ethical; 3) whether
Animal biotechnology 53 animal welfare was respected on not; 4) the considerations about the moral unacceptability was more important than the perceived risk for humans and the environment.
A prolific line of research developed by Wagner, Kronberger and Seifert (2002) has deeply investigated the social representations of biotechnology in the European domain. As for the socio-psychological process in action in the formation of beliefs about new technologies, Wagner, Kronberger and Seifert (2002) argued that since the majority of people do not possess the necessary educational resources or the time necessary to collect first-hand information about animal biotechnology, the general public develops an everyday understanding of the new technology by engaging in a process of collective copying (see paragraph 1.9 on collective symbolic coping ).
Collective copying with biotechnology in general involved a discourse related to moral concerns about interfering with nature. Human beings were seen as transgressing natural boundaries and interfering with the natural harmony. In this sense, they are perceived as doing something they are not allowed to do and, in a way, as playing God. As a consequence, lay discourse defines biotechnology as both morally objectionable and risky in the light of the unforeseen consequences of messing with the sacred nature. Nature is thought as some kind of living being which could be either benign to humans or either take revenge on humans who have trespassed natural borders (Wagner & Kronberger, 2002a; 2002b; Wagner at al., 2002).
On one hand, animal biotechnology was viewed as natural progressive evolution from selective breeding, while on the other hand it was perceived as a major human intervention on nature. In the latter sense, individuals were unease about the manipulation of nature which related to the corruption of integrity of the nature of animals and other undesirable effects resulting from such manipulation. Concern was expressed about the preservation of animal welfare and about the environmental impact of GM animals (AEBC, 2002).
When considering ethical concern about the genetic modification of animals, three aspects must be distinguished: 1) fundamental moral
Natural and Unnatural 54
objection to the use of animals for human benefit, 2) moral reasoning about the genetic modification of animals and the preservation of animal integrity; 3) concerns about the consequences of genetic modification such as the damages to the welfare of modified animals (The Boyd Group, 1999).
Many have been the possible explanations to this uneasiness. One could speculate that the modification of animals was likely to be emotionally charged because of the beliefs in animal rights and because of the emotional bonds people have with companion animals and of the popularity of animal cartoon characters (Bruhn, 2003).
Moreover, genetic engineering, by crossing the species, smears the human-animal distinction which is proper of the Western thought. As a consequence, genetic engineering is perceived as unnatural and stimulates feelings of repulsion and disgust (Rollin, 1995).
The public uneasiness about animal biotechnology was partly related to the fact that our relationship with animals in Western country was complex and contradictory. The cultural volatility of the notion of animals was pointed out as responsible for the complexity of the representations of animals and the uneasiness about animal biotechnology. Animal biotechnology reduced animals to aggregate of chemicals and in this way impoverished animals as a source for articulating human identity (Michael, 2001).
Moreover, animals play a role in the formation of supra-local identity in the sense that they are our “other” and they can serve as a way to articulate our social identity (Baker, 1993; Noske, 1989).
4.6.1 Animal cloning
In 1997, about two-thirds of the public believed that animal cloning was a bad idea and about 50% disapproved of this kind of research (Singer, Corning & Lamias, 1998). United Stated and European public were consistent in showing a moderate opposition to xeno-transplantation (Eurobarometer, 2003; Gaskell, Thompson & Allun, 2002).
Animal biotechnology 55 The moral acceptability of animal cloning was found as the most important explanatory factor in the encouragement or discouragement of cloning for pharming purposes. The general attitude towards cloning and the evaluation of the balance utility/risk explained the public support for cloning (Einsiedel, 2000).
Among the possible explanations, one could speculate that cloning presents threats to human identity and to the very essence of self. The equation identity-uniqueness is put in danger by the possibility of duplicating humans (Einsiedel et al. 2002).
4.6.2 Xeno-transplantation
The issue of xenotransplantation stimulated images of monsters generated by the combination of different body parts of different species.
Those images reminded people of the Frankenstein story and similar fairy tales where monsters were created by the human desire to reach immortality. The motive of wanting to be immortal and young forever was considered morally unacceptable in itself. Moreover, moral questions aroused on the acceptability of taking healthy organs from animals to be transplanted in humans and on perceiving animals as just machines or “spare parts bins”. (Nerlich, Clarke & Dingwall, 1999;
Wagner et al., 2002).